BACKGROUND There are thousands of papers about stigma, for instance about stigma's impact on ... more BACKGROUND There are thousands of papers about stigma, for instance about stigma's impact on wellbeing, mental or physical health. But the definition of stigma has received only modest attention. In "Conceptualizing stigma" from 2001, Link and Phelan offer a thorough and detailed definition of stigma. They suggest that there are six necessary conditions for stigma, namely labelled differences, stereotypes, separation, status loss and discrimination, power, and emotional reaction. This definition is widely applied in the literature but is left mainly uncriticized. METHOD We submit the Link and Phelan definition of stigma to a systematic conceptual analysis. We first interpret, analyze and reconsider each of the six components in Link and Phelan's definition of stigma, and on the basis of these analyses, we secondly suggest a revised definition of stigma. RESULT The Link and Phelan definition is thorough and detailed, but includes redundant components. These are status loss and discrimination, and emotional reaction. CONCLUSION We suggest that groups, not individuals, are the target of stigma, though it is individuals who may be the victims of it. We suggest a revised definition of stigma that is more simple, precise, and consistent with the empirical literature on stigma; there is stigma if and only if there is labelling, negative stereotyping, linguistic separation, and power asymmetry.
Consequentialism is a theory of moral rightness, where the domain of morality is to be understood... more Consequentialism is a theory of moral rightness, where the domain of morality is to be understood in the broadest sense, covering politics and normative economics as well as more personal morality. It holds that an action is right if and only if no other available action leads to a better outcome seen from an agent-neutral perspective. Thus, according to consequentialism we must maximize the good seen from an agent-neutral perspective. Consequentialism is demanding not only because our actions are right only if they lead to the best outcome—second or third best are never good enough—but also because the evaluation of what the best outcome is should be given from an agent-neutral perspective: The reasons we give, for acting in one way or another, should be reasons for anyone. Consequentialism is a basic moral theory in the sense that we need to specify its values for it to be operational, for it to tell us how to act, what to do. Our considerations over the values of consequentialism...
The main question pursued in this paper concerns whether (political) neutrality of justi cation –... more The main question pursued in this paper concerns whether (political) neutrality of justi cation – i.e., the idea that the state ought to be neutral vis-a-vis conceptions of the good – implies that the state ought to be neutral vis-a-vis (at least certain) forms of empirical facts. We argue that this is not the case. Mainstream liberal neutralism does not advocate any form of neutrality regarding facts. However, it might be claimed that it is unclear why non-neutrality regarding facts does not imply some form of disrespect for citizens insofar as non-neutrality regarding conceptions of the good can imply such disrespect, according to neutralists. We argue that non-neutrality regarding facts does not necessarily imply disrespect, and hence that the ideal of respecting citizens is not necessarily compromised by state non-neutrality regarding facts. Hence, liberal neutrality of justi cation is not compromised by state non-neutrality regarding facts.
In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a... more In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a principled moral reason to compromise. While I seek to understand how more precisely we are to understand this suggestion, I also object to it: I argue that we have a principled moral reason to accept democratic decisions that we disagree with, and that this can only be so if disagreement can change what the all things considered right political position is. But if this is so, then also a principled moral reason to compromise is possible. I suggest that there is a class of procedures, including compromise, voting, expert delegation, and coin flip, such that when we disagree about what justice requires, we have a principled moral reason (though not necessarily a decisive reason) to engage in one of these procedures.
The domestication of new crops would promote agricultural diversity and could provide a solution ... more The domestication of new crops would promote agricultural diversity and could provide a solution to many of the problems associated with intensive agriculture. We suggest here that genome editing can be used as a new tool by breeders to accelerate the domestication of semi-domesticated or even wild plants, building a more varied foundation for the sustainable provision of food and fodder in the future. We examine the feasibility of such plants from biological, social, ethical, economic, and legal perspectives.
What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for behaviors that lead to incre... more What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for behaviors that lead to increased risk of disease? We examine three approaches to responsibility that cover the most important aspects of the discussion of responsibility and spell out what it takes, according to each of them, to be responsible for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease. We show that only what we call the causal approach can adequately accommodate widely shared intuitions to the effect that certain causal influences-such as genetic make-up or certain social circumstances-diminish, or undermine personal responsibility. However, accepting the causal approach most likely makes personal responsibility impossible. We therefore need either to reject these widely shared intuitions about what counts as responsibility-softening or undermining or to accept that personal responsibility for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease rests on premises so shaky that personal responsibility is probably impossible.
ABSTRACT In recent literature, there has been much debate about whether and how luck egalitariani... more ABSTRACT In recent literature, there has been much debate about whether and how luck egalitarianism, given its focus on personal responsibility, can justify universal health care. In this paper we argue that, whether or not this is so, and in fact whether or not egalitarianism should be sensitive to responsibility at all, the question of personal responsibilization for health is not settled. This is the case because whether or not individuals are responsible for their own health condition is not all that is relevant when considering whether we should somehow hold them responsible for their own health condition, e.g. cost-wise. There may also be efficiency-based reasons to hold them responsible, and there may even be egalitarian reasons. Defining universal health care as an insurance system where everyone’s deductible and premium is 0, we will argue that efficiency-based reasons for cost-responsibilization are not convincing, but that there are egalitarian reasons for cost-responsibilization. Luck egalitarianism, therefore, cannot, at least not on its own term, justify universal health care.
Sustainable agriculture in response to increasing demands for food depends on development of high... more Sustainable agriculture in response to increasing demands for food depends on development of high-yielding crops with high nutritional value that require minimal intervention during growth. To date, the focus has been on changing plants by introducing genes that impart new properties, which the plants and their ancestors never possessed. By contrast, we suggest another potentially beneficial and perhaps less controversial strategy that modern plant biotechnology may adopt. This approach, which broadens earlier approaches to reverse breeding, aims to furnish crops with lost properties that their ancestors once possessed in order to tolerate adverse environmental conditions. What molecular techniques are available for implementing such rewilding? Are the strategies legally, socially, economically, and ethically feasible? These are the questions addressed in this review.
BACKGROUND There are thousands of papers about stigma, for instance about stigma's impact on ... more BACKGROUND There are thousands of papers about stigma, for instance about stigma's impact on wellbeing, mental or physical health. But the definition of stigma has received only modest attention. In "Conceptualizing stigma" from 2001, Link and Phelan offer a thorough and detailed definition of stigma. They suggest that there are six necessary conditions for stigma, namely labelled differences, stereotypes, separation, status loss and discrimination, power, and emotional reaction. This definition is widely applied in the literature but is left mainly uncriticized. METHOD We submit the Link and Phelan definition of stigma to a systematic conceptual analysis. We first interpret, analyze and reconsider each of the six components in Link and Phelan's definition of stigma, and on the basis of these analyses, we secondly suggest a revised definition of stigma. RESULT The Link and Phelan definition is thorough and detailed, but includes redundant components. These are status loss and discrimination, and emotional reaction. CONCLUSION We suggest that groups, not individuals, are the target of stigma, though it is individuals who may be the victims of it. We suggest a revised definition of stigma that is more simple, precise, and consistent with the empirical literature on stigma; there is stigma if and only if there is labelling, negative stereotyping, linguistic separation, and power asymmetry.
Consequentialism is a theory of moral rightness, where the domain of morality is to be understood... more Consequentialism is a theory of moral rightness, where the domain of morality is to be understood in the broadest sense, covering politics and normative economics as well as more personal morality. It holds that an action is right if and only if no other available action leads to a better outcome seen from an agent-neutral perspective. Thus, according to consequentialism we must maximize the good seen from an agent-neutral perspective. Consequentialism is demanding not only because our actions are right only if they lead to the best outcome—second or third best are never good enough—but also because the evaluation of what the best outcome is should be given from an agent-neutral perspective: The reasons we give, for acting in one way or another, should be reasons for anyone. Consequentialism is a basic moral theory in the sense that we need to specify its values for it to be operational, for it to tell us how to act, what to do. Our considerations over the values of consequentialism...
The main question pursued in this paper concerns whether (political) neutrality of justi cation –... more The main question pursued in this paper concerns whether (political) neutrality of justi cation – i.e., the idea that the state ought to be neutral vis-a-vis conceptions of the good – implies that the state ought to be neutral vis-a-vis (at least certain) forms of empirical facts. We argue that this is not the case. Mainstream liberal neutralism does not advocate any form of neutrality regarding facts. However, it might be claimed that it is unclear why non-neutrality regarding facts does not imply some form of disrespect for citizens insofar as non-neutrality regarding conceptions of the good can imply such disrespect, according to neutralists. We argue that non-neutrality regarding facts does not necessarily imply disrespect, and hence that the ideal of respecting citizens is not necessarily compromised by state non-neutrality regarding facts. Hence, liberal neutrality of justi cation is not compromised by state non-neutrality regarding facts.
In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a... more In “Principled Compromise and the Abortion Controversy” Simon C. May argues that we do not have a principled moral reason to compromise. While I seek to understand how more precisely we are to understand this suggestion, I also object to it: I argue that we have a principled moral reason to accept democratic decisions that we disagree with, and that this can only be so if disagreement can change what the all things considered right political position is. But if this is so, then also a principled moral reason to compromise is possible. I suggest that there is a class of procedures, including compromise, voting, expert delegation, and coin flip, such that when we disagree about what justice requires, we have a principled moral reason (though not necessarily a decisive reason) to engage in one of these procedures.
The domestication of new crops would promote agricultural diversity and could provide a solution ... more The domestication of new crops would promote agricultural diversity and could provide a solution to many of the problems associated with intensive agriculture. We suggest here that genome editing can be used as a new tool by breeders to accelerate the domestication of semi-domesticated or even wild plants, building a more varied foundation for the sustainable provision of food and fodder in the future. We examine the feasibility of such plants from biological, social, ethical, economic, and legal perspectives.
What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for behaviors that lead to incre... more What does it take for an individual to be personally responsible for behaviors that lead to increased risk of disease? We examine three approaches to responsibility that cover the most important aspects of the discussion of responsibility and spell out what it takes, according to each of them, to be responsible for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease. We show that only what we call the causal approach can adequately accommodate widely shared intuitions to the effect that certain causal influences-such as genetic make-up or certain social circumstances-diminish, or undermine personal responsibility. However, accepting the causal approach most likely makes personal responsibility impossible. We therefore need either to reject these widely shared intuitions about what counts as responsibility-softening or undermining or to accept that personal responsibility for behaviors leading to increased risk of disease rests on premises so shaky that personal responsibility is probably impossible.
ABSTRACT In recent literature, there has been much debate about whether and how luck egalitariani... more ABSTRACT In recent literature, there has been much debate about whether and how luck egalitarianism, given its focus on personal responsibility, can justify universal health care. In this paper we argue that, whether or not this is so, and in fact whether or not egalitarianism should be sensitive to responsibility at all, the question of personal responsibilization for health is not settled. This is the case because whether or not individuals are responsible for their own health condition is not all that is relevant when considering whether we should somehow hold them responsible for their own health condition, e.g. cost-wise. There may also be efficiency-based reasons to hold them responsible, and there may even be egalitarian reasons. Defining universal health care as an insurance system where everyone’s deductible and premium is 0, we will argue that efficiency-based reasons for cost-responsibilization are not convincing, but that there are egalitarian reasons for cost-responsibilization. Luck egalitarianism, therefore, cannot, at least not on its own term, justify universal health care.
Sustainable agriculture in response to increasing demands for food depends on development of high... more Sustainable agriculture in response to increasing demands for food depends on development of high-yielding crops with high nutritional value that require minimal intervention during growth. To date, the focus has been on changing plants by introducing genes that impart new properties, which the plants and their ancestors never possessed. By contrast, we suggest another potentially beneficial and perhaps less controversial strategy that modern plant biotechnology may adopt. This approach, which broadens earlier approaches to reverse breeding, aims to furnish crops with lost properties that their ancestors once possessed in order to tolerate adverse environmental conditions. What molecular techniques are available for implementing such rewilding? Are the strategies legally, socially, economically, and ethically feasible? These are the questions addressed in this review.
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Papers by Martin Marchman Andersen