CISPA HELMHOLTZ CENTER FOR INFORMATION SECURITY

RUHR UNIVERSITÄT BOCHUM RUB

Unchained Skies: A Deep Dive into Reverse Engineering and Exploitation of Drones

Nico Schiller **Moritz Schloegel**

Who we are

Nico Schiller

- researcher @ CISPA
- interested in drones and their security
- fuzz all the things!

Moritz Schloegel

- also researcher @ CISPA
- interested in automated bug finding, mostly fuzzing
- obfuscation / deobfuscation (Next-gen VMs talk at REcon22)

Consumer Drones

Why Drones?

BUT

Where things can go wrong: Airports

The Washington Post
Democracy Dies in Darkness

TRANSPORTATION

Drone sighting briefly stops air traffic at Reagan National

Some flights were delayed after arrivals and departures were temporarily halted

By Katherine Shaver

July 21, 2022 at 2:30 p.m. EDT

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HOME › TRANSPORTATION

Dublin Airport briefly shut down over a drone sighting at the runway

Bill Bostock Feb 21, 2019, 2:02 PM GMT+1

Planes from the flag carrier airline of Ireland Aer Lingus at Dublin Airport. Getty

Where things can go wrong: Airports

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Planes from the flag carrie

Gatwick drone disruption cost airport just £1.4m

Airlines bear brunt of cost with easyJet alone putting its compensation bill and lost revenue at £15m



Where things can go wrong: Prisons

JEFF LINK BUSINESS 29.07.2022 12:00 PM

Drone Contraband Deliveries Are Rampant at US Prisons

Law enforcement officers face an air assault as drugs, weapons, and phones are flown in to prisoners.

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Increase in use of drones for prison smuggling

4 April

The number of drones caught flying into Scottish prisons is increasing, new figures show.



- Block airport operations
- Expensive shutdowns

- Bypass physical barriers
- Smuggling

Low entry barrier for air mobility in a traditionally heavily regulated sector!

Recent Scenario: Conflicts

Ukraine sends 300 DJI Mavic 3T drones to battle Russians ahead of expected offensive

Bruce Crumley | Mar 31 2023 - 3:39 am PT 3 Comments

In another setback to global drone giant DJI's efforts to keep its consumer and enterprise products from being used in the conflict provoked by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, officials in Kyiv said this week a small army of 300 Mavic 3T UAVs had been procured and sent to the eastern front in the space of just a few days.

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WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE | WORLD

Chinese Drones Still Support Russia's War in Ukraine, Trade Data Show

Despite sanctions, Kremlin continues to deploy small unmanned Chinese aircraft

By Benoit Faucon Follow *in Dubai and Ian Talley* Follow *in Washington*

Updated Feb. 18, 2023 10:01 am ET

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ANALYSIS

The Drone War in Ukraine Is Cheap, Dea[illegible]

Cr[illegible]

By Faine Greenwood, an ex[illegible]

Ukraine rapidly expanding its 'Army of Drones' for front line

26 April

opular hobby drones in the world used for filming

n the front line is the DJI Mavic which costs

Last year, its Chinese manufacturer banned exports to Ukraine and Russia insisting its products are "for civilian use only".

Slava says the ban has made it harder to get hold of the drones but Ukraine has still been able to import thousands.

Vendors know these problems!





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



Position tracking

DJI Aeroscope



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



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

Software limits
Geofencing

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



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

Software limits
Geofencing

Hardware protection
No debug interfaces

Tracking and Identification

- Drones broadcast information
  - Serial number
  - Position
- Tracking via DJI Aeroscope *(recently deprecated)*
- New regulations mandate tracking



=> Quick identification and localization!

https://www.dji.com/de/aeroscope

Software Protection

- Height and range limitations
  - height: maximum 500m
  - but: safety warning above 120m
  - range: currently unlimited
- Speed limits
- No-Fly Zones







https://fly-safe.dji.com/nfz/nfz-query

Hardware Protection

- disabled debug interfaces
- firmware
  - closed source
  - encrypted
  - signed
- proprietary communication protocol



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



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

Software limits
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Let’s see if these countermeasures are good enough

Our focus: DJI drones

Photo: Copyright dji.com

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- Market share (94% Consumer)

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- Security-conscious
  - Whitepaper
  - Bug bounty program

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Analyzed Drones: Mini 2, Mavic Air 2, Mavic 2

Drone Hardware Overview



Wireless Physical Layer

- Eavesdropping
- Signal analysis

- Tracking
- Protocol knowledge

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

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

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Firmware

- Reverse engineering
- Fuzzing

- Privilege escalation
- Firmware reflashing
- Disable software limits

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

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Wireless Physical Layer

Reversing DJI DroneID

Static Analysis

Hands on the Drone

Dynamic Analysis

Fuzzing Drones for Pain and Profit

How to listen on the Wireless Physical Layer ...

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Software Defined Radio
(SDR)

How to listen on the Wireless Physical Layer ...

Software Defined Radio
(SDR)



Signal Analyzer Software
(e.g., baudline, inspectrum)

Listening on the Wireless Physical Layer ...

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

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

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

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

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

Reverse Engineering a Signal



Capture Raw
Signal Data

Reverse Engineering a Signal



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Packet Detection

Reverse Engineering a Signal



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

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

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

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

Fixed Synchronization Symbols
“Zadoff-Chu Sequences”

Capture Raw
Signal Data

Packet
Detection

Reverse Engineering a Signal



Capture Raw
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Packet
Detection

Reverse Engineering a Signal



Time synchronisation via cyclic prefixes



Reverse Engineering a Signal





Reverse Engineering a Signal





Reverse Engineering a Signal





Reverse Engineering a Signal





Reverse Engineering a Signal





Reverse Engineering a Signal





Reverse Engineering a Signal

```
Received DroneID packet:
{
    "pkt_len": 88,
    "unk": 16,
    "version": 2,
    "sequence_number": 749,
    "state_info": 8183,
    "serial_number": "1W          N1",
    "longitude": 7.267175834942389,
    "latitude": 51.44635111984553,
    "altitude": 40.84,
    "height": 3.66,
    "v_north": -1,
    "v_east": 0,
    "v_up": -1,
    "d_1_angle": -14958,
    "gps_time": 1649869492647,
    "app_lat": 51.446316742392554,
    "app_lon": 7.267101350460944,
    "longitude_home": 7.267170105366893,
    "latitude_home": 51.44636830857202,
    "device_type": "Mavic Air 2",
    "uuid_len": 19,
    "uuid": "                    ",
    "crc-packet": "267c",
    "crc-calculated": "267c"
}
```





Reverse Engineering a Signal

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    "unk": 16,
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    "sequence_number": 749,
    "state_info": 8183,
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    "latitude": 51.44635111984553,
    "altitude": 40.84,
    "height": 3.66,
    "v_north": -1,
    "v_east": 0,
    "v_up": -1,
    "d_1_angle": -14958,
    "gps_time": 1649869492647,
    "app_lat": 51.446316742392554,
    "app_lon": 7.267101350460944,
    "longitude_home": 7.267170105366893,
    "latitude_home": 51.44636830857202,
    "device_type": "Mavic Air 2",
    "uuid_len": 19,
    "uuid": "                    ",
    "crc-packet": "267c",
    "crc-calculated": "267c"
}
```



Reverse Engineering a Signal



Summary: Wireless Physical Layer

- Much information is broadcast, including:
  - Drone location
  - Pilot location
  - Serial number
- Signal not encrypted
- But: Easy to spoof the pilot location

Wireless Physical Layer

Reversing DJI DroneID

Static Analysis

Hands on the Drone

Dynamic Analysis

Fuzzing Drones for Pain and Profit



Analyze
PCB




PP001537.03
CS 1951 04



Analyze
PCB

Found
Boot Screen
(UART)!


Async Serial
Input Channel *
03. Channel 3
Bit Rate (Bits/s)
926300
Bits per Frame
8 Bits per Transfer (Standard)
Stop Bits
1 Stop Bit (Standard)
Parity Bit
No Parity Bit (Standard)
Significant Bit
Least Significant Bit Sent First (Standard)
Signal inversion
Non Inverted (Standard)
Mode
Normal
Show in protocol results table
Stream to terminal
99+ `}Z\r\nINFO:Platform
Trigger View
Data
DEBUG:spiflash_bp_status_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_wp_portion_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_write_protection_init=>ok
INFO:target init
\0\0@\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x08\0\0\x02\0\0\xC0|\0\00\
0\0\0\0\0\0\0\xFF\x08\0\x8C\0\0\0\0\0p\0\0\0\0\0\0
\08\0\0\x02\0\0\0\0\x80\0\0\0\0\0\x04\xFC\x0400.
3
0./!249suwy=!PRs{`}Z
INFO:Platform early init begin
INFO:Target early init begin
DEBUG:boot args 0x40110000 0x0 0x56b28 0x56b28
INIT: cpu 0, calling hook 0x43d21 (version) at lev
el 0x3ffff, flags 0x1
INFO:version:
arch: ARM
platform: SPARROW
target: SPARROW_RC
project: SPARROW_RC_TEST
buildid: K326J_LOCAL
buildtime:Mar 2 2021 14:38:46
DEBUG:initializing heap
DEBUG:calling constructors
DEBUG:initializing mp
DEBUG:initializing threads
DEBUG:initializing timers
DEBUG:initializing ports
DEBUG:creating bootstrap completion thread
DEBUG:top of bootstrap2()
CONTROL 0x0
INFO:initializing platform
INFO:lcs should be production
INFO:jtag will be disabled
INFO:initializing target
spi_master_get: spi master id :0
INFO:spiflash id : ef4018
DEBUG:cmp status(0) is ok
DEBUG:spiflash_cmp_status_select=>ok
DEBUG:BP status is ok(status:34, val:d)
DEBUG:spiflash_bp_status_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_wp_portion_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_write_protection_init=>ok
INFO:target init
\000.3cs should be production
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INFO:Target early init begin
DEBUG:boot args 0x40110000 0x0 0x56b28 0x56b28
INIT: cpu 0, calling hook 0x43d21 (version) at lev
el 0x3ffff, flags 0x1
INFO:version:
arch: ARM


Async Serial
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1 Stop Bit (Standard)
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No Parity Bit (Standard)
Significant Bit
Least Significant Bit Sent First (S
Signal inversion
Non Inverted (Standard)
Mode
Normal
Show in protocol results table
Stream to terminal
INFO:Platform early init begin
INFO:Target early init begin
DEBUG:boot args 0x40110000 0x0 0x55f20 0x55f20
INIT: cpu 0, calling hook 0x433fd (version) at level 0x3ffff, flags 0x1
INFO:version:
arch: ARM
platform: SPARROW
target: SPARROW_UAV
project: SPARROW_UAV_TEST
buildid: J9H88_LOCAL
buildtime:Sep 17 2020 16:17:53
DEBUG:initializing heap
DEBUG:calling constructors
DEBUG:initializing mp
DEBUG:initializing threads
DEBUG:initializing timers
DEBUG:initializing ports
DEBUG:creating bootstrap completion thread
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DEBUG:BP status is ok(status:34, val:d)
DEBUG:spiflash_bp_status_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_wp_portion_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_write_protection_init=>ok
INFO:target init
INFO:lcs should be production
Trigger View
Data


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target: SPARROW_UAV
project: SPARROW_UAV_TEST
buildid: J9H88_LOCAL
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
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arch: ARM
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target: SPARROW_UAV
project: SPARROW_UAV_TEST
buildid: J9H88_LOCAL
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
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Input Channel *
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
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Trigger View
Data


Async Serial
Input Channel *
03. Channel 3
Bit Rate (Bits/s)
926300
Bits per Frame
8 Bits per Transfer (Standard)
Stop Bits
1 Stop Bit (Standard)
Parity Bit
No Parity Bit (Standard)
Significant Bit
Least Significant Bit Sent First (S
Signal inversion
Non Inverted (Standard)
Mode
Normal
Show in protocol results table
Stream to terminal
INFO:Platform early init begin
INFO:Target early init begin
DEBUG:boot args 0x40110000 0x0 0x55f20 0x55f20
INIT: cpu 0, calling hook 0x433fd (version) at level 0x3ffff, flags 0x1
INFO:version:
arch: ARM
platform: SPARROW
target: SPARROW_UAV
project: SPARROW_UAV_TEST
buildid: J9H88_LOCAL
buildtime:Sep 17 2020 16:17:53
DEBUG:initializing heap
DEBUG:calling constructors
DEBUG:initializing mp
DEBUG:initializing threads
DEBUG:initializing timers
DEBUG:initializing ports
DEBUG:creating bootstrap completion thread
DEBUG:top of bootstrap2()
CONTROL 0x0
INFO:initializing platform
INFO:lcs should be production
INFO:jtag will be disabled
INFO:initializing target
spi_master_get: spi master id :0
INFO:spiflash id : ef4018
DEBUG:cmp status(0) is ok
DEBUG:spiflash_cmp_status_select=>ok
DEBUG:BP status is ok(status:34, val:d)
DEBUG:spiflash_bp_status_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_wp_portion_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_write_protection_init=>ok
INFO:target init
INFO:lcs should be production
Trigger View
Data


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DEBUG:initializing threads
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DEBUG:initializing ports
DEBUG:creating bootstrap completion thread
DEBUG:top of bootstrap2()
CONTROL 0x0
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INFO:lcs should be production
INFO:jtag will be disabled
INFO:initializing target
spi_master_get: spi master id :0
INFO:spiflash id : ef4018
DEBUG:cmp status(0) is ok
DEBUG:spiflash_cmp_status_select=>ok
DEBUG:BP status is ok(status:34, val:d)
DEBUG:spiflash_bp_status_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_wp_portion_select=>ok
DEBUG:spiflash_write_protection_init=>ok
INFO:target init
INFO:lcs should be production
Trigger View
Data

Trigger View

```
UG:spiflash_bp_status_select=>ok
UG:spiflash_wp_portion_select=>ok
UG:spiflash_write_protection_init=>ok
O:target init
0@\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\x08\0\0\x02\0\0\xC0|\0\00\
\0\0\0\0\0\xFF\x08\0\x8C\0\0\0\0\0p\0\0\0\0\0\0
\0\0\x02\0\0\0\0\x80\0\0\0\0\0\0\x04\xFC\x0400.

!249suwy=!PRs{`}Z
O:Platform early init begin
O:Target early init begin
UG:boot args 0x40110000 0x0 0x56b28 0x56b28
T: cpu 0, calling hook 0x43d21 (version) at lev
0x3ffff, flags 0x1
O:version:
     arch:     ARM
     platform: SPARROW
     target:   SPARROW_RC
     project:  SPARROW_RC_TEST
     buildid:  K326J_LOCAL
     buildtime:Mar  2 2021 14:38:46
UG:initializing heap
UG:calling constructors
UG:initializing mp
UG:initializing threads
UG:initializing timers
UG:initializing ports
UG:creating bootstrap completion thread
UG:top of bootstrap2()
TROL 0x0
O:initializing platform
O:lcs should be production
O:jtag will be disabled
O:initializing target
_master_get: spi master id :0
O:spiflash id : ef4018
UG:cmp status(0) is ok
UG:spiflash_cmp_status_select=>ok
UG:BP status is ok(status:34, val:d)
UG:spiflash_bp_status_select=>ok
UG:spiflash_wp_portion_select=>ok
UG:spiflash_write_protection_init=>ok
O:target init
0.3cs should be production
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O:Platform early init begin
O:Target early init begin
UG:boot args 0x40110000 0x0 0x56b28 0x56b28
T: cpu 0, calling hook 0x43d21 (version) at lev
0x3ffff, flags 0x1
O:version:
     arch:     ARM
```


GND
TX

dji
NORMAL
TRIPOD
SPORT
br: Gnd
bl: Rx
w: Tx

Analyze PCB

Found Boot Screen (UART)!

Check Bootloader Firmware

Analyze PCB

Found Boot Screen (UART)!

Check Bootloader Firmware

Some Magic Values to Unlock Bootloader?!

```
fseek(file_descriptor,0,2);
filesize = ftell(file_descriptor);
fseek(file_descriptor,0,0);
printf("The file size is:%ld\n",filesize);
fread(&file_data,filesize,1,file_descriptor);
MAGIC_DATA_J = 0x7c2a5242;
Mem_filesize = filesize;
checksum_filedata = checkSum(&file_data);
checksum_MAGIC_DATA_J = checkSum(&MAGIC_DATA_J,0xc);
MAGIC_DATA_D._0_4_ = (__sighandler_t)0x7c2a5260;
usb_if_transfer = (int *)libusb_alloc_transfer(0);
```


Unlock Transceiver Bootloader
Analyze PCB
Found Boot Screen (UART)!
Check Bootloader Firmware
Some Magic Values to Unlock Bootloader?!
Bootloader Unlocked!




```
uint get_mp_state(void)

{
  uint uVar1;

  uVar1 = read_volatile_4(global_mp_state_mem);
  return uVar1 & 0xff;
}
```

Modify Firmware




```
uint get_mp_state(void)

{
  uint uVar1;

  uVar1 = read_volatile_4(global_mp_state_mem);
  return uVar1 & 0xff;
}
```


Unlock Transceiver Bootloader
Analyze PCB
Found Boot Screen (UART)!
Check Bootloader Firmware
Some Magic Values to Unlock Bootloader?!
Bootloader Unlocked!
Modify Firmware
Unsigned (Patch) Files?!


Unlock Transceiver Bootloader
Analyze PCB
Found Boot Screen (UART)!
Check Bootloader Firmware
Some Magic Values to Unlock Bootloader?!
Bootloader Unlocked!
Firmware Signature Bypass
Forge Own Patch Files!
Unsigned (Patch) Files?!
Modify Firmware


Unlock Transceiver Bootloader
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Found Boot Screen (UART)!
Check Bootloader Firmware
Some Magic Values to Unlock Bootloader?!
Bootloader Unlocked!
Firmware Signature Bypass
Modify Firmware
Unsigned (Patch) Files?!
Forge Own Patch Files!
Unlock UART Console

Summary: Static Analysis

- Full control over the transceiver SoC -> next target: main SoC

- **Static analysis was key for all other steps**
  - For example, when reversing the signal:
    - We needed seeds hidden in the firmware
    - Confirm DroneID packet structure

Wireless Physical Layer

Reversing DJI DroneID

Static Analysis

Hands on the Drone

Dynamic Analysis

Fuzzing Drones for Pain and Profit



What is Fuzzing?



Input Program

What is Fuzzing?



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What is Fuzzing?



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

BUT

How to Fuzz Drones?

Problems:

- drone != a single binary
  - complex firmware (multiple SoC's, different OSes)
  - hard to emulate
- no source code we could instrument

=> no easy off-the-shelf fuzzing solution available

Idea: Let’s target communication protocol



DJI DUML Protocol

How to Fuzz Drones – DJI DUML Protocol

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

How to Fuzz Drones – DJI DUML Protocol



How to Fuzz Drones – DJI DUML Protocol

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

How to Fuzz Drones?

How to Fuzz Drones?

Fuzzer

Prerequisites:

- A drone and fuzzer

How to Fuzz Drones?

Prerequisites:

- A drone and fuzzer
- Protocol knowledge

How to Fuzz Drones?

Prerequisites:

- A drone and fuzzer
- Protocol knowledge
- Bug oracle



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

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

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

How to Fuzz Drones?

Prerequisites:

- A drone and fuzzer
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- Bug oracle

Reproducible bugs!



Does fuzzing work?

ID	Oracle	Component	Observable Behavior	Classification	Severity	Remote	Vulnerable Devices
#1	ADB check	`dji_sys` binary	ADB started (root access)	arbitrary code exec	mid	✗	Mini 2
#2	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#3	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#4	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#5	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#6	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#7	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#8	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#9	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#10	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#11	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	low	✓	Mini 2
#12	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	low	✓	Mini 2
#13	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	low	✓	Mavic Air 2
#14	UI change	WiFi chip	change SSID	arbitrary code exec	mid	✓	Mini 2, Mavic 3
#15	UI change	flight controller	change serial number	identity spoofing	mid	✓	Mini 2

*Following responsible disclosure, DJI fixed these bugs.

Does fuzzing work?

ID	Oracle	Component	Observable Behavior	Classification	Severity	Remote	Vulnerable Devices
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#5	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#6	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#7	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#8	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#9	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#10	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
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*Following responsible disclosure, DJI fixed these bugs.

Arbitrary Code Execution

- found by UI oracle: fuzzer changed an immutable value
- missing sanitization of user-controllable input

=> Linux command injection

Arbitrary Code Execution

Goal: root privileges -> start adb server

Problem: command length limited to max 32 characters

=> transfer exploit script chunkwise

Does fuzzing work?

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#10	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
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Change Immutable Serial Number



Change Immutable Serial Number




```
{
    "pkt_len": 88,
    "unk": 16,
    "version": 2,
    "sequence_number": 878,
    "state_info": 8179,
    "serial_number": "SecureStorage?",
    "longitude": 7.267960786785307,
    "latitude": 51.446866781640146,
    "altitude": 39.32,
    "height": 5.49,
    "v_north": 0,
    "v_east": -7,
    "v_up": 0,
    "d_1_angle": 16900,
    "gps_time": 1650894901980,
    "app_lat": 43.26826445428658,
    "app_lon": 6.640125363111847,
    "longitude_home": 7.26794359805882,
    "latitude_home": 51.446883970366635,
    "device_type": "Mini 2",
    "uuid_len": 0,
    "uuid": "",
    "crc-packet": "c935",
    "crc-calculated": "c935"
}
```

Does fuzzing work?

ID	Oracle	Component	Observable Behavior	Classification	Severity	Remote	Vulnerable Devices
#1	ADB check	`dji_sys` binary	ADB started (root access)	arbitrary code exec	mid	✗	Mini 2
#2	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#3	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#4	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#5	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#6	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	buffer overflow	mid	✓	Mavic Air 2
#7	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#8	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#9	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#10	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	mid	✓	Mini 2
#11	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	low	✓	Mini 2
#12	crash	unknown	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	low	✓	Mini 2
#13	crash	flight controller	critical error (drone reboot)	denial of service	low	✓	Mavic Air 2
#14	UI change	WiFi chip	change SSID	arbitrary code exec	mid	✓	Mini 2, Mavic 3
#15	UI change	flight controller	change serial number	identity spoofing	mid	✓	Mini 2

*Following responsible disclosure, DJI fixed these bugs.

Summary: Fuzzing the Drone

- Fuzzing on hardware: Slow & painful but real bugs
- Tailor fuzzer to your target, for example, custom oracles!

Recap: How to analyze drones



Drone and pilot’s location tracking

Wireless Analysis

Recap: How to analyze drones



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

Firmware signature verification bypass

Wireless Analysis

Static Analysis

Recap: How to analyze drones





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Vulnerability detection via fuzzing

Wireless Analysis

Static Analysis

Dynamic Analysis

Takeaways

- Holistic approach (analysis of different components/layers) needed
- Hardware-in-the-loop fuzzing is difficult but rewarding
- Countermeasures seem to be insufficient

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Paper

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