Mark Walker was born in a small log cabin built on conceptual foundations of his own design. He is a Professor in the Philosophy Department where he occupies the Richard L. Hedden Endowed Chair in Advanced Philosophical Studies. Mark’s PhD is from the Australian National University. He previously taught at McMaster University in the department of philosophy and in the Arts & Science Program. He serves on the editorial board of the Journal of Evolution and Technology and on the board of directors of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies. Dr. Walker’s teaching and research interests include ethics, epistemology, philosophy of law, philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. His current primary research interest is in ethical issues arising out of emerging technologies, e.g., genetic engineering, advanced pharmacology, artificial intelligence research and nanotechnology. https://sites.google.com/view/markwalker/home Supervisors: Huw Price and Peter Menzies
This chapter argues that there are good moral reasons to think of geoengineering as technology to... more This chapter argues that there are good moral reasons to think of geoengineering as technology to address both anthropogenic and natural threats to the environment. As geoengineering technology develops, we will increasingly have the ability to adjust the parameters of the environment, e.g., adjust the planet’s temperature, CO2 concentration, etc. With this greater ability comes greater responsibility: we must decide what the Earth’s environment ought to be like in a manner that justly serves its inhabitants—including animals. Thus, the preeminent question of environmental philosophy is: What should the environment be like?
I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: 1. It is epistemicall... more I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: 1. It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multiproposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not. 2. If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multiproposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically permissible for us to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 3. It is not epistemically permissible to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 4. At least one of 1, 2, or 3, is false.
Walker, Mark. "The Angelic Hierarchy: Aligning Ethical Push and Pull." Studies in Ethics, Law, an... more Walker, Mark. "The Angelic Hierarchy: Aligning Ethical Push and Pull." Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2.3 (2008).
Peter Singer has argued that there are good utilitarian reasons for rejecting the prospect of sup... more Peter Singer has argued that there are good utilitarian reasons for rejecting the prospect of superlongevity: developing technology to double (or more) the average human lifespan. I argue against Singer's view on two fronts. First, empirical research on happiness indicates that the later years of life are (on average) the happiest, and there is no reason to suppose that this
Keith DeRose provides us with an interesting puzzle about variability in the warranted assertabil... more Keith DeRose provides us with an interesting puzzle about variability in the warranted assertability of knowledge attributions: Bank Case A. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won't be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it'll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It's open until noon.”
Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no. I'd better go in and make sure.”
We shall refer to this as “the Puzzle.” One of its interesting features is that it relies on widely held judgments about the two cases, but the judgments have at least the appearance of being inconsistent. If it is appropriate to attribute knowledge in case A, and B case is evidentially equivalent, then it seems consistency demands that we should ascribe knowledge to the husband in case B. But if case B shows that it is inappropriate to ascribe knowledge to the husband, then we should resist attributing knowledge to him in case A. The fact that we are willing to ascribe knowledge in the first case, but not in the second, even though they are evidentially equivalent, suggests an additional factor is operative in knowledge attributions. A likely candidate, it seems, is that knowledge attribution is sensitive to pragmatic interests. DeRose offers an epistemic contextualist (EC) explanation for the Puzzle: the variability in warranted assertability of knowledge claims is explained by the variability in truth conditions for “knowledge.” I argue for a competing explanation: the embedded propositions in knowledge claims, the “P” in “S knows that P,” is ambiguous. A theory of speakers’ meaning must provide an account of “implicit modal modifiers,” e.g., “certainly,” “highly probable,” “probable,” and so on, and the appropriate implicit modal modifier to attribute to speakers varies with context. This view I call the “variable implicit modal modifier” (VIMM). I offer two independent arguments for VIMM. The first is that considerations of parsimony favor VIMM over EC. The second is that a theory of speakers’ meaning requires, in some cases, attributing implicit modal modifiers to speakers. Once these commitments are made explicit there is no way to solve the Puzzle without VIMM, and with VIMM, EC is redundant.
Consequentialism, Deontology, and Artificial Intelligence Safety”, in Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security, edited by Roman V. Yampolskiy, Taylor and Francis, 411-421. , 2018
This chapter explores some foundational issues in normative ethics in relation to artificial inte... more This chapter explores some foundational issues in normative ethics in relation to artificial intelligence security. It is argued that issues arising out of artificial intelligence security provide reasons for favoring consequentialism over deontology. To this end utilitarianism and Kantianism are contrasted, along with two new moral theories: ukantianism and kutilitarianism. Several thought experiments, including the famous “trolley problem”, are used to illustrate these theories. The paper outlines a solution to conflicting judgments about whether it is morally permissible to sacrifice one person in order to save a greater number of person. The paper also seeks to show the relevance of artificial intelligence research for ethicists.
This article seeks to provide a unified explanation to two profound; challenges to Christian beli... more This article seeks to provide a unified explanation to two profound; challenges to Christian belief: the existence of evil and Darwin’s theory of natural selection. It is argued that an understanding of the full implications of our evolutionary past in conjunction with play God the Irenaean theodicy provides us with the best answer to these challenges. The traditional Irenaean theodicy emphasizes the importance of education for soul building. Soul building can benefit from technologically enhancing the biological substrate of our humanity. In particular, genetic engineering can enhance human virtue. The biological basis of our moral natures can be improved using genetic technologies, including (possibly) somatic and germline engineering. To plan for virtue first enhancement—the Genetic Virtue Project, which focuses on genetic improvements to our moral natures—is of paramount importance for the neo-Irenaean theodicy.
Basic Income Guarantee, VAT, Guaranteed Jobs, And Capitalism, 2019
This chapter defends, on capitalist principles, the idea of using a value added tax (VAT) to fina... more This chapter defends, on capitalist principles, the idea of using a value added tax (VAT) to finance a basic income guarantee of $1,000 per month for adult U.S. citizens. It is suggested that the U.S. marketplace should be treated as an asset in just the same that eBay treats its marketplace as an asset. Like eBay’s transaction fee, a VAT would work like a transaction fee to generate an income on this asset. A basic income guarantee works like a dividend to shareholders.
I argue that if we allow that Moore’s Method, which involves taking an ordinary knowledge claim t... more I argue that if we allow that Moore’s Method, which involves taking an ordinary knowledge claim to support a substantive metaphysical conclusion, can be used to support Moore’s proof an external world, then we should accept that Moore’s Method can be used to support a variety of incompatible metaphysical conclusions. I shall refer to this as “the problem of many proofs”. The problem of many proofs, I claim, stems from the theory-ladenness of perception. I shall argue further that this plethora of proofs for incompatible positions leads to a darker form of skepticism, one which maintains that each of the dogmatic views is probably false. We will conclude by considering various ways a Moorean might respond to these difficulties.
Abstract: There are reasons to be skeptical of the claim that philosophy and science are making p... more Abstract: There are reasons to be skeptical of the claim that philosophy and science are making progress toward the complete truth of the universe and our place in it. I discuss two different kinds of skeptical worries about justifying contemporary philosophical and scientific beliefs. Widespread philosophical disagreement leads to a suspicion that most philosophers are probably wrong. In science there is more agreement, but science has not justified some of its basic assumptions including the use of Occam’s Razor for theory selection. Worse, noetic skepticism questions whether humans even have the cognitive capacity for understanding the complete truth. We do not believe that children or apes have that capacity, so the question naturally arises within both philosophy and science as to whether we have reason to believe that adult humans are adequately equipped. Finally, I propose a scientific experiment to put this type of skepticism to the test.
The Genetic Virtue Project (GVP) is a proposed interdisciplinary effort between philosophers, psy... more The Genetic Virtue Project (GVP) is a proposed interdisciplinary effort between philosophers, psychologists, and geneticists to discover and enhance human behavior using biotechnology. The empirical plausibility that virtues have biological correlates is based on the claims that (a) virtues are a subset of personality traits, specifically, personality traits are conceived as “enduring behaviors,” and (b) there is ample evidence that personality traits have a genetic basis. The moral necessity to use the GVP for moral enhancement is based on the claims that we should eliminate evil (as understood generically, not religiously), and some evil is a function of human nature. The GVP is defended against several ethical and political criticisms.
This paper describes a thought experiment that shows that people can travel faster than the spee... more This paper describes a thought experiment that shows that people can travel faster than the speed of light. The proposed explanation for why faster-than-light travel is possible for persons, yet consistent with our best physics, is that persons are not wholly physical. The thought experiment also has implications for our understanding of death, specifically, the death of the body may not be the death of the person.
A claimed benefit of epistemic externalism is that it alone can avoid skepticism. Most epistemic ... more A claimed benefit of epistemic externalism is that it alone can avoid skepticism. Most epistemic externalists, however, allow a residual amount of internalism in terms of a defeasibility condition. The paper argues that this internal condition is sufficient for skeptics to cast doubt on many claims to justified belief about perceptual matters about the world. Furthermore, the internal defeasibility condition also opens the door to a darker form of skepticism; skeptical dogmatism, which maintains that many of our perceptually based beliefs are probably false. Thus, the claimed benefits of externalism in avoiding skepticism are greatly exaggerated.
This paper offers a contrast between "content-first" course design, and "skills-first" course des... more This paper offers a contrast between "content-first" course design, and "skills-first" course design. The traditional lecture format is a paradigmatic example of the former, by the latter I mean courses that emphasize the sustained practice of skills integral to the discipline. Two arguments are offered for adopting, other things being equal, the skills-first design. One is the "content-plus" argument that the skills-first course design does a better job of promoting content acquisition than a content-first class. The second argument, the "skills-plus" argument, claims that a skills-first course design has the added value of better promoting philosophical skills as compared with a content-first course.
This chapter argues that there are good moral reasons to think of geoengineering as technology to... more This chapter argues that there are good moral reasons to think of geoengineering as technology to address both anthropogenic and natural threats to the environment. As geoengineering technology develops, we will increasingly have the ability to adjust the parameters of the environment, e.g., adjust the planet’s temperature, CO2 concentration, etc. With this greater ability comes greater responsibility: we must decide what the Earth’s environment ought to be like in a manner that justly serves its inhabitants—including animals. Thus, the preeminent question of environmental philosophy is: What should the environment be like?
I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: 1. It is epistemicall... more I hope to show that each of 1, 2, and 3 are plausible, yet we can derive 4: 1. It is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multiproposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not. 2. If it is epistemically permissible to believe that our preferred views in multiproposition disputes are true, or at least more likely true than not, then it is epistemically permissible for us to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 3. It is not epistemically permissible to believe that we are über epistemic superiors to our disagreeing colleagues in multi-proposition disputes. 4. At least one of 1, 2, or 3, is false.
Walker, Mark. "The Angelic Hierarchy: Aligning Ethical Push and Pull." Studies in Ethics, Law, an... more Walker, Mark. "The Angelic Hierarchy: Aligning Ethical Push and Pull." Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology 2.3 (2008).
Peter Singer has argued that there are good utilitarian reasons for rejecting the prospect of sup... more Peter Singer has argued that there are good utilitarian reasons for rejecting the prospect of superlongevity: developing technology to double (or more) the average human lifespan. I argue against Singer's view on two fronts. First, empirical research on happiness indicates that the later years of life are (on average) the happiest, and there is no reason to suppose that this
Keith DeRose provides us with an interesting puzzle about variability in the warranted assertabil... more Keith DeRose provides us with an interesting puzzle about variability in the warranted assertability of knowledge attributions: Bank Case A. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won't be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it'll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It's open until noon.”
Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no. I'd better go in and make sure.”
We shall refer to this as “the Puzzle.” One of its interesting features is that it relies on widely held judgments about the two cases, but the judgments have at least the appearance of being inconsistent. If it is appropriate to attribute knowledge in case A, and B case is evidentially equivalent, then it seems consistency demands that we should ascribe knowledge to the husband in case B. But if case B shows that it is inappropriate to ascribe knowledge to the husband, then we should resist attributing knowledge to him in case A. The fact that we are willing to ascribe knowledge in the first case, but not in the second, even though they are evidentially equivalent, suggests an additional factor is operative in knowledge attributions. A likely candidate, it seems, is that knowledge attribution is sensitive to pragmatic interests. DeRose offers an epistemic contextualist (EC) explanation for the Puzzle: the variability in warranted assertability of knowledge claims is explained by the variability in truth conditions for “knowledge.” I argue for a competing explanation: the embedded propositions in knowledge claims, the “P” in “S knows that P,” is ambiguous. A theory of speakers’ meaning must provide an account of “implicit modal modifiers,” e.g., “certainly,” “highly probable,” “probable,” and so on, and the appropriate implicit modal modifier to attribute to speakers varies with context. This view I call the “variable implicit modal modifier” (VIMM). I offer two independent arguments for VIMM. The first is that considerations of parsimony favor VIMM over EC. The second is that a theory of speakers’ meaning requires, in some cases, attributing implicit modal modifiers to speakers. Once these commitments are made explicit there is no way to solve the Puzzle without VIMM, and with VIMM, EC is redundant.
Consequentialism, Deontology, and Artificial Intelligence Safety”, in Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security, edited by Roman V. Yampolskiy, Taylor and Francis, 411-421. , 2018
This chapter explores some foundational issues in normative ethics in relation to artificial inte... more This chapter explores some foundational issues in normative ethics in relation to artificial intelligence security. It is argued that issues arising out of artificial intelligence security provide reasons for favoring consequentialism over deontology. To this end utilitarianism and Kantianism are contrasted, along with two new moral theories: ukantianism and kutilitarianism. Several thought experiments, including the famous “trolley problem”, are used to illustrate these theories. The paper outlines a solution to conflicting judgments about whether it is morally permissible to sacrifice one person in order to save a greater number of person. The paper also seeks to show the relevance of artificial intelligence research for ethicists.
This article seeks to provide a unified explanation to two profound; challenges to Christian beli... more This article seeks to provide a unified explanation to two profound; challenges to Christian belief: the existence of evil and Darwin’s theory of natural selection. It is argued that an understanding of the full implications of our evolutionary past in conjunction with play God the Irenaean theodicy provides us with the best answer to these challenges. The traditional Irenaean theodicy emphasizes the importance of education for soul building. Soul building can benefit from technologically enhancing the biological substrate of our humanity. In particular, genetic engineering can enhance human virtue. The biological basis of our moral natures can be improved using genetic technologies, including (possibly) somatic and germline engineering. To plan for virtue first enhancement—the Genetic Virtue Project, which focuses on genetic improvements to our moral natures—is of paramount importance for the neo-Irenaean theodicy.
Basic Income Guarantee, VAT, Guaranteed Jobs, And Capitalism, 2019
This chapter defends, on capitalist principles, the idea of using a value added tax (VAT) to fina... more This chapter defends, on capitalist principles, the idea of using a value added tax (VAT) to finance a basic income guarantee of $1,000 per month for adult U.S. citizens. It is suggested that the U.S. marketplace should be treated as an asset in just the same that eBay treats its marketplace as an asset. Like eBay’s transaction fee, a VAT would work like a transaction fee to generate an income on this asset. A basic income guarantee works like a dividend to shareholders.
I argue that if we allow that Moore’s Method, which involves taking an ordinary knowledge claim t... more I argue that if we allow that Moore’s Method, which involves taking an ordinary knowledge claim to support a substantive metaphysical conclusion, can be used to support Moore’s proof an external world, then we should accept that Moore’s Method can be used to support a variety of incompatible metaphysical conclusions. I shall refer to this as “the problem of many proofs”. The problem of many proofs, I claim, stems from the theory-ladenness of perception. I shall argue further that this plethora of proofs for incompatible positions leads to a darker form of skepticism, one which maintains that each of the dogmatic views is probably false. We will conclude by considering various ways a Moorean might respond to these difficulties.
Abstract: There are reasons to be skeptical of the claim that philosophy and science are making p... more Abstract: There are reasons to be skeptical of the claim that philosophy and science are making progress toward the complete truth of the universe and our place in it. I discuss two different kinds of skeptical worries about justifying contemporary philosophical and scientific beliefs. Widespread philosophical disagreement leads to a suspicion that most philosophers are probably wrong. In science there is more agreement, but science has not justified some of its basic assumptions including the use of Occam’s Razor for theory selection. Worse, noetic skepticism questions whether humans even have the cognitive capacity for understanding the complete truth. We do not believe that children or apes have that capacity, so the question naturally arises within both philosophy and science as to whether we have reason to believe that adult humans are adequately equipped. Finally, I propose a scientific experiment to put this type of skepticism to the test.
The Genetic Virtue Project (GVP) is a proposed interdisciplinary effort between philosophers, psy... more The Genetic Virtue Project (GVP) is a proposed interdisciplinary effort between philosophers, psychologists, and geneticists to discover and enhance human behavior using biotechnology. The empirical plausibility that virtues have biological correlates is based on the claims that (a) virtues are a subset of personality traits, specifically, personality traits are conceived as “enduring behaviors,” and (b) there is ample evidence that personality traits have a genetic basis. The moral necessity to use the GVP for moral enhancement is based on the claims that we should eliminate evil (as understood generically, not religiously), and some evil is a function of human nature. The GVP is defended against several ethical and political criticisms.
This paper describes a thought experiment that shows that people can travel faster than the spee... more This paper describes a thought experiment that shows that people can travel faster than the speed of light. The proposed explanation for why faster-than-light travel is possible for persons, yet consistent with our best physics, is that persons are not wholly physical. The thought experiment also has implications for our understanding of death, specifically, the death of the body may not be the death of the person.
A claimed benefit of epistemic externalism is that it alone can avoid skepticism. Most epistemic ... more A claimed benefit of epistemic externalism is that it alone can avoid skepticism. Most epistemic externalists, however, allow a residual amount of internalism in terms of a defeasibility condition. The paper argues that this internal condition is sufficient for skeptics to cast doubt on many claims to justified belief about perceptual matters about the world. Furthermore, the internal defeasibility condition also opens the door to a darker form of skepticism; skeptical dogmatism, which maintains that many of our perceptually based beliefs are probably false. Thus, the claimed benefits of externalism in avoiding skepticism are greatly exaggerated.
This paper offers a contrast between "content-first" course design, and "skills-first" course des... more This paper offers a contrast between "content-first" course design, and "skills-first" course design. The traditional lecture format is a paradigmatic example of the former, by the latter I mean courses that emphasize the sustained practice of skills integral to the discipline. Two arguments are offered for adopting, other things being equal, the skills-first design. One is the "content-plus" argument that the skills-first course design does a better job of promoting content acquisition than a content-first class. The second argument, the "skills-plus" argument, claims that a skills-first course design has the added value of better promoting philosophical skills as compared with a content-first course.
Prospective developments in computer and nanotechnology suggest that there is some possibility-pe... more Prospective developments in computer and nanotechnology suggest that there is some possibility-perhaps as early as this century-that we will have the technological means to attempt to duplicate people. For example, it has been speculated that the psychology of individuals might be emulated on a computer platform to create a personality duplicate-an "upload". Physical duplicates might be created by advanced nanobots tasked with creating molecule-for-molecule copies of individuals. Such possibilities are discussed in the philosophical literature as (putative) cases of "fission": one person "splitting" into two. Many philosophers, perhaps most, reject the idea of fission, appealing to some form of a "no-branching" condition to rule out such possibilities. I argue, to the contrary, that there are good moral reasons to think that any account of personal identity that does not permit fission is deeply problematic, especially in connection with theorizing about criminal punishment. I discuss and reject David Lewis' famous account of personal identity that invokes "multiple occupancy" to allow for branching. In contrast, I offer an account of personal identity that permits branching using the type/token distinction to help with such puzzling cases.
This article seeks to provide a unified explanation to two profound; challenges to Christian beli... more This article seeks to provide a unified explanation to two profound; challenges to Christian belief: the existence of evil and Darwin's theory of natural selection. It is argued that an understanding of the full implications of our evolutionary past in conjunction with play God the Irenaean theodicy provides us with the best answer to these challenges. The traditional Irenaean theodicy emphasizes the importance of education for soul building. Soul building can benefit from technologically enhancing the biological substrate of our humanity. In particular, genetic engineering can enhance human virtue. The biological basis of our moral natures can be improved using genetic technologies, including (possibly) somatic and germline engineering. To plan for virtue first enhancement—the Genetic Virtue Project, which focuses on genetic improvements to our moral natures—is of paramount importance for the neo-Irenaean theodicy.
Abstract
The notion of Socratic Note Taking (SNT) is introduced to enhance students’ learning fro... more Abstract The notion of Socratic Note Taking (SNT) is introduced to enhance students’ learning from assigned readings. SNT features students asking questions and answering their own questions while doing the readings. To test the effectiveness of SNT, half the students from two sections of a philosophy course were assigned SNT on alternating weeks. Quizzes each week alternated between the two classes as either high or low stakes in a counterbalanced format. The design was a 2 (Notes: SNT or not) x 2 (Stakes: high or low) x 2 (Replication: first or second replication of a Notes x Stakes cell) within-participants factorial. On 10-point quizzes, SNT made an average difference of 1.22 points (more than a letter grade). In effect size terms that take error variance into account, η_P^2=.43. Furthermore, the results indicate that SNT is particularly effective with weaker students, e.g., we found a nearly 3-point increase on 10-point quizzes for the weakest students.
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Papers by Mark Walker
Bank Case A. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won't be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it'll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It's open until noon.”
Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no. I'd better go in and make sure.”
We shall refer to this as “the Puzzle.” One of its interesting features is that it relies on widely held judgments about the two cases, but the judgments have at least the appearance of being inconsistent. If it is appropriate to attribute knowledge in case A, and B case is evidentially equivalent, then it seems consistency demands that we should ascribe knowledge to the husband in case B. But if case B shows that it is inappropriate to ascribe knowledge to the husband, then we should resist attributing knowledge to him in case A. The fact that we are willing to ascribe knowledge in the first case, but not in the second, even though they are evidentially equivalent, suggests an additional factor is operative in knowledge attributions. A likely candidate, it seems, is that knowledge attribution is sensitive to pragmatic interests.
DeRose offers an epistemic contextualist (EC) explanation for the Puzzle: the variability in warranted assertability of knowledge claims is explained by the variability in truth conditions for “knowledge.” I argue for a competing explanation: the embedded propositions in knowledge claims, the “P” in “S knows that P,” is ambiguous. A theory of speakers’ meaning must provide an account of “implicit modal modifiers,” e.g., “certainly,” “highly probable,” “probable,” and so on, and the appropriate implicit modal modifier to attribute to speakers varies with context. This view I call the “variable implicit modal modifier” (VIMM). I offer two independent arguments for VIMM. The first is that considerations of parsimony favor VIMM over EC. The second is that a theory of speakers’ meaning requires, in some cases, attributing implicit modal modifiers to speakers. Once these commitments are made explicit there is no way to solve the Puzzle without VIMM, and with VIMM, EC is redundant.
Drafts by Mark Walker
Bank Case A. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybe the bank won't be open tomorrow. Lots of banks are closed on Saturdays.” I reply, “No, I know it'll be open. I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday. It's open until noon.”
Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are not deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, “Banks do change their hours. Do you know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remaining as confident as I was before that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, “Well, no. I'd better go in and make sure.”
We shall refer to this as “the Puzzle.” One of its interesting features is that it relies on widely held judgments about the two cases, but the judgments have at least the appearance of being inconsistent. If it is appropriate to attribute knowledge in case A, and B case is evidentially equivalent, then it seems consistency demands that we should ascribe knowledge to the husband in case B. But if case B shows that it is inappropriate to ascribe knowledge to the husband, then we should resist attributing knowledge to him in case A. The fact that we are willing to ascribe knowledge in the first case, but not in the second, even though they are evidentially equivalent, suggests an additional factor is operative in knowledge attributions. A likely candidate, it seems, is that knowledge attribution is sensitive to pragmatic interests.
DeRose offers an epistemic contextualist (EC) explanation for the Puzzle: the variability in warranted assertability of knowledge claims is explained by the variability in truth conditions for “knowledge.” I argue for a competing explanation: the embedded propositions in knowledge claims, the “P” in “S knows that P,” is ambiguous. A theory of speakers’ meaning must provide an account of “implicit modal modifiers,” e.g., “certainly,” “highly probable,” “probable,” and so on, and the appropriate implicit modal modifier to attribute to speakers varies with context. This view I call the “variable implicit modal modifier” (VIMM). I offer two independent arguments for VIMM. The first is that considerations of parsimony favor VIMM over EC. The second is that a theory of speakers’ meaning requires, in some cases, attributing implicit modal modifiers to speakers. Once these commitments are made explicit there is no way to solve the Puzzle without VIMM, and with VIMM, EC is redundant.
The notion of Socratic Note Taking (SNT) is introduced to enhance students’ learning from assigned readings. SNT features students asking questions and answering their own questions while doing the readings. To test the effectiveness of SNT, half the students from two sections of a philosophy course were assigned SNT on alternating weeks. Quizzes each week alternated between the two classes as either high or low stakes in a counterbalanced format. The design was a 2 (Notes: SNT or not) x 2 (Stakes: high or low) x 2 (Replication: first or second replication of a Notes x Stakes cell) within-participants factorial. On 10-point quizzes, SNT made an average difference of 1.22 points (more than a letter grade). In effect size terms that take error variance into account, η_P^2=.43. Furthermore, the results indicate that SNT is particularly effective with weaker students, e.g., we found a nearly 3-point increase on 10-point quizzes for the weakest students.