My research focuses on the intersection between Philosophy of Language and Political Philosophy. I currently have three research projects: 1) explaining slurs in terms of the speech acts of derogation; 2) explaining how politically loaded words such as "political correctness" implicitly carry negative connotations; and 3) exploring questions about the nature, the aptness, and the values of taking offense. Supervisors: Robert Stainton
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 2019
Slurs are derogatory, and theories of slurs aim at explaining their “derogatory
force”. This pape... more Slurs are derogatory, and theories of slurs aim at explaining their “derogatory force”. This paper draws a distinction between the type derogatory force and the token derogatory force of slurs. To explain the type derogatory force is to explain why a slur is a derogatory word. By contrast, to explain the token derogatory force is to explain why an utterance of a slur is derogatory. This distinction will be defended by examples in which the type and the token derogatory force come apart. Because of the distinction, an adequate theory of slurs must be plausible for both the type and the token derogatory force. However, I will argue that many theories fail to be plausible for both. In particular, Hom's combinatorial externalism and the conventional implicature theory offer implausible accounts of the token derogatory force, whereas the prohibitionist theory is insufficient to explain the type derogatory force.
Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to in... more Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always includes [-polite] and [+derogatory]. Thus, e.g., what distinguishes ‘Chinese’ from ‘chink’ is neither a peculiar sort of descriptive nor emotional content, but rather the fact that ‘chink’ is lexically marked as belonging to different registers than ‘Chinese’. It is, moreover, partly such facts which makes slurring ethically unacceptable.
This paper defends descriptive theories from Kripke’s famous arguments by establishing two claims... more This paper defends descriptive theories from Kripke’s famous arguments by establishing two claims. First, I claim that Kripke’s arguments rest on the hidden assumption of the Russell-Fregean theory of definite descriptions, according to which definite descriptions designate objects that uniquely fit them. Second, I claim that descriptive theories might be saved, if they deny the hidden assumption by endorsing alternative theories of definite descriptions. To give an example, I have developed a tentative but Kripke-proof descriptive theory from Donnellan’s theory of definite descriptions. Kripke’s arguments are far from being definitive objections; they need to do extra works to rule out such descriptive theories.
Slurs are derogatory terms and they are used to derogate certain groups. Theories of slurs aim to... more Slurs are derogatory terms and they are used to derogate certain groups. Theories of slurs aim to explain why they are derogatory. This paper proposes an illocutionary force indicator account of slurs: First, slurs are derogatory terms because these expressions are illocutionary force indicators of derogation, which is an illocutionary act. For instance, the job of the slur “chink” in the utterance “Chang is a chink” is to make it explicit that the utterance has the illocutionary force of derogating the Chinese. Second, they are also propositional indicators that contribute to the propositional contents. I will illustrate the explanatory power of this account by explaining the common features of slurs. Moreover, I will present two new puzzles that require a force indicator account; many theories have difficulty in accommodating the non-derogatory uses of slurs and self-defeating sentences with slurs. I will also address objections to my view .
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio, 2019
Slurs are derogatory, and theories of slurs aim at explaining their “derogatory
force”. This pape... more Slurs are derogatory, and theories of slurs aim at explaining their “derogatory force”. This paper draws a distinction between the type derogatory force and the token derogatory force of slurs. To explain the type derogatory force is to explain why a slur is a derogatory word. By contrast, to explain the token derogatory force is to explain why an utterance of a slur is derogatory. This distinction will be defended by examples in which the type and the token derogatory force come apart. Because of the distinction, an adequate theory of slurs must be plausible for both the type and the token derogatory force. However, I will argue that many theories fail to be plausible for both. In particular, Hom's combinatorial externalism and the conventional implicature theory offer implausible accounts of the token derogatory force, whereas the prohibitionist theory is insufficient to explain the type derogatory force.
Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to in... more Most theories of slurs fall into one of two families: those which understand slurring terms to involve special descriptive/informational content (however conveyed), and those which understand them to encode special emotive/expressive content. Our view is that both offer essential insights, but that part of what sets slurs apart is use-theoretic content. In particular, we urge that slurring words belong at the intersection of a number of categories in a sociolinguistic register taxonomy, one that usually includes [+slang] and [+vulgar] and always includes [-polite] and [+derogatory]. Thus, e.g., what distinguishes ‘Chinese’ from ‘chink’ is neither a peculiar sort of descriptive nor emotional content, but rather the fact that ‘chink’ is lexically marked as belonging to different registers than ‘Chinese’. It is, moreover, partly such facts which makes slurring ethically unacceptable.
This paper defends descriptive theories from Kripke’s famous arguments by establishing two claims... more This paper defends descriptive theories from Kripke’s famous arguments by establishing two claims. First, I claim that Kripke’s arguments rest on the hidden assumption of the Russell-Fregean theory of definite descriptions, according to which definite descriptions designate objects that uniquely fit them. Second, I claim that descriptive theories might be saved, if they deny the hidden assumption by endorsing alternative theories of definite descriptions. To give an example, I have developed a tentative but Kripke-proof descriptive theory from Donnellan’s theory of definite descriptions. Kripke’s arguments are far from being definitive objections; they need to do extra works to rule out such descriptive theories.
Slurs are derogatory terms and they are used to derogate certain groups. Theories of slurs aim to... more Slurs are derogatory terms and they are used to derogate certain groups. Theories of slurs aim to explain why they are derogatory. This paper proposes an illocutionary force indicator account of slurs: First, slurs are derogatory terms because these expressions are illocutionary force indicators of derogation, which is an illocutionary act. For instance, the job of the slur “chink” in the utterance “Chang is a chink” is to make it explicit that the utterance has the illocutionary force of derogating the Chinese. Second, they are also propositional indicators that contribute to the propositional contents. I will illustrate the explanatory power of this account by explaining the common features of slurs. Moreover, I will present two new puzzles that require a force indicator account; many theories have difficulty in accommodating the non-derogatory uses of slurs and self-defeating sentences with slurs. I will also address objections to my view .
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Papers by Chang Liu
force”. This paper draws a distinction between the type derogatory force and the token
derogatory force of slurs. To explain the type derogatory force is to explain why a slur is a derogatory word. By contrast, to explain the token derogatory force is to explain why an utterance of a slur is derogatory. This distinction will be defended by examples in which the type and the token derogatory force come apart. Because of the distinction, an adequate theory of slurs must be plausible for both the type and the token derogatory force. However, I will argue that many theories fail to be plausible for both. In particular, Hom's combinatorial externalism and the conventional implicature theory offer implausible accounts of the token derogatory force, whereas the prohibitionist theory is insufficient to explain the type derogatory force.
Drafts by Chang Liu
force”. This paper draws a distinction between the type derogatory force and the token
derogatory force of slurs. To explain the type derogatory force is to explain why a slur is a derogatory word. By contrast, to explain the token derogatory force is to explain why an utterance of a slur is derogatory. This distinction will be defended by examples in which the type and the token derogatory force come apart. Because of the distinction, an adequate theory of slurs must be plausible for both the type and the token derogatory force. However, I will argue that many theories fail to be plausible for both. In particular, Hom's combinatorial externalism and the conventional implicature theory offer implausible accounts of the token derogatory force, whereas the prohibitionist theory is insufficient to explain the type derogatory force.