I recently completed a PhD in philosophy at the New School for Social Research. My work focuses on German Idealism (mainly Hegel), the Frankfurt School (mainly Adorno), as well as social and political thought more generally. Supervisors: Jay Bernstein (advisor), Richard J. Bernstein, Frederick Neuhouser, and Rahel Jaeggi
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
While Hegel’s discussion of the “speculative sentence” occurs in the “Preface” to the Phenomenolo... more While Hegel’s discussion of the “speculative sentence” occurs in the “Preface” to the Phenomenology of Spirit, commentators rarely link it to the larger program of this text. Instead, this discussion has typically been received as a guide to the Science of Logic’s presentation, as an independent theory of judgment, or as a reflection on the constraints and capacities of language generally. In this paper I argue that the speculative sentence can and should be linked to the Phenomenology itself. Specifically, I show that Hegel’s discussion both mirrors and supplements the “Introduction’s” explication of immanent phenomenological method. Establishing this parallel in turn allows us to identify a class of sentences throughout the Phenomenology as properly speculative and methodologically substantive. At the same time, this interpretation helps clarify several characteristics that Hegel ascribes to the speculative sentence, but which have gone unaddressed by commentators.
While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, ... more While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase “second nature” in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures “natural consciousness,” “natural notion,” and “inorganic nature,” in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the “official” version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an “unofficial” version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a “second nature.”
I begin by identifying an ambiguity in the post-Hegelian literature on Immanent Critique, disting... more I begin by identifying an ambiguity in the post-Hegelian literature on Immanent Critique, distinguishing two possible definitions: (a) judging an object against its “internal” norms; and (b) accounting for one’s own standpoint with reference to the object. I then claim that both definitions are represented in Hegel’s Phenomenology, and develop extended interpretations of material from the Einleitung, in order to clarify and substantiate this thesis. This yields revisionist readings of the famous “internal criteria” and “self examination” tropes. My discussion builds towards elucidating the relation between the two definitions of Immanent Critique I have distinguished, as it is developed in the Phenomenology.
This dissertation is a reconstruction of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit that establishes it... more This dissertation is a reconstruction of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit that establishes its underlying continuity with “Frankfurt School” thought. In three parts, it shows how Hegel’s early text expounds the “inner cells” of a unified and defensible critical theory. Part I shows that the Phenomenology obeys an exacting model of “immanent critique” – a philosophical method that promotes a self-reflexive transformation in “spirit.” I additionally connect Hegel’s discussion of “speculative sentences” to this immanent method. Part II develops an interpretation of the “object” corresponding to this method, so-called “natural consciousness.” I claim that the Phenomenology exhibits natural consciousness as the bearer of a “second nature” that must be “defetishized” through Hegel’s critical procedure. Further, I show that, in the “blindness” suffered by natural consciousness, Hegel has constructed an early model of “ideological delusion.” Part III advances the view that the entire Phenomenology can be read as a derivation of the immanent-critical standpoint, as it subverts all standpoints that remain “external” to their objects. The Phenomenology suggests, in fact, that this structure of “externality” is at the core of three modern “rational pathologies”: namely, “instrumental reason,” “nihilistic disenchantment,” and “moralizing criticism.” The Conclusion recollects the various “cells” isolated in the preceding discussion and integrates them into a Hegelian Critical Theory. The dissertation ends by contemplating several intellectual-historical questions regarding Hegel’s own intentions for such a critically transformative philosophy.
A Hegel-Studien book review of Alan Brudner's The Owl and the Rooster: Hegel’s Transformative Pol... more A Hegel-Studien book review of Alan Brudner's The Owl and the Rooster: Hegel’s Transformative Political Science, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
In this paper, I establish Hegel as an original theorist and critic of instrumental reason. I beg... more In this paper, I establish Hegel as an original theorist and critic of instrumental reason. I begin by showing that the Frankfurt School’s concept of instrumental reason, though frequently conflated with Weber’s Zweckrationälitat, or “means-ends” reason, has a substantially different – though connected – meaning. I then examine critical theory’s frequent use of the “instrument” metaphor to underscore this concept’s complexity. In the remainder of the paper, I consider Hegel’s own recurrent use of this metaphor, alongside his related treatments of Verstand, or the “understanding,” and mathematical cognition. I conclude by reconstructing Hegel’s view of the connection between Verstand and practical life-contexts of “means-ends” reasoning. In this way, I show that, beyond anticipating or even inspiring the Frankfurt School’s concept of instrumental reason, Hegel clarified its components and their interconnection, and thus identified a conceptual unity that has been neglected by critical theory itself. Hence Hegel is interpreted as a sophisticated analyst of an enduringly relevant phenomenon, from whom critical theory still has something to learn.
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
While Hegel’s discussion of the “speculative sentence” occurs in the “Preface” to the Phenomenolo... more While Hegel’s discussion of the “speculative sentence” occurs in the “Preface” to the Phenomenology of Spirit, commentators rarely link it to the larger program of this text. Instead, this discussion has typically been received as a guide to the Science of Logic’s presentation, as an independent theory of judgment, or as a reflection on the constraints and capacities of language generally. In this paper I argue that the speculative sentence can and should be linked to the Phenomenology itself. Specifically, I show that Hegel’s discussion both mirrors and supplements the “Introduction’s” explication of immanent phenomenological method. Establishing this parallel in turn allows us to identify a class of sentences throughout the Phenomenology as properly speculative and methodologically substantive. At the same time, this interpretation helps clarify several characteristics that Hegel ascribes to the speculative sentence, but which have gone unaddressed by commentators.
While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, ... more While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase “second nature” in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures “natural consciousness,” “natural notion,” and “inorganic nature,” in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the “official” version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an “unofficial” version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a “second nature.”
I begin by identifying an ambiguity in the post-Hegelian literature on Immanent Critique, disting... more I begin by identifying an ambiguity in the post-Hegelian literature on Immanent Critique, distinguishing two possible definitions: (a) judging an object against its “internal” norms; and (b) accounting for one’s own standpoint with reference to the object. I then claim that both definitions are represented in Hegel’s Phenomenology, and develop extended interpretations of material from the Einleitung, in order to clarify and substantiate this thesis. This yields revisionist readings of the famous “internal criteria” and “self examination” tropes. My discussion builds towards elucidating the relation between the two definitions of Immanent Critique I have distinguished, as it is developed in the Phenomenology.
This dissertation is a reconstruction of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit that establishes it... more This dissertation is a reconstruction of Hegel’s 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit that establishes its underlying continuity with “Frankfurt School” thought. In three parts, it shows how Hegel’s early text expounds the “inner cells” of a unified and defensible critical theory. Part I shows that the Phenomenology obeys an exacting model of “immanent critique” – a philosophical method that promotes a self-reflexive transformation in “spirit.” I additionally connect Hegel’s discussion of “speculative sentences” to this immanent method. Part II develops an interpretation of the “object” corresponding to this method, so-called “natural consciousness.” I claim that the Phenomenology exhibits natural consciousness as the bearer of a “second nature” that must be “defetishized” through Hegel’s critical procedure. Further, I show that, in the “blindness” suffered by natural consciousness, Hegel has constructed an early model of “ideological delusion.” Part III advances the view that the entire Phenomenology can be read as a derivation of the immanent-critical standpoint, as it subverts all standpoints that remain “external” to their objects. The Phenomenology suggests, in fact, that this structure of “externality” is at the core of three modern “rational pathologies”: namely, “instrumental reason,” “nihilistic disenchantment,” and “moralizing criticism.” The Conclusion recollects the various “cells” isolated in the preceding discussion and integrates them into a Hegelian Critical Theory. The dissertation ends by contemplating several intellectual-historical questions regarding Hegel’s own intentions for such a critically transformative philosophy.
A Hegel-Studien book review of Alan Brudner's The Owl and the Rooster: Hegel’s Transformative Pol... more A Hegel-Studien book review of Alan Brudner's The Owl and the Rooster: Hegel’s Transformative Political Science, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
In this paper, I establish Hegel as an original theorist and critic of instrumental reason. I beg... more In this paper, I establish Hegel as an original theorist and critic of instrumental reason. I begin by showing that the Frankfurt School’s concept of instrumental reason, though frequently conflated with Weber’s Zweckrationälitat, or “means-ends” reason, has a substantially different – though connected – meaning. I then examine critical theory’s frequent use of the “instrument” metaphor to underscore this concept’s complexity. In the remainder of the paper, I consider Hegel’s own recurrent use of this metaphor, alongside his related treatments of Verstand, or the “understanding,” and mathematical cognition. I conclude by reconstructing Hegel’s view of the connection between Verstand and practical life-contexts of “means-ends” reasoning. In this way, I show that, beyond anticipating or even inspiring the Frankfurt School’s concept of instrumental reason, Hegel clarified its components and their interconnection, and thus identified a conceptual unity that has been neglected by critical theory itself. Hence Hegel is interpreted as a sophisticated analyst of an enduringly relevant phenomenon, from whom critical theory still has something to learn.
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