Christina Lai is an Associate Research Fellow in the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, Taiwan. She is also an adjunct faculty in Global Security Studies at Johns Hopkins University. In 2015-2016, she was a post-doctoral fellow in China and the World Program at Princeton University.
She is interested in US–China Relations, Chinese Foreign Policy, East Asian politics, and Qualitative Research Methods. Her works have appeared in the Journal of Contemporary China, Pacific Review, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Asian Survey, Asia Time, China’s World, and, Asian Security.
This article investigates the factors contributing to Taiwan’s evolving identity, and how it migh... more This article investigates the factors contributing to Taiwan’s evolving identity, and how it might shape the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. It also analyzes how Taiwanese identity affects major party stances toward China, including those of the KMT, DPP, and TPP.
Strengthening ties with Taiwan is the best chance the United States has to preser ve the liberal ... more Strengthening ties with Taiwan is the best chance the United States has to preser ve the liberal international order in Asia and improve its securit y relative to China. This study offers a normative perspective on how Taiwan can contribute to US-led international institutions and the Asian regional order and reduce conf lict risk. It concludes w ith recommendations for the United States and its partners to integrate Taiwan into multilateral institutions in Asia.
In 2021 the US, UK, and Australia established a trilateral security partnership known as AUKUS. T... more In 2021 the US, UK, and Australia established a trilateral security partnership known as AUKUS. This new security arrangement carries strategic implications for Taiwan's national security and prospects for regional order in Asia. It also leads to empirical puzzles: how will members of multiple alliances respond to rising threats? Under what conditions can a patron state avoid unwanted entrapment and imperial overstretch?
This article contributes to existing scholarship in US foreign policy and alliance management in Asia. It offers concrete thoughts on how a US policy of strategic clarity toward Taiwan and its contingency would enhance AUKUS's resilience, while US allies in Asia and Europe could maintain a collective stance of strategic ambiguity that would lessen internal tensions among the member states. Such an arrangement could not only help stabilize Asia's regional order, but also secure Taiwan's autonomy against Beijing's forced reunification.
Over the last few decades, China has become one of the most important foreign investment destinat... more Over the last few decades, China has become one of the most important foreign investment destinations and centers of economic development in Asia. China’s growing economic clout and coercive measures lead to the following empirical puzzles: how has Taiwan perceived China’s increasing military capabilities and economic influence? What are the major factors that facilitate or constrain the role of a government agency of a weaker state in addressing the economic power of a stronger one? More specifically, what has been the purpose of Taiwan’s economic statecraft? Based on Taiwan’s official statements, regional trade data, and newspaper coverage in Chinese and English, this study investigates both positive and negative evaluations of China-Taiwan trade from 2009 to 2021. From 2009 to 2016, President Ma Ying-jeou adopted a desecuritization strategy in normalizing bilateral trade with China, and he actively promoted greater liberalization of Taiwan’s financial and service sectors for China’s investment. From 2016 to 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen employed a securitization strategy in light of the risks of economic reliance on China’s markets. The article proceeds as follows. First, it engages the current literature on economic statecraft, China-Taiwan relations, and Asian politics. Second, this study offers a framework of desecuritization and securitization of Taiwan’s trade toward China, and it highlights how the political leaders in Taiwan attempt to find a balance between trade and security. Third, it provides in-depth case studies on how Taiwan executed desecuritization and securitization strategies. Finally, it concludes with some initial thoughts on the studies of comparative economic statecraft, and provides policy implications for countries in the Asia Pacific region and beyond.
(In this PDF, the English version is available below the Japanese one)
The 20th Party Congress... more (In this PDF, the English version is available below the Japanese one)
The 20th Party Congress signaled Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, as he is now expected to execute his foreign policy and domestic agenda with fewer political constraints. In analyzing Xi’s public statements and the CPC’s official documents, this report highlights Beijing’s expansive definitions of security and how this understanding shapes China’s regional diplomacy. It concludes with policy recommendations for the Japanese and Taiwanese governments.
The impacts of the novel coronavirus (hereafter COVID-19) pose one of the greatest crises of our ... more The impacts of the novel coronavirus (hereafter COVID-19) pose one of the greatest crises of our generation. The policy decisions that the US and Chinese governments take will shape the current order of international relations, the global supply chain of medical supplies, and US–China relations. The COVID-19 crisis leads to the empirical puzzles: how do the two great world powers construct their narratives on the global pandemic and toward each other? What are the meanings, if any, of fear in US–China relations? This study explores the narrative of fear that is constituted in the US and China discourse. The historical analogies, such as the Boxer Indemnity, sick man of Asia, and Pearl Harbor attack, offer great examples to the political construction of the “fearful” other through specific representations amid the outbreak of COVID-19. Specifically, they have become the “cultural scripts” that define how they interact and who they are. The article proceeds as follows. First, this study examines the current literature of realism, constructivism, and discourse analysis. Second, it proposes a comparative framework for understanding the expressions of fear and threat perceptions for both countries. Specifically, the “Pearl Harbor Moment” from the US, and “the Boxer Indemnity” from the Chinese government substantially shape the landscape of US–China relations. Third, it highlights how the political elites appropriate these historical analogies in constructing their political identities and offers insights into the future of US–China relations. Finally, this article concludes with thoughts on the studies on the struggle of great powers and implications for pandemic politics.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established in 2014 to fund infrastructure pl... more The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established in 2014 to fund infrastructure plans and enhance economic development in Asia. As a founding member, China's strong presence raises the question of whether Beijing is selectively using institutions to promote its interests, or if it genuinely sees itself as a responsible power in the international community. This also leads to an empirical puzzle: What are China's strategies in maintaining a new institution? How can Beijing assure others and gain more influence in global economic governance? This study challenges the views on China's hegemonic ambitions in creating the AIIB, and suggests that Beijing's experience of socialisation in international organisations has positively contributed to China's institutional strategy. The author engages the current "China threat" debates in the literature of international relations and highlights that China's maintenance of both its benign image and its institutional strategy remains an understudied area. The author proposes a normative perspective to highlight Beijing's strategy in responding to the "China threat" theory. China's rise indeed offers both challenges and opportunities to the current world order.
Since Ma Ying-Jeou assumed presidency in 2008, he promoted an Economic Cooperation Framework Agre... more Since Ma Ying-Jeou assumed presidency in 2008, he promoted an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and Taiwan’s political rapprochement with China. However, the opposition party soon proposed a counter argument, claiming this agreement might produce severe negative consequences for Taiwan’s economy and sovereignty.
This study presents a securitization framework to highlight both the KMT and DPP strategy in contesting the nature of ECFA despite the potential inflation of benefit. It investigates both the KMT and DPP securitization strategies under Taiwan’s political and economic contexts. A de-securitizing discourse, though might have been a convincing counterargument against ECFA, was underdeveloped by the DPP members. It also shows how the debate shapes the discourse in the Sunflower Student Movements in 2014, and led to the DPP’s subsequent change of securitization strategy.
Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods o... more Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond.
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2018
South Korea and Taiwan provide fruitful comparisons in political economy. During the Cold War era... more South Korea and Taiwan provide fruitful comparisons in political economy. During the Cold War era, they deepened their trade with Japan. However, the top political leaders in those places exhibited different levels of threat perceptions towards Japan. Why did the leaders formulate their discourse towards Japan so differently in the post-Cold War era? The role of nationalism is salient during their economic take-off periods. The motivations behind these developmental strategies and the discourse used to justify such national growth cannot be excluded from the studies of comparative politics and political economy. This article examines the political discourses of two dictators—Park Chung-hee in South Korea and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan—and shows how they justified their policies towards Japan while establishing economic nationalism at the same time. It concludes with findings that are relevant to recent development in comparative studies, and it offers policy implications for East Asian security.
China’s economy and its military capabilities have grown significantly in the last three decades,... more China’s economy and its military capabilities have grown significantly in the last three decades, yet Southeast Asian countries responded differently to China’s foreign policy. This article examines China’s assurance and reassurance strategy toward Malaysia and the Philippines in the South China Sea territorial disputes. It points outs the ‘assurance and entrapment’ strategy that China and its neighbors deployed toward each other. China deploys different foreign discourses toward these two countries to address their concerns, and these countries also positively respond to Chinese rhetoric. However, when China was more assertive during 2010–13, they applied rhetorical strategies to constrain China’s foreign behavior. Specifically, both Malaysia and the Philippines set up different traps to gauge China’s intentions and highlight the inconsistency between China’s previous commitment on the peaceful rise and its recent assertiveness. The comparative analysis shows how they employ legitimation strategy in the territorial disputes. It concludes with policy implications for US–China relations.
Vietnam’s perceptions of China are complex and have been shaped bycultural affinity, the memory o... more Vietnam’s perceptions of China are complex and have been shaped bycultural affinity, the memory of wars, and geopolitical considerationsthroughout history. The construction of their foreign discourse has led tothe empirical puzzle: what makes China and Vietnam, two of the emergingpowers in East Asia, stick together in the post-Cold War era? How to explaintheir diplomatic spats in maritime disputes? This article traces the development of the ‘16 Word Guideline,’ adopted by both communist parties in 1999 and highlighted the binding effect of assurance rhetoric. This discursive context presents great opportunities for them for regional integration. A framework of ‘coercive rhetoric’ captures China’s and Vietnam’s official statements to signal benign intentions toward their neighbors, and to constrain foreign behavior from both sides.
South Korea and Taiwan are former Japanese colonies that have undergone similar processes of stat... more South Korea and Taiwan are former Japanese colonies that have undergone similar processes of state-building since WWII. But they have chosen different rhetorical frameworks in their maritime disputes with Japan. In South Korea, negotiating with Japan can be viewed as threatening the country’s independence and pride, whereas in the Taiwanese government, cooperation with Japan is considered mutually beneficial. Why have these two countries taken such divergent stances toward Japan?
This article examines the territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo, and between Taiwan and Japan over the Senkaku Islands. It sets forth a rhetorical framework of comparison, and it proposes a constructivist perspective in understanding South Korea’s and Taiwan’s legitimation strategies toward Japan from the late 1990s to 2018. This comparative study suggests that the differences between their legitimation strategies can be traced to their different colonial experiences with Japan.
Current China–Taiwan relations are marked by a worrisome dynamic, as there is no convergence of r... more Current China–Taiwan relations are marked by a worrisome dynamic, as there is no convergence of rhetoric between the two sides. How can China and Taiwan build healthy relations given they disagree on many essential issues? More importantly, in what ways could the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan come up with a new framework, despite its recent setback in Taiwan's 2018 mid-term elections, to engage a rising China? There is an urgent need for a framework of interaction, especially as the DPP, the ruling party, emphasizes the centrality of Taiwan's sovereignty and democratic systems in contrast to an increasingly assertive China under Xi. Drawing on sources from China and Taiwan and current literature on international relations, this study lays out a roadmap that enables both sides to step back from rivalry and move toward mutual accommodation in Asia. This article sets forth a framework of brotherhood for China–Taiwan relations in which both sides maintain their political identities while preserving cultural affinity. It traces the development of official discourse between China and Taiwan, and provides a guideline for how to construct a rhetorical common ground: a family framework that can transform China–Taiwan relations into an imagined brotherhood. In turn, this article provides policy implications for the DPP, so it can proactively engage in political conversations with Beijing while maintaining space for rhetorical maneuvers.
China has become one of the most important trading partners for many Asian countries, and Taiwan ... more China has become one of the most important trading partners for many Asian countries, and Taiwan is at the forefront of China’s economic coercion. It also leads to the following empirical puzzle: When can Beijing’s economic sanctions and incentives achieve their desired outcomes? Why and how do they often fail? Given the power asymmetry between China and Taiwan, how Taiwan resists China’s coercive measures contributes significantly to theoretical development in international relations. Taiwan has responded to Chinese economic pressure by diversifying its trade with and investment in Southeast Asian and South Asian countries to lessen dependence on China. It also securitizes China–Taiwan relations by raising public awareness about over-reliance on China’s market. Taiwan is not only a target of China’s coercion, but an active actor in its own right as well. This article re-evaluates the literature on East Asian politics and economic statecraft. First, it highlights the salience of power asymmetry to the field of economic statecraft. Second, it offers a three-level analysis of when and how China exercised economic coercion and incentives towards Taiwan. Third, it examines how Taiwan addressed Beijing’s sanctions on Chinese group tourists starting in 2016. The final section discusses some conclusions that can be drawn and suggests some avenues for future research.
China’s capabilities and prestige in the Sui and Tang dynasties (581–907) were stronger than the ... more China’s capabilities and prestige in the Sui and Tang dynasties (581–907) were stronger than the Koguryo Kingdom, but Koguryo resisted China’s tributary system more than other countries during 598–668. This article unpacks the unique role of the tributary system within Chinese foreign policy toward Koguryo, and it shows how the symbolic concept of political prestige affected China’s decisions to go to war against Koguryo during the Sui and Tang dynasties. It highlights the role of status and legitimacy that the Chinese emperors attached to China’s tributary systems, and argues that these status concerns, rather than the material factors emphasized by offensive realism and defensive realism, drove Chinese behavior. China’s capabilities were rising compared to those of the Koguryo kingdom, so there were no incentives for preventive war, and political discourse among China’s political elites showed great concern over status. Their justifications of military expeditions and heated debates in the Chinese court provide strong evidence illustrating this consistent struggle to reclaim supremacy in Northeastern Asia. The finding of the study indicates that Asian history should not simply be treated as empirical data to test Western international relations (IR) theory; rather, Asian history can contribute to theory building in IR.
China’s improved diplomatic relations with Asian countries have been characterised by positive en... more China’s improved diplomatic relations with Asian countries have been characterised by positive engagement with regional organisations. However, cross-nation opinion surveys show that China’s approval in the region has declined significantly since2013. Why does this gap exist, and what can China do to close it? More importantly, how can Beijing effectively align its policy objectives with its soft-power tools to gain more support among its Asian neighbours?This article argues that reconciliation between China’s core interests and its soft power discourse is possible and desirable, as China’s self-restraint, assuring, and leadership practices are crucial sources of China’s policy practices. First, it claims that China’s soft power discourse matters greatly, as a rising country needs to express its good intentions to others in avoiding an anti-China alliance. Secondly, it proposes a feasible framework to reconcile China’s core interests and its soft power policy, in which Beijing could be firm in its official stances and flexible in its execution.It offers an in-depth analysis of three case studies: China’s North Korea policy, its handling in the South China Sea disputes, and its governance in Hong Kong. Finally, it concludes with substantive implications for East Asian politics.
Policy Report;
In recent years, three major protests took place along
mainland China’s immediate... more Policy Report;
In recent years, three major protests took place along mainland China’s immediate periphery: most recently the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests in 2019, as well as the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, both in 2014. Slogans such as “Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan” (今日香港，明日台灣) and “Hong Kong and Taiwan, we are together” (香港台灣，我們在一起) were frequently heard among activists in these movements and were widely reported on in the media. They became common reference points in the broader political discourse about the future of China’s relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan and Taiwan-Hong Kong ties. This report offers a brief comparative and contemporary analysis of the role that social movements play in the Taiwan-Hong Kong-China triangle. Based on academic survey results, news articles, and public statements, this study offers a preliminary argument for explaining how identity narratives in Taiwan and Hong Kong emerged and converged in recent years. Furthermore, it examines the demonstration effects in Taiwan and Hong Kong on one another in terms of political mobilization and narrative framing strategy. Additionally, it contends that the convergence of political discourse in Taiwan and Hong Kong is significantly challenging the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy. It concludes by outlining the implications of these movements for US, Taiwan, and Chinese foreign policy in Asia and beyond.
Policy Report; Page 5-10;
This article highlights Taiwan’s diversification strategy to overcome e... more Policy Report; Page 5-10; This article highlights Taiwan’s diversification strategy to overcome economic and political challenges from China. Concerns over economic reliance on China and Taiwan’s geostrategic location are the main drivers for this strategy (Taiwan News, September 17, 2020). It concludes with initial thoughts on establishing a trade pact in the Asia-Pacific region to counter China’s unilateral economic sanctions.
This article investigates the factors contributing to Taiwan’s evolving identity, and how it migh... more This article investigates the factors contributing to Taiwan’s evolving identity, and how it might shape the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. It also analyzes how Taiwanese identity affects major party stances toward China, including those of the KMT, DPP, and TPP.
Strengthening ties with Taiwan is the best chance the United States has to preser ve the liberal ... more Strengthening ties with Taiwan is the best chance the United States has to preser ve the liberal international order in Asia and improve its securit y relative to China. This study offers a normative perspective on how Taiwan can contribute to US-led international institutions and the Asian regional order and reduce conf lict risk. It concludes w ith recommendations for the United States and its partners to integrate Taiwan into multilateral institutions in Asia.
In 2021 the US, UK, and Australia established a trilateral security partnership known as AUKUS. T... more In 2021 the US, UK, and Australia established a trilateral security partnership known as AUKUS. This new security arrangement carries strategic implications for Taiwan's national security and prospects for regional order in Asia. It also leads to empirical puzzles: how will members of multiple alliances respond to rising threats? Under what conditions can a patron state avoid unwanted entrapment and imperial overstretch?
This article contributes to existing scholarship in US foreign policy and alliance management in Asia. It offers concrete thoughts on how a US policy of strategic clarity toward Taiwan and its contingency would enhance AUKUS's resilience, while US allies in Asia and Europe could maintain a collective stance of strategic ambiguity that would lessen internal tensions among the member states. Such an arrangement could not only help stabilize Asia's regional order, but also secure Taiwan's autonomy against Beijing's forced reunification.
Over the last few decades, China has become one of the most important foreign investment destinat... more Over the last few decades, China has become one of the most important foreign investment destinations and centers of economic development in Asia. China’s growing economic clout and coercive measures lead to the following empirical puzzles: how has Taiwan perceived China’s increasing military capabilities and economic influence? What are the major factors that facilitate or constrain the role of a government agency of a weaker state in addressing the economic power of a stronger one? More specifically, what has been the purpose of Taiwan’s economic statecraft? Based on Taiwan’s official statements, regional trade data, and newspaper coverage in Chinese and English, this study investigates both positive and negative evaluations of China-Taiwan trade from 2009 to 2021. From 2009 to 2016, President Ma Ying-jeou adopted a desecuritization strategy in normalizing bilateral trade with China, and he actively promoted greater liberalization of Taiwan’s financial and service sectors for China’s investment. From 2016 to 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen employed a securitization strategy in light of the risks of economic reliance on China’s markets. The article proceeds as follows. First, it engages the current literature on economic statecraft, China-Taiwan relations, and Asian politics. Second, this study offers a framework of desecuritization and securitization of Taiwan’s trade toward China, and it highlights how the political leaders in Taiwan attempt to find a balance between trade and security. Third, it provides in-depth case studies on how Taiwan executed desecuritization and securitization strategies. Finally, it concludes with some initial thoughts on the studies of comparative economic statecraft, and provides policy implications for countries in the Asia Pacific region and beyond.
(In this PDF, the English version is available below the Japanese one)
The 20th Party Congress... more (In this PDF, the English version is available below the Japanese one)
The 20th Party Congress signaled Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, as he is now expected to execute his foreign policy and domestic agenda with fewer political constraints. In analyzing Xi’s public statements and the CPC’s official documents, this report highlights Beijing’s expansive definitions of security and how this understanding shapes China’s regional diplomacy. It concludes with policy recommendations for the Japanese and Taiwanese governments.
The impacts of the novel coronavirus (hereafter COVID-19) pose one of the greatest crises of our ... more The impacts of the novel coronavirus (hereafter COVID-19) pose one of the greatest crises of our generation. The policy decisions that the US and Chinese governments take will shape the current order of international relations, the global supply chain of medical supplies, and US–China relations. The COVID-19 crisis leads to the empirical puzzles: how do the two great world powers construct their narratives on the global pandemic and toward each other? What are the meanings, if any, of fear in US–China relations? This study explores the narrative of fear that is constituted in the US and China discourse. The historical analogies, such as the Boxer Indemnity, sick man of Asia, and Pearl Harbor attack, offer great examples to the political construction of the “fearful” other through specific representations amid the outbreak of COVID-19. Specifically, they have become the “cultural scripts” that define how they interact and who they are. The article proceeds as follows. First, this study examines the current literature of realism, constructivism, and discourse analysis. Second, it proposes a comparative framework for understanding the expressions of fear and threat perceptions for both countries. Specifically, the “Pearl Harbor Moment” from the US, and “the Boxer Indemnity” from the Chinese government substantially shape the landscape of US–China relations. Third, it highlights how the political elites appropriate these historical analogies in constructing their political identities and offers insights into the future of US–China relations. Finally, this article concludes with thoughts on the studies on the struggle of great powers and implications for pandemic politics.
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established in 2014 to fund infrastructure pl... more The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established in 2014 to fund infrastructure plans and enhance economic development in Asia. As a founding member, China's strong presence raises the question of whether Beijing is selectively using institutions to promote its interests, or if it genuinely sees itself as a responsible power in the international community. This also leads to an empirical puzzle: What are China's strategies in maintaining a new institution? How can Beijing assure others and gain more influence in global economic governance? This study challenges the views on China's hegemonic ambitions in creating the AIIB, and suggests that Beijing's experience of socialisation in international organisations has positively contributed to China's institutional strategy. The author engages the current "China threat" debates in the literature of international relations and highlights that China's maintenance of both its benign image and its institutional strategy remains an understudied area. The author proposes a normative perspective to highlight Beijing's strategy in responding to the "China threat" theory. China's rise indeed offers both challenges and opportunities to the current world order.
Since Ma Ying-Jeou assumed presidency in 2008, he promoted an Economic Cooperation Framework Agre... more Since Ma Ying-Jeou assumed presidency in 2008, he promoted an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and Taiwan’s political rapprochement with China. However, the opposition party soon proposed a counter argument, claiming this agreement might produce severe negative consequences for Taiwan’s economy and sovereignty.
This study presents a securitization framework to highlight both the KMT and DPP strategy in contesting the nature of ECFA despite the potential inflation of benefit. It investigates both the KMT and DPP securitization strategies under Taiwan’s political and economic contexts. A de-securitizing discourse, though might have been a convincing counterargument against ECFA, was underdeveloped by the DPP members. It also shows how the debate shapes the discourse in the Sunflower Student Movements in 2014, and led to the DPP’s subsequent change of securitization strategy.
Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods o... more Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond.
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 2018
South Korea and Taiwan provide fruitful comparisons in political economy. During the Cold War era... more South Korea and Taiwan provide fruitful comparisons in political economy. During the Cold War era, they deepened their trade with Japan. However, the top political leaders in those places exhibited different levels of threat perceptions towards Japan. Why did the leaders formulate their discourse towards Japan so differently in the post-Cold War era? The role of nationalism is salient during their economic take-off periods. The motivations behind these developmental strategies and the discourse used to justify such national growth cannot be excluded from the studies of comparative politics and political economy. This article examines the political discourses of two dictators—Park Chung-hee in South Korea and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan—and shows how they justified their policies towards Japan while establishing economic nationalism at the same time. It concludes with findings that are relevant to recent development in comparative studies, and it offers policy implications for East Asian security.
China’s economy and its military capabilities have grown significantly in the last three decades,... more China’s economy and its military capabilities have grown significantly in the last three decades, yet Southeast Asian countries responded differently to China’s foreign policy. This article examines China’s assurance and reassurance strategy toward Malaysia and the Philippines in the South China Sea territorial disputes. It points outs the ‘assurance and entrapment’ strategy that China and its neighbors deployed toward each other. China deploys different foreign discourses toward these two countries to address their concerns, and these countries also positively respond to Chinese rhetoric. However, when China was more assertive during 2010–13, they applied rhetorical strategies to constrain China’s foreign behavior. Specifically, both Malaysia and the Philippines set up different traps to gauge China’s intentions and highlight the inconsistency between China’s previous commitment on the peaceful rise and its recent assertiveness. The comparative analysis shows how they employ legitimation strategy in the territorial disputes. It concludes with policy implications for US–China relations.
Vietnam’s perceptions of China are complex and have been shaped bycultural affinity, the memory o... more Vietnam’s perceptions of China are complex and have been shaped bycultural affinity, the memory of wars, and geopolitical considerationsthroughout history. The construction of their foreign discourse has led tothe empirical puzzle: what makes China and Vietnam, two of the emergingpowers in East Asia, stick together in the post-Cold War era? How to explaintheir diplomatic spats in maritime disputes? This article traces the development of the ‘16 Word Guideline,’ adopted by both communist parties in 1999 and highlighted the binding effect of assurance rhetoric. This discursive context presents great opportunities for them for regional integration. A framework of ‘coercive rhetoric’ captures China’s and Vietnam’s official statements to signal benign intentions toward their neighbors, and to constrain foreign behavior from both sides.
South Korea and Taiwan are former Japanese colonies that have undergone similar processes of stat... more South Korea and Taiwan are former Japanese colonies that have undergone similar processes of state-building since WWII. But they have chosen different rhetorical frameworks in their maritime disputes with Japan. In South Korea, negotiating with Japan can be viewed as threatening the country’s independence and pride, whereas in the Taiwanese government, cooperation with Japan is considered mutually beneficial. Why have these two countries taken such divergent stances toward Japan?
This article examines the territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo, and between Taiwan and Japan over the Senkaku Islands. It sets forth a rhetorical framework of comparison, and it proposes a constructivist perspective in understanding South Korea’s and Taiwan’s legitimation strategies toward Japan from the late 1990s to 2018. This comparative study suggests that the differences between their legitimation strategies can be traced to their different colonial experiences with Japan.
Current China–Taiwan relations are marked by a worrisome dynamic, as there is no convergence of r... more Current China–Taiwan relations are marked by a worrisome dynamic, as there is no convergence of rhetoric between the two sides. How can China and Taiwan build healthy relations given they disagree on many essential issues? More importantly, in what ways could the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan come up with a new framework, despite its recent setback in Taiwan's 2018 mid-term elections, to engage a rising China? There is an urgent need for a framework of interaction, especially as the DPP, the ruling party, emphasizes the centrality of Taiwan's sovereignty and democratic systems in contrast to an increasingly assertive China under Xi. Drawing on sources from China and Taiwan and current literature on international relations, this study lays out a roadmap that enables both sides to step back from rivalry and move toward mutual accommodation in Asia. This article sets forth a framework of brotherhood for China–Taiwan relations in which both sides maintain their political identities while preserving cultural affinity. It traces the development of official discourse between China and Taiwan, and provides a guideline for how to construct a rhetorical common ground: a family framework that can transform China–Taiwan relations into an imagined brotherhood. In turn, this article provides policy implications for the DPP, so it can proactively engage in political conversations with Beijing while maintaining space for rhetorical maneuvers.
China has become one of the most important trading partners for many Asian countries, and Taiwan ... more China has become one of the most important trading partners for many Asian countries, and Taiwan is at the forefront of China’s economic coercion. It also leads to the following empirical puzzle: When can Beijing’s economic sanctions and incentives achieve their desired outcomes? Why and how do they often fail? Given the power asymmetry between China and Taiwan, how Taiwan resists China’s coercive measures contributes significantly to theoretical development in international relations. Taiwan has responded to Chinese economic pressure by diversifying its trade with and investment in Southeast Asian and South Asian countries to lessen dependence on China. It also securitizes China–Taiwan relations by raising public awareness about over-reliance on China’s market. Taiwan is not only a target of China’s coercion, but an active actor in its own right as well. This article re-evaluates the literature on East Asian politics and economic statecraft. First, it highlights the salience of power asymmetry to the field of economic statecraft. Second, it offers a three-level analysis of when and how China exercised economic coercion and incentives towards Taiwan. Third, it examines how Taiwan addressed Beijing’s sanctions on Chinese group tourists starting in 2016. The final section discusses some conclusions that can be drawn and suggests some avenues for future research.
China’s capabilities and prestige in the Sui and Tang dynasties (581–907) were stronger than the ... more China’s capabilities and prestige in the Sui and Tang dynasties (581–907) were stronger than the Koguryo Kingdom, but Koguryo resisted China’s tributary system more than other countries during 598–668. This article unpacks the unique role of the tributary system within Chinese foreign policy toward Koguryo, and it shows how the symbolic concept of political prestige affected China’s decisions to go to war against Koguryo during the Sui and Tang dynasties. It highlights the role of status and legitimacy that the Chinese emperors attached to China’s tributary systems, and argues that these status concerns, rather than the material factors emphasized by offensive realism and defensive realism, drove Chinese behavior. China’s capabilities were rising compared to those of the Koguryo kingdom, so there were no incentives for preventive war, and political discourse among China’s political elites showed great concern over status. Their justifications of military expeditions and heated debates in the Chinese court provide strong evidence illustrating this consistent struggle to reclaim supremacy in Northeastern Asia. The finding of the study indicates that Asian history should not simply be treated as empirical data to test Western international relations (IR) theory; rather, Asian history can contribute to theory building in IR.
China’s improved diplomatic relations with Asian countries have been characterised by positive en... more China’s improved diplomatic relations with Asian countries have been characterised by positive engagement with regional organisations. However, cross-nation opinion surveys show that China’s approval in the region has declined significantly since2013. Why does this gap exist, and what can China do to close it? More importantly, how can Beijing effectively align its policy objectives with its soft-power tools to gain more support among its Asian neighbours?This article argues that reconciliation between China’s core interests and its soft power discourse is possible and desirable, as China’s self-restraint, assuring, and leadership practices are crucial sources of China’s policy practices. First, it claims that China’s soft power discourse matters greatly, as a rising country needs to express its good intentions to others in avoiding an anti-China alliance. Secondly, it proposes a feasible framework to reconcile China’s core interests and its soft power policy, in which Beijing could be firm in its official stances and flexible in its execution.It offers an in-depth analysis of three case studies: China’s North Korea policy, its handling in the South China Sea disputes, and its governance in Hong Kong. Finally, it concludes with substantive implications for East Asian politics.
Policy Report;
In recent years, three major protests took place along
mainland China’s immediate... more Policy Report;
In recent years, three major protests took place along mainland China’s immediate periphery: most recently the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests in 2019, as well as the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, both in 2014. Slogans such as “Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan” (今日香港，明日台灣) and “Hong Kong and Taiwan, we are together” (香港台灣，我們在一起) were frequently heard among activists in these movements and were widely reported on in the media. They became common reference points in the broader political discourse about the future of China’s relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan and Taiwan-Hong Kong ties. This report offers a brief comparative and contemporary analysis of the role that social movements play in the Taiwan-Hong Kong-China triangle. Based on academic survey results, news articles, and public statements, this study offers a preliminary argument for explaining how identity narratives in Taiwan and Hong Kong emerged and converged in recent years. Furthermore, it examines the demonstration effects in Taiwan and Hong Kong on one another in terms of political mobilization and narrative framing strategy. Additionally, it contends that the convergence of political discourse in Taiwan and Hong Kong is significantly challenging the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy. It concludes by outlining the implications of these movements for US, Taiwan, and Chinese foreign policy in Asia and beyond.
Policy Report; Page 5-10;
This article highlights Taiwan’s diversification strategy to overcome e... more Policy Report; Page 5-10; This article highlights Taiwan’s diversification strategy to overcome economic and political challenges from China. Concerns over economic reliance on China and Taiwan’s geostrategic location are the main drivers for this strategy (Taiwan News, September 17, 2020). It concludes with initial thoughts on establishing a trade pact in the Asia-Pacific region to counter China’s unilateral economic sanctions.
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Papers by Christina Lai
This article contributes to existing scholarship in US foreign policy and alliance management in Asia. It offers concrete thoughts on how a US policy of strategic clarity toward Taiwan and its contingency would enhance AUKUS's resilience, while US allies in Asia and Europe could maintain a collective stance of strategic ambiguity that would lessen internal tensions among the member states. Such an arrangement could not only help stabilize Asia's regional order, but also secure Taiwan's autonomy against Beijing's forced reunification.
The 20th Party Congress signaled Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, as he is now expected to execute his foreign policy and domestic agenda with fewer political constraints. In analyzing Xi’s public statements and the CPC’s official documents, this report highlights Beijing’s expansive definitions of security and how this understanding shapes China’s regional diplomacy. It concludes with policy recommendations for the Japanese and Taiwanese governments.
中国共産党の公式の文書およびメディア報道、そして近年の中国外交政策に関する先行研究に基づいて、本稿は、習近平と党指導部が中国の安全保障環境をどのように解釈し、アジアとそれ以外の地域に対する中国の外交政策の展望をどのように考えているのかをより詳細に分析する。まず、第20回党大会文書のなかで、中国の不安感の高まりがどのように表現されているのかをみる。第2に、党中央が、国内外における深刻な課題に直面するなかで、安全保障概念の定義や範囲を公式文書でどのように示したのかを検証する。この検証を踏まえて、今後数年における中国の外交政策がどのような意味を持ち、どのような結果を生むのかを議論する。そして最後に、党中央の台湾に対する政策スタンスを取り上げ、日本と台湾双方に対する政策提言を行う。
This study presents a securitization framework to highlight both the KMT and DPP strategy in contesting the nature of ECFA despite the potential inflation of benefit. It investigates both the KMT and DPP securitization strategies under Taiwan’s political and economic contexts. A de-securitizing discourse, though might have been a convincing counterargument against ECFA, was underdeveloped by the DPP members. It also shows how the debate shapes the discourse in the Sunflower Student Movements in 2014, and led to the DPP’s subsequent change of securitization strategy.
This article examines the territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo, and between Taiwan and Japan over the Senkaku Islands. It sets forth a rhetorical framework of comparison, and it proposes a constructivist perspective in understanding South Korea’s and Taiwan’s legitimation strategies toward Japan from the late 1990s to 2018. This comparative study suggests that the differences between their legitimation strategies can be traced to their different colonial experiences with Japan.
Previous article
In recent years, three major protests took place along
mainland China’s immediate periphery: most recently the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests in 2019, as well as the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, both in 2014. Slogans such as “Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan” (今日香港，明日台灣) and “Hong Kong and Taiwan, we are together” (香港台灣，我們在一起) were frequently heard among activists in these movements and were widely reported on in the media. They became common reference points in the broader political discourse about the future of China’s relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan and Taiwan-Hong Kong ties. This report offers a brief comparative and contemporary analysis of the role that social movements play in the Taiwan-Hong Kong-China triangle. Based on academic survey results, news articles, and public statements, this study offers a preliminary argument for explaining how identity narratives in Taiwan and Hong Kong emerged and converged in recent years. Furthermore, it examines the demonstration effects in Taiwan and Hong Kong on one another in terms of political mobilization and narrative framing strategy. Additionally, it contends that the convergence of political discourse in Taiwan and Hong Kong is significantly challenging the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy. It concludes by outlining the implications of these movements for US, Taiwan, and Chinese foreign policy in Asia and beyond.
This article highlights Taiwan’s diversification strategy to overcome economic and political challenges from
China. Concerns over economic reliance on China and Taiwan’s geostrategic location are the main drivers for
this strategy (Taiwan News, September 17, 2020). It concludes with initial thoughts on establishing a trade pact
in the Asia-Pacific region to counter China’s unilateral economic sanctions.
This article contributes to existing scholarship in US foreign policy and alliance management in Asia. It offers concrete thoughts on how a US policy of strategic clarity toward Taiwan and its contingency would enhance AUKUS's resilience, while US allies in Asia and Europe could maintain a collective stance of strategic ambiguity that would lessen internal tensions among the member states. Such an arrangement could not only help stabilize Asia's regional order, but also secure Taiwan's autonomy against Beijing's forced reunification.
The 20th Party Congress signaled Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, as he is now expected to execute his foreign policy and domestic agenda with fewer political constraints. In analyzing Xi’s public statements and the CPC’s official documents, this report highlights Beijing’s expansive definitions of security and how this understanding shapes China’s regional diplomacy. It concludes with policy recommendations for the Japanese and Taiwanese governments.
中国共産党の公式の文書およびメディア報道、そして近年の中国外交政策に関する先行研究に基づいて、本稿は、習近平と党指導部が中国の安全保障環境をどのように解釈し、アジアとそれ以外の地域に対する中国の外交政策の展望をどのように考えているのかをより詳細に分析する。まず、第20回党大会文書のなかで、中国の不安感の高まりがどのように表現されているのかをみる。第2に、党中央が、国内外における深刻な課題に直面するなかで、安全保障概念の定義や範囲を公式文書でどのように示したのかを検証する。この検証を踏まえて、今後数年における中国の外交政策がどのような意味を持ち、どのような結果を生むのかを議論する。そして最後に、党中央の台湾に対する政策スタンスを取り上げ、日本と台湾双方に対する政策提言を行う。
This study presents a securitization framework to highlight both the KMT and DPP strategy in contesting the nature of ECFA despite the potential inflation of benefit. It investigates both the KMT and DPP securitization strategies under Taiwan’s political and economic contexts. A de-securitizing discourse, though might have been a convincing counterargument against ECFA, was underdeveloped by the DPP members. It also shows how the debate shapes the discourse in the Sunflower Student Movements in 2014, and led to the DPP’s subsequent change of securitization strategy.
This article examines the territorial disputes between South Korea and Japan over Dokdo, and between Taiwan and Japan over the Senkaku Islands. It sets forth a rhetorical framework of comparison, and it proposes a constructivist perspective in understanding South Korea’s and Taiwan’s legitimation strategies toward Japan from the late 1990s to 2018. This comparative study suggests that the differences between their legitimation strategies can be traced to their different colonial experiences with Japan.
Previous article
In recent years, three major protests took place along
mainland China’s immediate periphery: most recently the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests in 2019, as well as the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, both in 2014. Slogans such as “Today Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan” (今日香港，明日台灣) and “Hong Kong and Taiwan, we are together” (香港台灣，我們在一起) were frequently heard among activists in these movements and were widely reported on in the media. They became common reference points in the broader political discourse about the future of China’s relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan and Taiwan-Hong Kong ties. This report offers a brief comparative and contemporary analysis of the role that social movements play in the Taiwan-Hong Kong-China triangle. Based on academic survey results, news articles, and public statements, this study offers a preliminary argument for explaining how identity narratives in Taiwan and Hong Kong emerged and converged in recent years. Furthermore, it examines the demonstration effects in Taiwan and Hong Kong on one another in terms of political mobilization and narrative framing strategy. Additionally, it contends that the convergence of political discourse in Taiwan and Hong Kong is significantly challenging the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy. It concludes by outlining the implications of these movements for US, Taiwan, and Chinese foreign policy in Asia and beyond.
This article highlights Taiwan’s diversification strategy to overcome economic and political challenges from
China. Concerns over economic reliance on China and Taiwan’s geostrategic location are the main drivers for
this strategy (Taiwan News, September 17, 2020). It concludes with initial thoughts on establishing a trade pact
in the Asia-Pacific region to counter China’s unilateral economic sanctions.