Public Deployment of Cooperative Bug Isolation [*]

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Abstract

*As part of our work on Cooperative Bug Isolation (*CBI*) we have undertaken to instrument and distribute binaries for a number of large open source projects. This public deployment is an important step toward a large experiment involving (we hope) hundreds or thousands of users that will measure the effectiveness of CBI. This paper describes several of the significant engineering issues that arise in instrumenting the source code of realistic applications.*

1. Introduction

Cooperative Bug Isolation (*CBI*) seeks to leverage the huge amount of computation done by the end users of software. By gathering a little bit of information from every run of a program performed by its user community, we should be able to make inferences automatically about the causes of bugs experienced in the field.

Our approach to CBI is based upon compile-time instrumentation of the program's source code. We insert instrumentation to test a large number of predicates on program values during execution and to count how many times each predicate is observed to be true or false. On termination of the program the list of predicate counters is uploaded to a central server together with a record of whether the program terminated successfully or not. Subsequent statistical analysis of which predicates are correlated with program failure can then indicate to engineers which values and what parts of the program are the sources of crashes; in at least some cases even the exact line of code that is at fault can be identified [3, 4, 5].

We believe that CBI and related research efforts have great potential to make software development more responsive and efficient by giving developers accurate data about how software is actually used in deployment. However, testing this idea requires significant experimentation with real, and preferably large, user communities using real applications.

This paper reports on our experience in preparing for just such an experiment. We have instrumented a number of large open source applications, listed in Table 1, with a total of about 1.8 million lines of code. We have made these instrumented programs available to the public and are in the process of collecting feedback reports. As a result, we have demonstrated a complete CBI system and feel comfortable in claiming that our approach is technically feasible; while aspects of our system could certainly be improved, at this point all components are good enough to support the deployment of realistic instrumented applications and the collection of feedback reports from a large user community.

The design of a CBI system involves interesting challenges, both technical and social. In this paper, we focus on the solutions to technical problems most likely to be useful to the designers of similar systems and experiments: dealing with existing native compilers, shared libraries, plugins, and threads. We also briefly discuss how users interact with our system, as well as give some static and dynamic measures of the applications we instrument.

Application	Lines of Code	Shared Libraries	Plugins	Threads
Evolution	460,912	✓	✓	✓
Gaim	160,435		✓	
The GIMP	650,660	✓	✓	
Gnumeric	319,137		✓	
Nautilus	124,679	✓	✓	✓
Rhythmbox	56,442	✓		

Table 1. Instrumented applications

2. Native Compiler Integration

The system as a whole looks and behaves like GCC with a few extra command line flags. No manual annotation of source code is required, and all existing configuration scripts and makefiles work transparently. This lets us instrument 1.8 million lines of open source code and keep up with new releases with very short turnaround. Simply changing an environment variable ($CC) builds an application with our instrumenting compiler instead of the standard one.

The meat of instrumentation happens as a source to source transformation after the preprocessor and before the real C compiler. However, we actually need to affect all stages of compilation:

before preprocessing (`cpp0`): Pull in extra headers to declare or define various constructs used by instrumented code. For fixed content such as this it is easier to use fixed headers rather than synthesizing the needed constructs programmatically within the instrumentor.

before compilation (`cc1`): Inject sampled instrumentation as a source-to-source transformation. Emit additional static site information into temporary files for use in next step.

after assembly (`asm`): Fuse extra static site information from temporary files into the assembled object file.

before linking (`ld`): Pull in extra libraries containing common runtime support code and data used by instrumented programs.

We use GCC's `-B <path>` flag to specify an alternate directory in which to find the compiler stages. Custom scripts in that directory named cc1 and asm do the extra "before compilation" and "after assembly" work and invoke the corresponding native compiler stages as appropriate.

We also use GCC's `-specs=<file>` flag to augment (not replace) the standard option specs file with one of our own. An *option specs file*, or simply "specfile," determines how GCC parses its command line arguments. We can add flags of our own, request temporary file names, and so on. A specfile is essentially a tiny domain-specific language for tweaking the command lines used for the various compiler stages. Using this facility we are able to take care of our "before preprocessing" and "before linking" needs by augmenting the cpp0 and ld command lines without actually replacing those stages with custom scripts of our own.

2.1. Static Site Information

While the main "before compilation" task is to inject instrumentation code, that this phase also produces static reference information about each instrumentation site. This includes each site's source file name, line number, host function, control flow graph node, and other information specific to the instrumentation scheme being used. When decoding feedback reports, this information is used to tie predicate counts back to source level features understood by the programmer. Our experience is that maintaining this information external to the corresponding object file is brittle, as existing application build scripts often move or rename object files during the build process. Therefore, we fuse the static site information into the assembled object file by storing it in several custom ELF sections.

When the linker combines several object files, it pads each unknown section out to some fixed modulus and then concatenates all same-named sections in link order. We represent our static site information in a way that remains valid under null-byte injection and concatenation. Thus each instrumented executable, shared library, or plugin is self describing, with complete static information for all of its own instrumentation sites. Our extra sections are flagged as debug information, which means that they will be stripped out along with other debugging information during post-build packaging. We retain a copy locally to assist in report decoding, but end users do not need to download and store this extra information on their own machines.

3. Libraries and Plugins

Post-run reporting would be easy for an application that consisted of a single object file. We would simply write out the predicate counters in the order in which they appear in that file, and that list would constitute a complete report.

However, as can be seen in Table 1, most applications involve multiple object files in the form of shared libraries, plugins, or both. Note that this table counts only those shared libraries and plugins that are part of the source code of the application; additionally, there generally will be other shared libraries and plugins that are resident only on the end user's machine. Thus, the running environment is a mix of code that has been instrumented by CBI and code that we have never seen before. Shared libraries are also interesting because they may be used by other applications that we have not instrumented. Thus, not only must instrumented applications cope with uninstrumented code, but instrumented code must cope with finding itself in an uninstrumented application.

An orthogonal set of problems arises from static linking and dynamic loading. Our system does not have control over the linker and cannot assume that object files appear in any particular order. Plugins may be loaded late and unloaded at any time. If an instrumented plugin is about to be unloaded, we must capture its part of the feedback report immediately, because once it is unloaded its global predicate counters vanish from the address space and can no longer be accessed.

Our solution to all of these problems is to make each object file self-managing, with some initialization code that runs when it is loaded, and finalization code that runs when it is unloaded. For objects which are part of the main application binary, the initialization code runs early in program execution, before `main()`. The finalization code runs after `main()` returns or after `exit()` is called. Shared libraries are similar. For plugins, the initialization code runs within `dlopen()` after the plugin has been mapped into memory. Plugin finalization code runs within `dlclose()` just before the plugin is removed from memory. Each object file also maintains its own instrumentation state; in particular, each object file maintains its own predicate counters.

There is one situation in which we need global knowledge of the loaded object files. Finalization code does not run after a crash. Thus if the program receives a fatal signal, we must immediately gather the predicate counters from each loaded object file for the feedback report. We maintain a doubly-linked list of loaded object files, and the initialization/finalization code for each object file adds/removes that file from this list. Thus at any moment in time the application has a central registry of all instrumented, currently loaded object files.

We have also given some attention to the fact that this global registry could itself be corrupted by a buggy program. We maintain a global count of the expected size of the global registry. When walking the list in a signal handler, we use the counter to decide when to stop even if we have not reached the end of the list data structure. This prevents an infinite loop if a memory error in the application introduces a cycle into the doubly-linked list. The global registry can be damaged in other ways by a misbehaving program, of course, but avoiding cycles is the most important case to handle.

The complications in checking for a corrupted global registry are just an example of the general problem that it is not possible to completely isolate program instrumentation from the program itself in unsafe languages such as C and C++. As a result it is necessary to sanity check feedback reports at the central server and discard any that are ill-formed. In practice we do receive ill-formed reports, but the number is only a tiny fraction of all reports.

4. Threads

Our CBI system maintains three kinds of global data that need special attention in multi-threaded applications. In each case thread-safety can hurt performance, so we only take this extra care if in fact the application is multi-threaded (e.g. if the compiler's command line contains the GCC `-pthread` flag).

A key feature of our CBI system is that performance can be improved by sampling the instrumentation code, which is implemented by frequently skipping over some instrumentation and instead executing a "fast path" with no instrumentation at all. We use a *global countdown* to determine how many instrumentation sites to skip before testing one predicate and recording its result. The countdown is chosen randomly from a geometric distribution with a mean that is the desired sampling rate. (This is equivalent to, but much more efficient than, tossing a coin at each instrumentation site to decide whether to take a sample.) In a multi-threaded system, the global variable holding this next-sample countdown would be a source of high contention among threads.

The simple solution to this problem is to give each thread its own, independent countdown variable. This is equivalent to giving each thread its own coin to toss. The behavior of the system with per-thread countdowns is indistinguishable from having a single global countdown, and in addition we avoid all locking.

Enacting this plan requires compiler support. We use the `__thread` storage qualifier to declare thread-specific storage. This is a GCC extension and also requires support from the POSIX threading runtime, C library, and runtime loader. We also must alter thread creation so we can initialize the new thread's global state. We use the `--wrap` flag provided by the GNU linker to replace `pthread_create()` with our augmented version.

The second class of data that requires special handling in multi-threaded applications is the predicate counters. Recall that the predicate counters keep track of how often a particular predicate at a particular line of code is observed to be true or false. For efficiency we use low sampling rates, such

as once every hundred times (on average, randomized) that the line of code associated with the predicate is executed. Therefore predicates are tested rarely and any individual counter is accessed rarely even by a single thread. Therefore, we maintain only one copy of each predicate counter, shared by all threads. The critical operation on these counters, an increment by one, is so basic that every CPU architecture has some way of doing this atomically without resorting to heavyweight locking.

Finally, the third class of data that must be protected from concurrent access includes the global registry of compilation units and the report file. Because these structures are accessed very rarely, we guarantee exclusive access by guarding each with its own mutual exclusion lock.

5. User Interaction

When a user launches an instrumented application, he does not run the instrumented binary directly. Instead, we install a wrapper script in the expected location (e.g. `/usr/bin`) and put the instrumented binary elsewhere. The wrapper script has several responsibilities: it performs all user interaction that goes beyond what the underlying application would normally do, and it collects the raw feedback report from the instrumented application, packages it for transit, and sends it to the report collection server along with other information such as program outcome. In this way we avoid adding GUI infrastructure and encrypted networking support to the applications themselves. Also, the script can be in a different language, Python, which has excellent library support for both networking and desktop interaction.

When the wrapper script starts up, it checks whether the user has run an instrumented version of this application before. If not, it presents the first-time opt-in dialog box shown in Figure 1. The dialog box briefly describes the goals of the project and the consequences of participating or not, and lets the user decide what to do. The logo icon and highlighting of the yes/no explanatory text change to reflect user's current choice. A hyperlink button links to the project web site for more information [2]. This dialog box is initially presented in the background, and the real application launched without waiting for a reply. On this first run, the application reports no data. Once the user has selected yes or no, that preference is remembered and the first-time opt-in dialog box is not shown on subsequent runs, though it is possible to change the preference later using a distinct sampler control panel.

Also in the background, the wrapper posts a small status icon in the desktop status bar notification area. This icon provides a visual reminder that an instrumented application is currently running. It provides a simple pop-up menu with a toggle to globally disable or enable sampling. The status


Figure 1. First-time opt-in dialog box

Application	Min	Max
Evolution	830	39,863
Gaim	1,786	18,772
The GIMP	15,617	26,304
Gnumeric	6,661	15,876
Nautilus	3,252	10,638
Rhythmbox	897	5,823

Table 2. Feedback report sizes in bytes

icon changes depending on whether sampling is enabled or disabled globally, and remains present as long as at least one instrumented application is running. A second menu item launches the sampler control panel which allows for more detailed customization of data collection preferences.

The opt-in dialog box, status icon, and control panel work together to keep the user fully informed and fully in control. Additional configuration management hooks let system administrators change both defaults as well as mandatory, locked-down settings. These settings can include the sampling density, the address of the report collection server, and whether reporting is enabled for all or selected applications. Tracking of user behavior is a delicate matter, so users and their system administrators must be able to adapt the system to local needs and concerns.

Because the wrapper script launches the instrumented binary as a subprocess, it can also check that subprocess's exit status (either a result code or a fatal signal), which is included in the report uploaded to our feedback collection server. The wrapper script compresses the raw feedback report for transit using `gzip`-compatible compression. This

is a huge benefit, as reports are mostly zeros and compress very well. The average compression of the reports we have received is 96%; Table 2 shows the range of report sizes we have received by application. The largest reports are less than 40K bytes, which can be uploaded over even a slow modem connection in seconds.

Before submitting a report, the wrapper checks once more whether sampling is enabled both globally and for this application. If the user changed his mind after program launch, this gives a second chance to quash an unwanted feedback report before it reaches the collection server.

A report is submitted using an HTTP POST request across an encrypted SSL connection. Each HTTP request can also have a response from the server. Ordinarily the collection server does not give any response beyond a success code. However, if the server does give a response, the wrapper script receives it and presents it to the user as an HTML page. This feature might be used, for example, if a critical security issue were found requiring immediate upgrades.

The HTTP reply can also include a few special reply headers which update the local sampling configuration on the client. We have the ability to promote a different destination URL for future reports, which may be useful if we need to relocate the collection server. We can change the sampling density from its default of $1/100$, which may be useful if performance problems arise. We can also issue a "poison pill" which turns off sampling for future runs of the application. This is intended as a shutoff should the Cooperative Bug Isolation project be discontinued at some future date (a feature we learned would be useful from the prior experience of Elbaum and Hardojo [1]), and it might also be used to suppress future reports from individual misbehaving users. So far we have not needed any of these facilities.

6. Status of the Public Deployment

We conclude with some discussion of our experience thus far with our public deployment of the applications listed earlier.

One concern is that our approach adds a great deal of new code to an application; in fact, binaries will often be at least twice as large as the original, uninstrumented program. However, the growth in disk footprint is considerably smaller if one considers the entire package that comes with a typical large application, and in fact the executable code is often a relatively small percentage of the total distribution. For the applications we have instrumented, downloaded packages are between 13% and 49% larger and the installed footprint on disk grows between 13% and 71%. The actual application binaries are between 74% and 304% larger than in the original distribution. Thus far we have

Application	Total	Good	Error	Crash
Evolution	916	838	55	23 (3%)
Gaim	495	417	62	16 (4%)
The GIMP	109	107	2	0 (0%)
Gnumeric	261	242	2	17 (7%)
Nautilus	747	642	96	9 (1%)
Rhythmbox	869	728	39	102 (14%)

Table 3. Number of reports received to date

received no complaints about package sizes, either downloaded or as expanded onto disk.

Another potential issue is application performance, but thus far we have received no complaints about the performance of any of our instrumented applications. We use $1/100$ sampling, which apparently is sparse enough; we probably could have sampled even more densely for these interactive applications which spend most of their time waiting for the user to do something. Note however that these applications do have CPU-intensive phases, such as when Rhythmbox is loading up a library with thousands of music files or when Gnumeric is recalculating a very large spreadsheet.

Table 3 summarizes the current state of the data for each of our instrumented applications. The *total* number of valid feedback reports received so far is broken out into *good* runs, runs that exited with a non-zero *error* status, and runs that ended in a *crash* due to a fatal signal. Note the large variation in crash rates, from 0% (The GIMP) to 14% (Rhythmbox).

There is both good news and bad news in these figures. The bad news is that we have not yet received enough reports to carry out statistically significant analysis of the results, based on our previous experience with studies done "in the lab" running applications on synthetic data to simulate a large user community. With $1/100$ sampling we need between ten and twenty thousand runs with our current methods to achieve accurate analysis of the results, which is more than ten times the number of reports we have received to date for any of these applications.[1] Our situation here reflects an inherent aspect of CBI and similar approaches, which is that these methods work well only beyond a certain minimum scale.

The good news is that these applications do crash, indicating to us that there is potential to improve the state of the software given enough users participating in CBI. In addition, we have enough data to demonstrate that the complete system works, from instrumenting code through gathering of reports, and we continue to receive new feedback reports daily. We are only at the beginning of this experiment and have not yet invested much effort in attracting users. The next step in our experiment will be to find ways to recruit

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[1] We began collecting data from the public in October, 2003.

enough users to test the advantages of CBI for large user communities of complex applications.

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