Queen's U prof, Philosophy & Linguistics; UCLA: MA, PhD (Philosophy) & MA, CPHIL (Linguistics); post-docs: Stanford CSLI & Paris CREA; Barcelona research affiliate, Logic, Language & Cognition. 2012: President, Canadian Philosophical Association. Expert witness in Canadian courts: on Same-sex marriage; on racial vs racist language. Practising feminist. Supervisors: Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan
... Sachons gre a Emmanuel Malolo Dissake d'avoir mis a la disposition des lecteurs fran... more ... Sachons gre a Emmanuel Malolo Dissake d'avoir mis a la disposition des lecteurs francophones un texte important d'un des grands philosophes du XXe siecle. LOUIS MARCHILDON Universite du Quebec a Trois-Rivieres ... ADELE MERCIER Queen's University
"A semantic picture (Aristotle, Mill, direct reference) analyzes the logical structure of sentenc... more "A semantic picture (Aristotle, Mill, direct reference) analyzes the logical structure of sentences in terms of reference –the subject denoting an object—and predication –the predicate ascribing a property to that object. Frege brought attention to puzzling dimensions of that view, concluding that proper names themselves had not only a reference, but a predicative sense (while Russell did away with reference altogether). (Correcting Russell,) Donnellan showed that not just proper names but definite descriptions had both a referential use and a predicative (attributive) use.
The understanding of logical structure in terms of semantic function has by and large been ejected from linguistic theorizing, replaced in GB by structural, syntactic, analyses (although categorial grammars retain some of this understanding through rules of functional application.)
Various facts detailed in this talk suggest that the referential-predicative distinction is psychologically real. A closer look at how this distinction operates deeply in our linguistic judgments sheds light on subtleties affecting belief attributions, derogation inheritance, and other presuppositional facts.
First, we review subject-object asymmetries in syntax, which are legion and well-studied. Then, we observe much less studied metalinguistic subject-object asymmetries: we show that proper names are referential in subject position, but receive predicative interpretation in object position.
However, we show that the relevant subject-object asymmetries are not amenable to structural explanations: they cannot be cashed out in structural or syntactic terms, but in semantic (or functional or logical or ontological) terms: the first denotes an object, the second a property.
We show that interestingly (although predictably, by our analysis), the metalinguistic referential-predicative effects discussed in the talk also appear in derogation inheritance: they explain when a speaker uttering “that bastard Kaplan” will inherit, or not the, the negative presupposition. The same analysis also solves (part of) the “projection problem,” or how to compute the presuppositions of a complex sentence.
I present several arguments which together or separately, and among other things, provide what I ... more I present several arguments which together or separately, and among other things, provide what I take to be a definitive argument against the use of so-called sex-neutral masculine language. The main title presents, in elevated language, a simple (perverse) idea --some might say small, and I am happy to agree-- that is the essential keystone of masculine language and the essential reason behind its current remise-en-question. The subtitle plays on deep structure to convey the idea that this paper has both semantic interests and deontic concerns. In the sense of any paper with an 'ought' in it, it is, among other things, an advocacy paper. Part I: Double Standards and the Contingent A Priori focuses on the use of the word 'man'. Part II: The Masculine Language Loop examines how the pernicious a priori --the masculine language virus-- infects our pronominal system, and our attitudes.
Je présente plusieurs arguments qui fournissent ce que je considère être un argument définitif co... more Je présente plusieurs arguments qui fournissent ce que je considère être un argument définitif contre certaines formes de langage masculin dans leur emploi soi-disant sexuellement neutre. Dans la première partie, je me concentre sur l’emploi du mot ‘homme’, et je défends l’idée qu’il véhicule un a priori Dans la seconde, j’examine de quelle façon cet a priori pernicieux --ce virus du langage masculin-- infecte le système pronominal du français. Je conclus avec une critique linguistique et féministe sans doute surprenante de la décision récente de l’Office de la langue française du Québec de féminiser les titres de fonction. Je montre que le problème réside ailleurs et par conséquent qu'il faut trouver ailleurs une solution efficace.
On the basis of my analysis of the affidavits filed by Professor Susan Ehrlich and Professor Robe... more On the basis of my analysis of the affidavits filed by Professor Susan Ehrlich and Professor Robert Stainton in Egale v. Canada and in Halpern v. Canada in the matter of same sex couples seeking to marry, it is my opinion that Professor Stainton's criticisms of Professor Ehrlich are based on faulty reasoning: his arguments are either question-begging, irrelevant or based on a significant misstatement of Professor Ehrlich's position.
In his affidavit filed in response to Professor Ehrlich's affidavit, Professor Stainton rejects her position, concluding that extending the definition of 'marriage' to include lesbian and gay couples would have to alter the very meaning of the term, which "is in conflict with the normal use and development of language." (para. 64) In this affidavit, I review each of Professor Stainton's arguments and demonstrate why, in my professional opinion, his analysis cannot be supported.
This is a paper in applied philosophy of language. It has both semantic and deontic concerns. Mor... more This is a paper in applied philosophy of language. It has both semantic and deontic concerns. More than about the meaning of ‘marriage,’ it is about how one goes about determining the meaning of ‘marriage’. But it is equally about the place of philosophy of language in the political sphere, and inter alia, about the roles and responsibilities of philosophers in public life.
The article critically reviews an argument against same-sex marriage presented to Canadian Courts... more The article critically reviews an argument against same-sex marriage presented to Canadian Courts by Margaret Somerville based on “a basic presumption in favour of the natural.” It scrutinizes the claim that opposite-sex couples represent “a naturally, inherently procreative relationship” while same-sex couples do not, as well as the reasoning to the conclusion that the alleged difference justifies separate institutions. It criticizes the use Somerville makes of the language of “norms”, and hints at disastrous consequences her viewpoint would yield regarding adoption. The article reveals her argument in its full circularity, and shows that Somerville fallaciously targets same-sex marriage since her real issue is with in vitro fertilization from donor gametes, something neither universal in, nor exclusive to, same-sex marriages. Deliberately restricting same-sex couples to civil unions is unfair both to the children in those unions, and to same-sex couples if they alone must bear the cost of reducing IVF-produced life.
Résumé/Abstract Conventional behavior is behavior engaged in because of, or due to, convention. T... more Résumé/Abstract Conventional behavior is behavior engaged in because of, or due to, convention. There are two senses of" due to": the convention explains my behavior by actually causing it; or the convention explains my behavior by providing reasons I have for ...
... to make about the how-could-anyone-have-picked-it-up view of rule transmission, which is summ... more ... to make about the how-could-anyone-have-picked-it-up view of rule transmission, which is summed up in the observation that we don't all speak proto-Sanskrit. ... The parameter is postulated as part of an explanation of rapid language acquisition, since a child exposed to ...
... Sachons gre a Emmanuel Malolo Dissake d'avoir mis a la disposition des lecteurs fran... more ... Sachons gre a Emmanuel Malolo Dissake d'avoir mis a la disposition des lecteurs francophones un texte important d'un des grands philosophes du XXe siecle. LOUIS MARCHILDON Universite du Quebec a Trois-Rivieres ... ADELE MERCIER Queen's University
"A semantic picture (Aristotle, Mill, direct reference) analyzes the logical structure of sentenc... more "A semantic picture (Aristotle, Mill, direct reference) analyzes the logical structure of sentences in terms of reference –the subject denoting an object—and predication –the predicate ascribing a property to that object. Frege brought attention to puzzling dimensions of that view, concluding that proper names themselves had not only a reference, but a predicative sense (while Russell did away with reference altogether). (Correcting Russell,) Donnellan showed that not just proper names but definite descriptions had both a referential use and a predicative (attributive) use.
The understanding of logical structure in terms of semantic function has by and large been ejected from linguistic theorizing, replaced in GB by structural, syntactic, analyses (although categorial grammars retain some of this understanding through rules of functional application.)
Various facts detailed in this talk suggest that the referential-predicative distinction is psychologically real. A closer look at how this distinction operates deeply in our linguistic judgments sheds light on subtleties affecting belief attributions, derogation inheritance, and other presuppositional facts.
First, we review subject-object asymmetries in syntax, which are legion and well-studied. Then, we observe much less studied metalinguistic subject-object asymmetries: we show that proper names are referential in subject position, but receive predicative interpretation in object position.
However, we show that the relevant subject-object asymmetries are not amenable to structural explanations: they cannot be cashed out in structural or syntactic terms, but in semantic (or functional or logical or ontological) terms: the first denotes an object, the second a property.
We show that interestingly (although predictably, by our analysis), the metalinguistic referential-predicative effects discussed in the talk also appear in derogation inheritance: they explain when a speaker uttering “that bastard Kaplan” will inherit, or not the, the negative presupposition. The same analysis also solves (part of) the “projection problem,” or how to compute the presuppositions of a complex sentence.
I present several arguments which together or separately, and among other things, provide what I ... more I present several arguments which together or separately, and among other things, provide what I take to be a definitive argument against the use of so-called sex-neutral masculine language. The main title presents, in elevated language, a simple (perverse) idea --some might say small, and I am happy to agree-- that is the essential keystone of masculine language and the essential reason behind its current remise-en-question. The subtitle plays on deep structure to convey the idea that this paper has both semantic interests and deontic concerns. In the sense of any paper with an 'ought' in it, it is, among other things, an advocacy paper. Part I: Double Standards and the Contingent A Priori focuses on the use of the word 'man'. Part II: The Masculine Language Loop examines how the pernicious a priori --the masculine language virus-- infects our pronominal system, and our attitudes.
Je présente plusieurs arguments qui fournissent ce que je considère être un argument définitif co... more Je présente plusieurs arguments qui fournissent ce que je considère être un argument définitif contre certaines formes de langage masculin dans leur emploi soi-disant sexuellement neutre. Dans la première partie, je me concentre sur l’emploi du mot ‘homme’, et je défends l’idée qu’il véhicule un a priori Dans la seconde, j’examine de quelle façon cet a priori pernicieux --ce virus du langage masculin-- infecte le système pronominal du français. Je conclus avec une critique linguistique et féministe sans doute surprenante de la décision récente de l’Office de la langue française du Québec de féminiser les titres de fonction. Je montre que le problème réside ailleurs et par conséquent qu'il faut trouver ailleurs une solution efficace.
On the basis of my analysis of the affidavits filed by Professor Susan Ehrlich and Professor Robe... more On the basis of my analysis of the affidavits filed by Professor Susan Ehrlich and Professor Robert Stainton in Egale v. Canada and in Halpern v. Canada in the matter of same sex couples seeking to marry, it is my opinion that Professor Stainton's criticisms of Professor Ehrlich are based on faulty reasoning: his arguments are either question-begging, irrelevant or based on a significant misstatement of Professor Ehrlich's position.
In his affidavit filed in response to Professor Ehrlich's affidavit, Professor Stainton rejects her position, concluding that extending the definition of 'marriage' to include lesbian and gay couples would have to alter the very meaning of the term, which "is in conflict with the normal use and development of language." (para. 64) In this affidavit, I review each of Professor Stainton's arguments and demonstrate why, in my professional opinion, his analysis cannot be supported.
This is a paper in applied philosophy of language. It has both semantic and deontic concerns. Mor... more This is a paper in applied philosophy of language. It has both semantic and deontic concerns. More than about the meaning of ‘marriage,’ it is about how one goes about determining the meaning of ‘marriage’. But it is equally about the place of philosophy of language in the political sphere, and inter alia, about the roles and responsibilities of philosophers in public life.
The article critically reviews an argument against same-sex marriage presented to Canadian Courts... more The article critically reviews an argument against same-sex marriage presented to Canadian Courts by Margaret Somerville based on “a basic presumption in favour of the natural.” It scrutinizes the claim that opposite-sex couples represent “a naturally, inherently procreative relationship” while same-sex couples do not, as well as the reasoning to the conclusion that the alleged difference justifies separate institutions. It criticizes the use Somerville makes of the language of “norms”, and hints at disastrous consequences her viewpoint would yield regarding adoption. The article reveals her argument in its full circularity, and shows that Somerville fallaciously targets same-sex marriage since her real issue is with in vitro fertilization from donor gametes, something neither universal in, nor exclusive to, same-sex marriages. Deliberately restricting same-sex couples to civil unions is unfair both to the children in those unions, and to same-sex couples if they alone must bear the cost of reducing IVF-produced life.
Résumé/Abstract Conventional behavior is behavior engaged in because of, or due to, convention. T... more Résumé/Abstract Conventional behavior is behavior engaged in because of, or due to, convention. There are two senses of" due to": the convention explains my behavior by actually causing it; or the convention explains my behavior by providing reasons I have for ...
... to make about the how-could-anyone-have-picked-it-up view of rule transmission, which is summ... more ... to make about the how-could-anyone-have-picked-it-up view of rule transmission, which is summed up in the observation that we don't all speak proto-Sanskrit. ... The parameter is postulated as part of an explanation of rapid language acquisition, since a child exposed to ...
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The understanding of logical structure in terms of semantic function has by and large been ejected from linguistic theorizing, replaced in GB by structural, syntactic, analyses (although categorial grammars retain some of this understanding through rules of functional application.)
Various facts detailed in this talk suggest that the referential-predicative distinction is psychologically real. A closer look at how this distinction operates deeply in our linguistic judgments sheds light on subtleties affecting belief attributions, derogation inheritance, and other presuppositional facts.
First, we review subject-object asymmetries in syntax, which are legion and well-studied. Then, we observe much less studied metalinguistic subject-object asymmetries: we show that proper names are referential in subject position, but receive predicative interpretation in object position.
However, we show that the relevant subject-object asymmetries are not amenable to structural explanations: they cannot be cashed out in structural or syntactic terms, but in semantic (or functional or logical or ontological) terms: the first denotes an object, the second a property.
We show that interestingly (although predictably, by our analysis), the metalinguistic referential-predicative effects discussed in the talk also appear in derogation inheritance: they explain when a speaker uttering “that bastard Kaplan” will inherit, or not the, the negative presupposition. The same analysis also solves (part of) the “projection problem,” or how to compute the presuppositions of a complex sentence.
"
Part I: Double Standards and the Contingent A Priori focuses on the use of the word 'man'. Part II: The Masculine Language Loop examines how the pernicious a priori --the masculine language virus-- infects our pronominal system, and our attitudes.
In his affidavit filed in response to Professor Ehrlich's affidavit, Professor Stainton rejects her position, concluding that extending the definition of 'marriage' to include lesbian and gay couples would have to alter the very meaning of the term, which "is in conflict with the normal use and development of language." (para. 64) In this affidavit, I review each of Professor Stainton's arguments and demonstrate why, in my professional opinion, his analysis cannot be supported.
The understanding of logical structure in terms of semantic function has by and large been ejected from linguistic theorizing, replaced in GB by structural, syntactic, analyses (although categorial grammars retain some of this understanding through rules of functional application.)
Various facts detailed in this talk suggest that the referential-predicative distinction is psychologically real. A closer look at how this distinction operates deeply in our linguistic judgments sheds light on subtleties affecting belief attributions, derogation inheritance, and other presuppositional facts.
First, we review subject-object asymmetries in syntax, which are legion and well-studied. Then, we observe much less studied metalinguistic subject-object asymmetries: we show that proper names are referential in subject position, but receive predicative interpretation in object position.
However, we show that the relevant subject-object asymmetries are not amenable to structural explanations: they cannot be cashed out in structural or syntactic terms, but in semantic (or functional or logical or ontological) terms: the first denotes an object, the second a property.
We show that interestingly (although predictably, by our analysis), the metalinguistic referential-predicative effects discussed in the talk also appear in derogation inheritance: they explain when a speaker uttering “that bastard Kaplan” will inherit, or not the, the negative presupposition. The same analysis also solves (part of) the “projection problem,” or how to compute the presuppositions of a complex sentence.
"
Part I: Double Standards and the Contingent A Priori focuses on the use of the word 'man'. Part II: The Masculine Language Loop examines how the pernicious a priori --the masculine language virus-- infects our pronominal system, and our attitudes.
In his affidavit filed in response to Professor Ehrlich's affidavit, Professor Stainton rejects her position, concluding that extending the definition of 'marriage' to include lesbian and gay couples would have to alter the very meaning of the term, which "is in conflict with the normal use and development of language." (para. 64) In this affidavit, I review each of Professor Stainton's arguments and demonstrate why, in my professional opinion, his analysis cannot be supported.