In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about ... more In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection.
Kant’s formula of universal law (FUL) is standardly understood as a test of the moral permissibil... more Kant’s formula of universal law (FUL) is standardly understood as a test of the moral permissibility of an agent’s maxim: maxims which pass the test are morally neutral, and so permissible, while those which do not are morally impermissible. In contrast, I argue that the FUL tests whether a maxim is the cause or determining ground of an action at all. According to Kant’s general account of causality, nothing can be a cause of some effect unless there is a law-like relation between the putative cause and effect. Applied to the case of action, no maxim can be the cause of an agent’s action unless there is a law-like relation between maxims of that kind and actions of that kind. The special capacity to act according to maxims as law-like causes is what Kant calls a will; the basic constitutive principle of the will is a non-normative principle I call the categorical declarative. While the actions of a perfectly good will would be described by the categorical declarative alone, human action is determined not only by the causality of the will, but also by competing causes, namely those stemming from inclination. There is thus need for a causal test for putative maxims. The test contained in the FUL is meant to determine whether an action could be grounded solely on the agent’s maxim, or whether it requires a cause external to the will. This account permits one to build eventual distinctions concerning the morality of actions on prior and independent distinctions concerning their causality.
One of the most surprisingly prominent themes in Robert Brandom's A Spirit of Trust is the role o... more One of the most surprisingly prominent themes in Robert Brandom's A Spirit of Trust is the role of genealogical explanations. Brandom sees genealogies or 'debunking arguments' as significant because of their ability to deprive our discursive acts (claims and actions) of the normative status they require to be genuinely discursive or conceptual. His solution to the problem of genealogy is to offer rationalizing reconstructions of others' discursive acts, which credit them with normative status. He calls this "forgiveness" (a notion similar to Davidson's "charity"). In this paper, I provide some additional conceptual resources to explicate Brandom's notions of genealogy and forgiveness. These resources allow me to discriminate between two alternate and seemingly incompatible ways of responding to genealogies. One way depends on rationalizing explanations that still attempt to attribute commitments to their subjects, the other avoids making such attributions in favor of explaining commitments only in terms of norms accepted by the rationalizer. I argue that Brandom's work sometimes promotes the latter response to genealogy but that this tendency should be eliminated from the account.
It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with t... more It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with terms to form complex nouns such as “thing in itself” and “end in itself.” I argue that the basic use of “an sich selbst” in Kant’s German is as a sentence adverb, which has the role of modifying subject-predicate combinations, rather than either subject or predicate on their own. I show, through an examination of Kant’s less famous uses as well as the usage of some his contemporaries, that expressions of the form “S is P an sich selbst” mean roughly that S is P ‘in its own right’ or without some further ‘condition’. A consequence of this reading is that “an sich selbst” should not be read as forming complex nouns. Though the analysis I provide is meant to apply to the general usage of the expression, it has significant consequences for the interpretation of “thing in itself” in particular. In general, the reading implies that “thing in itself” is not a complete expression. Instead, one must treat "an sich selbst" as expressing how some S is a ‘thing’, always looking to the wider sentential context. I conclude with a brief account of the new significance granted to the concept of a ‘thing’ according to the present interpretation.
This essay clarifies Edmund Husserl's view of "pure" concepts, with a view to its contemporary me... more This essay clarifies Edmund Husserl's view of "pure" concepts, with a view to its contemporary metaphilosophical significance. It is argued that Husserl's conception of pure concepts is unique in that he allows an overlap between pure and empirical concepts. This overlap leads to a potential for confusion between pure and empirical concepts which I label "amphiboly," following Kant's use of the term. The essay begins by clarifying Husserl's view of the divergence in concept formation between empirical and pure concepts, and then articulates the specific properties of pure concepts that allow an empirical overlap. These properties include the modality and range of the extension of the concepts, the ordering of objects under the concept, and the mental faculty required to identify an object under the concept. Once we see the source of amphiboly on Husserl's view, it can be observed that many concepts of interest to philosophy, even outside phenomenology proper, are potentially subject to amphibolous uses. Thus, Husserl's view can be a general hermeneutical resource for clarifying the nature of philosophical concepts.
Hegel often says that his "logic" is meant to replace metaphysics. Since Hegel's Science of Logic... more Hegel often says that his "logic" is meant to replace metaphysics. Since Hegel's Science of Logic is so different from a standard logic, most commentators have not treated the portion of that work devoted to logical forms as relevant to this claim. This paper argues that Hegel's discussion of logical forms of judgment and syllogism is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel's discussion of the logical forms is the view that the metaphysical concepts discussed in Books I and II of the Science of Logic supervene on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in Book III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and significance of metaphysical concepts that resembles Kant's "metaphysical deduction," according to which the categories can be derived from the table of judgments. Though Hegel's metaphysics is often supposed to be influenced by Kant, prevailing interpretations do not show how Hegel's fine-grained treatment of logical forms is relevant to his critical view of metaphysics. The present interpretation provides a model for Hegel's explanation of metaphysical concepts, as well as a new picture of the structure of his Science of Logic that emphasizes the priority of its Doctrine of the Concept.
An Ethical Modernity? Hegel’s Concept of Ethical Life Today – Its Limits and Potential. Eds. Tereza Matějčková and Jiři Chotaš (Brill), 2019
While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a ... more While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019
The close connection often cited between Hegel and Wilfrid Sellars is not only said to lie in the... more The close connection often cited between Hegel and Wilfrid Sellars is not only said to lie in their common negative challenges to the “framework of givenness,” but also in the positive lesson drawn from these challenges. In particular, the critique of givenness is thought to lead to a conceptualist view of perceptual experience. In this essay, I challenge the common idea that Hegel’s critique of givenness provides specific support for a conceptualist view. The notion that Hegel, if anyone, is a conceptualist depends on faulty assumptions about the conceptual character of all language, including the indexical expressions Hegel discusses in “Sense-Certainty.” I first show that these assumptions are often imported into Hegel’s texts but are also out of keeping with his own systematic views of concepts and language. To avoid a merely verbal disagreement, however, I then explore the features of Sellarsian semantics needed to make a thorough conceptualism plausible. Sellars’ “picturing” theory is necessary to show how non-predicate terms (like indexicals) have meaning, but in order to put this feature of Sellars’ semantics in service of a conceptualist view, one must abandon the descriptive character of concepts that is a minimal feature of Hegelian thought.
In this paper, I contest increasingly common "realist" interpretations of Hegel's theory of "the ... more In this paper, I contest increasingly common "realist" interpretations of Hegel's theory of "the concept" (der Begriff), offering instead a "isomorphic" conception of the relation of concepts and the world. The isomorphism recommended, however, is metaphysically deflationary, for I show how Hegel's conception of conceptual form creates a conceptually internal standard for the adequacy of concepts. No "sideways-on" theory of the concept-world relationship is envisioned. This standard of conceptual adequacy is also "graduated" in that it allows for a lack of fit between concept and world. The possibility for a "maximally isomorphic" fit between concept and world obtains through the teleological realization of concepts, which marks especially the "artificial" world of human culture (law, art, religion, etc.). Some of the most seemingly exaggerated claims Hegel makes about the concept, I contend, can be understood when we consider the significance Hegel ascribes to human making, which is provided for in his conceptual theory. But my framework provides an interpretive key for the way Hegel sees concepts imperfectly realized in the natural world as well.
Traditionally, the ideas of “intuitive” and “discursive” forms of understanding have been seen as... more Traditionally, the ideas of “intuitive” and “discursive” forms of understanding have been seen as near opposites. Whereas an intuitive understanding could have a direct grasp of something, a discursive understanding would always depend on what is given to it, as mediated by concepts. In this essay, I suggest that Paul Ricoeur’s conception of analogy presents a way of overcoming this opposition. For Ricoeur, an analogy works within discursive understanding, but it depends on an eventful insight that leads beyond what is merely given in discourse. The analogy “gives more” for thought. Yet, as I argue, what analogy gives for thought is always explicable in conceptual terms: any intuitive understanding is commensurate with a discursive one. I illustrate Ricoeur’s mediation of discursive and intuitive understanding in particular with his conception of metaphor, which vividly depends on overcoming a discursive contradiction by analogical and intuitive means. Before introducing Ricoeur’s conception, I discuss the Kantian background of the intuitive/discursive distinction. In particular, I suggest how Goethe’s attempt to revitalize a notion of intuitive understanding can be compared to Ricoeur’s conception, though Ricoeur improves upon Goethe by grounding intuition in the specific phenomenon of analogy.
Abstract, Table of Contents, and Introduction of my 2019 dissertation, "The Province of Conceptua... more Abstract, Table of Contents, and Introduction of my 2019 dissertation, "The Province of Conceptual Reason: Hegel's Post-Kantian Rationalism"
Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism, 2023
This is a sample of my translation of Michael Wolff's Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense... more This is a sample of my translation of Michael Wolff's Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism. In the book, Wolff sets out an elementary language of syllogistic logic, and shows it to be sufficient to express all universally valid principles of general and formal logic. In the excerpt, Wolff begins by distinguishing a syllogistic language as one that expresses only relations between concepts, rather than (with Frege) asymmetrical object-concept relations. Key features of the elementary language are also: the basic form of negation is non-truth-functional, and expressions for modality are necessary for the elementary language itself. This excerpt gives readers a first picture of the elementary language. The heart of the book's argument lies in Wolff's comparison of this language with class-logical and function-theoretic attempts to express general or formal logic.
Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism, 2023
Michael Wolff's new preface to my translation of his Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense ... more Michael Wolff's new preface to my translation of his Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism.
Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism, 2023
Table of Contents for my translation of Michael Wolff's Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defen... more Table of Contents for my translation of Michael Wolff's Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism.
Michael Wolff's book is an attempt to show that a non-truth-functional syllogistic logic is the only formal and general logic - in that it introduces no specific conceptual content into its formulas and principles. Further, he shows that post-Fregean logics can be reproduced within syllogistic, so long as postulates are added which are not universally valid. Yet because "classical" logics depend on postulates that are not valid in every case, they cannot earn the title of formal and general logic with the same right as the syllogistic. The book includes a full comparison of syllogistic with class-logical and function-theoretic logical languages, as well as a reconstruction of Aristotle's syllogistic within Wolff's new syllogistic language.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about ... more In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection.
Kant’s formula of universal law (FUL) is standardly understood as a test of the moral permissibil... more Kant’s formula of universal law (FUL) is standardly understood as a test of the moral permissibility of an agent’s maxim: maxims which pass the test are morally neutral, and so permissible, while those which do not are morally impermissible. In contrast, I argue that the FUL tests whether a maxim is the cause or determining ground of an action at all. According to Kant’s general account of causality, nothing can be a cause of some effect unless there is a law-like relation between the putative cause and effect. Applied to the case of action, no maxim can be the cause of an agent’s action unless there is a law-like relation between maxims of that kind and actions of that kind. The special capacity to act according to maxims as law-like causes is what Kant calls a will; the basic constitutive principle of the will is a non-normative principle I call the categorical declarative. While the actions of a perfectly good will would be described by the categorical declarative alone, human action is determined not only by the causality of the will, but also by competing causes, namely those stemming from inclination. There is thus need for a causal test for putative maxims. The test contained in the FUL is meant to determine whether an action could be grounded solely on the agent’s maxim, or whether it requires a cause external to the will. This account permits one to build eventual distinctions concerning the morality of actions on prior and independent distinctions concerning their causality.
One of the most surprisingly prominent themes in Robert Brandom's A Spirit of Trust is the role o... more One of the most surprisingly prominent themes in Robert Brandom's A Spirit of Trust is the role of genealogical explanations. Brandom sees genealogies or 'debunking arguments' as significant because of their ability to deprive our discursive acts (claims and actions) of the normative status they require to be genuinely discursive or conceptual. His solution to the problem of genealogy is to offer rationalizing reconstructions of others' discursive acts, which credit them with normative status. He calls this "forgiveness" (a notion similar to Davidson's "charity"). In this paper, I provide some additional conceptual resources to explicate Brandom's notions of genealogy and forgiveness. These resources allow me to discriminate between two alternate and seemingly incompatible ways of responding to genealogies. One way depends on rationalizing explanations that still attempt to attribute commitments to their subjects, the other avoids making such attributions in favor of explaining commitments only in terms of norms accepted by the rationalizer. I argue that Brandom's work sometimes promotes the latter response to genealogy but that this tendency should be eliminated from the account.
It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with t... more It is commonly assumed that the expression “an sich selbst” (“in itself”) in Kant combines with terms to form complex nouns such as “thing in itself” and “end in itself.” I argue that the basic use of “an sich selbst” in Kant’s German is as a sentence adverb, which has the role of modifying subject-predicate combinations, rather than either subject or predicate on their own. I show, through an examination of Kant’s less famous uses as well as the usage of some his contemporaries, that expressions of the form “S is P an sich selbst” mean roughly that S is P ‘in its own right’ or without some further ‘condition’. A consequence of this reading is that “an sich selbst” should not be read as forming complex nouns. Though the analysis I provide is meant to apply to the general usage of the expression, it has significant consequences for the interpretation of “thing in itself” in particular. In general, the reading implies that “thing in itself” is not a complete expression. Instead, one must treat "an sich selbst" as expressing how some S is a ‘thing’, always looking to the wider sentential context. I conclude with a brief account of the new significance granted to the concept of a ‘thing’ according to the present interpretation.
This essay clarifies Edmund Husserl's view of "pure" concepts, with a view to its contemporary me... more This essay clarifies Edmund Husserl's view of "pure" concepts, with a view to its contemporary metaphilosophical significance. It is argued that Husserl's conception of pure concepts is unique in that he allows an overlap between pure and empirical concepts. This overlap leads to a potential for confusion between pure and empirical concepts which I label "amphiboly," following Kant's use of the term. The essay begins by clarifying Husserl's view of the divergence in concept formation between empirical and pure concepts, and then articulates the specific properties of pure concepts that allow an empirical overlap. These properties include the modality and range of the extension of the concepts, the ordering of objects under the concept, and the mental faculty required to identify an object under the concept. Once we see the source of amphiboly on Husserl's view, it can be observed that many concepts of interest to philosophy, even outside phenomenology proper, are potentially subject to amphibolous uses. Thus, Husserl's view can be a general hermeneutical resource for clarifying the nature of philosophical concepts.
Hegel often says that his "logic" is meant to replace metaphysics. Since Hegel's Science of Logic... more Hegel often says that his "logic" is meant to replace metaphysics. Since Hegel's Science of Logic is so different from a standard logic, most commentators have not treated the portion of that work devoted to logical forms as relevant to this claim. This paper argues that Hegel's discussion of logical forms of judgment and syllogism is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel's discussion of the logical forms is the view that the metaphysical concepts discussed in Books I and II of the Science of Logic supervene on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in Book III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and significance of metaphysical concepts that resembles Kant's "metaphysical deduction," according to which the categories can be derived from the table of judgments. Though Hegel's metaphysics is often supposed to be influenced by Kant, prevailing interpretations do not show how Hegel's fine-grained treatment of logical forms is relevant to his critical view of metaphysics. The present interpretation provides a model for Hegel's explanation of metaphysical concepts, as well as a new picture of the structure of his Science of Logic that emphasizes the priority of its Doctrine of the Concept.
An Ethical Modernity? Hegel’s Concept of Ethical Life Today – Its Limits and Potential. Eds. Tereza Matějčková and Jiři Chotaš (Brill), 2019
While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a ... more While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2019
The close connection often cited between Hegel and Wilfrid Sellars is not only said to lie in the... more The close connection often cited between Hegel and Wilfrid Sellars is not only said to lie in their common negative challenges to the “framework of givenness,” but also in the positive lesson drawn from these challenges. In particular, the critique of givenness is thought to lead to a conceptualist view of perceptual experience. In this essay, I challenge the common idea that Hegel’s critique of givenness provides specific support for a conceptualist view. The notion that Hegel, if anyone, is a conceptualist depends on faulty assumptions about the conceptual character of all language, including the indexical expressions Hegel discusses in “Sense-Certainty.” I first show that these assumptions are often imported into Hegel’s texts but are also out of keeping with his own systematic views of concepts and language. To avoid a merely verbal disagreement, however, I then explore the features of Sellarsian semantics needed to make a thorough conceptualism plausible. Sellars’ “picturing” theory is necessary to show how non-predicate terms (like indexicals) have meaning, but in order to put this feature of Sellars’ semantics in service of a conceptualist view, one must abandon the descriptive character of concepts that is a minimal feature of Hegelian thought.
In this paper, I contest increasingly common "realist" interpretations of Hegel's theory of "the ... more In this paper, I contest increasingly common "realist" interpretations of Hegel's theory of "the concept" (der Begriff), offering instead a "isomorphic" conception of the relation of concepts and the world. The isomorphism recommended, however, is metaphysically deflationary, for I show how Hegel's conception of conceptual form creates a conceptually internal standard for the adequacy of concepts. No "sideways-on" theory of the concept-world relationship is envisioned. This standard of conceptual adequacy is also "graduated" in that it allows for a lack of fit between concept and world. The possibility for a "maximally isomorphic" fit between concept and world obtains through the teleological realization of concepts, which marks especially the "artificial" world of human culture (law, art, religion, etc.). Some of the most seemingly exaggerated claims Hegel makes about the concept, I contend, can be understood when we consider the significance Hegel ascribes to human making, which is provided for in his conceptual theory. But my framework provides an interpretive key for the way Hegel sees concepts imperfectly realized in the natural world as well.
Traditionally, the ideas of “intuitive” and “discursive” forms of understanding have been seen as... more Traditionally, the ideas of “intuitive” and “discursive” forms of understanding have been seen as near opposites. Whereas an intuitive understanding could have a direct grasp of something, a discursive understanding would always depend on what is given to it, as mediated by concepts. In this essay, I suggest that Paul Ricoeur’s conception of analogy presents a way of overcoming this opposition. For Ricoeur, an analogy works within discursive understanding, but it depends on an eventful insight that leads beyond what is merely given in discourse. The analogy “gives more” for thought. Yet, as I argue, what analogy gives for thought is always explicable in conceptual terms: any intuitive understanding is commensurate with a discursive one. I illustrate Ricoeur’s mediation of discursive and intuitive understanding in particular with his conception of metaphor, which vividly depends on overcoming a discursive contradiction by analogical and intuitive means. Before introducing Ricoeur’s conception, I discuss the Kantian background of the intuitive/discursive distinction. In particular, I suggest how Goethe’s attempt to revitalize a notion of intuitive understanding can be compared to Ricoeur’s conception, though Ricoeur improves upon Goethe by grounding intuition in the specific phenomenon of analogy.
Abstract, Table of Contents, and Introduction of my 2019 dissertation, "The Province of Conceptua... more Abstract, Table of Contents, and Introduction of my 2019 dissertation, "The Province of Conceptual Reason: Hegel's Post-Kantian Rationalism"
Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism, 2023
This is a sample of my translation of Michael Wolff's Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense... more This is a sample of my translation of Michael Wolff's Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism. In the book, Wolff sets out an elementary language of syllogistic logic, and shows it to be sufficient to express all universally valid principles of general and formal logic. In the excerpt, Wolff begins by distinguishing a syllogistic language as one that expresses only relations between concepts, rather than (with Frege) asymmetrical object-concept relations. Key features of the elementary language are also: the basic form of negation is non-truth-functional, and expressions for modality are necessary for the elementary language itself. This excerpt gives readers a first picture of the elementary language. The heart of the book's argument lies in Wolff's comparison of this language with class-logical and function-theoretic attempts to express general or formal logic.
Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism, 2023
Michael Wolff's new preface to my translation of his Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense ... more Michael Wolff's new preface to my translation of his Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism.
Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism, 2023
Table of Contents for my translation of Michael Wolff's Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defen... more Table of Contents for my translation of Michael Wolff's Essay on the Principles of Logic: A Defense of Logical Monism.
Michael Wolff's book is an attempt to show that a non-truth-functional syllogistic logic is the only formal and general logic - in that it introduces no specific conceptual content into its formulas and principles. Further, he shows that post-Fregean logics can be reproduced within syllogistic, so long as postulates are added which are not universally valid. Yet because "classical" logics depend on postulates that are not valid in every case, they cannot earn the title of formal and general logic with the same right as the syllogistic. The book includes a full comparison of syllogistic with class-logical and function-theoretic logical languages, as well as a reconstruction of Aristotle's syllogistic within Wolff's new syllogistic language.
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Michael Wolff's book is an attempt to show that a non-truth-functional syllogistic logic is the only formal and general logic - in that it introduces no specific conceptual content into its formulas and principles. Further, he shows that post-Fregean logics can be reproduced within syllogistic, so long as postulates are added which are not universally valid. Yet because "classical" logics depend on postulates that are not valid in every case, they cannot earn the title of formal and general logic with the same right as the syllogistic. The book includes a full comparison of syllogistic with class-logical and function-theoretic logical languages, as well as a reconstruction of Aristotle's syllogistic within Wolff's new syllogistic language.
Michael Wolff's book is an attempt to show that a non-truth-functional syllogistic logic is the only formal and general logic - in that it introduces no specific conceptual content into its formulas and principles. Further, he shows that post-Fregean logics can be reproduced within syllogistic, so long as postulates are added which are not universally valid. Yet because "classical" logics depend on postulates that are not valid in every case, they cannot earn the title of formal and general logic with the same right as the syllogistic. The book includes a full comparison of syllogistic with class-logical and function-theoretic logical languages, as well as a reconstruction of Aristotle's syllogistic within Wolff's new syllogistic language.