I’m an Assistant Professor in the Department of Ethics Education at Seoul National University. Before joining SNU, I was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Bioethics in the National Institutes of Health (NIH). I’ve received a PhD in the Philosophy Department at Duke University, where I served as the Assistant Director of the Center for Comparative Philosophy (CCP). I also have philosophy degrees from Oxford University (BPhil; 2-year master’s) and Yonsei University (BA and MA).
I work primarily in ethics, applied ethics (esp. bioethics), and social and political philosophy. I also have considerable research interest and teaching competency in the history of ethics and Chinese and comparative philosophy. My philosophical journey has been an endeavor to harmonize virtue and happiness in a good human life with a focus on the interpersonal and social aspects.
My works have been published in Philosophical Studies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and American Philosophical Quarterly. And I have been awarded the Mark S. Ehrenreich Prize in Healthcare Ethics Research for the best paper (Asia) from 2020 World Congress of Bioethics.
Please email me at sungwoou@gmail.com. Phone: 19196382836
CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas, 2009
본 논문의 목적은 전통적인 이중효과 원리와 퀸(Warren Quinn)의 수정된 버전이 모두 행위자의 근본적인 태도에서 도덕적으로 중요한 요소를 포착하는 데 실패함을 밝히는 ... more 본 논문의 목적은 전통적인 이중효과 원리와 퀸(Warren Quinn)의 수정된 버전이 모두 행위자의 근본적인 태도에서 도덕적으로 중요한 요소를 포착하는 데 실패함을 밝히는 데 있다. 우선 전통적인 이중효과 원리 입장에 반대해서, 자신의 목적을 이루는 데 있어 남의 피해가 불가피한 부작용으로 뒤따를 것임을 분명히 예견하고 행위하는 것은 남의 피해를 자기 자신의 목적을 실현하기 위한 수단으로 삼을 의도로 행위하는 것만큼 도덕적 결함을 가짐을 주장할 것이다. 즉, 전자는 후자만큼이나 정당화하기 힘들다는 것이다. 그리고 퀸의 수정된 이중효과 원리에 반대해서, 남의 피해가 자신의 목적을 이루는 데 기여하는지 여부가 그 자체로는 행위자의 태도에 드러난 도덕적 성품을 평가하는 데 있어 무관함을 주장할 것이다. 즉, 그의 직접 행위능력과 간접 행위능력 사이의 구분은 도덕적 차이를 정확히 포착하는 데 실패함을 보일 것이다.
This paper aims to offer new insights into the virtue of modesty. It argues that modesty is best ... more This paper aims to offer new insights into the virtue of modesty. It argues that modesty is best understood as an executive virtue with the moderate evaluative attitude at its center. The main goals include to describe the main features of this evaluative attitude and to distinguish it from other features that are only contingently associated with modesty. Then some distinctive features of modesty as an executive virtue are suggested and defended. Next, some of existing accounts are critically examined. Finally, this paper ends with the claim that modesty as a virtue does not depend on whether the agent has excellent qualities.
My dissertation aims to shed light on the importance and distinctive nature of intimate relations... more My dissertation aims to shed light on the importance and distinctive nature of intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship and friendship by developing my own version of a virtue-ethical approach. In Chapter 1, I critically examine important contemporary Western theories of filial piety and argue that they do not adequately capture the nature of a desirable parent-child relationship and filial piety. In Chapter 2, I show why the duty-centered approach to filial piety is inadequate focusing on why it fails to make sense of filial love and argue that filial piety is better understood as a virtue by showing how it can do justice to the normative significance of filial love. In Chapter 3, I introduce what I call ‘gratitude for being’ to capture the distinctive type of gratitude we owe to people who have consistent and particularized care for us, especially our parents. I argue that the idea of gratitude for being can best make sense of deep gratitude typically found among intimates who care for each other. In Chapter 4, I introduce what I call ‘relational virtues,’ which are virtues required for the participants of a given type of personal relationship and argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate personal relationships. Next, I propose my own relational virtue theory of filial piety. In Chapter 5, I discuss several aspects of the Confucian conception of filial piety—early filial piety, the close connection between self-cultivation and filial piety, and postmortem filial piety—and show how my relational virtue theory can defend and make sense of them. Lastly, I show how my view of filial piety is different from the Confucian view, or at least a version of it. In Chapter 6, I discuss the virtue of friendship as a relational virtue and show how it can make sense of the nature and value of friendship. In particular, I show why the virtue of friendship is distinct from general virtues such as benevolence or generosity and why it is morally important to have this virtue. Finally, in Chapter 7, I propose what I call ‘relational activity view’ on partiality. After critically examining existing views on partiality, I suggest a picture of how special values are transformed, delivered, and created within intimate relationships.
ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that what I call ‘gratitude for being’ can capture the distinctiv... more ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that what I call ‘gratitude for being’ can capture the distinctive sort of gratitude that we typically owe to our intimates, such as parents and close friends. Instead of specific actions or beneficial objects, the benefactor herself and her relationship to the beneficiary are considered as the grounds of gratitude. I argue that people who have consistent and particularized care for us deserve our gratitude for being, rather than gratitude for doing.
Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively ... more Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively direct the care of their future incapacitated selves. There has been much discussion about issues such as whether the future incompetent self is identical to the agent who issues the advance directive or whether advance directives can legitimately secure patient autonomy. However, there is another important question to ask: to what extent and in what conditions is it ethically appropriate for one to limit the liberty or agency of one's future incompetent self by issuing an advance directive? In this paper, I use a virtue-ethical approach to explore this question, focusing on the case of an advance directive for the future self with moderate dementia. First, I examine virtuous attitudes with regard to autonomy and argue that one can manifest vices or ethically undesirable character traits in trying to intervene in the future self's life. In particular, I argue that this case can m...
Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively ... more Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively direct the care of their future incapacitated selves. There has been much discussion about issues such as whether the future incompetent self is identical to the agent who issues the advance directives or whether advance directives can legitimately secure patient autonomy. However, there is another important question to ask: to what extent and in what conditions is it ethically appropriate for one to limit the liberty or agency of one’s future incompetent self by issuing an advance directive? In this paper, I use a virtue-ethical approach to explore this question, focusing on the case of an advance directive for the future self with moderate dementia. First, I examine virtuous attitudes with regard to autonomy and argue that one can manifest vices or ethically undesirable character traits in trying to intervene in the future self’s life. In particular, I argue that this case can manifest...
In his book, The Skillfulness of Virtue, Matt Stichter defends the virtue as skill thesis (VS): v... more In his book, The Skillfulness of Virtue, Matt Stichter defends the virtue as skill thesis (VS): virtues are skills. Although many philosophers share the view that virtues and skills bear many structural similarities, VS is a quite strong claim in that it understands virtues as another kind of skills, not just something analogous. He introduces an account of skill and shows how the nature of virtue and its acquisition can be understood in light of our understanding of skills. I think this is an excellent book recommendable to those who are interested in knowing what a virtue is and how to cultivate it.
If each person is equally valuable and thus deserves equal treatment, why should the fact that we... more If each person is equally valuable and thus deserves equal treatment, why should the fact that we have a close relationship with someone permit or even direct us to treat her preferentially? We may call this the puzzle of partiality. This paper aims to analyze previous attempts to solve the puzzle of partiality and introduce my new approach. I first examine Simon Keller’s individuals view, to show the difficulties of a view that puts each individual’s equal worth at its center in making sense of the appropriate motives and reasons for partial behavior. Next, I explore two views that seem to capture the agent-neutrality of reasons of partiality better than the individuals view: the projects view, which focuses on the agent’s own projects, and the relationships view, which focuses on the value of the relationship itself. Then I introduce my own relational activity view and explain how it can retain the merits of these two views while avoiding their difficulties. In particular, I suggest a picture of how special values are transformed, delivered, and created within intimate relationships and show how the characteristic structure in the intimates’ concern for each other can shed light on the puzzle of partiality.
In this paper, I introduce what I call relational virtue and defend it as an important subcategor... more In this paper, I introduce what I call relational virtue and defend it as an important subcategory of virtue. In particular, I argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship or friendship. After briefly sketching what I mean by relational virtue, I show why it is a virtue and in what sense we can meaningfully distinguish it from other sorts of virtue. I then describe some distinctive features of relational virtue in more detail and discuss their implications. Next, I present filial piety as the paradigmatic example of relational virtue. I argue that a child's being filial should be understood as an appropriate response to her parent's being virtuous as a parent. I conclude by showing how my relational virtue theory of filial piety can avoid the difficulties faced by previous theories of filial piety such as gratitude theory and friendship theory.
In this paper, I argue that what I call ‘gratitude for being’ can capture the distinctive sort of... more In this paper, I argue that what I call ‘gratitude for being’ can capture the distinctive sort of gratitude that we typically owe to our intimates, such as parents and close friends. Instead of specific actions or beneficial objects, the benefactor herself and her relationship to the beneficiary are considered as the grounds of gratitude. I argue that people who have consistent and particularized care for us deserve our gratitude for being, rather than gratitude for doing.
CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas, 2009
본 논문의 목적은 전통적인 이중효과 원리와 퀸(Warren Quinn)의 수정된 버전이 모두 행위자의 근본적인 태도에서 도덕적으로 중요한 요소를 포착하는 데 실패함을 밝히는 ... more 본 논문의 목적은 전통적인 이중효과 원리와 퀸(Warren Quinn)의 수정된 버전이 모두 행위자의 근본적인 태도에서 도덕적으로 중요한 요소를 포착하는 데 실패함을 밝히는 데 있다. 우선 전통적인 이중효과 원리 입장에 반대해서, 자신의 목적을 이루는 데 있어 남의 피해가 불가피한 부작용으로 뒤따를 것임을 분명히 예견하고 행위하는 것은 남의 피해를 자기 자신의 목적을 실현하기 위한 수단으로 삼을 의도로 행위하는 것만큼 도덕적 결함을 가짐을 주장할 것이다. 즉, 전자는 후자만큼이나 정당화하기 힘들다는 것이다. 그리고 퀸의 수정된 이중효과 원리에 반대해서, 남의 피해가 자신의 목적을 이루는 데 기여하는지 여부가 그 자체로는 행위자의 태도에 드러난 도덕적 성품을 평가하는 데 있어 무관함을 주장할 것이다. 즉, 그의 직접 행위능력과 간접 행위능력 사이의 구분은 도덕적 차이를 정확히 포착하는 데 실패함을 보일 것이다.
This paper aims to offer new insights into the virtue of modesty. It argues that modesty is best ... more This paper aims to offer new insights into the virtue of modesty. It argues that modesty is best understood as an executive virtue with the moderate evaluative attitude at its center. The main goals include to describe the main features of this evaluative attitude and to distinguish it from other features that are only contingently associated with modesty. Then some distinctive features of modesty as an executive virtue are suggested and defended. Next, some of existing accounts are critically examined. Finally, this paper ends with the claim that modesty as a virtue does not depend on whether the agent has excellent qualities.
My dissertation aims to shed light on the importance and distinctive nature of intimate relations... more My dissertation aims to shed light on the importance and distinctive nature of intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship and friendship by developing my own version of a virtue-ethical approach. In Chapter 1, I critically examine important contemporary Western theories of filial piety and argue that they do not adequately capture the nature of a desirable parent-child relationship and filial piety. In Chapter 2, I show why the duty-centered approach to filial piety is inadequate focusing on why it fails to make sense of filial love and argue that filial piety is better understood as a virtue by showing how it can do justice to the normative significance of filial love. In Chapter 3, I introduce what I call ‘gratitude for being’ to capture the distinctive type of gratitude we owe to people who have consistent and particularized care for us, especially our parents. I argue that the idea of gratitude for being can best make sense of deep gratitude typically found among intimates who care for each other. In Chapter 4, I introduce what I call ‘relational virtues,’ which are virtues required for the participants of a given type of personal relationship and argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate personal relationships. Next, I propose my own relational virtue theory of filial piety. In Chapter 5, I discuss several aspects of the Confucian conception of filial piety—early filial piety, the close connection between self-cultivation and filial piety, and postmortem filial piety—and show how my relational virtue theory can defend and make sense of them. Lastly, I show how my view of filial piety is different from the Confucian view, or at least a version of it. In Chapter 6, I discuss the virtue of friendship as a relational virtue and show how it can make sense of the nature and value of friendship. In particular, I show why the virtue of friendship is distinct from general virtues such as benevolence or generosity and why it is morally important to have this virtue. Finally, in Chapter 7, I propose what I call ‘relational activity view’ on partiality. After critically examining existing views on partiality, I suggest a picture of how special values are transformed, delivered, and created within intimate relationships.
ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that what I call ‘gratitude for being’ can capture the distinctiv... more ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that what I call ‘gratitude for being’ can capture the distinctive sort of gratitude that we typically owe to our intimates, such as parents and close friends. Instead of specific actions or beneficial objects, the benefactor herself and her relationship to the beneficiary are considered as the grounds of gratitude. I argue that people who have consistent and particularized care for us deserve our gratitude for being, rather than gratitude for doing.
Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively ... more Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively direct the care of their future incapacitated selves. There has been much discussion about issues such as whether the future incompetent self is identical to the agent who issues the advance directive or whether advance directives can legitimately secure patient autonomy. However, there is another important question to ask: to what extent and in what conditions is it ethically appropriate for one to limit the liberty or agency of one's future incompetent self by issuing an advance directive? In this paper, I use a virtue-ethical approach to explore this question, focusing on the case of an advance directive for the future self with moderate dementia. First, I examine virtuous attitudes with regard to autonomy and argue that one can manifest vices or ethically undesirable character traits in trying to intervene in the future self's life. In particular, I argue that this case can m...
Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively ... more Advance directives are intended to extend patient autonomy by enabling patients to prospectively direct the care of their future incapacitated selves. There has been much discussion about issues such as whether the future incompetent self is identical to the agent who issues the advance directives or whether advance directives can legitimately secure patient autonomy. However, there is another important question to ask: to what extent and in what conditions is it ethically appropriate for one to limit the liberty or agency of one’s future incompetent self by issuing an advance directive? In this paper, I use a virtue-ethical approach to explore this question, focusing on the case of an advance directive for the future self with moderate dementia. First, I examine virtuous attitudes with regard to autonomy and argue that one can manifest vices or ethically undesirable character traits in trying to intervene in the future self’s life. In particular, I argue that this case can manifest...
In his book, The Skillfulness of Virtue, Matt Stichter defends the virtue as skill thesis (VS): v... more In his book, The Skillfulness of Virtue, Matt Stichter defends the virtue as skill thesis (VS): virtues are skills. Although many philosophers share the view that virtues and skills bear many structural similarities, VS is a quite strong claim in that it understands virtues as another kind of skills, not just something analogous. He introduces an account of skill and shows how the nature of virtue and its acquisition can be understood in light of our understanding of skills. I think this is an excellent book recommendable to those who are interested in knowing what a virtue is and how to cultivate it.
If each person is equally valuable and thus deserves equal treatment, why should the fact that we... more If each person is equally valuable and thus deserves equal treatment, why should the fact that we have a close relationship with someone permit or even direct us to treat her preferentially? We may call this the puzzle of partiality. This paper aims to analyze previous attempts to solve the puzzle of partiality and introduce my new approach. I first examine Simon Keller’s individuals view, to show the difficulties of a view that puts each individual’s equal worth at its center in making sense of the appropriate motives and reasons for partial behavior. Next, I explore two views that seem to capture the agent-neutrality of reasons of partiality better than the individuals view: the projects view, which focuses on the agent’s own projects, and the relationships view, which focuses on the value of the relationship itself. Then I introduce my own relational activity view and explain how it can retain the merits of these two views while avoiding their difficulties. In particular, I suggest a picture of how special values are transformed, delivered, and created within intimate relationships and show how the characteristic structure in the intimates’ concern for each other can shed light on the puzzle of partiality.
In this paper, I introduce what I call relational virtue and defend it as an important subcategor... more In this paper, I introduce what I call relational virtue and defend it as an important subcategory of virtue. In particular, I argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship or friendship. After briefly sketching what I mean by relational virtue, I show why it is a virtue and in what sense we can meaningfully distinguish it from other sorts of virtue. I then describe some distinctive features of relational virtue in more detail and discuss their implications. Next, I present filial piety as the paradigmatic example of relational virtue. I argue that a child's being filial should be understood as an appropriate response to her parent's being virtuous as a parent. I conclude by showing how my relational virtue theory of filial piety can avoid the difficulties faced by previous theories of filial piety such as gratitude theory and friendship theory.
In this paper, I argue that what I call ‘gratitude for being’ can capture the distinctive sort of... more In this paper, I argue that what I call ‘gratitude for being’ can capture the distinctive sort of gratitude that we typically owe to our intimates, such as parents and close friends. Instead of specific actions or beneficial objects, the benefactor herself and her relationship to the beneficiary are considered as the grounds of gratitude. I argue that people who have consistent and particularized care for us deserve our gratitude for being, rather than gratitude for doing.
Virtue, Virtuous Activity, and Moral Self-Indulgence
One distinctive feature of virtue ethics is... more Virtue, Virtuous Activity, and Moral Self-Indulgence
One distinctive feature of virtue ethics is its emphasis on action’s having roots in virtue, i.e., a stable state of character that incorporate proper motivational and emotional elements. Thomas Hurka argues that its excessive focus on virtue itself renders virtue ethics unable to explain why moral self-indulgence is objectionable. I claim that virtue is better understood as a stable disposition to engage in virtuous activities in the given situations. I argue that virtue has mere potential intrinsic value until it is actualized in a virtuous activity, and that, even when it is actualized in a virtuous activity, it has an actual intrinsic value only as a part of that virtuous activity as a whole. I argue that virtuous activity should be understood as a sort of organic unity which includes the agent’s virtue (e.g. benevolence) and its intentional object (e.g. a friend’s pleasure) as its two relata. In this framework, the intrinsic value of a virtuous activity is a function of two factors: the virtuousness of the agent’s response and the intrinsic value of the virtue’s intentional object. In my framework, the second-order value of virtuous activity cannot simply be compared to the first-order value of its component; in any case, we cannot simply say that the first-order value is always greater than the second-order value, as Hurka does.
In this paper, my main aim is to give a plausible interpretation of how Mozi’s doctrine of inc... more In this paper, my main aim is to give a plausible interpretation of how Mozi’s doctrine of inclusive care is to be harmonized with filiality (xiao 孝). I examine how this doctrine is to be practiced in relation to special relationships, especially a parent-child relationship. As a background work, I briefly analyze the meaning of basic concepts in the Mozi. Next, I provide evidence that Mozi endorses significant special relationships and regards filiality as an important relational virtue. And then I suggest a possible interpretation of Mohist doctrine which can reconcile the apparent conflict between caring for everyone inclusively and being filial to one’s own parents. Finally, I compare Mohist view on filiality with Mengzi’s view, and conclude by showing where their disagreement actually lies.
This paper aims to examine Rousseau’s view on human nature, focusing on the different status he a... more This paper aims to examine Rousseau’s view on human nature, focusing on the different status he allows to pity and to amour-propre. I argue that Rousseau reveals inconsistency in his view on these two relative sentiments, and that this inconsistency poses difficulty on his natural goodness thesis. First, I briefly address Rousseau’s general view on human nature, and show how he attempts to include pity in human nature while excluding amour-propre. Next, I examine Rousseau’s seemingly different uses of the term ‘pity’ and explore the possible senses in which pity can be natural while amour-propre cannot. Then I argue that the asymmetry in Rousseau’s treatments of pity and amour-propre is unjustified. Finally, I conclude with the claim that Rousseau’s inconsistent view on pity and amour-propre undermines his natural goodness thesis.
The main aim of this paper is to reveal the problem inherent in the concept of quasi-memory, ther... more The main aim of this paper is to reveal the problem inherent in the concept of quasi-memory, thereby undermining the plausibility of the alternative criterion of personal identity suggested by the proponents of this concept. After setting up the background issue, I show that the proponents of quasi-memory do not make it clear about what they mean by apparent memory, in terms of which quasi-memory is defined. I argue that they have a serious difficulty in making apparent memory comprehensible independently of the concept of ordinary memory, and that it imposes a problem on the conceivability of quasi-memory. To show this, first, I closely examine the imagined case of quasi-memory Parfit suggests (Parfit 1984, Ch. 11), and then examine a case of real patient recently suggested by Stanley B. Klein and Shaun Nichols (Klein and Nichols 2012). At the end of this paper, I hope, we will see the significance of accurately characterizing apparent memory in defining quasi-memory.
It is difficult to give an account of modesty that adequately explains both what modesty is and w... more It is difficult to give an account of modesty that adequately explains both what modesty is and why it is a virtue at the same time. On the one hand, if one’s merits are truly excellent and one knows it, it seems hard to explain how one can be sincerely modest. If, on the other, modesty as a moral virtue requires the agent to be ignorant of the true excellence of her merits, this would be problematic because it entails an uneliminable tension between our ethical and epistemic ideals. My aim is to offer an account that solves this apparent puzzle of modesty. I begin by showing that Driver’s account has difficulties in accounting for modesty as a virtue, even given her consequentialist view of virtue. I then show that the accounts of her opponents have problems in identifying what modesty is, and thus fail to distinguish modesty from other traits. Finally, I suggest three conditions for modesty: equal respect for persons, a proper source of self-esteem, and appropriate self-consciousness.
It is difficult to give an account of modesty that adequately explains both what modesty is and w... more It is difficult to give an account of modesty that adequately explains both what modesty is and why it is a virtue at the same time. On the one hand, if one’s merits are truly excellent and one knows it, it seems hard to explain how one can be sincerely modest. If, on the other, modesty as a moral virtue requires the agent to be ignorant of the true excellence of her merits, this would be problematic because it entails an uneliminable tension between our ethical and epistemic ideals. My aim is to offer an account that solves this apparent puzzle of modesty. I begin by showing that Driver’s account has difficulties in accounting for modesty as a virtue, even given her consequentialist view of virtue. I then show that the accounts of her opponents have problems in identifying what modesty is, and thus fail to distinguish modesty from other traits. Finally, I suggest three conditions for modesty: equal respect for persons, a proper source of self-esteem, and appropriate self-consciousness.
My dissertation aims to shed light on the importance and distinctive nature of intimate relations... more My dissertation aims to shed light on the importance and distinctive nature of intimate relationships such as parent-child relationship and friendship by developing my own version of a virtue-ethical approach. In Chapter 1, I critically examine important contemporary Western theories of filial piety and argue that they do not adequately capture the nature of a desirable parent-child relationship and filial piety. In Chapter 2, I show why the duty-centered approach to filial piety is inadequate focusing on why it fails to make sense of filial love and argue that filial piety is better understood as a virtue by showing how it can do justice to the normative significance of filial love. In Chapter 3, I introduce what I call ‘gratitude for being’ to capture the distinctive type of gratitude we owe to people who have consistent and particularized care for us, especially our parents. I argue that the idea of gratitude for being can best make sense of deep gratitude typically found among intimates who care for each other. In Chapter 4, I introduce what I call ‘relational virtues,’ which are virtues required for the participants of a given type of personal relationship and argue that it offers a valuable resource for answering questions concerning the value of intimate personal relationships. Next, I propose my own relational virtue theory of filial piety. In Chapter 5, I discuss several aspects of the Confucian conception of filial piety—early filial piety, the close connection between self-cultivation and filial piety, and postmortem filial piety—and show how my relational virtue theory can defend and make sense of them. Lastly, I show how my view of filial piety is different from the Confucian view, or at least a version of it. In Chapter 6, I discuss the virtue of friendship as a relational virtue and show how it can make sense of the nature and value of friendship. In particular, I show why the virtue of friendship is distinct from general virtues such as benevolence or generosity and why it is morally important to have this virtue. Finally, in Chapter 7, I propose what I call ‘relational activity view’ on partiality. After critically examining existing views on partiality, I suggest a picture of how special values are transformed, delivered, and created within intimate relationships.
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Papers by Sungwoo Um
One distinctive feature of virtue ethics is its emphasis on action’s having roots in virtue, i.e., a stable state of character that incorporate proper motivational and emotional elements. Thomas Hurka argues that its excessive focus on virtue itself renders virtue ethics unable to explain why moral self-indulgence is objectionable.
I claim that virtue is better understood as a stable disposition to engage in virtuous activities in the given situations. I argue that virtue has mere potential intrinsic value until it is actualized in a virtuous activity, and that, even when it is actualized in a virtuous activity, it has an actual intrinsic value only as a part of that virtuous activity as a whole.
I argue that virtuous activity should be understood as a sort of organic unity which includes the agent’s virtue (e.g. benevolence) and its intentional object (e.g. a friend’s pleasure) as its two relata. In this framework, the intrinsic value of a virtuous activity is a function of two factors: the virtuousness of the agent’s response and the intrinsic value of the virtue’s intentional object.
In my framework, the second-order value of virtuous activity cannot simply be compared to the first-order value of its component; in any case, we cannot simply say that the first-order value is always greater than the second-order value, as Hurka does.