My claim in this paper is that two instances of liability—liability to pay compensation and liabi... more My claim in this paper is that two instances of liability—liability to pay compensation and liability to defensive harming—are on a par. People who are about to suffer harm are sometimes allowed to act in self-preservation or self-defense—that is, to take measures to avert this harm, even if these measures are likely to impose a burden on others. Similarly, people who have suffered harm are sometimes allowed to extract reparations—that is, to make themselves as well as they were before having suffered the harm, even if the only means of doing so is by imposing a certain burden on other people. In this paper, I argue for the Equivalence Thesis: the claim that (at least in the state of nature) the conditions of permissibility for imposing a burden on someone through acting in self-defense and through the extraction of reparations are the same.
In this paper I argue that torts are like self-defense in the sense that whatever it is that just... more In this paper I argue that torts are like self-defense in the sense that whatever it is that justifies causing harm to the aggressor in self-defense before the harm occurs in order to prevent it, should justify causing harm to the aggressor after the harm occurred, in order to undo it. I do it by advancing three kinds of arguments. First, I try to show that this claim is intuitively plausible as the mere fact that the harm has occurred doesn’t seem to make much of a difference (as long as the harm can be undone). Second, I argue that features which seem to distinguish between self-defense and torts by applying only to one of them (such as the requirement of imminence in cases of self-defense or the fact that self-defense may only be employed to preserve life rather than property), are not substantive features of self-defense, and they do not apply in the state of nature. Finally, I argue that to the extent that some elements that serve to justify self-defense (such as the fact that the harm must fall either with the aggressor or with the victim) seem irreconcilable with the principles governing the allocation of reparations, they can either be changed to accommodate causing harm in order to undo the harm caused or must be rejected as implausible. If time permits, I will try show how these shared features of torts and self-defense can help explain some puzzling doctrines of tort law.
One hotly debated question regarding moral responsibility is whether luck can affect one’s moral ... more One hotly debated question regarding moral responsibility is whether luck can affect one’s moral responsibility, also known as the problem of moral luck. Philosophers who believe that luck can affect one’s moral standing (i.e. how culpable, blameworthy, at fault etc. one is) and responsibility, rely heavily (though, not exclusively) on intuitions in their arguments. They try to demonstrate by appeal to intuitive cases (such as Nagel’s and Williams’s negligent lorry driver) that how culpable we are depends not only on what we intend but also on what we cause. We all share the intuition, goes the argument, that the negligent lorry driver who kills a child is responsible for something significantly worse than the one who, luckily, doesn’t cause any harm. More importantly, this intuition is even shared by the lorry driver himself. In this paper I argue that Friends of Moral Luck (FMLs) cannot rely on these intuitions to argue that what we cause (which is a matter of luck) affects our moral standing and makes us more (or less) responsible, because similar intuitive judgments seem to suggest that even things that we do not cause affect our moral standing. Moreover, the similarities between the ways our intuitive judgments are affected by what we cause and by things we do not cause seem to suggest that something else is at work in forming these intuitions. I suggest that FMLs will try to explain away as a matter of epistemic limitations intuitive judgments that correlate one’s moral standing and responsibility with things one does not cause. This, however, is precisely the explanation that is often invoked by Adversaries of Moral Luck to explain away the intuitive judgments in the case(s) of the negligent lorry driver that the FMLs rely on. I conclude that the arguments from intuitions invoked by FMLs are self-defeating.
My claim in this paper is that two instances of liability—liability to pay compensation and liabi... more My claim in this paper is that two instances of liability—liability to pay compensation and liability to defensive harming—are on a par. People who are about to suffer harm are sometimes allowed to act in self-preservation or self-defense—that is, to take measures to avert this harm, even if these measures are likely to impose a burden on others. Similarly, people who have suffered harm are sometimes allowed to extract reparations—that is, to make themselves as well as they were before having suffered the harm, even if the only means of doing so is by imposing a certain burden on other people. In this paper, I argue for the Equivalence Thesis: the claim that (at least in the state of nature) the conditions of permissibility for imposing a burden on someone through acting in self-defense and through the extraction of reparations are the same.
My claim in this paper is that two instances of liability—liability to pay compensation and liabi... more My claim in this paper is that two instances of liability—liability to pay compensation and liability to defensive harming—are on a par. People who are about to suffer harm are sometimes allowed to act in self-preservation or self-defense—that is, to take measures to avert this harm, even if these measures are likely to impose a burden on others. Similarly, people who have suffered harm are sometimes allowed to extract reparations—that is, to make themselves as well as they were before having suffered the harm, even if the only means of doing so is by imposing a certain burden on other people. In this paper, I argue for the Equivalence Thesis: the claim that (at least in the state of nature) the conditions of permissibility for imposing a burden on someone through acting in self-defense and through the extraction of reparations are the same.
In this paper I argue that torts are like self-defense in the sense that whatever it is that just... more In this paper I argue that torts are like self-defense in the sense that whatever it is that justifies causing harm to the aggressor in self-defense before the harm occurs in order to prevent it, should justify causing harm to the aggressor after the harm occurred, in order to undo it. I do it by advancing three kinds of arguments. First, I try to show that this claim is intuitively plausible as the mere fact that the harm has occurred doesn’t seem to make much of a difference (as long as the harm can be undone). Second, I argue that features which seem to distinguish between self-defense and torts by applying only to one of them (such as the requirement of imminence in cases of self-defense or the fact that self-defense may only be employed to preserve life rather than property), are not substantive features of self-defense, and they do not apply in the state of nature. Finally, I argue that to the extent that some elements that serve to justify self-defense (such as the fact that the harm must fall either with the aggressor or with the victim) seem irreconcilable with the principles governing the allocation of reparations, they can either be changed to accommodate causing harm in order to undo the harm caused or must be rejected as implausible. If time permits, I will try show how these shared features of torts and self-defense can help explain some puzzling doctrines of tort law.
One hotly debated question regarding moral responsibility is whether luck can affect one’s moral ... more One hotly debated question regarding moral responsibility is whether luck can affect one’s moral responsibility, also known as the problem of moral luck. Philosophers who believe that luck can affect one’s moral standing (i.e. how culpable, blameworthy, at fault etc. one is) and responsibility, rely heavily (though, not exclusively) on intuitions in their arguments. They try to demonstrate by appeal to intuitive cases (such as Nagel’s and Williams’s negligent lorry driver) that how culpable we are depends not only on what we intend but also on what we cause. We all share the intuition, goes the argument, that the negligent lorry driver who kills a child is responsible for something significantly worse than the one who, luckily, doesn’t cause any harm. More importantly, this intuition is even shared by the lorry driver himself. In this paper I argue that Friends of Moral Luck (FMLs) cannot rely on these intuitions to argue that what we cause (which is a matter of luck) affects our moral standing and makes us more (or less) responsible, because similar intuitive judgments seem to suggest that even things that we do not cause affect our moral standing. Moreover, the similarities between the ways our intuitive judgments are affected by what we cause and by things we do not cause seem to suggest that something else is at work in forming these intuitions. I suggest that FMLs will try to explain away as a matter of epistemic limitations intuitive judgments that correlate one’s moral standing and responsibility with things one does not cause. This, however, is precisely the explanation that is often invoked by Adversaries of Moral Luck to explain away the intuitive judgments in the case(s) of the negligent lorry driver that the FMLs rely on. I conclude that the arguments from intuitions invoked by FMLs are self-defeating.
My claim in this paper is that two instances of liability—liability to pay compensation and liabi... more My claim in this paper is that two instances of liability—liability to pay compensation and liability to defensive harming—are on a par. People who are about to suffer harm are sometimes allowed to act in self-preservation or self-defense—that is, to take measures to avert this harm, even if these measures are likely to impose a burden on others. Similarly, people who have suffered harm are sometimes allowed to extract reparations—that is, to make themselves as well as they were before having suffered the harm, even if the only means of doing so is by imposing a certain burden on other people. In this paper, I argue for the Equivalence Thesis: the claim that (at least in the state of nature) the conditions of permissibility for imposing a burden on someone through acting in self-defense and through the extraction of reparations are the same.
Uploads
Papers by Guy Sela
Talks by Guy Sela
Moreover, the similarities between the ways our intuitive judgments are affected by what we cause and by things we do not cause seem to suggest that something else is at work in forming these intuitions. I suggest that FMLs will try to explain away as a matter of epistemic limitations intuitive judgments that correlate one’s moral standing and responsibility with things one does not cause. This, however, is precisely the explanation that is often invoked by Adversaries of Moral Luck to explain away the intuitive judgments in the case(s) of the negligent lorry driver that the FMLs rely on. I conclude that the arguments from intuitions invoked by FMLs are self-defeating.
Drafts by Guy Sela
Moreover, the similarities between the ways our intuitive judgments are affected by what we cause and by things we do not cause seem to suggest that something else is at work in forming these intuitions. I suggest that FMLs will try to explain away as a matter of epistemic limitations intuitive judgments that correlate one’s moral standing and responsibility with things one does not cause. This, however, is precisely the explanation that is often invoked by Adversaries of Moral Luck to explain away the intuitive judgments in the case(s) of the negligent lorry driver that the FMLs rely on. I conclude that the arguments from intuitions invoked by FMLs are self-defeating.