I received my Ph.D. degree from McMaster University in 2013, and currently the Associate Professor of Philosophy at Peking University (Beijing, China). Phone: (86) 10- 6275-1949 Address: The Department of Philosophy, Peking University, 5 Yi-He-Yuan Street, Haidian District, Beijing, China Postal Code: 100871
Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional condi... more Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional conditions of justified true belief with the truth-making condition, which would jointly provide us with the sufficient condition of knowledge, and this truth-maker account of knowledge in turn explains why a gettiered justified true belief fails to be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge. In this paper, by the comparison of two different casual models that are illustrated by the thermometer and the clock respectively, however, it will be argued that Heathcote’s truth-making account of knowledge fails to cope with the Gettier case of the stopped clock and therefore is called for some further remedy
W. V. Quine is one of the most prominent advocates of the naturalistic approach to epistemology a... more W. V. Quine is one of the most prominent advocates of the naturalistic approach to epistemology and he argues that epistemology should be naturalized and transformed into a sub-discipline of psychology and hence a chapter in science. In his famous paper " Epistemology Naturalized, " Quine starts to compare epistemology with the logical and set-theoretical studies of the foundations of mathematics. Similar to the studies of the foundations of mathematics, as Quine suggests, epistemological studies, which are " concerned with the foundation of science " (Quine 1968, p. 69), can be divided into two sorts— one is conceptual and the other is doctrinal. Quine further argues that the conceptual ones are concerned with meaning of our material object concepts, which are clarified by reducing them into sense experience concepts; and, on the other hand, the doctrinal ones are concerned with truth of our material object beliefs, which are established by deducing them from th...
本文通过论述休漠在反驳因果原则过程当申所使用的“可设想性原则”,解释了其中存在的问题,通过对休漠该原则的历史追溯说明休漠在使用该原则的过程当中所具有的特殊性,最终通过一种可能的替代性解释提供了在... more 本文通过论述休漠在反驳因果原则过程当申所使用的“可设想性原则”,解释了其中存在的问题,通过对休漠该原则的历史追溯说明休漠在使用该原则的过程当中所具有的特殊性,最终通过一种可能的替代性解释提供了在这一个层面维系休漠论述的维度。
In this paper it is argued that the safety condition of knowledge can provide a satisfactory solu... more In this paper it is argued that the safety condition of knowledge can provide a satisfactory solution to the lottery puzzle without appealing to too sophisticated theory of conditional probability. With a proper interpretation of the lottery puzzle, the standard possible-world analysis suffices for the need in question. The solution to the lottery puzzle in this paper also illustrates the crucial distinction between the concepts of epistemic safety and objective probability; more specifically, the general theoretical framework embodied in the suggested solution in this paper implies a two-dimensional structure of the possible worlds. In order to establish the above conclusions, the paper is divided into three parts. The first and preliminary part of this paper introduces the safety condition, the lottery puzzle and seeming difficulty in the safety solution to the lottery puzzle. It is then argued that the objective distribution of the probability for each lottery to win plays a significant role only in the metaphysical dimension of the set-up of the possible worlds in question, which does not reflect the genuine degree of the safety of the epistemic belief in question. By contrast, the epistemic strength and the degree of the safety of the belief is explicitly measured the distance between a possible world and the centered actual world, which counts as the second dimension of the set-up of the possible worlds. In the third and last part of the paper, a more general theoretical lesson is drawn from the previous arguments, which may in turn shed some light on the significance of the distinction between epistemic modality and metaphysical modality.
In this paper, Pritchard's theory of safe belief is scrutinized with respect to its proposed solu... more In this paper, Pritchard's theory of safe belief is scrutinized with respect to its proposed solution to the lottery puzzle. By comparison with the sensitivity solution to the lottery puzzle, some serious challenges to Pritchard's safety solution to the lottery puzzle are revealed. Then, it is suggested that a reasonable arrangement of possible worlds in question, together with a better theoretical ground for conceptual distinction between epistemic modality and probability, can be derived directly from the safety theory, which in turn successfully solves the lottery puzzle.
在《理性、真理与历史》一书当中,普特南构造了一个名为“缸中之脑”( Brains in a Vat)的情形并声称有一种语义外在主义(Semantic Externalism)的方法可以证明那个“... more 在《理性、真理与历史》一书当中,普特南构造了一个名为“缸中之脑”( Brains in a Vat)的情形并声称有一种语义外在主义(Semantic Externalism)的方法可以证明那个“我们都是缸中之脑”的陈述总是(甚至必然是)假的。通过这种方式,普特南认为他可以成功地反驳认知怀疑论 (Epistemic Skepticism)②,因为他已经展示出认知怀疑论本身是不一致的。普特南的解决方案在当代认识论当中引发了热烈的讨论。本文力图论证普特南对认知怀疑论的回应是不成功的。全文共分为五个部分。第一部分介绍缸中之脑的情形并探讨认知怀疑论的本质。第二部分通过综述普特南反驳认知怀疑论的论证,力图澄清普特南论证策略的主要思想和步骤。第三部分集中探讨普特南论证本身中存在的种种缺陷。第四部分以前面对怀疑论本质的探讨为背景和框架,从方法论的视角重新评价语义外在主义对怀疑论的反驳策略。通过展示单纯的语义策略并不足以反驳怀疑论的种种原因,笔者提出, 普特南式的策略失败的原因在于,以他为代表的一般意义上的语义外在主义的解决方法并没有真正充分且完全地把握认知怀疑论的本质。文章的结论是普特南式的策略并不能够成功地应对认知怀疑论的挑战。
In this paper, the truth-maker solution to the Gettier problem, which is advocated by Adrian Heat... more In this paper, the truth-maker solution to the Gettier problem, which is advocated by Adrian Heathcote, will be closely examined. This investigation of the truth maker theory will reveal the theoretical advantages as well as the theoretical deficiency of the theory. Through the comparison of a series of the Gettier cases, it is suggested that the causal models implied in the various types of the Gettier cases are significantly different, which is especially illustrated by the Gettier cases concerning the thermometer and the clock. It is argued that, due to the different innate causal mechanism of the thermometer, the clock as well as their correspondent different representative mechanism, the truth-maker theory may successfully solve one of them on the one hand, but on the other hand fail to adequately solve the other one, which in turn indicates the theoretical impasses and challenges that are posed upon the truth-maker theory.
I will explore some philosophical implications generated from Williamson's thesis that knowing is... more I will explore some philosophical implications generated from Williamson's thesis that knowing is a state of mind (KSM). By using the fake barn case, I introduce a way to evaluate Williamson's KSM thesis— whether Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from some other apparently similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind (i.e., accidentally true beliefs). Then, some tentative externalist accounts for the supposed differences between Williamsonian mental state of knowing, and accidentally true beliefs are critically assessed, which in turn implies that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson's thesis KMS. In the end, I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising, which indicates that the active externalism would be called for by Williamson's KMS thesis.
2024.05.23 Slides for Functional meaning and teleosemantics, Searle on Speech act, and Capplen & ... more 2024.05.23 Slides for Functional meaning and teleosemantics, Searle on Speech act, and Capplen & Dever on De-Anthropocentrized Externalism
Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional condi... more Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional conditions of justified true belief with the truth-making condition, which would jointly provide us with the sufficient condition of knowledge, and this truth-maker account of knowledge in turn explains why a gettiered justified true belief fails to be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge. In this paper, by the comparison of two different casual models that are illustrated by the thermometer and the clock respectively, however, it will be argued that Heathcote’s truth-making account of knowledge fails to cope with the Gettier case of the stopped clock and therefore is called for some further remedy
W. V. Quine is one of the most prominent advocates of the naturalistic approach to epistemology a... more W. V. Quine is one of the most prominent advocates of the naturalistic approach to epistemology and he argues that epistemology should be naturalized and transformed into a sub-discipline of psychology and hence a chapter in science. In his famous paper " Epistemology Naturalized, " Quine starts to compare epistemology with the logical and set-theoretical studies of the foundations of mathematics. Similar to the studies of the foundations of mathematics, as Quine suggests, epistemological studies, which are " concerned with the foundation of science " (Quine 1968, p. 69), can be divided into two sorts— one is conceptual and the other is doctrinal. Quine further argues that the conceptual ones are concerned with meaning of our material object concepts, which are clarified by reducing them into sense experience concepts; and, on the other hand, the doctrinal ones are concerned with truth of our material object beliefs, which are established by deducing them from th...
本文通过论述休漠在反驳因果原则过程当申所使用的“可设想性原则”,解释了其中存在的问题,通过对休漠该原则的历史追溯说明休漠在使用该原则的过程当中所具有的特殊性,最终通过一种可能的替代性解释提供了在... more 本文通过论述休漠在反驳因果原则过程当申所使用的“可设想性原则”,解释了其中存在的问题,通过对休漠该原则的历史追溯说明休漠在使用该原则的过程当中所具有的特殊性,最终通过一种可能的替代性解释提供了在这一个层面维系休漠论述的维度。
In this paper it is argued that the safety condition of knowledge can provide a satisfactory solu... more In this paper it is argued that the safety condition of knowledge can provide a satisfactory solution to the lottery puzzle without appealing to too sophisticated theory of conditional probability. With a proper interpretation of the lottery puzzle, the standard possible-world analysis suffices for the need in question. The solution to the lottery puzzle in this paper also illustrates the crucial distinction between the concepts of epistemic safety and objective probability; more specifically, the general theoretical framework embodied in the suggested solution in this paper implies a two-dimensional structure of the possible worlds. In order to establish the above conclusions, the paper is divided into three parts. The first and preliminary part of this paper introduces the safety condition, the lottery puzzle and seeming difficulty in the safety solution to the lottery puzzle. It is then argued that the objective distribution of the probability for each lottery to win plays a significant role only in the metaphysical dimension of the set-up of the possible worlds in question, which does not reflect the genuine degree of the safety of the epistemic belief in question. By contrast, the epistemic strength and the degree of the safety of the belief is explicitly measured the distance between a possible world and the centered actual world, which counts as the second dimension of the set-up of the possible worlds. In the third and last part of the paper, a more general theoretical lesson is drawn from the previous arguments, which may in turn shed some light on the significance of the distinction between epistemic modality and metaphysical modality.
In this paper, Pritchard's theory of safe belief is scrutinized with respect to its proposed solu... more In this paper, Pritchard's theory of safe belief is scrutinized with respect to its proposed solution to the lottery puzzle. By comparison with the sensitivity solution to the lottery puzzle, some serious challenges to Pritchard's safety solution to the lottery puzzle are revealed. Then, it is suggested that a reasonable arrangement of possible worlds in question, together with a better theoretical ground for conceptual distinction between epistemic modality and probability, can be derived directly from the safety theory, which in turn successfully solves the lottery puzzle.
在《理性、真理与历史》一书当中,普特南构造了一个名为“缸中之脑”( Brains in a Vat)的情形并声称有一种语义外在主义(Semantic Externalism)的方法可以证明那个“... more 在《理性、真理与历史》一书当中,普特南构造了一个名为“缸中之脑”( Brains in a Vat)的情形并声称有一种语义外在主义(Semantic Externalism)的方法可以证明那个“我们都是缸中之脑”的陈述总是(甚至必然是)假的。通过这种方式,普特南认为他可以成功地反驳认知怀疑论 (Epistemic Skepticism)②,因为他已经展示出认知怀疑论本身是不一致的。普特南的解决方案在当代认识论当中引发了热烈的讨论。本文力图论证普特南对认知怀疑论的回应是不成功的。全文共分为五个部分。第一部分介绍缸中之脑的情形并探讨认知怀疑论的本质。第二部分通过综述普特南反驳认知怀疑论的论证,力图澄清普特南论证策略的主要思想和步骤。第三部分集中探讨普特南论证本身中存在的种种缺陷。第四部分以前面对怀疑论本质的探讨为背景和框架,从方法论的视角重新评价语义外在主义对怀疑论的反驳策略。通过展示单纯的语义策略并不足以反驳怀疑论的种种原因,笔者提出, 普特南式的策略失败的原因在于,以他为代表的一般意义上的语义外在主义的解决方法并没有真正充分且完全地把握认知怀疑论的本质。文章的结论是普特南式的策略并不能够成功地应对认知怀疑论的挑战。
In this paper, the truth-maker solution to the Gettier problem, which is advocated by Adrian Heat... more In this paper, the truth-maker solution to the Gettier problem, which is advocated by Adrian Heathcote, will be closely examined. This investigation of the truth maker theory will reveal the theoretical advantages as well as the theoretical deficiency of the theory. Through the comparison of a series of the Gettier cases, it is suggested that the causal models implied in the various types of the Gettier cases are significantly different, which is especially illustrated by the Gettier cases concerning the thermometer and the clock. It is argued that, due to the different innate causal mechanism of the thermometer, the clock as well as their correspondent different representative mechanism, the truth-maker theory may successfully solve one of them on the one hand, but on the other hand fail to adequately solve the other one, which in turn indicates the theoretical impasses and challenges that are posed upon the truth-maker theory.
I will explore some philosophical implications generated from Williamson's thesis that knowing is... more I will explore some philosophical implications generated from Williamson's thesis that knowing is a state of mind (KSM). By using the fake barn case, I introduce a way to evaluate Williamson's KSM thesis— whether Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from some other apparently similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind (i.e., accidentally true beliefs). Then, some tentative externalist accounts for the supposed differences between Williamsonian mental state of knowing, and accidentally true beliefs are critically assessed, which in turn implies that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson's thesis KMS. In the end, I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising, which indicates that the active externalism would be called for by Williamson's KMS thesis.
2024.05.23 Slides for Functional meaning and teleosemantics, Searle on Speech act, and Capplen & ... more 2024.05.23 Slides for Functional meaning and teleosemantics, Searle on Speech act, and Capplen & Dever on De-Anthropocentrized Externalism
2024.03.28 Slides for Strawson on referring, Donnellan on attributive uses and referential uses o... more 2024.03.28 Slides for Strawson on referring, Donnellan on attributive uses and referential uses of definite descriptions & Kripke on semantic reference and speaker's reference
2024.03.14 Slides for the review of Frege & introduction to Russell's theory of Definite Descript... more 2024.03.14 Slides for the review of Frege & introduction to Russell's theory of Definite Descriptions
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(Epistemic Skepticism)②,因为他已经展示出认知怀疑论本身是不一致的。普特南的解决方案在当代认识论当中引发了热烈的讨论。本文力图论证普特南对认知怀疑论的回应是不成功的。全文共分为五个部分。第一部分介绍缸中之脑的情形并探讨认知怀疑论的本质。第二部分通过综述普特南反驳认知怀疑论的论证,力图澄清普特南论证策略的主要思想和步骤。第三部分集中探讨普特南论证本身中存在的种种缺陷。第四部分以前面对怀疑论本质的探讨为背景和框架,从方法论的视角重新评价语义外在主义对怀疑论的反驳策略。通过展示单纯的语义策略并不足以反驳怀疑论的种种原因,笔者提出, 普特南式的策略失败的原因在于,以他为代表的一般意义上的语义外在主义的解决方法并没有真正充分且完全地把握认知怀疑论的本质。文章的结论是普特南式的策略并不能够成功地应对认知怀疑论的挑战。
(Epistemic Skepticism)②,因为他已经展示出认知怀疑论本身是不一致的。普特南的解决方案在当代认识论当中引发了热烈的讨论。本文力图论证普特南对认知怀疑论的回应是不成功的。全文共分为五个部分。第一部分介绍缸中之脑的情形并探讨认知怀疑论的本质。第二部分通过综述普特南反驳认知怀疑论的论证,力图澄清普特南论证策略的主要思想和步骤。第三部分集中探讨普特南论证本身中存在的种种缺陷。第四部分以前面对怀疑论本质的探讨为背景和框架,从方法论的视角重新评价语义外在主义对怀疑论的反驳策略。通过展示单纯的语义策略并不足以反驳怀疑论的种种原因,笔者提出, 普特南式的策略失败的原因在于,以他为代表的一般意义上的语义外在主义的解决方法并没有真正充分且完全地把握认知怀疑论的本质。文章的结论是普特南式的策略并不能够成功地应对认知怀疑论的挑战。