Papers by Bernt Kerremans
Historisch Nieuwsblad, 2020
Review of my thesis in Dutch
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De invloed van munten op het collectieve geheugen van de Romeinen
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Acta Classica, 2018
This article attempts to appraise the effect of the so-called clades Lolliana in Augustan Rome, a... more This article attempts to appraise the effect of the so-called clades Lolliana in Augustan Rome, as represented in contemporary poetry and later Roman historiography. Although this defeat of the Roman general Marcus Lollius against some German tribes in 17/16 was ostensibly regarded harmless by later ancient and modern historians, seen within a wider context of Roman memory culture, the clades Lolliana is likely to have provoked collective memories of traumatic Roman-German confrontations at the turn of the second century, causing serious agitation at the court of Augustus, as is reflected in Propertius’ Elegiae 4.1.95-97 and two poems by Crinagoras of Mytilene from the Anthologia Graeca. This assumption has implications for the appreciation of Lollius’ political career, which was probably seriously impaired by his military discomfiture and hampered by negative perceptions as a result thereof, of which Horace, Carmina 4.9 could well be an artful contemporary sample.
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Kleio, 2017
This article challenges the deep-rooted conviction that Roman contacts with German culture were a... more This article challenges the deep-rooted conviction that Roman contacts with German culture were a result of Caesar's military confrontations with German tribes in the 50s B.C. In effect the traumatic wars against the Cimbri and Teutones in the late second century B.C. were the first encounters of the Roman Empire with the Germanic inhabitants of Northwest Europe, wars that, according to the ancient literary tradition, had a tremendous impact on the Roman collective memory.
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Mnemosyne, 2016
This article aims to contribute to an ongoing scholarly debate about crises in the Roman world. I... more This article aims to contribute to an ongoing scholarly debate about crises in the Roman world. It presents a case study of Roman crisis management, the so-called tumultus. The main question it sets out to answer is whether the wars of the Romans against the Germanic Cimbri and Teutones (113-101) – the Roman defeat at the Battle of Arausio (Orange) in 105 in particular – led to the promulgation of such a military emergency, which opened the possibility to facilitate the draft of extra troops by the Roman Senate. A prerequisite for this state of emergency was that the enemy had crossed the Alps and had set foot on Italian soil (tumultus Italicus), or at least entered the area north of the river Po, Cisalpine Gaul (tumultus Gallicus). Contrary to recent views on crisis management during the Roman Republic, it is stated here that the scattered literary sources related to the Cimbrian War all seem to suggest that on two occasions during this war a tumultus declaration may have been proclaimed in Rome; either directly after the news of Arausio reaching the city of Rome, or else after the Cimbrian invasion of Italy in 102.
Keywords
Tumultus; Roman crisis management; cultural memory; Marius; Cimbri; Teutones
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Hermeneus, 2010
Published in: Hermeneus 5 (2010) 198-204.
Publius Quinctilius Varus is above all known as the Ro... more Published in: Hermeneus 5 (2010) 198-204.
Publius Quinctilius Varus is above all known as the Roman general who suffered a crushing defeat in Germania in the year 9 AD. Two thousand years after the 'clades Variana', many exhibitions and lectures were organized in Germany and other countries to commemorate the fact that Varus lost the Roman honor on German soil. Although interest in the Netherlands in this matter was fairly low, the magazine Hermeneus devoted a special issue on this theme. However, Varus came of rather poorly. In Germany, attention was focused almost exclusively on Arminius, the leader of the rebellious German tribes, and the possible location of the battlefield at Kalkriese. Indeed, the prevailing image of Varus in history is that of a loser. Yet, at the time Varus was appointed commander over the Rhine armies, he was already a man of great distinction in Rome, as this article tries to emphasize.
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Geschiedenis Magazine, 2009
Published in: Geschiedenis Magazine 7 (2009) 20-24.
The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD w... more Published in: Geschiedenis Magazine 7 (2009) 20-24.
The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD was one of many confrontations between "civilized" Rome and the "barbaric" Germans. What was the intention of the Roman military effort beyond the Rhine? There does not appear to have been a carefully worked out military strategy. The situation is comparable to that of the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan.
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This paper discusses recent insights into the location of the Varus battlefield near Kalkriese (G... more This paper discusses recent insights into the location of the Varus battlefield near Kalkriese (Germany)
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Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis, 2011
Published in: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 3 (2011) 301-317.
The Roman general Germanicus (15 B... more Published in: Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 3 (2011) 301-317.
The Roman general Germanicus (15 BCE-19 CE) gained unprecedented popularity during his lifetime. However, in dealing with the mutiny of the Rhine armies in 14 CE he did not show the determination which his popularity might lead us to expect. His campaigns against a German alliance lead by Arminius, can hardly be described as successful, and never resulted in the permanent subjection of Germany. Germanicus took several unnecessary risks which caused losses to the Roman treasury and military. This interpretation of Germanicus’ German command matches the current view that Tacitus does not present Germanicus as a glorious figure, but depicts his so-called hero often in a negative light. Nonetheless, according to Tacitus, the recall of Germanicus in 16 CE was the consequence of Tiberius’ fear of his nephew’s popularity and his own wish not to pursue a policy of expansion. Although the ending of Germanicus’ command, memorialized after his death in 19 CE in several monuments in honour of the deceased (as summoned in the Tabula Siarensis), meant the abrupt end of Roman campaigning in Germany, it is argued here that the recall of Germanicus should be considered a sensible measure, dictated by a pragmatic outlook on foreign affairs.
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Thesis Chapters by Bernt Kerremans
Doctoral thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands (ISBN 978-94-028-1754-6), 2019
This thesis concerning memory culture and places of remembrance in ancient Rome aims to gain insi... more This thesis concerning memory culture and places of remembrance in ancient Rome aims to gain insight into the impact of the Roman wars against Germanic tribes in the second and first centuries BCE on Roman collective memory. For the purpose of this research two cases are explored, viz. the Roman wars against the Cimbri and Teutones between 113 and 101 BCE, and Caesar's wars against Germanic tribes between 58 and 50 BCE.
The research draws some general conclusions about the construction of collective trauma and the functioning of collective memory in Roman society. Following the sociological notions of Piotr Sztompka and Jeffrey C. Alexander, it can be remarked that the impact of the consecutive defeats against the Cimbri and Teutones meets the sociological criteria of a collective trauma. These series of horrendous events, culminating in the double disaster of Arausio (105 BCE), left indelible impressions upon Roman society that marked Roman collective memory until well into late antiquity. In the formation of this collective trauma, the six defining stadia of Sztompka's traumatic sequence can be recognized, evolving against a conducive background of political and social disruption and collective memories of suffering inflicted by previous barbarian invasions. The ancient sources contain rudimentary traces of a master narrative and reveal the identity of six so-called carrier groups, collective agents of the trauma process. The persistency of collective memories of the wars against the Cimbri and Teutones, which turned Caius Marius into an undisputed icon, becomes manifest in their recurring nature throughout Roman history, starting with pragmatic recalled memories in the rhetorical oeuvre of Cicero and in Julius Caesar's De Bello Gallico, in the centuries thereafter occasionally reappearing in times when Rome seemed desperately in need of a new Marius.
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Papers by Bernt Kerremans
Keywords
Tumultus; Roman crisis management; cultural memory; Marius; Cimbri; Teutones
Publius Quinctilius Varus is above all known as the Roman general who suffered a crushing defeat in Germania in the year 9 AD. Two thousand years after the 'clades Variana', many exhibitions and lectures were organized in Germany and other countries to commemorate the fact that Varus lost the Roman honor on German soil. Although interest in the Netherlands in this matter was fairly low, the magazine Hermeneus devoted a special issue on this theme. However, Varus came of rather poorly. In Germany, attention was focused almost exclusively on Arminius, the leader of the rebellious German tribes, and the possible location of the battlefield at Kalkriese. Indeed, the prevailing image of Varus in history is that of a loser. Yet, at the time Varus was appointed commander over the Rhine armies, he was already a man of great distinction in Rome, as this article tries to emphasize.
The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD was one of many confrontations between "civilized" Rome and the "barbaric" Germans. What was the intention of the Roman military effort beyond the Rhine? There does not appear to have been a carefully worked out military strategy. The situation is comparable to that of the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan.
The Roman general Germanicus (15 BCE-19 CE) gained unprecedented popularity during his lifetime. However, in dealing with the mutiny of the Rhine armies in 14 CE he did not show the determination which his popularity might lead us to expect. His campaigns against a German alliance lead by Arminius, can hardly be described as successful, and never resulted in the permanent subjection of Germany. Germanicus took several unnecessary risks which caused losses to the Roman treasury and military. This interpretation of Germanicus’ German command matches the current view that Tacitus does not present Germanicus as a glorious figure, but depicts his so-called hero often in a negative light. Nonetheless, according to Tacitus, the recall of Germanicus in 16 CE was the consequence of Tiberius’ fear of his nephew’s popularity and his own wish not to pursue a policy of expansion. Although the ending of Germanicus’ command, memorialized after his death in 19 CE in several monuments in honour of the deceased (as summoned in the Tabula Siarensis), meant the abrupt end of Roman campaigning in Germany, it is argued here that the recall of Germanicus should be considered a sensible measure, dictated by a pragmatic outlook on foreign affairs.
Thesis Chapters by Bernt Kerremans
The research draws some general conclusions about the construction of collective trauma and the functioning of collective memory in Roman society. Following the sociological notions of Piotr Sztompka and Jeffrey C. Alexander, it can be remarked that the impact of the consecutive defeats against the Cimbri and Teutones meets the sociological criteria of a collective trauma. These series of horrendous events, culminating in the double disaster of Arausio (105 BCE), left indelible impressions upon Roman society that marked Roman collective memory until well into late antiquity. In the formation of this collective trauma, the six defining stadia of Sztompka's traumatic sequence can be recognized, evolving against a conducive background of political and social disruption and collective memories of suffering inflicted by previous barbarian invasions. The ancient sources contain rudimentary traces of a master narrative and reveal the identity of six so-called carrier groups, collective agents of the trauma process. The persistency of collective memories of the wars against the Cimbri and Teutones, which turned Caius Marius into an undisputed icon, becomes manifest in their recurring nature throughout Roman history, starting with pragmatic recalled memories in the rhetorical oeuvre of Cicero and in Julius Caesar's De Bello Gallico, in the centuries thereafter occasionally reappearing in times when Rome seemed desperately in need of a new Marius.
Keywords
Tumultus; Roman crisis management; cultural memory; Marius; Cimbri; Teutones
Publius Quinctilius Varus is above all known as the Roman general who suffered a crushing defeat in Germania in the year 9 AD. Two thousand years after the 'clades Variana', many exhibitions and lectures were organized in Germany and other countries to commemorate the fact that Varus lost the Roman honor on German soil. Although interest in the Netherlands in this matter was fairly low, the magazine Hermeneus devoted a special issue on this theme. However, Varus came of rather poorly. In Germany, attention was focused almost exclusively on Arminius, the leader of the rebellious German tribes, and the possible location of the battlefield at Kalkriese. Indeed, the prevailing image of Varus in history is that of a loser. Yet, at the time Varus was appointed commander over the Rhine armies, he was already a man of great distinction in Rome, as this article tries to emphasize.
The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD was one of many confrontations between "civilized" Rome and the "barbaric" Germans. What was the intention of the Roman military effort beyond the Rhine? There does not appear to have been a carefully worked out military strategy. The situation is comparable to that of the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan.
The Roman general Germanicus (15 BCE-19 CE) gained unprecedented popularity during his lifetime. However, in dealing with the mutiny of the Rhine armies in 14 CE he did not show the determination which his popularity might lead us to expect. His campaigns against a German alliance lead by Arminius, can hardly be described as successful, and never resulted in the permanent subjection of Germany. Germanicus took several unnecessary risks which caused losses to the Roman treasury and military. This interpretation of Germanicus’ German command matches the current view that Tacitus does not present Germanicus as a glorious figure, but depicts his so-called hero often in a negative light. Nonetheless, according to Tacitus, the recall of Germanicus in 16 CE was the consequence of Tiberius’ fear of his nephew’s popularity and his own wish not to pursue a policy of expansion. Although the ending of Germanicus’ command, memorialized after his death in 19 CE in several monuments in honour of the deceased (as summoned in the Tabula Siarensis), meant the abrupt end of Roman campaigning in Germany, it is argued here that the recall of Germanicus should be considered a sensible measure, dictated by a pragmatic outlook on foreign affairs.
The research draws some general conclusions about the construction of collective trauma and the functioning of collective memory in Roman society. Following the sociological notions of Piotr Sztompka and Jeffrey C. Alexander, it can be remarked that the impact of the consecutive defeats against the Cimbri and Teutones meets the sociological criteria of a collective trauma. These series of horrendous events, culminating in the double disaster of Arausio (105 BCE), left indelible impressions upon Roman society that marked Roman collective memory until well into late antiquity. In the formation of this collective trauma, the six defining stadia of Sztompka's traumatic sequence can be recognized, evolving against a conducive background of political and social disruption and collective memories of suffering inflicted by previous barbarian invasions. The ancient sources contain rudimentary traces of a master narrative and reveal the identity of six so-called carrier groups, collective agents of the trauma process. The persistency of collective memories of the wars against the Cimbri and Teutones, which turned Caius Marius into an undisputed icon, becomes manifest in their recurring nature throughout Roman history, starting with pragmatic recalled memories in the rhetorical oeuvre of Cicero and in Julius Caesar's De Bello Gallico, in the centuries thereafter occasionally reappearing in times when Rome seemed desperately in need of a new Marius.