The bifurcation of public health responsibilities between the federal government and the province... more The bifurcation of public health responsibilities between the federal government and the provinces creates a security vulnerability to Canada. Epidemiological information collected by a province is normally only shared on a voluntary basis with the federal government. Most provinces are not legally compelled to disclose information to the federal government for the purposes of pandemic surveillance. This is further compounded when a pandemic occurs within a single province, as the federal government is unable to compel provincial officials to provide information. These structural inefficiencies create information gaps, which exacerbate a pandemic and should be corrected.
The September 26, 2020 decision of the Speaker of the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly to direc... more The September 26, 2020 decision of the Speaker of the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly to direct Commissionaires to remove demonstrators’ tents from the grounds of the Legislative Precinct raises questions both in the context of 2(c) Charter rights respecting the freedom of peaceful assembly and the authority of the Speaker to control access to the Legislative Precinct under Parliamentary Privilege or other property related powers. This article outlines that the source of the Speaker’s authority to regulate activities on the grounds of the Legislative Precinct is not Parliamentary Privilege nor the common law. The article concludes that the New Brunswick Speaker does not have jurisdiction over the grounds of the Legislative Precinct and therefore Parliamentary immunity cannot be claimed by the Legislative Assembly for any potential legal action arising from the seizure of the tents. This is important as it means that actions by government actors are subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Depending on the Legislative Assembly’s internal policies, either the Speaker or the Legislative Administration Committee may have the ability to control access and security in the context property law; however, this power would be inoperative during dissolution due to a lack of intersessional authority.
This paper argues that non-violent acts of civil disobedience on public land must be accommodated... more This paper argues that non-violent acts of civil disobedience on public land must be accommodated to facilitate the larger right of freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression to raise awareness of social justice issues. On private land, police should not tolerate extended physical obstructions by demonstrators.
Like a game of chess, have the results of the 2018 New Brunswick elections created a Legislative ... more Like a game of chess, have the results of the 2018 New Brunswick elections created a Legislative Assembly that is in a true stalemate that can produce no winner and must be dissolved prompting a new election? Or is the minority Gallant Government in fact in political checkmate, where any maneuver ultimately results in its defeat?
Our analysis shows that Gallant is likely in check rather than a stalemate but that he faces the strong possibility of being put into checkmate. From this, he only has two rational choices with a limited chance of success:
1) Not allowing any Liberal MLAs to become candidates for Speaker. As no other party will put forward a candidate, this will cause the Assembly to go without a Speaker and be unable to conduct any other business. The Assembly would become deadlocked. Historical precedents shows that Gallant will remain Premier, and that the Lieutenant-Governor should allow a reasonable amount of time for the Assembly to attempt to elect a Speaker. This process could allow for a political resolution. In the meantime, within the Assembly, Gallant could continue to negotiate for support from the Alliance and Greens to survive a Throne Speech vote. Outside, Gallant could use the procedural confusion to try and shift public opinion towards supporting his Government.
2) Putting a Liberal MLA forward as Speaker and then presenting a Throne Speech for the purposes of political posturing, daring the other parties to vote against it. As the precedents from Ontario in 1985 and British Columbia in 2017 demonstrate, this option is political suicide for a government wishing to remain in power.
Our article provides an overview of the political circumstances resulting from the recent election. We use constitutional principles, historical precedents, notably deadlocked Assemblies that were unable to put forward a Speaker (Prince Edward Island in 1859 and Newfoundland in 1908-09) to show that only Premier Gallant, and not the Legislative Assembly, can cause an early election by advising Lieutenant-Governor Roy-Vienneau to dissolve the Legislature. However, we will show that under these exceptional circumstances in New Brunswick, the Lieutenant-Governor is not bound to accept the advice from the Premier. Instead, depending on the path that Premier Gallant chooses, he will be forced to resign as Premier, enabling Lieutenant-Governor Roy-Vienneau to appoint Blaine Higgs as the New Brunswick’s 34th Premier since Confederation.
This paper will examine the nature of Speaker impartiality within the British Parliamentary syste... more This paper will examine the nature of Speaker impartiality within the British Parliamentary system by examining the political involvement and the casting vote of Speakers. This will attempt to historically contextualize the role of the Speaker in the province of New Brunswick and explain the institutional circumstances of the unusual conduct of Speakers Bev Harrison and Michael ‘Tanker’ Malley during the 3rd session of the 55th Legislative Assembly. This paper argues that the source of this irregularity was the close seat count between opposition and government members. This issue illustrates the difficulties of smaller Legislative Assemblies reaching the convention established by the British parliament respecting the impartiality of a Speaker where a Speaker is apolitical, thereby divorced from partisan politics. In the British convention, which serves as the fount of parliamentary practice, the Speaker refrains from any active political involvement, and in return the Speaker is uncontested in upcoming parliamentary elections.
The bifurcation of public health responsibilities between the federal government and the province... more The bifurcation of public health responsibilities between the federal government and the provinces creates a security vulnerability to Canada. Epidemiological information collected by a province is normally only shared on a voluntary basis with the federal government. Most provinces are not legally compelled to disclose information to the federal government for the purposes of pandemic surveillance. This is further compounded when a pandemic occurs within a single province, as the federal government is unable to compel provincial officials to provide information. These structural inefficiencies create information gaps, which exacerbate a pandemic and should be corrected.
The September 26, 2020 decision of the Speaker of the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly to direc... more The September 26, 2020 decision of the Speaker of the New Brunswick Legislative Assembly to direct Commissionaires to remove demonstrators’ tents from the grounds of the Legislative Precinct raises questions both in the context of 2(c) Charter rights respecting the freedom of peaceful assembly and the authority of the Speaker to control access to the Legislative Precinct under Parliamentary Privilege or other property related powers. This article outlines that the source of the Speaker’s authority to regulate activities on the grounds of the Legislative Precinct is not Parliamentary Privilege nor the common law. The article concludes that the New Brunswick Speaker does not have jurisdiction over the grounds of the Legislative Precinct and therefore Parliamentary immunity cannot be claimed by the Legislative Assembly for any potential legal action arising from the seizure of the tents. This is important as it means that actions by government actors are subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Depending on the Legislative Assembly’s internal policies, either the Speaker or the Legislative Administration Committee may have the ability to control access and security in the context property law; however, this power would be inoperative during dissolution due to a lack of intersessional authority.
This paper argues that non-violent acts of civil disobedience on public land must be accommodated... more This paper argues that non-violent acts of civil disobedience on public land must be accommodated to facilitate the larger right of freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression to raise awareness of social justice issues. On private land, police should not tolerate extended physical obstructions by demonstrators.
Like a game of chess, have the results of the 2018 New Brunswick elections created a Legislative ... more Like a game of chess, have the results of the 2018 New Brunswick elections created a Legislative Assembly that is in a true stalemate that can produce no winner and must be dissolved prompting a new election? Or is the minority Gallant Government in fact in political checkmate, where any maneuver ultimately results in its defeat?
Our analysis shows that Gallant is likely in check rather than a stalemate but that he faces the strong possibility of being put into checkmate. From this, he only has two rational choices with a limited chance of success:
1) Not allowing any Liberal MLAs to become candidates for Speaker. As no other party will put forward a candidate, this will cause the Assembly to go without a Speaker and be unable to conduct any other business. The Assembly would become deadlocked. Historical precedents shows that Gallant will remain Premier, and that the Lieutenant-Governor should allow a reasonable amount of time for the Assembly to attempt to elect a Speaker. This process could allow for a political resolution. In the meantime, within the Assembly, Gallant could continue to negotiate for support from the Alliance and Greens to survive a Throne Speech vote. Outside, Gallant could use the procedural confusion to try and shift public opinion towards supporting his Government.
2) Putting a Liberal MLA forward as Speaker and then presenting a Throne Speech for the purposes of political posturing, daring the other parties to vote against it. As the precedents from Ontario in 1985 and British Columbia in 2017 demonstrate, this option is political suicide for a government wishing to remain in power.
Our article provides an overview of the political circumstances resulting from the recent election. We use constitutional principles, historical precedents, notably deadlocked Assemblies that were unable to put forward a Speaker (Prince Edward Island in 1859 and Newfoundland in 1908-09) to show that only Premier Gallant, and not the Legislative Assembly, can cause an early election by advising Lieutenant-Governor Roy-Vienneau to dissolve the Legislature. However, we will show that under these exceptional circumstances in New Brunswick, the Lieutenant-Governor is not bound to accept the advice from the Premier. Instead, depending on the path that Premier Gallant chooses, he will be forced to resign as Premier, enabling Lieutenant-Governor Roy-Vienneau to appoint Blaine Higgs as the New Brunswick’s 34th Premier since Confederation.
This paper will examine the nature of Speaker impartiality within the British Parliamentary syste... more This paper will examine the nature of Speaker impartiality within the British Parliamentary system by examining the political involvement and the casting vote of Speakers. This will attempt to historically contextualize the role of the Speaker in the province of New Brunswick and explain the institutional circumstances of the unusual conduct of Speakers Bev Harrison and Michael ‘Tanker’ Malley during the 3rd session of the 55th Legislative Assembly. This paper argues that the source of this irregularity was the close seat count between opposition and government members. This issue illustrates the difficulties of smaller Legislative Assemblies reaching the convention established by the British parliament respecting the impartiality of a Speaker where a Speaker is apolitical, thereby divorced from partisan politics. In the British convention, which serves as the fount of parliamentary practice, the Speaker refrains from any active political involvement, and in return the Speaker is uncontested in upcoming parliamentary elections.
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Papers by Lyle Skinner
Our analysis shows that Gallant is likely in check rather than a stalemate but that he faces the strong possibility of being put into checkmate. From this, he only has two rational choices with a limited chance of success:
1) Not allowing any Liberal MLAs to become candidates for Speaker. As no other party will put forward a candidate, this will cause the Assembly to go without a Speaker and be unable to conduct any other business. The Assembly would become deadlocked. Historical precedents shows that Gallant will remain Premier, and that the Lieutenant-Governor should allow a reasonable amount of time for the Assembly to attempt to elect a Speaker. This process could allow for a political resolution. In the meantime, within the Assembly, Gallant could continue to negotiate for support from the Alliance and Greens to survive a Throne Speech vote. Outside, Gallant could use the procedural confusion to try and shift public opinion towards supporting his Government.
2) Putting a Liberal MLA forward as Speaker and then presenting a Throne Speech for the purposes of political posturing, daring the other parties to vote against it. As the precedents from Ontario in 1985 and British Columbia in 2017 demonstrate, this option is political suicide for a government wishing to remain in power.
Our article provides an overview of the political circumstances resulting from the recent election. We use constitutional principles, historical precedents, notably deadlocked Assemblies that were unable to put forward a Speaker (Prince Edward Island in 1859 and Newfoundland in 1908-09) to show that only Premier Gallant, and not the Legislative Assembly, can cause an early election by advising Lieutenant-Governor Roy-Vienneau to dissolve the Legislature. However, we will show that under these exceptional circumstances in New Brunswick, the Lieutenant-Governor is not bound to accept the advice from the Premier. Instead, depending on the path that Premier Gallant chooses, he will be forced to resign as Premier, enabling Lieutenant-Governor Roy-Vienneau to appoint Blaine Higgs as the New Brunswick’s 34th Premier since Confederation.
Our analysis shows that Gallant is likely in check rather than a stalemate but that he faces the strong possibility of being put into checkmate. From this, he only has two rational choices with a limited chance of success:
1) Not allowing any Liberal MLAs to become candidates for Speaker. As no other party will put forward a candidate, this will cause the Assembly to go without a Speaker and be unable to conduct any other business. The Assembly would become deadlocked. Historical precedents shows that Gallant will remain Premier, and that the Lieutenant-Governor should allow a reasonable amount of time for the Assembly to attempt to elect a Speaker. This process could allow for a political resolution. In the meantime, within the Assembly, Gallant could continue to negotiate for support from the Alliance and Greens to survive a Throne Speech vote. Outside, Gallant could use the procedural confusion to try and shift public opinion towards supporting his Government.
2) Putting a Liberal MLA forward as Speaker and then presenting a Throne Speech for the purposes of political posturing, daring the other parties to vote against it. As the precedents from Ontario in 1985 and British Columbia in 2017 demonstrate, this option is political suicide for a government wishing to remain in power.
Our article provides an overview of the political circumstances resulting from the recent election. We use constitutional principles, historical precedents, notably deadlocked Assemblies that were unable to put forward a Speaker (Prince Edward Island in 1859 and Newfoundland in 1908-09) to show that only Premier Gallant, and not the Legislative Assembly, can cause an early election by advising Lieutenant-Governor Roy-Vienneau to dissolve the Legislature. However, we will show that under these exceptional circumstances in New Brunswick, the Lieutenant-Governor is not bound to accept the advice from the Premier. Instead, depending on the path that Premier Gallant chooses, he will be forced to resign as Premier, enabling Lieutenant-Governor Roy-Vienneau to appoint Blaine Higgs as the New Brunswick’s 34th Premier since Confederation.