Page 1. BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVIII, No. 1 (January 1989) WITTGENSTEIN ON ... more Page 1. BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVIII, No. 1 (January 1989) WITTGENSTEIN ON MEANING. By COLIN MCGINN. Oxford, England, Basil Blackwell, 1984. Pp. viii, 202. The book is part of the enormous ...
Questions about the self, the use of ‘I’, and the first-person point of view arise throughout Lud... more Questions about the self, the use of ‘I’, and the first-person point of view arise throughout Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings. This article explores two interrelated issues. First, what is the function and significance of the first-person pronoun? Second, what is the relation between the first-person point of view — the point of view that each of us has on ourselves, our experiences, and our mental states — and the second- or third-person point of view — the point of view we adopt towards others, their experiences, and their mental states? When ‘I’ is used ‘as object’, Wittgenstein says, ‘the possibility of an error has been provided for’; when ‘I’ is used ‘as subject’, ‘no error is possible’. Wittgenstein has identified a genuine feature of certain self-ascriptions: immunity to error through misidentification. One of Wittgenstein's aims in Philosophical Investigations is to offer an account of the ‘language-game’ of ascribing sensations and attitudes to oneself and others th...
RESUMEN ?En que sentido puede, segun Wittgenstein, presentarse ante una mente el significado de u... more RESUMEN ?En que sentido puede, segun Wittgenstein, presentarse ante una mente el significado de una palabra? Esta cuestion es abordada a la luz de algunos ejemplos poco discutidos. Wittgenstein rechaza una explicacion del fenomeno de que un significado se presente ante una mente en terminos de un doble componente de (a) habilidades mas (b) experiencias conscientes que carecen de contenido intencional intrinseco. Pero no dice sin mas que se trata de un fenomeno basico de la conciencia que no requiere explicacion. Mas bien, hace varias observaciones positivas acerca de lo que sucede cuando el significado se presenta ante una mente, observaciones que buscan iluminar el fenomeno.
Preface Foreword: Some Philosophical Reflections 1. 'Solipsism' in the Tractatus 2. When ... more Preface Foreword: Some Philosophical Reflections 1. 'Solipsism' in the Tractatus 2. When the Whistling had to Stop 3. Wittgenstein's Builders and Aristotle's Craftsmen 4. Pear's Wittgenstein: Rule-Following, Platonism, and Naturalism 5. Logical Rules, Necessity, and Convention 6. Private Objects, Physical Objects, and Ostension 7. The Reality of Consciousness Index
Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive
Autonomie et connaissance de soi. Les questions qu'on peut se poser au sujet de l'autonom... more Autonomie et connaissance de soi. Les questions qu'on peut se poser au sujet de l'autonomie relevent de la controverse entre les conceptions causaliste et non causaliste de l'explication de l'action. Dans cette controverse, certains (p. ex. Wittgenstein) soutiennent que le fait que la connaissance que nous avons de nos raisons est immediate et absolue prouve que ces raisons ne peuvent pas etre les causes des croyances et des actions qu'elles nous servent a expliquer. En effet, la connaissance des causes est une connaissance empirique, laquelle ne saurait etre acquise a la maniere dont nous connaissons nos raisons. Ce chapitre s'oppose a cette facon de voir. Est d'abord avance un modele de la connaissance de soi (derive du meme Wittgenstein) d'apres lequel le fait de s'auto-attribuer une croyance implique la conversion d'un jugement exprimant cette croyance en un jugement qui l'auto-attribue explicitement. Ensuite, ce modele est remodele de facon a lui permettre d'expliquer comment il se fait que nous soyons capables, de maniere fiable et sans effort particulier, de nous auto-attribuer les raisons de nos croyances et de nos actions. Ce modele s'avere propre a rendre compte du caractere immediat de la connaissance de nos raisons tout en restant parfaitement compatible avec l'opinion selon laquelle ces raisons sont des causes.
For nutre than forty years, David Pears has been a major figure in Wittgenstein scholarship. He i... more For nutre than forty years, David Pears has been a major figure in Wittgenstein scholarship. He is author of many papers and three books on Wittgenstein's philosophy; Wittgenstein ( 1971 ) and The False Prison: A Study in the ...
Page 1. BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVIII, No. 1 (January 1989) WITTGENSTEIN ON ... more Page 1. BOOK REVIEWS The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCVIII, No. 1 (January 1989) WITTGENSTEIN ON MEANING. By COLIN MCGINN. Oxford, England, Basil Blackwell, 1984. Pp. viii, 202. The book is part of the enormous ...
Questions about the self, the use of ‘I’, and the first-person point of view arise throughout Lud... more Questions about the self, the use of ‘I’, and the first-person point of view arise throughout Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings. This article explores two interrelated issues. First, what is the function and significance of the first-person pronoun? Second, what is the relation between the first-person point of view — the point of view that each of us has on ourselves, our experiences, and our mental states — and the second- or third-person point of view — the point of view we adopt towards others, their experiences, and their mental states? When ‘I’ is used ‘as object’, Wittgenstein says, ‘the possibility of an error has been provided for’; when ‘I’ is used ‘as subject’, ‘no error is possible’. Wittgenstein has identified a genuine feature of certain self-ascriptions: immunity to error through misidentification. One of Wittgenstein's aims in Philosophical Investigations is to offer an account of the ‘language-game’ of ascribing sensations and attitudes to oneself and others th...
RESUMEN ?En que sentido puede, segun Wittgenstein, presentarse ante una mente el significado de u... more RESUMEN ?En que sentido puede, segun Wittgenstein, presentarse ante una mente el significado de una palabra? Esta cuestion es abordada a la luz de algunos ejemplos poco discutidos. Wittgenstein rechaza una explicacion del fenomeno de que un significado se presente ante una mente en terminos de un doble componente de (a) habilidades mas (b) experiencias conscientes que carecen de contenido intencional intrinseco. Pero no dice sin mas que se trata de un fenomeno basico de la conciencia que no requiere explicacion. Mas bien, hace varias observaciones positivas acerca de lo que sucede cuando el significado se presenta ante una mente, observaciones que buscan iluminar el fenomeno.
Preface Foreword: Some Philosophical Reflections 1. 'Solipsism' in the Tractatus 2. When ... more Preface Foreword: Some Philosophical Reflections 1. 'Solipsism' in the Tractatus 2. When the Whistling had to Stop 3. Wittgenstein's Builders and Aristotle's Craftsmen 4. Pear's Wittgenstein: Rule-Following, Platonism, and Naturalism 5. Logical Rules, Necessity, and Convention 6. Private Objects, Physical Objects, and Ostension 7. The Reality of Consciousness Index
Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive
Autonomie et connaissance de soi. Les questions qu'on peut se poser au sujet de l'autonom... more Autonomie et connaissance de soi. Les questions qu'on peut se poser au sujet de l'autonomie relevent de la controverse entre les conceptions causaliste et non causaliste de l'explication de l'action. Dans cette controverse, certains (p. ex. Wittgenstein) soutiennent que le fait que la connaissance que nous avons de nos raisons est immediate et absolue prouve que ces raisons ne peuvent pas etre les causes des croyances et des actions qu'elles nous servent a expliquer. En effet, la connaissance des causes est une connaissance empirique, laquelle ne saurait etre acquise a la maniere dont nous connaissons nos raisons. Ce chapitre s'oppose a cette facon de voir. Est d'abord avance un modele de la connaissance de soi (derive du meme Wittgenstein) d'apres lequel le fait de s'auto-attribuer une croyance implique la conversion d'un jugement exprimant cette croyance en un jugement qui l'auto-attribue explicitement. Ensuite, ce modele est remodele de facon a lui permettre d'expliquer comment il se fait que nous soyons capables, de maniere fiable et sans effort particulier, de nous auto-attribuer les raisons de nos croyances et de nos actions. Ce modele s'avere propre a rendre compte du caractere immediat de la connaissance de nos raisons tout en restant parfaitement compatible avec l'opinion selon laquelle ces raisons sont des causes.
For nutre than forty years, David Pears has been a major figure in Wittgenstein scholarship. He i... more For nutre than forty years, David Pears has been a major figure in Wittgenstein scholarship. He is author of many papers and three books on Wittgenstein's philosophy; Wittgenstein ( 1971 ) and The False Prison: A Study in the ...
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