Edward Harcourt’s research lies in ethics, in particular in moral psychology, and on the boundaries between ethics and the philosophy of mind. His special interests include neo-Aristotelianism and child development, ethical dimensions of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, the moral emotions, love and the virtues, and Nietzsche's ethics; the philosophy of mental health and mental illness; literature and philosophy; and Wittgenstein. A Fellow of Keble since 2005, he was previously Lecturer and then Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent, and before that Domus Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford. He has been a Mind Association Research Fellow and has held visiting appointments including Visiting Research Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, and Wittgenstein Professor at the University of Innsbruck. Before taking the BPhil and DPhil in Oxford he was an undergraduate at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he read Philosophy (Part I) and History (Part II). He was Principal Investigator of the Wellcome ISSF project ‘Therapeutic Conflicts: Co-Producing Meaning in Mental Health’ and of the AHRC International Research Network ‘The Development of Character: Attachment Theory and the Moral Psychology of Vice and Virtue’, and remains a director of the biennial Oxford Summer Schools in Philosophy and Psychiatry. He recently completed a four-year secondment to the UKRI Arts and Humanities Research Council as Director of Research, Strategy and Innovation. In addition to his role in the Philosophy Faculty, he is Professor of Philosophy in Oxford’s Department of Psychiatry where he leads on Patient and Public Involvement for the Oxford Health Biomedical Research Centre, and Academic Director of the Royal Institute of Philosophy.
Psychoanalytic writing rarely features on university ethics curricula, so the idea that psychoana... more Psychoanalytic writing rarely features on university ethics curricula, so the idea that psychoanalysis has a place in the history of ethics may be a surprise. The aim of the paper is to show that it should not be. The strategy is to sketch in outline an enduring line of inquiry in the history of ethics, namely the Platonic-Aristotelian investigation of the relationship between human nature, human excellence and the human good, and to suggest that psychoanalysis exemplifies it too. But since the suggestion, once made, seems not only true but obviously true, the paper spends some time exploring why the place of psychoanalysis in the history of ethics has so often been overlooked, before developing the outline more fully and offering detailed reasons as to why psychoanalysis fits it. One consequence is that Freudian and (in a sense explained) ‘relational’ variants of psychoanalysis continue the Platonic-Aristotelian line of inquiry in interestingly different ways.
The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool wi... more The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool with which to try to theorise what goes wrong when mental health service users are not listened to by clinicians, and what goes right when they are. Is the tool adequate to the task? It is argued that, to be applicable at all, the concept needs some adjustment so that being disbelieved as a result of prejudice is one of a family of alternative necessary conditions for its application, rather than a necessary condition all on its own. It is then argued that even once adjusted in this way, the concept does not fit well in the area where the biggest efforts have been made to apply it so far, namely the highly sensitive case of adult patients suffering from delusions. Indeed it does not serve the interests of service users struggling for recognition to try to apply it in this context, because there is so much more to being listened to than simply being believed. However, the concept is found t...
This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning ... more This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness. Then, relying on phenomena described by ‘extended mind’ theorists, I argue that a common view of self-regulation in children – that it is importantly other-dependent – is also true of adult self-regulation. But that is all the more reason to think that other-dependence and a well-functioning moral consciousness can go together. Moreover, since shame and guilt are one aspect of self-regulation, if other-dependence can be a characteristic generally of our well-functioning self-regulation – the ‘macro’ thesis – this supports the ‘micro’ thesis that other-dependence can characterize the well-functioning of both shame and guilt. The conclus...
Attachment and Character: Attachment Theory, Ethics and the Developmental Psychology of Vice and Virtue, 2021
Secure attachment is reliably associated with ‘the virtues of intimacy’ – the capacity to love we... more Secure attachment is reliably associated with ‘the virtues of intimacy’ – the capacity to love well, or to engage in love relations of the best sort. And there is a widely held intuition that the capacity to love well is associated with the virtues across the spectrum: loving well makes us good generally – get it right in the love department, and the rest will take care of itself. This intuition has filtered back into attachment theory, and informs efforts to trace a developmental connection between secure attachment in the early years and adult virtue. That is the first route from secure attachment to virtue. There is an a priori consideration to the effect that these efforts cannot succeed: the capacity to love well, and secure attachment itself, is a capacity trained upon a very small number of non-substitutible individuals, whereas the virtues (which include justice, fairness, fidelity to promises and so on) are in their nature said to be impartial. So how can a capacity of the first kind be the psychological foundation of a set of capacities of the latter kind? This paper develops that objection, and proposes a second route from secure attachment to virtue, though it remains an empirical matter whether the route is actually taken. Alongside its association with the virtues of intimacy, secure attachment is also associated with the disposition to explore the environment, both physical and social, and in a way which does not speak merely to the subject’s immediate needs or interests. Since virtues may be conceived of as patterns of sensitivity to reasons, and reasons may be conceived of as features of the environment, it should be no surprise if there is after all an association between security of attachment and the virtues beyond the virtues of intimacy.
Attachment and Character: Attachment Theory, Ethics and the Developmental Psychology of Vice and Virtue, 2021
There are many exciting points of contact between the questions pursued by attachment theory and ... more There are many exciting points of contact between the questions pursued by attachment theory and those first raised by Aristotle’s ethics, and which continue to preoccupy moral philosophers today. This volume brings experts from ethics and from attachment theory together to explore them for the first time, in order to show philosophers working in moral psychology, or in ‘virtue ethics’ – better, the triangle of relationships between the concepts of human nature, human excellence and the best life for human beings – that they both have more to learn from, and more to teach, developmental psychology in the attachment paradigm than has been thought to date. Attachment theory is a theory of psychological development. And the characteristics attachment theory is a developmental theory of – the various subvarieties of attachment – are evaluatively inflected: to be securely attached to a parent is to have a kind of attachment that makes for a good intimate relationship. But obviously the classification of human character in terms of the virtues and vices is evaluatively inflected too. So it would be strange if there were no story to be told about how these two sets of evaluatively inflected descriptions relate to one another. This collection of papers explores the latest empirical findings on the relationship between attachment and the vices and virtues, and the relative importance of attachment status as against other determinants of prosocial behaviour. It also probes the concept of the prosocial itself, and the connections between prosocial behaviour, virtue and the quality of the social environment; explores whether what we know about these connections casts light on whether there are even such things as stable character traits; and whether attachment theory, in locating the origins of virtue in secure attachment, and attachment dispositions in human evolutionary history, gives support to ethical naturalism, in any of the many meanings of that expression.
The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool wi... more The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool with which to try to theorise what goes wrong when mental health service users are not listened to by clinicians, and what goes right when they are. Is the tool adequate to the task? It is argued that, to be applicable at all, the concept needs some adjustment so that being disbelieved as a result of prejudice is one of a family of alternative necessary conditions for its application, rather than a necessary condition all on its own. It is then argued that even once adjusted in this way, the concept does not fit well in the area where the biggest efforts have been made to apply it so far, namely the highly sensitive case of adult patients suffering from delusions. Indeed it does not serve the interests of service users struggling for recognition to try to apply it in this context, because there is so much more to being listened to than simply being believed. However, the concept is found to apply smoothly in many cases where the service users are children, e.g. in relation to children's testimony on the efficacy of treatment. It is suggested that further research would demonstrate the usefulness of the concept in adult cases of a similar kind.
As Lamarque agrees, to read philosophy is to read for truth, so if literary fiction non-accidenta... more As Lamarque agrees, to read philosophy is to read for truth, so if literary fiction non-accidentally conveys philosophical claims, Lamarque's anti-cognitivist position on it must be flawed. Deploying Iris Murdoch's notion of the 'work' an author does in a text, I try to expand what should be ...
Psychoanalytic writing rarely features on university ethics curricula, so the idea that psychoana... more Psychoanalytic writing rarely features on university ethics curricula, so the idea that psychoanalysis has a place in the history of ethics may be a surprise. The aim of the paper is to show that it should not be. The strategy is to sketch in outline an enduring line of inquiry in the history of ethics, namely the Platonic-Aristotelian investigation of the relationship between human nature, human excellence and the human good, and to suggest that psychoanalysis exemplifies it too. But since the suggestion, once made, seems not only true but obviously true, the paper spends some time exploring why the place of psychoanalysis in the history of ethics has so often been overlooked, before developing the outline more fully and offering detailed reasons as to why psychoanalysis fits it. One consequence is that Freudian and (in a sense explained) ‘relational’ variants of psychoanalysis continue the Platonic-Aristotelian line of inquiry in interestingly different ways.
The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool wi... more The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool with which to try to theorise what goes wrong when mental health service users are not listened to by clinicians, and what goes right when they are. Is the tool adequate to the task? It is argued that, to be applicable at all, the concept needs some adjustment so that being disbelieved as a result of prejudice is one of a family of alternative necessary conditions for its application, rather than a necessary condition all on its own. It is then argued that even once adjusted in this way, the concept does not fit well in the area where the biggest efforts have been made to apply it so far, namely the highly sensitive case of adult patients suffering from delusions. Indeed it does not serve the interests of service users struggling for recognition to try to apply it in this context, because there is so much more to being listened to than simply being believed. However, the concept is found t...
This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning ... more This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness. Then, relying on phenomena described by ‘extended mind’ theorists, I argue that a common view of self-regulation in children – that it is importantly other-dependent – is also true of adult self-regulation. But that is all the more reason to think that other-dependence and a well-functioning moral consciousness can go together. Moreover, since shame and guilt are one aspect of self-regulation, if other-dependence can be a characteristic generally of our well-functioning self-regulation – the ‘macro’ thesis – this supports the ‘micro’ thesis that other-dependence can characterize the well-functioning of both shame and guilt. The conclus...
Attachment and Character: Attachment Theory, Ethics and the Developmental Psychology of Vice and Virtue, 2021
Secure attachment is reliably associated with ‘the virtues of intimacy’ – the capacity to love we... more Secure attachment is reliably associated with ‘the virtues of intimacy’ – the capacity to love well, or to engage in love relations of the best sort. And there is a widely held intuition that the capacity to love well is associated with the virtues across the spectrum: loving well makes us good generally – get it right in the love department, and the rest will take care of itself. This intuition has filtered back into attachment theory, and informs efforts to trace a developmental connection between secure attachment in the early years and adult virtue. That is the first route from secure attachment to virtue. There is an a priori consideration to the effect that these efforts cannot succeed: the capacity to love well, and secure attachment itself, is a capacity trained upon a very small number of non-substitutible individuals, whereas the virtues (which include justice, fairness, fidelity to promises and so on) are in their nature said to be impartial. So how can a capacity of the first kind be the psychological foundation of a set of capacities of the latter kind? This paper develops that objection, and proposes a second route from secure attachment to virtue, though it remains an empirical matter whether the route is actually taken. Alongside its association with the virtues of intimacy, secure attachment is also associated with the disposition to explore the environment, both physical and social, and in a way which does not speak merely to the subject’s immediate needs or interests. Since virtues may be conceived of as patterns of sensitivity to reasons, and reasons may be conceived of as features of the environment, it should be no surprise if there is after all an association between security of attachment and the virtues beyond the virtues of intimacy.
Attachment and Character: Attachment Theory, Ethics and the Developmental Psychology of Vice and Virtue, 2021
There are many exciting points of contact between the questions pursued by attachment theory and ... more There are many exciting points of contact between the questions pursued by attachment theory and those first raised by Aristotle’s ethics, and which continue to preoccupy moral philosophers today. This volume brings experts from ethics and from attachment theory together to explore them for the first time, in order to show philosophers working in moral psychology, or in ‘virtue ethics’ – better, the triangle of relationships between the concepts of human nature, human excellence and the best life for human beings – that they both have more to learn from, and more to teach, developmental psychology in the attachment paradigm than has been thought to date. Attachment theory is a theory of psychological development. And the characteristics attachment theory is a developmental theory of – the various subvarieties of attachment – are evaluatively inflected: to be securely attached to a parent is to have a kind of attachment that makes for a good intimate relationship. But obviously the classification of human character in terms of the virtues and vices is evaluatively inflected too. So it would be strange if there were no story to be told about how these two sets of evaluatively inflected descriptions relate to one another. This collection of papers explores the latest empirical findings on the relationship between attachment and the vices and virtues, and the relative importance of attachment status as against other determinants of prosocial behaviour. It also probes the concept of the prosocial itself, and the connections between prosocial behaviour, virtue and the quality of the social environment; explores whether what we know about these connections casts light on whether there are even such things as stable character traits; and whether attachment theory, in locating the origins of virtue in secure attachment, and attachment dispositions in human evolutionary history, gives support to ethical naturalism, in any of the many meanings of that expression.
The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool wi... more The concept of epistemic (specifically testimonial) injustice is the latest philosophical tool with which to try to theorise what goes wrong when mental health service users are not listened to by clinicians, and what goes right when they are. Is the tool adequate to the task? It is argued that, to be applicable at all, the concept needs some adjustment so that being disbelieved as a result of prejudice is one of a family of alternative necessary conditions for its application, rather than a necessary condition all on its own. It is then argued that even once adjusted in this way, the concept does not fit well in the area where the biggest efforts have been made to apply it so far, namely the highly sensitive case of adult patients suffering from delusions. Indeed it does not serve the interests of service users struggling for recognition to try to apply it in this context, because there is so much more to being listened to than simply being believed. However, the concept is found to apply smoothly in many cases where the service users are children, e.g. in relation to children's testimony on the efficacy of treatment. It is suggested that further research would demonstrate the usefulness of the concept in adult cases of a similar kind.
As Lamarque agrees, to read philosophy is to read for truth, so if literary fiction non-accidenta... more As Lamarque agrees, to read philosophy is to read for truth, so if literary fiction non-accidentally conveys philosophical claims, Lamarque's anti-cognitivist position on it must be flawed. Deploying Iris Murdoch's notion of the 'work' an author does in a text, I try to expand what should be ...
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Papers by Edward Harcourt
Attachment theory is a theory of psychological development. And the characteristics attachment theory is a developmental theory of – the various subvarieties of attachment – are evaluatively inflected: to be securely attached to a parent is to have a kind of attachment that makes for a good intimate relationship. But obviously the classification of human character in terms of the virtues and vices is evaluatively inflected too. So it would be strange if there were no story to be told about how these two sets of evaluatively inflected descriptions relate to one another. This collection of papers explores the latest empirical findings on the relationship between attachment and the vices and virtues, and the relative importance of attachment status as against other determinants of prosocial behaviour. It also probes the concept of the prosocial itself, and the connections between prosocial behaviour, virtue and the quality of the social environment; explores whether what we know about these connections casts light on whether there are even such things as stable character traits; and whether attachment theory, in locating the origins of virtue in secure attachment, and attachment dispositions in human evolutionary history, gives support to ethical naturalism, in any of the many meanings of that expression.
Attachment theory is a theory of psychological development. And the characteristics attachment theory is a developmental theory of – the various subvarieties of attachment – are evaluatively inflected: to be securely attached to a parent is to have a kind of attachment that makes for a good intimate relationship. But obviously the classification of human character in terms of the virtues and vices is evaluatively inflected too. So it would be strange if there were no story to be told about how these two sets of evaluatively inflected descriptions relate to one another. This collection of papers explores the latest empirical findings on the relationship between attachment and the vices and virtues, and the relative importance of attachment status as against other determinants of prosocial behaviour. It also probes the concept of the prosocial itself, and the connections between prosocial behaviour, virtue and the quality of the social environment; explores whether what we know about these connections casts light on whether there are even such things as stable character traits; and whether attachment theory, in locating the origins of virtue in secure attachment, and attachment dispositions in human evolutionary history, gives support to ethical naturalism, in any of the many meanings of that expression.