This paper argues that we can comparatively benefit and harm someone by creating her.
First I d... more This paper argues that we can comparatively benefit and harm someone by creating her.
First I defend a conception of comparative benenfit and harm that asks which of the options available to the agent are better for the patient. Second I argue that we can hold that existing can be better for the patient than never having existed without inviting unpalatable normative implications or doing violence to our understanding of the betterness relation. Third I show that the comparison between the patient's existence and her non-existence cannot be a wellbeing comparison.
Still, I argue, the comparison is intelligible. I conclude that if I create a child and it has a good life, this is better for the child and I benenfit it. If I do not create the child, I neither harm nor benenfit it. I should thus be praised if I create it, but not reprimanded if I don't.
Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve recently pointed out that the way
prioritarianism handles pros... more Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve recently pointed out that the way
prioritarianism handles prospects is worrisome. They also proposed a
version of deontic egalitarianism which does better.
This paper shows that their challenge applies to telic moderate egalitarianism too. It then asks: assuming that at least parts of the challenge are cogent - how should prioritarians and egalitarians respond?
Telic egalitarians, it is argued, can simply amend their view. Doing so will alwaysbe preferable to accepting Otsuka and Voorhoeve's deontic account.
Amending egalitarianism is not an entirely unproblematic solution. If
only certain parts of the challenge are cogent we should thus adopt
a view which is pluralist in an interesting way. Prioritarians can also
respond to parts of the challenge by adopting such a view. If all parts
of the challenge are cogent they can adopt a version of Otsuka and
Voorhoeve's deontic account.
This paper argues that we can comparatively benefit and harm someone by creating her.
First I d... more This paper argues that we can comparatively benefit and harm someone by creating her.
First I defend a conception of comparative benenfit and harm that asks which of the options available to the agent are better for the patient. Second I argue that we can hold that existing can be better for the patient than never having existed without inviting unpalatable normative implications or doing violence to our understanding of the betterness relation. Third I show that the comparison between the patient's existence and her non-existence cannot be a wellbeing comparison.
Still, I argue, the comparison is intelligible. I conclude that if I create a child and it has a good life, this is better for the child and I benenfit it. If I do not create the child, I neither harm nor benenfit it. I should thus be praised if I create it, but not reprimanded if I don't.
Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve recently pointed out that the way
prioritarianism handles pros... more Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve recently pointed out that the way
prioritarianism handles prospects is worrisome. They also proposed a
version of deontic egalitarianism which does better.
This paper shows that their challenge applies to telic moderate egalitarianism too. It then asks: assuming that at least parts of the challenge are cogent - how should prioritarians and egalitarians respond?
Telic egalitarians, it is argued, can simply amend their view. Doing so will alwaysbe preferable to accepting Otsuka and Voorhoeve's deontic account.
Amending egalitarianism is not an entirely unproblematic solution. If
only certain parts of the challenge are cogent we should thus adopt
a view which is pluralist in an interesting way. Prioritarians can also
respond to parts of the challenge by adopting such a view. If all parts
of the challenge are cogent they can adopt a version of Otsuka and
Voorhoeve's deontic account.
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Papers by Florian Dahl
First I defend a conception of comparative benenfit and harm that asks which of the options available to the agent are better for the patient. Second I argue that we can hold that existing can be better for the patient than never having existed without inviting unpalatable normative implications or doing violence to our understanding of the betterness relation. Third I show that the comparison between the patient's existence and her non-existence cannot be a wellbeing comparison.
Still, I argue, the comparison is intelligible. I conclude that if I create a child and it has a good life, this is better for the child and I benenfit it. If I do not create the child, I neither harm nor benenfit it. I should thus be praised if I create it, but not reprimanded if I don't.
prioritarianism handles prospects is worrisome. They also proposed a
version of deontic egalitarianism which does better.
This paper shows that their challenge applies to telic moderate egalitarianism too. It then asks: assuming that at least parts of the challenge are cogent - how should prioritarians and egalitarians respond?
Telic egalitarians, it is argued, can simply amend their view. Doing so will alwaysbe preferable to accepting Otsuka and Voorhoeve's deontic account.
Amending egalitarianism is not an entirely unproblematic solution. If
only certain parts of the challenge are cogent we should thus adopt
a view which is pluralist in an interesting way. Prioritarians can also
respond to parts of the challenge by adopting such a view. If all parts
of the challenge are cogent they can adopt a version of Otsuka and
Voorhoeve's deontic account.
First I defend a conception of comparative benenfit and harm that asks which of the options available to the agent are better for the patient. Second I argue that we can hold that existing can be better for the patient than never having existed without inviting unpalatable normative implications or doing violence to our understanding of the betterness relation. Third I show that the comparison between the patient's existence and her non-existence cannot be a wellbeing comparison.
Still, I argue, the comparison is intelligible. I conclude that if I create a child and it has a good life, this is better for the child and I benenfit it. If I do not create the child, I neither harm nor benenfit it. I should thus be praised if I create it, but not reprimanded if I don't.
prioritarianism handles prospects is worrisome. They also proposed a
version of deontic egalitarianism which does better.
This paper shows that their challenge applies to telic moderate egalitarianism too. It then asks: assuming that at least parts of the challenge are cogent - how should prioritarians and egalitarians respond?
Telic egalitarians, it is argued, can simply amend their view. Doing so will alwaysbe preferable to accepting Otsuka and Voorhoeve's deontic account.
Amending egalitarianism is not an entirely unproblematic solution. If
only certain parts of the challenge are cogent we should thus adopt
a view which is pluralist in an interesting way. Prioritarians can also
respond to parts of the challenge by adopting such a view. If all parts
of the challenge are cogent they can adopt a version of Otsuka and
Voorhoeve's deontic account.