


Differentially Private Bayesian Optimization

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
Privacy in Learning



learning can reveal information about the **training set!**

[Kasiviswanathan et al., 2008; Dwork & Lei, 2009; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Chaudhuri & Hsu, 2012; Jain et al., 2012; Kifer et al., 2012; Smith & Thakurta, 2013; Jain & Thakurta, 2014; Bassily et al., 2014]

Privacy in Hyperparameter Tuning



selecting hyperparameters can reveal information about the **validation set!**


[Chaudhuri & Vinterbo, 2013]

Selecting Hyperparameters

e.g., RBF Kernel SVM has hyperparameters: (λ, σ)

regularization trade-off
kernel width


grid search



prior work:
private grid search

Bayesian Optimization (BO)

[Hutter et al. 2011; Bergstra & Bengio, 2012; Snoek et al. 2012; Gardner et al., 2014]



this work:
private BO

Bayesian Optimization

e.g., validation accuracy


$$\max_{\lambda} f(\lambda)$$

$f(\lambda)$ is **very expensive** to compute

$f(\lambda)$ is **nonconvex**

idea: model $f(\lambda)$ with an easy-to-evaluate surrogate

figure credit: [Rasmussen & Williams, 2006]




1. given samples $f(\lambda_1), f(\lambda_2), \dots, f(\lambda_5)$

$$h(\lambda) \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu(\lambda), \sigma^2(\lambda))$$

$$\mu(\lambda) + \sqrt{\beta\sigma(\lambda)}$$

[Srinivas et al., 2010]



Return: best $f(\lambda)$ seen so far

How to make this procedure private?

Differential Privacy

[Dwork et al., 2006]

A formalization of “privacy through randomness”

BO validation set 1 \mathcal{V}

BO validation set 2 \mathcal{V}'

$$\mathcal{A} \left(\begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline \text{age: 20} & \text{gender: M} & \text{SSN: 42...2} \\ \hline \text{age: 91} & \text{gender: M} & \text{SSN: 21...0} \\ \hline \text{age: 82} & \text{gender: F} & \text{SSN: 46...7} \\ \hline \text{age: 39} & \text{gender: F} & \text{SSN: 91...3} \\ \hline \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \hline \end{array} \right) \approx \mathcal{A} \left(\begin{array}{|c|c|c|} \hline \text{age: 20} & \text{gender: M} & \text{SSN: 42...2} \\ \hline \text{age: 91} & \text{gender: M} & \text{SSN: 21...0} \\ \hline \text{age: 56} & \text{gender: F} & \text{SSN: 72...4} \\ \hline \text{age: 39} & \text{gender: F} & \text{SSN: 91...3} \\ \hline \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \hline \end{array} \right)$$

Definition 1. A randomized algorithm \mathcal{A} is (ϵ, δ) -differentially private for $\epsilon, \delta \geq 0$ if for all $f(\lambda) \in \text{Range}(\mathcal{A})$ and for all neighboring datasets $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{V}'$ (i.e., such that \mathcal{V} and \mathcal{V}' differ in the value of one record) we have that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{V}) = f(\lambda)] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{V}') = f(\lambda)] + \delta.$$

properties

- $k(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differentially private runs is $(k\epsilon, k\delta)$ -diff. private
- post-processing doesn't decrease privacy
- immune to common attacks (e.g., linkage, differencing attacks)

A Private Mechanism

Goal: mask change in \mathcal{A} when run on \mathcal{V} vs. \mathcal{V}'

Definition 2. The global sensitivity of an algorithm \mathcal{A} over all neighboring datasets $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{V}'$ (i.e., $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{V}'$ differ by the value of one record) is

$$\Delta_{\mathcal{A}} \triangleq \max_{\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{V}'} \|\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{V}) - \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{V}')\|_1.$$

is $(\epsilon, 0)$ -differentially private

Laplace Mechanism

[Dwork et al., 2006]

1. Draw $\omega \sim \text{Laplace}(0, \Delta_{\mathcal{A}}/\epsilon)$ 2. Release $\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{V}) + \omega$

Our Results

Assumption 1: $f(\lambda)$ and $f'(\lambda)$ are GP distributed

Theorem 1. Given Assumption 1 and the assumptions in Theorem 2 of de Freitas et al. (2012), for neighboring datasets $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{V}'$ we have the following global sensitivity bound,

$$|f'(\lambda_T) - f(\lambda_T)| \leq Ae^{-\frac{\tau T}{(\log T)^{d/4}}} + c$$

w.p. at least $1 - \delta$ for c, d as defined in the paper and given constants A and τ in de Freitas et al. (2012), after T rounds of BO.

in the presence of noise...

Theorem 2. Given Assumption 1, and neighboring $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{V}'$, we have the following global sensitivity bound for the maximum v (noisy validation accuracy) after BO, w.p. $\geq 1 - \delta$

$$|\max_{t \leq T} v'_t - \max_{t \leq T} v_t| \leq \frac{\sqrt{C_1 \beta_T \gamma_T}}{\sqrt{T}} + c + q.$$

(for c, q, C_1, β_T as defined in the paper), where γ_T is bounded above for the squared exponential and Matérn kernels (Srinivas et al., 2010).

Assumption 2: $f(\lambda)$ and is L-Lipschitz (additionally training loss is L-Lipschitz and convex)

Theorem 3. Given Assumption 2, for neighboring $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{V}'$ and arbitrary $\lambda < \lambda'$ (and λ_{\min} is the smallest hyperparameter) we have that,

$$|f(\lambda) - f(\lambda')| \leq \frac{(\lambda' - \lambda)L}{\lambda\lambda'} + \min\left\{\frac{g^*}{m}, \frac{L}{m\lambda_{\min}}\right\}$$

where L is the Lipschitz constant of f , m is the size of \mathcal{V} , and g is defined in the paper.

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