Working at the interface of policy-making and academia, I bring applied advisory policy experience and scholarly expertise in the areas of social policy, remittances, conflict prevention, decentralization and governance in the Middle East. With nearly 15 years of field experience, I've served in several capacities at the United Nations including Governance Officer on Iraq, Chief of Technical Cooperation, as well as First Governance Officer on Syria at ESCWA. In these capacities, I led research projects, facilitated dialogues, advised governments, managed programs, and raised funds. Previously, I was a Visiting Research Scholar at UC Berkeley, Assistant Professor at Arizona State University, and a post-doctoral fellow at Wesleyan. Supervisors: Richard Sandbrook and Dickson Eyoh
Many countries emerged from the Arab Spring uprisings seriously weakened by conflict and politica... more Many countries emerged from the Arab Spring uprisings seriously weakened by conflict and political deadlock. Observers have concluded that democratic progress in those countries has largely been hampered by divisive politics and the increasing fragmentation of society. Many argue that the social-political divide is on generational lines and that dissatisfied youth, accounting for around 20 per cent of the region’s population, is a driver of that polarization. The study looks at two questions: To what extent is there a sociopolitical divide along generational lines and whether or not the region is witnessing youth-driven polarization. It explores patterns of youth preferences and behaviour in the region based on 2010-2014 World Values Survey (WVS) data from 60 countries, including nine Arab countries in transition (ACTs). The arguments on youth bulge linking young demographics to violence and instability need to be revisited. Although, according to data, young people are more likely to view the use of force as justifiable to achieve certain ends, they are also more likely to have positive views on democracy. A close look at the degree of divergence in youth preferences reveals that, as far as strategies of mobilization and political orientation go, youth cannot be seen as a cohesive category or collective actor. For that they are too divided among themselves. The degree of their ideological radicalization is comparable to that of older generations. Standard deviation analysis of responses shows that, as a group, young people disagree more strongly among themselves than older generations on issues of ideology, the use of violence for political action, and the role of religious institutions. The findings also make evident that youth are not necessarily at the forefront of struggles for democratic change and that young people and older generations value civil rights equally. They are also at odds with claims that young people, as an “economic underclass”, are more likely to support distribution of income and less likely to be divided on that subject than people in other age groups. Analysis of the survey responses shows that the issue of gender equality is highly controversial among young people in eight of the nine ACTs surveyed.
This rich anthology offers twenty studies on instances of emerging social justice and women's... more This rich anthology offers twenty studies on instances of emerging social justice and women's empowerment in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. These areas are home to large populations where women's rights have withered under patriarchal rule, and many are beset by civic unrest. The book shows how changes are occurring as flood tides of capital, people, and information erode entrenched gender regimes, giving birth to energetic and forward-thinking women's movements. Highly original, conceptually sophisticated, and eminently readable, this book illustrates how local women are transforming their collective fates by questioning their status, forming alliances, demanding full participation in economic development and the political process, and mining the opportunities afforded by globalization.
Viewed from a distance the ongoing protests that have swept across Arab countries seem broadly si... more Viewed from a distance the ongoing protests that have swept across Arab countries seem broadly similar. Youths play a predominant role in spurring them through social media, broad segments of society seem to bandwagon with the protestors, and Tunisia’s “Jasmine revolution” has provided a blueprint for these grassroots mobilizations. Belligerent regimes respond by employing a mix of repression, new subsidies, employment programs and political reforms in an effort to stem the tide of change. Pivotally, the army’s stance seems to determine outcomes that range from brutal suppression and/or civil war in Syria, and Libya to relatively peaceful regime change in Egypt and Tunisia. One of the most dominant explanations of the mobilizations is that the protests are born out of systemic economic pressures, which in the Middle Eastern contexts coincide with fundamental contradictions between free markets and authoritarian rule. In this view, the world recession’s impact on migrant workers’ rem...
C'est l'économie, idiot ! » Les soulèvements au Bahreïn, en Égypte et en Tunisie par Asya... more C'est l'économie, idiot ! » Les soulèvements au Bahreïn, en Égypte et en Tunisie par Asya El Meehy le s actions de masse qui ont agité le monde arabe en 2010-2011 sont plus souvent considérées comme un phénomène régional homogène que comme des événements distincts, avec leur propre dynamique interne et leur propre distribution des rôles entre acteurs sociaux. Selon l'historien Perry Anderson, elles font partie d'une catégorie rare d'événements historiques : « Un enchaînement d'insurrections politiques se propageant dans toute une région, chacune constituant le détonateur de la suivante » 1 . Aussi nombre d'auteurs jugent-ils vain de penser les soulèvements arabes autrement qu'au singulier : non seulement « la révolution arabe » 2 plongerait ses racines dans les formes de pouvoir néopatrimonial typiques de la région, mais encore ses objectifs, ses modes opératoires et le rôle de pointe qu'y a joué la jeunesse rendraient négligeables les différences...
C'est l'économie, idiot ! » Les soulèvements au Bahreïn, en Égypte et en Tunisie par Asya... more C'est l'économie, idiot ! » Les soulèvements au Bahreïn, en Égypte et en Tunisie par Asya El Meehy le s actions de masse qui ont agité le monde arabe en 2010-2011 sont plus souvent considérées comme un phénomène régional homogène que comme des événements distincts, avec leur propre dynamique interne et leur propre distribution des rôles entre acteurs sociaux. Selon l'historien Perry Anderson, elles font partie d'une catégorie rare d'événements historiques : « Un enchaînement d'insurrections politiques se propageant dans toute une région, chacune constituant le détonateur de la suivante » 1 . Aussi nombre d'auteurs jugent-ils vain de penser les soulèvements arabes autrement qu'au singulier : non seulement « la révolution arabe » 2 plongerait ses racines dans les formes de pouvoir néopatrimonial typiques de la région, mais encore ses objectifs, ses modes opératoires et le rôle de pointe qu'y a joué la jeunesse rendraient négligeables les différences...
As in Bill Clinton’s famous quip, “It’s the economy, stupid!” the revolts of the Arab Spring are ... more As in Bill Clinton’s famous quip, “It’s the economy, stupid!” the revolts of the Arab Spring are often treated as a single monolithic phenomenon born of systemic economic pressures. A critical look at this dominant narrative reveals some of its internal contradictions as well as its inability to account for differences between Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain. In order to evaluate the relative place occupied by the economy and politics in the grievances voiced by the populations in question, this article begins with a comparative political economic analysis of the three uprisings. Highlighting the unique role played by middle class youth in all of them, it notes that, despite the targeted measures taken on their behalf by authoritarian regimes, young people suffered from both high unemployment and relative deprivation. Yet economic grievance was not always the principal source of revolt and the relative importance of the middle classes, the poor, workers’ organizations and pro-democracy m...
Iraq’s decentralization experiment sheds lights on the challenges of fundamentally overhauling th... more Iraq’s decentralization experiment sheds lights on the challenges of fundamentally overhauling the unitary state’s structure to create a federal system in post-conflict countries with strong cultural and institutional legacies of centralization. Despite officially adopting a-symmetrical federalism since 2005, the state structure has remained high centralized. In light of the emerging consensus that decentralization is imperative for the country’s long-term development and stability, the study critically analyses its record of reforms. It identifies two generations of reforms, one geared towards de-concentration (2008-2012) and another oriented towards delegation of powers, resources and mandates (2013-). Using a comparative historical analytical framework and based on in-depth interviews with policymakers and stakeholders, the study inductively pinpoints the underlying legalinstitutional, economic, ideational and power dynamics that have hindered the implementation of reforms thus f...
ABSTRACT This thesis explores the relationship between private industrialists and the state in Eg... more ABSTRACT This thesis explores the relationship between private industrialists and the state in Egypt since 1974. What is the nature of the local bourgeoisie? How capable is the state and how far does the East-Asian model of benevolent state autonomy apply to the case of Egypt? How has the adoption of economic liberalization affected business state relations? To address these questions, the industrial sector is analyzed as a case study. The approach adopted here is that of political economy and involves a comparison across the last three decades. Based on developments in the industrial policy, the distribution of private investment, the institutional environment and the structure of the manufacturing sector, the study demonstrates that state capacity in Egypt is low and the fundamental division among the bourgeoisie is size-based. The state's autonomy has not contributed to its ability to direct and undergo structural transformation. Further, its accommodation of the business sector has not been accompanied by private sector growth since discriminatory incentives favouring large enterprises and the prevalence of a system of 'crony capitalism', have impeded smaller firms from access to the available opportunities. Indeed, the leaders of the business power center, who contribute most to private investment, have been maneuvered by the state to support the political status quo.
.................................................................................................... more ............................................................................................................................ 4 About the Author .............................................................................................................. 4 I. Contrasting Inner Dynamics and Patterns of Mobilization ........................................ 7 Labor Movements ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 Pro-democracy Movements �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 Urban vs� Rural Poor �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8 Geographies of the Uprisings ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8 II. Economic Contexts ....................................................................................................... 9 III. Relative Deprivation and Young Middle Class Protestors ......................................11 IV. Political Sparks of the Uprisings ..............................................................................14 V. Finding the Balance: Economic versus Political Grievances ...................................16 VI. Conclusion .................................................................................................................19 References ......................................................................................................................20
iv Acronyms vi Appendix 271 Bibliography 279 Introduction 1 I. Puzzle 4 II. Welfare Retrenchment ... more iv Acronyms vi Appendix 271 Bibliography 279 Introduction 1 I. Puzzle 4 II. Welfare Retrenchment and Social Expenditures in MENA 11 III. Contrasting Retrenchment Patters 17 Chapter I: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 28 I. Welfare Politics in the Middle East 29 II. Origins and Types of Developed Welfare States 33 III. Welfare States in the South 37 IV. Politics of Retrenchment 47 A. External Influences 48 B. Economic Adjustment and Welfare Reforms 54 C. Politics of Welfare Regime Change 61 V. The Argument 70 VI. Research Design and Methodology 71 VII. Outline of Chapters 73 Chapter II: Egypt’s Welfare Regime from Expansion to Retrenchment 75 I. The Origins of Egypt’s Welfare Regime 1936-1951 76 II. The Insurance-based Egalitarian Regime 1952-1986 84 A. Social Insurance 88 B. Cash Transfers 94 C. Income Generation Schemes 97 D. Subsidies 98 III. Hidden Retrenchment 1987105 A. Fiscal Reforms and the Political Economy of Welfare 108 B. The SFD and Hidden Patterns of Retrench...
Iraq’s decentralization experiment sheds lights on the challenges of fundamentally overhauling th... more Iraq’s decentralization experiment sheds lights on the challenges of fundamentally overhauling the unitary state’s structure to create a federal system in post-conflict countries with strong cultural and institutional legacies of centralization. Despite officially adopting a-symmetrical federalism since 2005, the state structure has remained high centralized. In light of the emerging consensus that decentralization is imperative for the country’s long-term development and stability, the study critically analyses its record of reforms. It identifies two generations of reforms, one geared towards de-concentration (2008-2012) and another oriented towards delegation of powers, resources and mandates (2013-). Using a comparative historical analytical framework and based on in-depth interviews with policymakers and stakeholders, the study inductively pinpoints the underlying legal institutional, economic, ideational and power dynamics that have hindered the implementation of reforms thus far. It puts forward policy recommendations aimed at shifting the policy-framing of decentralization, strengthening institutional arrangements for reforms, deepening links to the citizenry, moderating the system’s asymmetry and pursuing financial decentralization.
Many countries emerged from the Arab Spring uprisings seriously weakened by conflict and politica... more Many countries emerged from the Arab Spring uprisings seriously weakened by conflict and political deadlock. Observers have concluded that democratic progress in those countries has largely been hampered by divisive politics and the increasing fragmentation of society. Many argue that the social-political divide is on generational lines and that dissatisfied youth, accounting for around 20 per cent of the region’s population, is a driver of that polarization. The study looks at two questions: To what extent is there a sociopolitical divide along generational lines and whether or not the region is witnessing youth-driven polarization. It explores patterns of youth preferences and behaviour in the region based on 2010-2014 World Values Survey (WVS) data from 60 countries, including nine Arab countries in transition (ACTs). The arguments on youth bulge linking young demographics to violence and instability need to be revisited. Although, according to data, young people are more likely to view the use of force as justifiable to achieve certain ends, they are also more likely to have positive views on democracy. A close look at the degree of divergence in youth preferences reveals that, as far as strategies of mobilization and political orientation go, youth cannot be seen as a cohesive category or collective actor. For that they are too divided among themselves. The degree of their ideological radicalization is comparable to that of older generations. Standard deviation analysis of responses shows that, as a group, young people disagree more strongly among themselves than older generations on issues of ideology, the use of violence for political action, and the role of religious institutions. The findings also make evident that youth are not necessarily at the forefront of struggles for democratic change and that young people and older generations value civil rights equally. They are also at odds with claims that young people, as an “economic underclass”, are more likely to support distribution of income and less likely to be divided on that subject than people in other age groups. Analysis of the survey responses shows that the issue of gender equality is highly controversial among young people in eight of the nine ACTs surveyed.
This rich anthology offers twenty studies on instances of emerging social justice and women's... more This rich anthology offers twenty studies on instances of emerging social justice and women's empowerment in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. These areas are home to large populations where women's rights have withered under patriarchal rule, and many are beset by civic unrest. The book shows how changes are occurring as flood tides of capital, people, and information erode entrenched gender regimes, giving birth to energetic and forward-thinking women's movements. Highly original, conceptually sophisticated, and eminently readable, this book illustrates how local women are transforming their collective fates by questioning their status, forming alliances, demanding full participation in economic development and the political process, and mining the opportunities afforded by globalization.
Viewed from a distance the ongoing protests that have swept across Arab countries seem broadly si... more Viewed from a distance the ongoing protests that have swept across Arab countries seem broadly similar. Youths play a predominant role in spurring them through social media, broad segments of society seem to bandwagon with the protestors, and Tunisia’s “Jasmine revolution” has provided a blueprint for these grassroots mobilizations. Belligerent regimes respond by employing a mix of repression, new subsidies, employment programs and political reforms in an effort to stem the tide of change. Pivotally, the army’s stance seems to determine outcomes that range from brutal suppression and/or civil war in Syria, and Libya to relatively peaceful regime change in Egypt and Tunisia. One of the most dominant explanations of the mobilizations is that the protests are born out of systemic economic pressures, which in the Middle Eastern contexts coincide with fundamental contradictions between free markets and authoritarian rule. In this view, the world recession’s impact on migrant workers’ rem...
C'est l'économie, idiot ! » Les soulèvements au Bahreïn, en Égypte et en Tunisie par Asya... more C'est l'économie, idiot ! » Les soulèvements au Bahreïn, en Égypte et en Tunisie par Asya El Meehy le s actions de masse qui ont agité le monde arabe en 2010-2011 sont plus souvent considérées comme un phénomène régional homogène que comme des événements distincts, avec leur propre dynamique interne et leur propre distribution des rôles entre acteurs sociaux. Selon l'historien Perry Anderson, elles font partie d'une catégorie rare d'événements historiques : « Un enchaînement d'insurrections politiques se propageant dans toute une région, chacune constituant le détonateur de la suivante » 1 . Aussi nombre d'auteurs jugent-ils vain de penser les soulèvements arabes autrement qu'au singulier : non seulement « la révolution arabe » 2 plongerait ses racines dans les formes de pouvoir néopatrimonial typiques de la région, mais encore ses objectifs, ses modes opératoires et le rôle de pointe qu'y a joué la jeunesse rendraient négligeables les différences...
C'est l'économie, idiot ! » Les soulèvements au Bahreïn, en Égypte et en Tunisie par Asya... more C'est l'économie, idiot ! » Les soulèvements au Bahreïn, en Égypte et en Tunisie par Asya El Meehy le s actions de masse qui ont agité le monde arabe en 2010-2011 sont plus souvent considérées comme un phénomène régional homogène que comme des événements distincts, avec leur propre dynamique interne et leur propre distribution des rôles entre acteurs sociaux. Selon l'historien Perry Anderson, elles font partie d'une catégorie rare d'événements historiques : « Un enchaînement d'insurrections politiques se propageant dans toute une région, chacune constituant le détonateur de la suivante » 1 . Aussi nombre d'auteurs jugent-ils vain de penser les soulèvements arabes autrement qu'au singulier : non seulement « la révolution arabe » 2 plongerait ses racines dans les formes de pouvoir néopatrimonial typiques de la région, mais encore ses objectifs, ses modes opératoires et le rôle de pointe qu'y a joué la jeunesse rendraient négligeables les différences...
As in Bill Clinton’s famous quip, “It’s the economy, stupid!” the revolts of the Arab Spring are ... more As in Bill Clinton’s famous quip, “It’s the economy, stupid!” the revolts of the Arab Spring are often treated as a single monolithic phenomenon born of systemic economic pressures. A critical look at this dominant narrative reveals some of its internal contradictions as well as its inability to account for differences between Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain. In order to evaluate the relative place occupied by the economy and politics in the grievances voiced by the populations in question, this article begins with a comparative political economic analysis of the three uprisings. Highlighting the unique role played by middle class youth in all of them, it notes that, despite the targeted measures taken on their behalf by authoritarian regimes, young people suffered from both high unemployment and relative deprivation. Yet economic grievance was not always the principal source of revolt and the relative importance of the middle classes, the poor, workers’ organizations and pro-democracy m...
Iraq’s decentralization experiment sheds lights on the challenges of fundamentally overhauling th... more Iraq’s decentralization experiment sheds lights on the challenges of fundamentally overhauling the unitary state’s structure to create a federal system in post-conflict countries with strong cultural and institutional legacies of centralization. Despite officially adopting a-symmetrical federalism since 2005, the state structure has remained high centralized. In light of the emerging consensus that decentralization is imperative for the country’s long-term development and stability, the study critically analyses its record of reforms. It identifies two generations of reforms, one geared towards de-concentration (2008-2012) and another oriented towards delegation of powers, resources and mandates (2013-). Using a comparative historical analytical framework and based on in-depth interviews with policymakers and stakeholders, the study inductively pinpoints the underlying legalinstitutional, economic, ideational and power dynamics that have hindered the implementation of reforms thus f...
ABSTRACT This thesis explores the relationship between private industrialists and the state in Eg... more ABSTRACT This thesis explores the relationship between private industrialists and the state in Egypt since 1974. What is the nature of the local bourgeoisie? How capable is the state and how far does the East-Asian model of benevolent state autonomy apply to the case of Egypt? How has the adoption of economic liberalization affected business state relations? To address these questions, the industrial sector is analyzed as a case study. The approach adopted here is that of political economy and involves a comparison across the last three decades. Based on developments in the industrial policy, the distribution of private investment, the institutional environment and the structure of the manufacturing sector, the study demonstrates that state capacity in Egypt is low and the fundamental division among the bourgeoisie is size-based. The state's autonomy has not contributed to its ability to direct and undergo structural transformation. Further, its accommodation of the business sector has not been accompanied by private sector growth since discriminatory incentives favouring large enterprises and the prevalence of a system of 'crony capitalism', have impeded smaller firms from access to the available opportunities. Indeed, the leaders of the business power center, who contribute most to private investment, have been maneuvered by the state to support the political status quo.
.................................................................................................... more ............................................................................................................................ 4 About the Author .............................................................................................................. 4 I. Contrasting Inner Dynamics and Patterns of Mobilization ........................................ 7 Labor Movements ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 Pro-democracy Movements �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������7 Urban vs� Rural Poor �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8 Geographies of the Uprisings ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������8 II. Economic Contexts ....................................................................................................... 9 III. Relative Deprivation and Young Middle Class Protestors ......................................11 IV. Political Sparks of the Uprisings ..............................................................................14 V. Finding the Balance: Economic versus Political Grievances ...................................16 VI. Conclusion .................................................................................................................19 References ......................................................................................................................20
iv Acronyms vi Appendix 271 Bibliography 279 Introduction 1 I. Puzzle 4 II. Welfare Retrenchment ... more iv Acronyms vi Appendix 271 Bibliography 279 Introduction 1 I. Puzzle 4 II. Welfare Retrenchment and Social Expenditures in MENA 11 III. Contrasting Retrenchment Patters 17 Chapter I: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 28 I. Welfare Politics in the Middle East 29 II. Origins and Types of Developed Welfare States 33 III. Welfare States in the South 37 IV. Politics of Retrenchment 47 A. External Influences 48 B. Economic Adjustment and Welfare Reforms 54 C. Politics of Welfare Regime Change 61 V. The Argument 70 VI. Research Design and Methodology 71 VII. Outline of Chapters 73 Chapter II: Egypt’s Welfare Regime from Expansion to Retrenchment 75 I. The Origins of Egypt’s Welfare Regime 1936-1951 76 II. The Insurance-based Egalitarian Regime 1952-1986 84 A. Social Insurance 88 B. Cash Transfers 94 C. Income Generation Schemes 97 D. Subsidies 98 III. Hidden Retrenchment 1987105 A. Fiscal Reforms and the Political Economy of Welfare 108 B. The SFD and Hidden Patterns of Retrench...
Iraq’s decentralization experiment sheds lights on the challenges of fundamentally overhauling th... more Iraq’s decentralization experiment sheds lights on the challenges of fundamentally overhauling the unitary state’s structure to create a federal system in post-conflict countries with strong cultural and institutional legacies of centralization. Despite officially adopting a-symmetrical federalism since 2005, the state structure has remained high centralized. In light of the emerging consensus that decentralization is imperative for the country’s long-term development and stability, the study critically analyses its record of reforms. It identifies two generations of reforms, one geared towards de-concentration (2008-2012) and another oriented towards delegation of powers, resources and mandates (2013-). Using a comparative historical analytical framework and based on in-depth interviews with policymakers and stakeholders, the study inductively pinpoints the underlying legal institutional, economic, ideational and power dynamics that have hindered the implementation of reforms thus far. It puts forward policy recommendations aimed at shifting the policy-framing of decentralization, strengthening institutional arrangements for reforms, deepening links to the citizenry, moderating the system’s asymmetry and pursuing financial decentralization.
The end of Hosni Mubarak’s rule in Egypt saw tightening government controls over national civil s... more The end of Hosni Mubarak’s rule in Egypt saw tightening government controls over national civil society organizations throughout the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood and the popular neo-authoritarian military regime that followed it after the 2013 coup. Nonetheless, the ongoing political transformations in Egypt also opened new spaces for civic activism at the local level. Grassroots popular committees, or lijan shaabya, emerged as a vital actor in the post-Mubarak Egyptian political landscape. Committees, which sprang up during the January 25th uprising as citizen watch brigades, were locally embedded structures loosely bound by, common ideological framing, shared symbols and overlapping social networks.
Mapping Local Governance in Syria- A Baseline Study, 2020
Inter-Syrian dialogue is increasingly converging on the establishment of a form of democratic dec... more Inter-Syrian dialogue is increasingly converging on the establishment of a form of democratic decentralization as a cornerstone of the country’s future political order. The purpose of this report is to lay the groundwork for any future local governance assistance framework as part of stabilization programming following a political settlement based on United Nations Security Council resolution 2254. Despite the wealth of studies on the future shape of the Syrian State, the debate has remained largely removed from local governance dynamics on the ground. This study seeks to map the functional presence of local governments and the varieties of de facto decision-making arrangements in five sites across the country. The selected areas fall under the control of the Government, the autonomous administration in the north-east, the Turkish authorities along the border, and Hay’et Tahrir al Sham (HTS) in the north-west. As background to the mapping exercise, the report begins by analysing the officially prevailing local administration system in the country, including contradictions, gaps and challenges in the implementation of decentralization reforms enacted in the wake of the uprising, through Law 107. Our analysis shows that there are significant gaps across the various de jure local governance models, on the one hand, and de facto local power dynamics, on the other hand. These can be attributed to the weak institutional development of local authorities, which not only lack resources and technical capacities but also compete with powerful parallel hierarchies. Findings from this baseline mapping demonstrate significant divergence in organizational structures of local authorities, their autonomy, capacity to raise revenues, and prevailing centre-periphery relations. Nonetheless, they also highlight the following five shared local governance deficits: lack of democratic accountability, weak institutionalization of local council structures and restricted de facto powers, lack of technical capacities, community disengagement with ad hoc or sporadic horizontal decentralization initiatives, and uneven decentralization on the administrative, fiscal and political fronts.
Localizing SDGs and Decentralization of public Services in Iraq: Final Workshop Report, 2017
The report is based on assessment workshop aimed at supporting reforms at the planning and organi... more The report is based on assessment workshop aimed at supporting reforms at the planning and organizational levels of public services in Iraq. First, at the planning level, the workshop addressed the issues of adapting and designing governorate level plans for SDGs by applying an integrated development in the health, educational, labor, and social affairs sectors. Second, on the organizational level of the sector, the workshop identified weaknesses, obstacles, and success stories in the administrative decentralization of the health, education and social affairs ministries. It brought together stakeholders from the central, governorate and sectoral levels. It included a group of Iraqi government officials with expertise from the Higher Commission for Coordination across Provinces, the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. It also targeted local members from planning and development councils, local elected councils and governors' councils, as well as local officials. Participants were chosen from three governorates: Karbala, Al-Diwaniyah, and Anbar, and by that they collected important variations, both in terms of development and in terms of exposure to terrorism and violence in Iraq.
In the wake of the uprisings in Egypt and Syria, new modes of grassroots governing emerged. In b... more In the wake of the uprisings in Egypt and Syria, new modes of grassroots governing emerged. In both countries, new bodies arose to perform a range of services that were formally fulfilled by central governments, or by local institutions that were organized in a top-down fashion. In Egypt, it was the Local Popular Committees (LPCs), and in Syria, the Local Administrative Councils (LACs). The LPCs and LACs both held promise as examples of bottom-up governance with democratic ambitions, in countries where such efforts had been in extremely short supply. With original empirical research, the author investigates the success of the LPCs and LACs in fulfilling their aims of building inclusive, democratic, locally led governance. She finds that by several metrics, and for different reasons that depend much on the contrasting contexts of Egypt and Syria, the bodies have so far fallen short of empowered participatory governance principles. Still, they represent a watershed moment for governance practices in the two countries, and indicate that locally driven organizing will be enduringly relevant in the years ahead.
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Papers by Asya El-Meehy
the study critically analyses its record of reforms. It identifies two generations of reforms, one geared towards de-concentration (2008-2012) and another oriented towards delegation of powers, resources
and mandates (2013-). Using a comparative historical analytical framework and based on in-depth interviews with policymakers and stakeholders, the study inductively pinpoints the underlying legal institutional, economic, ideational and power dynamics that have hindered the implementation of reforms thus far. It puts forward policy recommendations aimed at shifting the policy-framing of decentralization, strengthening institutional arrangements for reforms, deepening links to the citizenry, moderating the system’s asymmetry and pursuing financial decentralization.
the study critically analyses its record of reforms. It identifies two generations of reforms, one geared towards de-concentration (2008-2012) and another oriented towards delegation of powers, resources
and mandates (2013-). Using a comparative historical analytical framework and based on in-depth interviews with policymakers and stakeholders, the study inductively pinpoints the underlying legal institutional, economic, ideational and power dynamics that have hindered the implementation of reforms thus far. It puts forward policy recommendations aimed at shifting the policy-framing of decentralization, strengthening institutional arrangements for reforms, deepening links to the citizenry, moderating the system’s asymmetry and pursuing financial decentralization.
in the north-west. As background to the mapping exercise, the report begins by analysing the officially prevailing local administration system in the country, including contradictions, gaps and challenges in the implementation of decentralization reforms enacted in the wake of the uprising, through Law 107. Our analysis shows that there
are significant gaps across the various de jure local governance models, on the one hand, and de facto local power dynamics, on the other hand. These can be attributed to the weak institutional development of local authorities, which not only lack resources and technical capacities but also compete with powerful parallel hierarchies. Findings from this baseline mapping demonstrate significant divergence in organizational
structures of local authorities, their autonomy, capacity to raise revenues, and prevailing centre-periphery relations. Nonetheless, they also highlight the following five shared local governance deficits: lack of democratic accountability, weak institutionalization of local council structures and restricted de facto powers, lack of technical capacities, community disengagement with ad hoc or sporadic horizontal
decentralization initiatives, and uneven decentralization on the administrative, fiscal and political fronts.