Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
От | Antonin Houska |
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Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 9148.1552063139@localhost обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) (Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>) |
Ответы |
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at> wrote: > Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Agreed. > > > > For the WAL encryption, I wonder if we can have a encryption key > > dedicated for WAL. Regardless of keys of tables and indexes all WAL > > are encrypted with the WAL key. During the recovery the startup > > process decrypts WAL and applies it, and then the table data will be > > encrypted with its table key when flushing. So we just control the > > scope of encryption object: WAL of tables and indexes etc or > > everything. > > My point of view is that different key usually means different user. The user > who can decrypt WAL can effectively see all the data, even though another user > put them (encrypted with another key) into tables. So in this case, different > keys don't really separate users in terms of data access. Please ignore what I said here. You probably meant that the WAL is both encrypted and decrypted using the same (dedicated) key. -- Antonin Houska https://www.cybertec-postgresql.com
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