This chapter examines connections between virtue epistemology and psychology. The authors’ intere... more This chapter examines connections between virtue epistemology and psychology. The authors’ interest is thus to explain, understand, and evaluate virtue theoretic forms of epistemic psychology. Section I provides a brief overview of virtue epistemology; section II then discusses the two main types of virtue epistemological theories currently on offer (responsibilism and reliabilism). Section III examines empirical challenges to responsibilism from social psychology (epistemic situationism) and some lines of response. Section IV concludes by showing that a pressing problem for virtue reliabilism, namely providing an adequate account of epistemic agency, can be resolved by utilizing recent empirical work in the psychology of attention. The authors defend an empirically informed account of epistemic agency suitable for virtue reliabilism.
Chapter 1. Introduction: Virtue epistemology meets philosophy of science Abrol Fairweather.- Part... more Chapter 1. Introduction: Virtue epistemology meets philosophy of science Abrol Fairweather.- Part I. Epistemic Virtue, Cognitive Science & Situationism.- Chapter 2. The Function of Perception Peter Graham.- Chapter 3.Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue Chris Lepock.- Chapter 4. Daring to Believe: Epistemic Agency and Reflective Knowledge in Virtue Epistemology Fernando Broncano.- Chapter 5. Success, Minimal Agency and Epistemic Virtue Carlos Montemayor.- Chapter 6. Toward a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology Berit Brogaard.- Chapter 7. The Situationist Challenge to Reliabilism About Inference Mark Alfano.- Chapter 8. Inferential Virtues and Common Epistemic Goods Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor.- Part II. Epistemic Virtue and Formal Epistemology.- Chapter 9. Curiosity, Belief and Acquaintance Ilhan Inan.- Chapter 10. Epistemic Values and Disinformation Don Fallis.- Chapter 11. Defeasibility without inductivism Juan Comasana.- Part III. Virtues of Theories and Virtues of Theor...
This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic... more This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic virtues are not sufficiently widely distributed for a virtue-theoretic constraint on knowledge to apply without leading to skepticism. It deals with four objections to epistemic situation: 1) that virtuous dispositions are not required for knowledge, 2) that the Big Five or Big Six personality model proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, 3) that the cognitive-affective personality system framework proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, and 4) that weakening the reliability requirement through epistemic dependence or abilism means that common inferential strategies really are virtues. The paper concludes with reflections on the replication crisis in psychological science
While the situationist challenge has been prominent in philosophical literature in ethics for ove... more While the situationist challenge has been prominent in philosophical literature in ethics for over a decade, only recently has it been extended to virtue epistemology (See also forthcoming work on this issue by Doris and Olin, Heather Battaly, Christian Miller in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. (Fairweather & Flanagan eds.)). Mark Alfano argues that virtue epistemology is shown to be empirically inadequate in light of a wide range of results in social psychology, essentially succumbing to the same argument as virtue ethics. We argue that this meeting of the twain between virtue epistemology and social psychology in no way signals the end of virtue epistemology, but is rather a boon to naturalized virtue epistemology. We use Gird Gigerenzer’s models for bounded rationality (2011) to present a persuasive line of defense for virtue epistemology, and consider prospects for a naturalized virtue epistemology that is supported by current research in psychology.
The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isol... more The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and WV Quine. Duhem resolves ...
This chapter examines connections between virtue epistemology and psychology. The authors’ intere... more This chapter examines connections between virtue epistemology and psychology. The authors’ interest is thus to explain, understand, and evaluate virtue theoretic forms of epistemic psychology. Section I provides a brief overview of virtue epistemology; section II then discusses the two main types of virtue epistemological theories currently on offer (responsibilism and reliabilism). Section III examines empirical challenges to responsibilism from social psychology (epistemic situationism) and some lines of response. Section IV concludes by showing that a pressing problem for virtue reliabilism, namely providing an adequate account of epistemic agency, can be resolved by utilizing recent empirical work in the psychology of attention. The authors defend an empirically informed account of epistemic agency suitable for virtue reliabilism.
Chapter 1. Introduction: Virtue epistemology meets philosophy of science Abrol Fairweather.- Part... more Chapter 1. Introduction: Virtue epistemology meets philosophy of science Abrol Fairweather.- Part I. Epistemic Virtue, Cognitive Science & Situationism.- Chapter 2. The Function of Perception Peter Graham.- Chapter 3.Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue Chris Lepock.- Chapter 4. Daring to Believe: Epistemic Agency and Reflective Knowledge in Virtue Epistemology Fernando Broncano.- Chapter 5. Success, Minimal Agency and Epistemic Virtue Carlos Montemayor.- Chapter 6. Toward a Eudaimonistic Virtue Epistemology Berit Brogaard.- Chapter 7. The Situationist Challenge to Reliabilism About Inference Mark Alfano.- Chapter 8. Inferential Virtues and Common Epistemic Goods Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor.- Part II. Epistemic Virtue and Formal Epistemology.- Chapter 9. Curiosity, Belief and Acquaintance Ilhan Inan.- Chapter 10. Epistemic Values and Disinformation Don Fallis.- Chapter 11. Defeasibility without inductivism Juan Comasana.- Part III. Virtues of Theories and Virtues of Theor...
This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic... more This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic virtues are not sufficiently widely distributed for a virtue-theoretic constraint on knowledge to apply without leading to skepticism. It deals with four objections to epistemic situation: 1) that virtuous dispositions are not required for knowledge, 2) that the Big Five or Big Six personality model proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, 3) that the cognitive-affective personality system framework proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, and 4) that weakening the reliability requirement through epistemic dependence or abilism means that common inferential strategies really are virtues. The paper concludes with reflections on the replication crisis in psychological science
While the situationist challenge has been prominent in philosophical literature in ethics for ove... more While the situationist challenge has been prominent in philosophical literature in ethics for over a decade, only recently has it been extended to virtue epistemology (See also forthcoming work on this issue by Doris and Olin, Heather Battaly, Christian Miller in Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. (Fairweather & Flanagan eds.)). Mark Alfano argues that virtue epistemology is shown to be empirically inadequate in light of a wide range of results in social psychology, essentially succumbing to the same argument as virtue ethics. We argue that this meeting of the twain between virtue epistemology and social psychology in no way signals the end of virtue epistemology, but is rather a boon to naturalized virtue epistemology. We use Gird Gigerenzer’s models for bounded rationality (2011) to present a persuasive line of defense for virtue epistemology, and consider prospects for a naturalized virtue epistemology that is supported by current research in psychology.
The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isol... more The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and WV Quine. Duhem resolves ...
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