I'm an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore. I got my Ph.D. from UC Berkeley in 1999. My advisors were Hans Sluga and Hubert Dreyfus.
Poets would make pronouncements about these Movements in an expansive tone of voice, like that us... more Poets would make pronouncements about these Movements in an expansive tone of voice, like that used when offering one another drinks, and as a rule they could look after themselves. But when an earnest logical student takes up this line of talk he gets bogged down very rapidly; I have seen it happen.
... S: In an age in which gestures of theoretical significance are backed by strangely few theori... more ... S: In an age in which gestures of theoretical significance are backed by strangely few theories, anti-theoretic gestures by strangely many, this slender reed of an argument may be grasped ... could be that those who think they get by fine with 'little theory' common sense, as it is ...
... perament and outlook. Defenders of dilemmas do tend to build defenses on Moorean lines:5 here... more ... perament and outlook. Defenders of dilemmas do tend to build defenses on Moorean lines:5 here is one dilemma (bran? dish Antigone); here is another (brandish Agamemnon); so there are moral dilem? mas; actual implies possible; moral dilemmas are possible. ...
Caricature and comics are elastic categories. This essay treats caricature not as a type or aspec... more Caricature and comics are elastic categories. This essay treats caricature not as a type or aspect of comics but as a window through which we can view comics in relation to the broader European visual art tradition. Caricature is exaggeration. But all art exaggerates, insofar as it stylizes. Is all art caricature, since all has 'style'? Ernst Gombrich's classic Art and Illusion comes close to arguing so. This article conjoins critical reflections on Gombrich's discussion of 'the experiment of caricature' with a survey of art historical paradigm cases. It makes sense for comics to emerge from this mix.
This review appeared in "The Common Review" way back in 2006. I don't seem to have a copy of the ... more This review appeared in "The Common Review" way back in 2006. I don't seem to have a copy of the printed version (now where did I put that thing?) It has no web presence I can detect. Did I really publish it, or was it all a dream? Well, here it is. Kind of a clever old piece, I think.
This is the text of a brief talk I delivered at the ALSC annual conference in New Orleans in 2004... more This is the text of a brief talk I delivered at the ALSC annual conference in New Orleans in 2004. I discuss, on the one hand, typical hostility to (filmic) adaptation of literary material; on the other, the sheer oddity of the notion that there could be any presumptive harm in adaptation (it being a standard feature for organisms to exhibit, in the process of reproduction.)
Let a genuine moral dilemma be any situation answering to this
description: (1) an agent, M, is c... more Let a genuine moral dilemma be any situation answering to this description: (1) an agent, M, is categorically (absolutely, all things considered) obliged to do A, and can do A; (2) M is categorically (etc.) obliged to do B, and can do B; (3) M cannot do both A and B. Can there be genuine moral dilemmas? Some argue any such situation is strictly contradictory (Brink's versions of these arguments are canvased.) The correct answer is: yes. The key to eliminating any appearance of contradiction is to analyze obligation statements as conditionals: if you do not fulfill your obligations, you are bad. (Very informal gloss.) If you are obliged to do A and obliged not to do A, this isn't a contradiction. It is the basis of proof that you are/will be a bad person. The paper's conclusion discusses how standard deontic logic can encourage confusion on this score:
"one slides, unawares, from talk about the actual world into talk about a deontically perfect world in which all obligations are satisfied. One may – after taking a quick look around – conclude there can be no genuine moral dilemmas here, which is true enough. What does not follow is anything whatsoever about the actual world.
Once clarity concerning domains of discourse is restored, defenders of dilemmas can grant that, to be sure, deontically perfect worlds contain no moral dilemmas. (It is illogical to suppose an angel – incapable of wrong-doing – could confront a moral dilemma.) All the same, it does not appear to be a truth of logic that there must always be deontically perfect possible worlds counterpart to the actual one. So it is not a truth of logic that moral dilemmas are impossible."
Redefining comics offers a indirect defense of Scott McCloud's famous definition of 'comics': “ju... more Redefining comics offers a indirect defense of Scott McCloud's famous definition of 'comics': “juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, intended to convey information and/or to produce an aesthetic response in the viewer.” Meskin (and others) have critiqued its inadequacies. It doesn't do a good job of catching all and only the cases we intuitively label 'comics' (although McCloud implies this is the job of a definition.) I defend like so: another job of a definition is to provide insight, by making us see connections where our intuitive labeling scheme might have obscured them. If we take McCloud flatly 'comics' might turn out to be a hugely accommodating category. For example, ordinary novels - consisting only of words - might be reclassified as 'pictureless comics'. This is not a redesignation we are seriously going to adopt, in ordinary usage, but there is something formally logical about it: picture + text the normal, standard, paradigm case. Pure picture products (see your local museum for details) and pure text products (visit the library) are, formally, limit cases. Putting it another way, McCloud definition may fit, more nearly, the class of cases we classify as: graphic design. Again, it is reasonable to regard this as an error on McCloud's part. His book is "Understanding Comics", not "Understanding Graphic Design". But it is fair to say, as well, that his book, when it first appeared, inspired enthusiasm from readers who were not just comics fans (and scholars) but students of graphic design. McCloud's insights into 'how comics works' are insights into how graphic design works - how pictures and text function together. How two-dimensional surfaces 'read'.
Philosophy and Literature, 2004, 28: 430–440, 2004
A short discussion piece on Slavoj Zizek's short book, "On Belief". From my conclusion: "A health... more A short discussion piece on Slavoj Zizek's short book, "On Belief". From my conclusion: "A healthy liberal is one who dialectically tacks and trims, in pursuit of liberty, between extremes of illiberal arch-rationalism and anti-rationalism. I have been tunneling to this exact point from the opposite direction: an unhealthy anti-liberal is one, like Zizek, who ticks and tocks in unreflective revulsion at liberalism, pantomiming that he is de Maistre (or Abraham) or Robespierre (or Lenin) by turns, lest he look like Mill." That about sums the paper.
Presentism styles itself a distinctive critical approach to literary texts, characterized by heig... more Presentism styles itself a distinctive critical approach to literary texts, characterized by heightened self-critical awareness and complementing (rather than competing with) historicism. It’s main proponents—Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes—are Shakespearean scholars, and in several recent works, including a recent anthology (Presentist Shakespeares), they elaborate and showcase their approach. This essay argues that the likes of Grady and Hawkes have failed to face up to the simple consideration that ‘presentism’ means a species of error, or it means nothing. They have also failed to square up, satisfactorily, against what is evidently their real target: namely, post-Theory approaches to Shakespeare. (David Kastan is a named target, but is really more a convenient marker for the target zone, due to the title of his book: Shakespeare After Theory.) Presentism is, in effect, oblique apologetics for Theory, but in fact fails to say anything in its defense.
The 4th edition of our textbook. It contains 3 Plato dialogues, general introductory commentary o... more The 4th edition of our textbook. It contains 3 Plato dialogues, general introductory commentary on Plato and specific, lengthy commentary on each dialogue. The 3rd edition was published by Pearson. This 4th edition is self-published using Amazon Createspace. It is available in paper and Kindle formats from Amazon (and other e-book retailers). It is also available as a free PDF download here at academia.edu and also from the book site: www.reasonandpersuasion.com (which may be more convenient for students accessing it.) We hope some instructors will decide that free is good, and the book is good, and they will adopt it for course use. It is intended for use as an introductory textbook, but should also be of interest to more advanced students of Plato. The world already contains many Plato books. What is worse (from an author's point of view): many are good! Ours is, at any rate, different. Also, cartoons.
In " Pictorial Diversity " , John Kulvicki argues that the lack of a certain sort of interpretive... more In " Pictorial Diversity " , John Kulvicki argues that the lack of a certain sort of interpretive diversity, in practice, needs explanation, and some theories are better situated, others worse, to provide it. This paper argues that the shoe is on the other foot. The diversity Kulvicki finds peculiarly absent is exceedingly common. We habitually apply competing schemes, of the sort he says we do not, without noticing we are doing so, or how. A puzzle: why can't we say what shape Charlie Brown's head is? How long is the long-necked Madonna's neck? And a hypothesis: recognitional pandemonium? Even if the hypothesis is too speculative, the diversity it seeks to explain is real.
Political philosophers doing ‘ideal theory’ have weak heads for the relationship between their su... more Political philosophers doing ‘ideal theory’ have weak heads for the relationship between their subject and ‘real politics’. An old complaint, but here is a new version: academic political philosophy has a blind spot for conservatism, due to the dominance of Rawlsian liberalism, due to Rawls having a blind spot for conservatism, due to Rawls having a blind spot for partisanship. In Rawls’ ‘realistic utopia’ of political liberalism, partisanship is non-compliance, idealized away. Is this hopelessly unrealistic, since humans will always exhibit partisanship—and perhaps a good thing, too; so this omission is also hopelessly un-idealistic? The paper defends the view that Rawls-style ideal theory is, in principle, fine. It needs supplementing by—not synthesis with—something else. The problem is not that it is unrealistic but that it conflates distinct levels of idealization, producing incoherent results that also tend to interfere with maintenance of healthy line-of-sight relations to real politics.
Gendler takes 'the puzzle of imaginative resistance' to be that of 'explaining comparative diffic... more Gendler takes 'the puzzle of imaginative resistance' to be that of 'explaining comparative difficulty imagining fictional worlds we take to be morally deviant.' Gendler follows Walton, who focuses on difficulties 'making true', where fictional morality is concerned. The puzzle seems real but is dissolved by reflections on genre. Absurdism is not the same as absurdity. Philosophers have wrongly conflated imaginative resistance with aesthetic failure. Further reflections solve the 'imaginability puzzle': much genre fiction invites morally deviant imaginings, yet without making deviant moralities fictionally true. Ethical escapism, of this sort, is of interest to moral psychologists, as well as students of genre. It seems neglected by both.
A combination composed of a sacrifice has more immediate effect upon the person playing over the ... more A combination composed of a sacrifice has more immediate effect upon the person playing over the game in which it occurs than another combination, because the apparent senselessness of the sacrifice is convincing proof of the design of the player offering it. Hence it comes that the risk of material, and the victory of the weaker material over the stronger material, gives the impression of a symbol of the mastery of mind over matter. Now we see wherein lies the pleasure to be derived from a chess combination. It lies in the feeling that a human mind is behind the game dominating the inanimate pieces with which the game is carried on, and giving them the breath of life. – R. Reti, Modern Ideas in Chess
This is the second of two mock-Platonic dialogues I wrote back in the mid-aughts. The other is "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Theory For Life". This is the sequel, although it's stand-alone. The idea: consider the algebraic notation of a classic chess game, the so-called "Immortal", as a poem. Now knock various theories of poetic language and meaning against this case and watch them fall to pieces. Probably I should rewrite it as an essay. But then what would become of all the Macbeth jokes? (There are a lot!)
Poets would make pronouncements about these Movements in an expansive tone of voice, like that us... more Poets would make pronouncements about these Movements in an expansive tone of voice, like that used when offering one another drinks, and as a rule they could look after themselves. But when an earnest logical student takes up this line of talk he gets bogged down very rapidly; I have seen it happen.
... S: In an age in which gestures of theoretical significance are backed by strangely few theori... more ... S: In an age in which gestures of theoretical significance are backed by strangely few theories, anti-theoretic gestures by strangely many, this slender reed of an argument may be grasped ... could be that those who think they get by fine with 'little theory' common sense, as it is ...
... perament and outlook. Defenders of dilemmas do tend to build defenses on Moorean lines:5 here... more ... perament and outlook. Defenders of dilemmas do tend to build defenses on Moorean lines:5 here is one dilemma (bran? dish Antigone); here is another (brandish Agamemnon); so there are moral dilem? mas; actual implies possible; moral dilemmas are possible. ...
Caricature and comics are elastic categories. This essay treats caricature not as a type or aspec... more Caricature and comics are elastic categories. This essay treats caricature not as a type or aspect of comics but as a window through which we can view comics in relation to the broader European visual art tradition. Caricature is exaggeration. But all art exaggerates, insofar as it stylizes. Is all art caricature, since all has 'style'? Ernst Gombrich's classic Art and Illusion comes close to arguing so. This article conjoins critical reflections on Gombrich's discussion of 'the experiment of caricature' with a survey of art historical paradigm cases. It makes sense for comics to emerge from this mix.
This review appeared in "The Common Review" way back in 2006. I don't seem to have a copy of the ... more This review appeared in "The Common Review" way back in 2006. I don't seem to have a copy of the printed version (now where did I put that thing?) It has no web presence I can detect. Did I really publish it, or was it all a dream? Well, here it is. Kind of a clever old piece, I think.
This is the text of a brief talk I delivered at the ALSC annual conference in New Orleans in 2004... more This is the text of a brief talk I delivered at the ALSC annual conference in New Orleans in 2004. I discuss, on the one hand, typical hostility to (filmic) adaptation of literary material; on the other, the sheer oddity of the notion that there could be any presumptive harm in adaptation (it being a standard feature for organisms to exhibit, in the process of reproduction.)
Let a genuine moral dilemma be any situation answering to this
description: (1) an agent, M, is c... more Let a genuine moral dilemma be any situation answering to this description: (1) an agent, M, is categorically (absolutely, all things considered) obliged to do A, and can do A; (2) M is categorically (etc.) obliged to do B, and can do B; (3) M cannot do both A and B. Can there be genuine moral dilemmas? Some argue any such situation is strictly contradictory (Brink's versions of these arguments are canvased.) The correct answer is: yes. The key to eliminating any appearance of contradiction is to analyze obligation statements as conditionals: if you do not fulfill your obligations, you are bad. (Very informal gloss.) If you are obliged to do A and obliged not to do A, this isn't a contradiction. It is the basis of proof that you are/will be a bad person. The paper's conclusion discusses how standard deontic logic can encourage confusion on this score:
"one slides, unawares, from talk about the actual world into talk about a deontically perfect world in which all obligations are satisfied. One may – after taking a quick look around – conclude there can be no genuine moral dilemmas here, which is true enough. What does not follow is anything whatsoever about the actual world.
Once clarity concerning domains of discourse is restored, defenders of dilemmas can grant that, to be sure, deontically perfect worlds contain no moral dilemmas. (It is illogical to suppose an angel – incapable of wrong-doing – could confront a moral dilemma.) All the same, it does not appear to be a truth of logic that there must always be deontically perfect possible worlds counterpart to the actual one. So it is not a truth of logic that moral dilemmas are impossible."
Redefining comics offers a indirect defense of Scott McCloud's famous definition of 'comics': “ju... more Redefining comics offers a indirect defense of Scott McCloud's famous definition of 'comics': “juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, intended to convey information and/or to produce an aesthetic response in the viewer.” Meskin (and others) have critiqued its inadequacies. It doesn't do a good job of catching all and only the cases we intuitively label 'comics' (although McCloud implies this is the job of a definition.) I defend like so: another job of a definition is to provide insight, by making us see connections where our intuitive labeling scheme might have obscured them. If we take McCloud flatly 'comics' might turn out to be a hugely accommodating category. For example, ordinary novels - consisting only of words - might be reclassified as 'pictureless comics'. This is not a redesignation we are seriously going to adopt, in ordinary usage, but there is something formally logical about it: picture + text the normal, standard, paradigm case. Pure picture products (see your local museum for details) and pure text products (visit the library) are, formally, limit cases. Putting it another way, McCloud definition may fit, more nearly, the class of cases we classify as: graphic design. Again, it is reasonable to regard this as an error on McCloud's part. His book is "Understanding Comics", not "Understanding Graphic Design". But it is fair to say, as well, that his book, when it first appeared, inspired enthusiasm from readers who were not just comics fans (and scholars) but students of graphic design. McCloud's insights into 'how comics works' are insights into how graphic design works - how pictures and text function together. How two-dimensional surfaces 'read'.
Philosophy and Literature, 2004, 28: 430–440, 2004
A short discussion piece on Slavoj Zizek's short book, "On Belief". From my conclusion: "A health... more A short discussion piece on Slavoj Zizek's short book, "On Belief". From my conclusion: "A healthy liberal is one who dialectically tacks and trims, in pursuit of liberty, between extremes of illiberal arch-rationalism and anti-rationalism. I have been tunneling to this exact point from the opposite direction: an unhealthy anti-liberal is one, like Zizek, who ticks and tocks in unreflective revulsion at liberalism, pantomiming that he is de Maistre (or Abraham) or Robespierre (or Lenin) by turns, lest he look like Mill." That about sums the paper.
Presentism styles itself a distinctive critical approach to literary texts, characterized by heig... more Presentism styles itself a distinctive critical approach to literary texts, characterized by heightened self-critical awareness and complementing (rather than competing with) historicism. It’s main proponents—Hugh Grady and Terence Hawkes—are Shakespearean scholars, and in several recent works, including a recent anthology (Presentist Shakespeares), they elaborate and showcase their approach. This essay argues that the likes of Grady and Hawkes have failed to face up to the simple consideration that ‘presentism’ means a species of error, or it means nothing. They have also failed to square up, satisfactorily, against what is evidently their real target: namely, post-Theory approaches to Shakespeare. (David Kastan is a named target, but is really more a convenient marker for the target zone, due to the title of his book: Shakespeare After Theory.) Presentism is, in effect, oblique apologetics for Theory, but in fact fails to say anything in its defense.
The 4th edition of our textbook. It contains 3 Plato dialogues, general introductory commentary o... more The 4th edition of our textbook. It contains 3 Plato dialogues, general introductory commentary on Plato and specific, lengthy commentary on each dialogue. The 3rd edition was published by Pearson. This 4th edition is self-published using Amazon Createspace. It is available in paper and Kindle formats from Amazon (and other e-book retailers). It is also available as a free PDF download here at academia.edu and also from the book site: www.reasonandpersuasion.com (which may be more convenient for students accessing it.) We hope some instructors will decide that free is good, and the book is good, and they will adopt it for course use. It is intended for use as an introductory textbook, but should also be of interest to more advanced students of Plato. The world already contains many Plato books. What is worse (from an author's point of view): many are good! Ours is, at any rate, different. Also, cartoons.
In " Pictorial Diversity " , John Kulvicki argues that the lack of a certain sort of interpretive... more In " Pictorial Diversity " , John Kulvicki argues that the lack of a certain sort of interpretive diversity, in practice, needs explanation, and some theories are better situated, others worse, to provide it. This paper argues that the shoe is on the other foot. The diversity Kulvicki finds peculiarly absent is exceedingly common. We habitually apply competing schemes, of the sort he says we do not, without noticing we are doing so, or how. A puzzle: why can't we say what shape Charlie Brown's head is? How long is the long-necked Madonna's neck? And a hypothesis: recognitional pandemonium? Even if the hypothesis is too speculative, the diversity it seeks to explain is real.
Political philosophers doing ‘ideal theory’ have weak heads for the relationship between their su... more Political philosophers doing ‘ideal theory’ have weak heads for the relationship between their subject and ‘real politics’. An old complaint, but here is a new version: academic political philosophy has a blind spot for conservatism, due to the dominance of Rawlsian liberalism, due to Rawls having a blind spot for conservatism, due to Rawls having a blind spot for partisanship. In Rawls’ ‘realistic utopia’ of political liberalism, partisanship is non-compliance, idealized away. Is this hopelessly unrealistic, since humans will always exhibit partisanship—and perhaps a good thing, too; so this omission is also hopelessly un-idealistic? The paper defends the view that Rawls-style ideal theory is, in principle, fine. It needs supplementing by—not synthesis with—something else. The problem is not that it is unrealistic but that it conflates distinct levels of idealization, producing incoherent results that also tend to interfere with maintenance of healthy line-of-sight relations to real politics.
Gendler takes 'the puzzle of imaginative resistance' to be that of 'explaining comparative diffic... more Gendler takes 'the puzzle of imaginative resistance' to be that of 'explaining comparative difficulty imagining fictional worlds we take to be morally deviant.' Gendler follows Walton, who focuses on difficulties 'making true', where fictional morality is concerned. The puzzle seems real but is dissolved by reflections on genre. Absurdism is not the same as absurdity. Philosophers have wrongly conflated imaginative resistance with aesthetic failure. Further reflections solve the 'imaginability puzzle': much genre fiction invites morally deviant imaginings, yet without making deviant moralities fictionally true. Ethical escapism, of this sort, is of interest to moral psychologists, as well as students of genre. It seems neglected by both.
A combination composed of a sacrifice has more immediate effect upon the person playing over the ... more A combination composed of a sacrifice has more immediate effect upon the person playing over the game in which it occurs than another combination, because the apparent senselessness of the sacrifice is convincing proof of the design of the player offering it. Hence it comes that the risk of material, and the victory of the weaker material over the stronger material, gives the impression of a symbol of the mastery of mind over matter. Now we see wherein lies the pleasure to be derived from a chess combination. It lies in the feeling that a human mind is behind the game dominating the inanimate pieces with which the game is carried on, and giving them the breath of life. – R. Reti, Modern Ideas in Chess
This is the second of two mock-Platonic dialogues I wrote back in the mid-aughts. The other is "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Theory For Life". This is the sequel, although it's stand-alone. The idea: consider the algebraic notation of a classic chess game, the so-called "Immortal", as a poem. Now knock various theories of poetic language and meaning against this case and watch them fall to pieces. Probably I should rewrite it as an essay. But then what would become of all the Macbeth jokes? (There are a lot!)
"Poets would make pronouncements about these Movements in an expansive tone of voice, like that u... more "Poets would make pronouncements about these Movements in an expansive tone of voice, like that used when offering one another drinks, and as a rule they could look after themselves. But when an earnest logical student takes up this line of talk he gets bogged down very rapidly; I have seen it happen." - W. Empson
Way back in the mid-aughts I slaved hard to produce two brilliant, polished, patently unpublishable mock-platonic dialogues, this being the larger of the two. The other is "Poems and Problems". (Why didn't I notice these were unpublishable? Perhaps I wrongly supposed 'aughts implies can'. It was another time.) At any rate, this is some of the best philosophy I ever wrote. It's a parody of Plato's "Phaedrus" (I'm looking at you, Derrida!) I thought about calling it "Big Pharma", on account of its bulk. Basically, it's a Socratic deconstruction of 'Theory', in the literary studies sense. I think it's great. How did it ever get into my head to write it? But no one will ever publish it. But you can read it. Maybe someone will.
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description: (1) an agent, M, is categorically (absolutely, all things
considered) obliged to do A, and can do A; (2) M is categorically (etc.) obliged to do B, and can do B; (3) M cannot do both A and B.
Can there be genuine moral dilemmas? Some argue any such situation is strictly contradictory (Brink's versions of these arguments are canvased.) The correct answer is: yes. The key to eliminating any appearance of contradiction is to analyze obligation statements as conditionals: if you do not fulfill your obligations, you are bad. (Very informal gloss.) If you are obliged to do A and obliged not to do A, this isn't a contradiction. It is the basis of proof that you are/will be a bad person. The paper's conclusion discusses how standard deontic logic can encourage confusion on this score:
"one slides, unawares, from talk about the actual world into talk about a deontically perfect world in which all obligations are satisfied. One may – after taking a quick look around – conclude there can be no genuine moral dilemmas here, which is true enough. What does not follow is anything whatsoever about the actual world.
Once clarity concerning domains of discourse is restored,
defenders of dilemmas can grant that, to be sure, deontically perfect worlds contain no moral dilemmas. (It is illogical to suppose an angel – incapable of wrong-doing – could confront a moral dilemma.) All the same, it does not appear to be a truth of logic that there must always be deontically perfect possible worlds counterpart to the actual one. So it is not a truth of logic that moral dilemmas are impossible."
This is the second of two mock-Platonic dialogues I wrote back in the mid-aughts. The other is "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Theory For Life". This is the sequel, although it's stand-alone. The idea: consider the algebraic notation of a classic chess game, the so-called "Immortal", as a poem. Now knock various theories of poetic language and meaning against this case and watch them fall to pieces. Probably I should rewrite it as an essay. But then what would become of all the Macbeth jokes? (There are a lot!)
description: (1) an agent, M, is categorically (absolutely, all things
considered) obliged to do A, and can do A; (2) M is categorically (etc.) obliged to do B, and can do B; (3) M cannot do both A and B.
Can there be genuine moral dilemmas? Some argue any such situation is strictly contradictory (Brink's versions of these arguments are canvased.) The correct answer is: yes. The key to eliminating any appearance of contradiction is to analyze obligation statements as conditionals: if you do not fulfill your obligations, you are bad. (Very informal gloss.) If you are obliged to do A and obliged not to do A, this isn't a contradiction. It is the basis of proof that you are/will be a bad person. The paper's conclusion discusses how standard deontic logic can encourage confusion on this score:
"one slides, unawares, from talk about the actual world into talk about a deontically perfect world in which all obligations are satisfied. One may – after taking a quick look around – conclude there can be no genuine moral dilemmas here, which is true enough. What does not follow is anything whatsoever about the actual world.
Once clarity concerning domains of discourse is restored,
defenders of dilemmas can grant that, to be sure, deontically perfect worlds contain no moral dilemmas. (It is illogical to suppose an angel – incapable of wrong-doing – could confront a moral dilemma.) All the same, it does not appear to be a truth of logic that there must always be deontically perfect possible worlds counterpart to the actual one. So it is not a truth of logic that moral dilemmas are impossible."
This is the second of two mock-Platonic dialogues I wrote back in the mid-aughts. The other is "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Theory For Life". This is the sequel, although it's stand-alone. The idea: consider the algebraic notation of a classic chess game, the so-called "Immortal", as a poem. Now knock various theories of poetic language and meaning against this case and watch them fall to pieces. Probably I should rewrite it as an essay. But then what would become of all the Macbeth jokes? (There are a lot!)
Way back in the mid-aughts I slaved hard to produce two brilliant, polished, patently unpublishable mock-platonic dialogues, this being the larger of the two. The other is "Poems and Problems". (Why didn't I notice these were unpublishable? Perhaps I wrongly supposed 'aughts implies can'. It was another time.) At any rate, this is some of the best philosophy I ever wrote. It's a parody of Plato's "Phaedrus" (I'm looking at you, Derrida!) I thought about calling it "Big Pharma", on account of its bulk. Basically, it's a Socratic deconstruction of 'Theory', in the literary studies sense. I think it's great. How did it ever get into my head to write it? But no one will ever publish it. But you can read it. Maybe someone will.