With an extensive background delivering learning outcomes in tertiary education, I am currently based at Macquarie University working as a Lecturer with the Macquarie Law School. Previously I have worked as a solicitor, practicing predominantly in the areas of: family law; property law; criminal law; and wills and estates. My research focuses on Constitutional Law.
This article argues that the prerogative of mercy should be retained in New South Wales as a nece... more This article argues that the prerogative of mercy should be retained in New South Wales as a necessary and appropriate power of the Executive. Historically, pardons have provided opportunities for redemption. Currently, the statutory appeals process is limited to cases involving a miscarriage of justice where there is considerable doubt as to a person’s guilt. In cases where a person is guilty but is nevertheless deserving of mercy, the prerogative of mercy is the only avenue available. As a purely executive power, the prerogative of mercy can achieve the aims of the criminal justice system by tempering justice with mercy. The role of the sovereign involves maintaining order, but also enacting some conception of the good, driven by compassion, love, and mercy. Finally, this article argues that grants of mercy should be a matter of public record, for transparency and as a means of demonstrating this compassion to the public.
This article argues that the Commonwealth’s non-statutory executive power should be interpreted u... more This article argues that the Commonwealth’s non-statutory executive power should be interpreted using an ‘historical constitutional approach’, first developed by JWF Allison for the United Kingdom. Some argue that the non-statutory executive power should be informed by the Crown’s historical prerogative powers and the common law (the ‘common law view’), while the High Court has recognised an inherent ‘nationhood power’ sourced directly in section 61 of the Australian Constitution, that does not require reference to the common law or the prerogatives (the ‘inherent view’). Peter Gerangelos identified a potential jurisprudential shift after Gageler J seemingly adopted an historical approach in Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 257 CLR 42. This article argues that interpreting section 61 through an historical constitutional lens would be in keeping with the origins, influences, and common law limitations on the development of the Crown’s powers ...
This article argues that the prerogative of mercy should be retained in New South Wales as a nece... more This article argues that the prerogative of mercy should be retained in New South Wales as a necessary and appropriate power of the Executive. Historically, pardons have provided opportunities for redemption. Currently, the statutory appeals process is limited to cases involving a miscarriage of justice where there is considerable doubt as to a person’s guilt. In cases where a person is guilty but is nevertheless deserving of mercy, the prerogative of mercy is the only avenue available. As a purely executive power, the prerogative of mercy can achieve the aims of the criminal justice system by tempering justice with mercy. The role of the sovereign involves maintaining order, but also enacting some conception of the good, driven by compassion, love, and mercy. Finally, this article argues that grants of mercy should be a matter of public record, for transparency and as a means of demonstrating this compassion to the public.
This article argues that the Commonwealth’s non-statutory executive power should be interpreted u... more This article argues that the Commonwealth’s non-statutory executive power should be interpreted using an ‘historical constitutional approach’, first developed by JWF Allison for the United Kingdom. Some argue that the non-statutory executive power should be informed by the Crown’s historical prerogative powers and the common law (the ‘common law view’), while the High Court has recognised an inherent ‘nationhood power’ sourced directly in section 61 of the Australian Constitution, that does not require reference to the common law or the prerogatives (the ‘inherent view’). Peter Gerangelos identified a potential jurisprudential shift after Gageler J seemingly adopted an historical approach in Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 257 CLR 42. This article argues that interpreting section 61 through an historical constitutional lens would be in keeping with the origins, influences, and common law limitations on the development of the Crown’s powers ...
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Papers by Catherine D Greentree