Even though their views differ on what constitutes the proper relationship between morality and t... more Even though their views differ on what constitutes the proper relationship between morality and the law, Aquinas, J.S. Mill and Brentano all agree that the state is morally justified in inflicting punishment on those who are found guilty of infringing state law and committing crime. Punishment is necessary, they argue, for the purposes of bringing about law compliance and a better society. Punishment, however, steps in after the law has not been complied with and, even when transacted, punishment is no guarantee of any moral betterment in society. Notwithstanding the different moral theories that Aquinas, Mill and Brentano elaborate, this paper argues that each of these authors hold an a priori moral conviction in the state's justification of punishment, but this cherished conviction can be called into question on practical, moral and state grounds.
All of Brentano's students recall the burning sense of a mission to render philosophy a science t... more All of Brentano's students recall the burning sense of a mission to render philosophy a science that permeated the core of their mentor's being and teaching, but what kind of science does Brentano defend for philosophy in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) and new science of descriptive psychology which he subsequently elaborated in his lectures in philosophy at the University of Vienna in the 1880s? Brentano would like us to believe that he is continuing the perennial science of philosophy as inaugurated by the ancient Greeks, and by Aristotle in particular, into the nineteenth century. This article, however, argues that once Brentano accepts the status of the newly emerging natural science of psychology and adopts in the 1870s a Humean philosophical approach to the mind and its contents, he cannot, despite his best efforts, establish the continuity of philosophy as philosophia perennis that exists before and after the modern conception of natural science. He thus defends for the science of philosophy instead, a psychology from an empirical standpoint that is fully modern in temperament, yet one that is neither fully empirical or rational in Hume or Kant's sense nor a capitulation to the method of the natural sciences in general and fledgling natural science of empirical psychology in particular.
Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill, Sep 5, 2022
In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), Brentano defines psychology as the science of ... more In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), Brentano defines psychology as the science of psychical phenomena rather than study of the soul. As such, he does not address Hume’s objection regarding the existence of the soul as substantial bearer of human experiences or his conclusion that the “self” is merely “a bundle of perceptions.” Yet Brentano has an implicit understanding of the self that radically challenges various conceptions of self by Hume, Kant, Mill, Comte and others. This paper explains how Brentano circumvents Hume’s “problem of the I,” by calling into question his views on causality and outlines certain features of Brentano’s account of the self that are most relevant to its understanding and evaluation. In conclusion, it argues that there is another “problem of the I” in Brentano’s understanding of the self in PES, to which he is oblivious, but which some of his followers struggled to resolve.
This paper investigates the different ‘scientific’ methods of enquiry that were proposed by Brent... more This paper investigates the different ‘scientific’ methods of enquiry that were proposed by Brentano, Dilthey, and Husserl in late nineteenth-century philosophy as background to understanding the philosophical dispute that later emerged between Husserl and Heidegger regarding the definition of phenomenology in the twentieth century. It argues that once Heidegger accepts both Dilthey’s approach and hermeneutic method of enquiry into human experiences, he is unable to follow Husserl in his development of Brentano’s idea of a descriptive science of consciousness and its objectivities into an eidetic science of pure intentional consciousness.
Even though their views differ on what constitutes the proper relationship between morality and t... more Even though their views differ on what constitutes the proper relationship between morality and the law, Aquinas, J.S. Mill and Brentano all agree that the state is morally justified in inflicting punishment on those who are found guilty of infringing state law and committing crime. Punishment is necessary, they argue, for the purposes of bringing about law compliance and a better society. Punishment, however, steps in after the law has not been complied with and, even when transacted, punishment is no guarantee of any moral betterment in society. Notwithstanding the different moral theories that Aquinas, Mill and Brentano elaborate, this paper argues that each of these authors hold an a priori moral conviction in the state's justification of punishment, but this cherished conviction can be called into question on practical, moral and state grounds.
All of Brentano's students recall the burning sense of a mission to render philosophy a science t... more All of Brentano's students recall the burning sense of a mission to render philosophy a science that permeated the core of their mentor's being and teaching, but what kind of science does Brentano defend for philosophy in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) and new science of descriptive psychology which he subsequently elaborated in his lectures in philosophy at the University of Vienna in the 1880s? Brentano would like us to believe that he is continuing the perennial science of philosophy as inaugurated by the ancient Greeks, and by Aristotle in particular, into the nineteenth century. This article, however, argues that once Brentano accepts the status of the newly emerging natural science of psychology and adopts in the 1870s a Humean philosophical approach to the mind and its contents, he cannot, despite his best efforts, establish the continuity of philosophy as philosophia perennis that exists before and after the modern conception of natural science. He thus defends for the science of philosophy instead, a psychology from an empirical standpoint that is fully modern in temperament, yet one that is neither fully empirical or rational in Hume or Kant's sense nor a capitulation to the method of the natural sciences in general and fledgling natural science of empirical psychology in particular.
Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill, Sep 5, 2022
In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), Brentano defines psychology as the science of ... more In Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), Brentano defines psychology as the science of psychical phenomena rather than study of the soul. As such, he does not address Hume’s objection regarding the existence of the soul as substantial bearer of human experiences or his conclusion that the “self” is merely “a bundle of perceptions.” Yet Brentano has an implicit understanding of the self that radically challenges various conceptions of self by Hume, Kant, Mill, Comte and others. This paper explains how Brentano circumvents Hume’s “problem of the I,” by calling into question his views on causality and outlines certain features of Brentano’s account of the self that are most relevant to its understanding and evaluation. In conclusion, it argues that there is another “problem of the I” in Brentano’s understanding of the self in PES, to which he is oblivious, but which some of his followers struggled to resolve.
This paper investigates the different ‘scientific’ methods of enquiry that were proposed by Brent... more This paper investigates the different ‘scientific’ methods of enquiry that were proposed by Brentano, Dilthey, and Husserl in late nineteenth-century philosophy as background to understanding the philosophical dispute that later emerged between Husserl and Heidegger regarding the definition of phenomenology in the twentieth century. It argues that once Heidegger accepts both Dilthey’s approach and hermeneutic method of enquiry into human experiences, he is unable to follow Husserl in his development of Brentano’s idea of a descriptive science of consciousness and its objectivities into an eidetic science of pure intentional consciousness.
This book investigates the philosophical path that took Heidegger through phenomenology to the qu... more This book investigates the philosophical path that took Heidegger through phenomenology to the question of the meaning of Being, from his initial encounter with Husserl’s texts in phenomenology in 1909 to his definition of phenomenology as ‘fundamental ontology’ in Being and Time (1927). It explains how Heidegger comes to the conclusion, around 1919, that this question had been left ‘unthought’ by Husserl in phenomenology and phenomenological research and why he had go in search of an alternative method of enquiry to Husserl’s in order to retrieve this issue for phenomenology. The study identifies three methods of enquiry that Heidegger uses and that are of most relevance to his effort of ‘raising anew’ the question of the meaning of Being in phenomenology. These are: Dilthey’s historical-hermeneutic method, Kierkegaard’s existentialist method, and Schleiermacher’s biblical-hermeneutic method. It also investigates the centrality of Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological analysis of ‘being-for-death’ in Being and Time in terms of its unique contribution to philosophy and phenomenological research and as a radical immanent philosophical critique of Husserl’s version of post-Kantian transcendental idealism defended in Ideas I (1913).
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Papers by Cyril McDonnell