Truthful double auction for joint internet of energy and profit optimization in cognitive radio networks
With the development of cognitive radio networks in recent years, spectrum utilization has
been enhanced, as secondary users can lease under-utilized spectrum from the spectrum
owners. Spectrum is allocated through auctions in wireless communication networks. The
auction can provide benefits for both primary users and secondary users. Existing auction
mechanisms for spectrum are mainly based on interference graphs and consider the
heterogeneity of spectrums only to a minimal degree. The economic efficiency of the auction …
been enhanced, as secondary users can lease under-utilized spectrum from the spectrum
owners. Spectrum is allocated through auctions in wireless communication networks. The
auction can provide benefits for both primary users and secondary users. Existing auction
mechanisms for spectrum are mainly based on interference graphs and consider the
heterogeneity of spectrums only to a minimal degree. The economic efficiency of the auction …
With the development of cognitive radio networks in recent years, spectrum utilization has been enhanced, as secondary users can lease under-utilized spectrum from the spectrum owners. Spectrum is allocated through auctions in wireless communication networks. The auction can provide benefits for both primary users and secondary users. Existing auction mechanisms for spectrum are mainly based on interference graphs and consider the heterogeneity of spectrums only to a minimal degree. The economic efficiency of the auction is usually neglected due to the focus on improving spectrum utilization. In this paper, we consider a signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) constrained interference model; this model is more realistic as users can simultaneously communicate as long as their requirements SINRs are satisfied. We propose a truthful profit maximization double auction mechanism to improve the benefit of networks with low energy. At the same time, security concerns are guaranteed because buyers and sellers make their true critical decision, i.e., they cannot improve their utility by misreporting their asks and bids. Moreover, our proposed novel auction mechanism is individually rational and budget-balanced. The experiments demonstrate that our auction mechanism efficiently increases the number of winners and improves the auctioneer's profit.
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