Active mapping: Resisting NIDS evasion without altering traffic

U Shankar, V Paxson - 2003 Symposium on Security and …, 2003 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
U Shankar, V Paxson
2003 Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003., 2003ieeexplore.ieee.org
A critical problem faced by a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is that of ambiguity.
The NIDS cannot always determine what traffic reaches a given host nor how that host will
interpret the traffic, and attackers may exploit this ambiguity to avoid detection or cause
misleading alarms. We present a lightweight solution, active mapping, which eliminates
TCP/IP-based ambiguity in a NIDS analysis with minimal runtime cost. Active mapping
efficiently builds profiles of the network topology and the TCP/IP policies of hosts on the …
A critical problem faced by a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is that of ambiguity. The NIDS cannot always determine what traffic reaches a given host nor how that host will interpret the traffic, and attackers may exploit this ambiguity to avoid detection or cause misleading alarms. We present a lightweight solution, active mapping, which eliminates TCP/IP-based ambiguity in a NIDS analysis with minimal runtime cost. Active mapping efficiently builds profiles of the network topology and the TCP/IP policies of hosts on the network; a NIDS may then use the host profiles to disambiguate the interpretation of the network traffic on a per-host basis. Active mapping avoids the semantic and performance problems of traffic normalization, in which traffic streams are modified to remove ambiguities. We have developed a prototype implementation of active mapping and modified a NIDS to use the active mapping-generated profile database in our tests. We found wide variation across operating systems' TCP/IP stack policies in real-world tests (about 6700 hosts), underscoring the need for this sort of disambiguation.
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