PhD candidate in Philosophy; working on value theory, metaethical constructivism, political philosophy, philosophy of history, philosophical psychology, Kant, the Pittsburgh School, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Spinoza, Hegel etc.
Democracies today face the challenge of the polarization of values. But a plurality of values nee... more Democracies today face the challenge of the polarization of values. But a plurality of values need not in itself be a cause for concern if democracy is founded on a value pluralistic framework. John Dewey's work on the theory of value can help develop a metaethical constructivism that can provide us with such a framework. Dewey's work on value theory should be viewed as continuous with Humean constructivism because it emphasizes the motivating role of desires, emotions, preferences, and cares, the contingency of values, and the non-categoricity (and relativity) of moral judgments. Additionally, Dewey considers the cultural-historical-political conditions in which evaluations take place and compete. I argue that Humean constructivism and Deweyan constructivism complement each other because the former outlines the ontological source of normativity (the origin and nature of valuing), whereas the latter outlines the epistemological medium in which such normativity is exercised (the formation, empirical verification, and democratic discourse on value judgments). Given these features, Deweyan metaethical constructivism provides a foundation for ethical, social, and political theorizing which is appropriate for the present political climate than the rationalist, Kantian tradition centered around the authority of reason.
Street (2012) has criticized Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism from the perspective of Humean co... more Street (2012) has criticized Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism from the perspective of Humean constructivism. I argue that Street's objection to Korsgaard fails insofar as her position accepts one of the key features of Kantian constructivism. This is the view that practical reason and the principle of practical reason (if you have an end, you must take the necessary means to your end) are constitutive of agency and normativity, respectively. Street's "Humean" constructivism lapses into some form of Kantian constructivism by the logic of its own commitments (insofar as being alive is a necessary means to any ends whatsoever). As an alternative, I sketch out the outline of what I take to be a more properly Humean view in metaethical constructivism. I draw some implications of this alternative view for our understanding of what constitutes 'construction' in metaethical constructivism broadly construed.
This article critically evaluates the notion of the meaning of life. I suggest that life's meanin... more This article critically evaluates the notion of the meaning of life. I suggest that life's meaning has to do with a personal, subjective interpretation, and that religion is an essentially intersubjective interpretation that consists of systematic anthropomorphism. With recourse to anthropological insights, I attempt to understand why meaning becomes a problem for human animals in the first place, how this problem has been historically resolved under the aegis of religion, and what this resolution entails (re: nihilism) for the topic in general as it stands today.
McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that experience must exercise normative constraint on our thinking, ... more McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that experience must exercise normative constraint on our thinking, especially thinking which aims at knowledge. The issue of normative constraint is to see how experience can provide reasons for our perceptual beliefs. According to McDowell, if experience is to exercise such constraint, it must have conceptual content. To support his thesis, McDowell takes recourse to Kant's idea that both receptivity and spontaneity are functional in experience. Crucially, he takes this to mean that Kantian intuitions (or 'perceptions' in contemporary usage) consist of demonstrative concepts and ipso facto constrain empirical judgements, since experience and judgement are both taken to draw on the same conceptual capacities (McDowell 2013). This paper critically evaluates McDowell's position. I argue that McDowell's strategy of taking Kantian intuitions to be conceptual is mistaken because it rests on a questionable reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. I focus on three crucial points: the import of the 'togetherness' and 'sameness of function' principles, the content of intuitions, and the singularity and immediacy of intuitions. I further argue that McDowell's approach undermines its own aim of finding in intuitions a source of "friction" for empirical judgments, which potentially leads to a 'Myth of the Conceptual Given'. I argue that an approach truer to Kant better avoids the problems that concern McDowell without affirming some sort of isomorphism between the content of our experiences and the propositions we use to think and talk about our experiences.
MA Philosophy Dissertation - Durham University, 2019
McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that in order for our thought and judgments to be about the world, o... more McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that in order for our thought and judgments to be about the world, our sensory experience itself must be concept-laden. In Kantian terms, McDowell’s claim is that intuitions are conceptual, demonstrative ‘this-suches’ and ipso facto provide constraint on our conceptual judgments. The purpose of this paper is twofold: it is a critique of McDowell’s position followed by a positive account of how sensory experience constrains not only our conceptual judgments but also our perceptual interactions with objects. First, I argue that McDowell’s strategy of finding normative constraint on knowledge by conceptualizing intuitions is problematic because it rests on an exegetically questionable reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, namely on three crucial points: the import of the ‘togetherness’ and ‘sameness of function’ principles, the content of an intuition, and the singularity and immediacy of intuition. I further argue that McDowell’s approach undermines its own aim of finding in intuition a source of ‘friction’ for our conceptual judgments. Secondly, I take recourse to Todes’s phenomenological account of the ‘Perceptual Categories’ in order to develop the notion of a normative framework which hinges on the role of perceptual satisfactions. I speculate that this framework, which I term ‘somatic normativity’, is not exhausted at the level of preconceptual perceptual interactions but is continuous with and functions at the level of conceptual judgments. I suggest that this might be a more fruitful approach in sourcing experience’s normative constraint on thought and knowledge without purporting an isomorphism of intuition and concept. I conclude after considering potential objections to this proposal.
Democracies today face the challenge of the polarization of values. But a plurality of values nee... more Democracies today face the challenge of the polarization of values. But a plurality of values need not in itself be a cause for concern if democracy is founded on a value pluralistic framework. John Dewey's work on the theory of value can help develop a metaethical constructivism that can provide us with such a framework. Dewey's work on value theory should be viewed as continuous with Humean constructivism because it emphasizes the motivating role of desires, emotions, preferences, and cares, the contingency of values, and the non-categoricity (and relativity) of moral judgments. Additionally, Dewey considers the cultural-historical-political conditions in which evaluations take place and compete. I argue that Humean constructivism and Deweyan constructivism complement each other because the former outlines the ontological source of normativity (the origin and nature of valuing), whereas the latter outlines the epistemological medium in which such normativity is exercised (the formation, empirical verification, and democratic discourse on value judgments). Given these features, Deweyan metaethical constructivism provides a foundation for ethical, social, and political theorizing which is appropriate for the present political climate than the rationalist, Kantian tradition centered around the authority of reason.
Street (2012) has criticized Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism from the perspective of Humean co... more Street (2012) has criticized Korsgaard's Kantian constructivism from the perspective of Humean constructivism. I argue that Street's objection to Korsgaard fails insofar as her position accepts one of the key features of Kantian constructivism. This is the view that practical reason and the principle of practical reason (if you have an end, you must take the necessary means to your end) are constitutive of agency and normativity, respectively. Street's "Humean" constructivism lapses into some form of Kantian constructivism by the logic of its own commitments (insofar as being alive is a necessary means to any ends whatsoever). As an alternative, I sketch out the outline of what I take to be a more properly Humean view in metaethical constructivism. I draw some implications of this alternative view for our understanding of what constitutes 'construction' in metaethical constructivism broadly construed.
This article critically evaluates the notion of the meaning of life. I suggest that life's meanin... more This article critically evaluates the notion of the meaning of life. I suggest that life's meaning has to do with a personal, subjective interpretation, and that religion is an essentially intersubjective interpretation that consists of systematic anthropomorphism. With recourse to anthropological insights, I attempt to understand why meaning becomes a problem for human animals in the first place, how this problem has been historically resolved under the aegis of religion, and what this resolution entails (re: nihilism) for the topic in general as it stands today.
McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that experience must exercise normative constraint on our thinking, ... more McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that experience must exercise normative constraint on our thinking, especially thinking which aims at knowledge. The issue of normative constraint is to see how experience can provide reasons for our perceptual beliefs. According to McDowell, if experience is to exercise such constraint, it must have conceptual content. To support his thesis, McDowell takes recourse to Kant's idea that both receptivity and spontaneity are functional in experience. Crucially, he takes this to mean that Kantian intuitions (or 'perceptions' in contemporary usage) consist of demonstrative concepts and ipso facto constrain empirical judgements, since experience and judgement are both taken to draw on the same conceptual capacities (McDowell 2013). This paper critically evaluates McDowell's position. I argue that McDowell's strategy of taking Kantian intuitions to be conceptual is mistaken because it rests on a questionable reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. I focus on three crucial points: the import of the 'togetherness' and 'sameness of function' principles, the content of intuitions, and the singularity and immediacy of intuitions. I further argue that McDowell's approach undermines its own aim of finding in intuitions a source of "friction" for empirical judgments, which potentially leads to a 'Myth of the Conceptual Given'. I argue that an approach truer to Kant better avoids the problems that concern McDowell without affirming some sort of isomorphism between the content of our experiences and the propositions we use to think and talk about our experiences.
MA Philosophy Dissertation - Durham University, 2019
McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that in order for our thought and judgments to be about the world, o... more McDowell (1994, 2013) argues that in order for our thought and judgments to be about the world, our sensory experience itself must be concept-laden. In Kantian terms, McDowell’s claim is that intuitions are conceptual, demonstrative ‘this-suches’ and ipso facto provide constraint on our conceptual judgments. The purpose of this paper is twofold: it is a critique of McDowell’s position followed by a positive account of how sensory experience constrains not only our conceptual judgments but also our perceptual interactions with objects. First, I argue that McDowell’s strategy of finding normative constraint on knowledge by conceptualizing intuitions is problematic because it rests on an exegetically questionable reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, namely on three crucial points: the import of the ‘togetherness’ and ‘sameness of function’ principles, the content of an intuition, and the singularity and immediacy of intuition. I further argue that McDowell’s approach undermines its own aim of finding in intuition a source of ‘friction’ for our conceptual judgments. Secondly, I take recourse to Todes’s phenomenological account of the ‘Perceptual Categories’ in order to develop the notion of a normative framework which hinges on the role of perceptual satisfactions. I speculate that this framework, which I term ‘somatic normativity’, is not exhausted at the level of preconceptual perceptual interactions but is continuous with and functions at the level of conceptual judgments. I suggest that this might be a more fruitful approach in sourcing experience’s normative constraint on thought and knowledge without purporting an isomorphism of intuition and concept. I conclude after considering potential objections to this proposal.
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