Too many works have been written on the theological discourses revolving around particular Shari’... more Too many works have been written on the theological discourses revolving around particular Shari’ah injunctions allegedly clashing with human rights norms and particularly with the universal and absolute human rights provision of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. However, little attention has been given to general ethos of the Qur’an regarding this issue. Two particular concepts will be of interest in this work: Firstly, we will examine the theory of naskh (abrogation). We will then continue with a humble attempt to take a balanced approach and nuanced position in understanding naskh. We will argue in favour of its existence, investigate its rationales and benefits and come up with a compromise redefinition and reconceptualisation of naskh. It will then be asked how the revelatory contexts of the two verses (ayat al-sayf and ayat al-qital) that have been claimed to have abrogated dozens of verses on peaceful coexistence, relate to naskh. Secondly, we will conclude with a few thoughts on the objectives (Maqāṣid) of Shari’ah.
Mohsin Kadivar, a post-revolutionary Iranian intellectual, traditionally trained in Islamic Law i... more Mohsin Kadivar, a post-revolutionary Iranian intellectual, traditionally trained in Islamic Law in both of the preeminent seminary centres of Shi’ite intelligentsia, Qom and Najaf, is one of the outstanding scholars of our time trying to reconcile human rights norms with modern Islamic thoughts and practices. It is these above-mentioned philosophical and epistemological differences and their distinct way of defining the essence of human beings, according to Kadivar, that are underlying the current incompatibility between internationally recognised human rights and traditional Sunni and Shi’ite Islamic law. In this essay, we will firstly examine how Kadivar demonstrates why traditional fiqh is incapable of overcoming the fundamental conflict between the notion of human rights and Shari’ah precepts in traditional islam. We will go on by outlining his proposed way of elevating the authority of collective reason in imposing time limits for Shari’ah ordinances concerning interpersonal social transactions and of rethinking and reassessing their eternality, fixedness and continuity. We will then discuss critically his premises such as the possibility of such a collective reason, the rationality of Shari’ah ordinances and the utilisation of the concept of abrogation.
Undoubtedly, the international human rights movements is one of numerous human advancements and a... more Undoubtedly, the international human rights movements is one of numerous human advancements and achievements of the modern period that have challenged Muslims and the Islamic world. Almost too much has been said and written as to whether the classical tools of traditional islamic jurisprudence has sufficient potential to come to terms with contemporary human rights norms. When discussing the traditional islamic legal discourse on human rights and its relationship with modern legal philosophy, a perennial problem re- enters the field of discussion, that I characterise as non-complementary paradigms. Similar to the non-complementarity between Newtonian Physics and Quantum Mechanics (both using a different language to depict the world and working at a certain level), modern judicial interpretation and legal philosophy on the one side and traditional Islam on the other make use of different languages based on different underlying presumptions, propositions,underpinnings,principles,theoretical bases and ontological and epistemological frameworks. While taking this fact into consideration, I still believe a harmonisation between the two is possible. The paradox between strict universalism and cultural relativism - the former running the danger of imposing a western-centred notion of human rights that is often perceived by former colonies as a new form of cultural colonialism and the latter being susceptible for being abused and rationalised for obvious human rights violations and repressive policies - needs to be overcome by acknowledging cultural diversity and embracing an inclusive multicultural interpretation of human rights principles and a distribution of normative and interpretative authority among different cultures and civilisations. Islam, as one of the major civilisations of the modern world, can therefore as a matter of fact not be excluded from - even needs to be welcomed into - this process of interpretation, as is the case for all other cultures and civilisations world-wide. Contrary to the reformist approaches of thinkers such as Kadivar or Khaled Abou el Fadl, I advocate an approach that is more grounded in traditional jurisprudence. While I genuinely appreciate reformist works and sincerely believe that they inspire and offer new frameworks for heated theoretical discussion, I believe that any attempt to reconcile or harmonise Islamic Law with modern human rights norms will be in need of an Islamic jurisprudential legitimacy and textual support in order to be to be heard and acknowledged by traditional mainstream circles, and to be a stimulator for change and transformation instead of limiting its impact to the bookshelf. All tools available in fiqh that have the potential to overcome possible clashes should be utilised and exhausted. Utilising the the traditional doctrines and tools of maqasid and maslahah (the commonweal of the community or society) effectively on the side of Islamic Law and the tool of ‘margin of appreciation’ on the side of human rights will therefore help to establish a more harmonist approach towards the issue. I will try to demonstrate through a critical evaluation of different theoretical perspectives why I adopt this position. For this, I have selected two provisions of the ICCPR: Article 7 (Prohibition of torture or cruel, in- human or degrading treatment or punishment) and Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion). Due to the breathtaking amount of literature on these two particular rights, I will only highlight those contributions that to my assessment need to be contemplated on more intensely, instead of merely repeating what has already been said.
Nach der Veröffentlichung der Arbeiten von Frank Ramsey (1927) zur Steuertheorie und Marcel Boit... more Nach der Veröffentlichung der Arbeiten von Frank Ramsey (1927) zur Steuertheorie und Marcel Boiteux (1956) haben sich viele Wissenschaftler mit der Frage beschäftigt, welche Preisstruktur effizient ist, wenn ein Unternehmen unterschiedliche Güter bzw. Dienste anbietet, bei deren Herstellung Produktionskosten anfallen, und das Unternehmen verlustfrei operieren soll. Im etwas allgemeinerem Fall geht es um ein öffentliches Unternehmen, bzw. eine Regierung, welche(s) eine bestimmte Menge an Steuereinnahmen erzielen soll. Dabei soll die soziale Wohlfahrt bzw. der Unternehmensgewinn unter der Bedingung eben dieser Steuereinnahmen maximiert werden. Wie sollen nun diese Steuern auf verschiedene Güter verteilt werden, sodass eine second-best Lösung erzielt wird kann? Die bereits längst bekannte Antwort auf diese Frage lautet, dass der Preis für das Produkt bzw. die Dienstleistung umso höher über die Grenzkosten gesetzt werden sollte, je weniger empfindlich die Nachfrager des jeweiligen Gutes auf ihre Preisänderungen reagieren. In anderen Worten sollte der Preis für das Produkt invers proportional zur Elastizität ihrer Nachfrage sein. Nach dieser Theorie ist es effizient, die Fix- bzw. Gemeinkosten primär durch die Produkte zu finanzieren, deren Nachfrager schwächer auf Preisänderungen reagieren. Preise, die nach einer solchen Struktur gebildet werden, bezeichnet man als Ramsey-Boiteux-Preise. Mit diesem Thema beschäftigt sich diese Arbeit.
In this essay, we will examine the tension between faith and reason in the writings of Qutb. We w... more In this essay, we will examine the tension between faith and reason in the writings of Qutb. We will begin by providing the general conceptual framework of hakimiyyah upon which Qutb’s ideas on the status of the human intellect is built. We will then ponder his attitude towards the human intellect and the aims of science in accordance to Islamic conception of being. Finally we will explore his understanding of religious knowledge as a dynamic experiential revelatory process interwoven with action and struggle.
I have tried to outline the theory of post-secularism by first examining the historical and philo... more I have tried to outline the theory of post-secularism by first examining the historical and philosophical framework in which secularism initially emerged and asserted its claims. We have seen that the philosophical, political and societal constituents of the secularism thesis were perceived as intrinsically interrelated components of a single universal epistemological process of human development. This holistic imagination has been subject to a serious review and reconsideration in the last few decades. However, the idea of post-secular neither implies a rejection of the secular, nor a teleological failure of secularism per se. It rather tries to include religious voices, terminologies into the hitherto secular public sphere, and it reconceptualises, modifies both the secular and the religious, re-evaluates and abstracts its own presumptions and finally recognises its own limitations, while still sticking insistently to its inevitable secular epistemic framework, by recognising ‘the religious’ and encouraging and facilitating its way to gaining a secular episteme. Post-secularism is the process from a polemical, thoroughly ideological distaste for religion, to a more including, embracing, self-critical and respectful attitude towards religion.
Too many works have been written on the theological discourses revolving around particular Shari’... more Too many works have been written on the theological discourses revolving around particular Shari’ah injunctions allegedly clashing with human rights norms and particularly with the universal and absolute human rights provision of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. However, little attention has been given to general ethos of the Qur’an regarding this issue. Two particular concepts will be of interest in this work: Firstly, we will examine the theory of naskh (abrogation). We will then continue with a humble attempt to take a balanced approach and nuanced position in understanding naskh. We will argue in favour of its existence, investigate its rationales and benefits and come up with a compromise redefinition and reconceptualisation of naskh. It will then be asked how the revelatory contexts of the two verses (ayat al-sayf and ayat al-qital) that have been claimed to have abrogated dozens of verses on peaceful coexistence, relate to naskh. Secondly, we will conclude with a few thoughts on the objectives (Maqāṣid) of Shari’ah.
Mohsin Kadivar, a post-revolutionary Iranian intellectual, traditionally trained in Islamic Law i... more Mohsin Kadivar, a post-revolutionary Iranian intellectual, traditionally trained in Islamic Law in both of the preeminent seminary centres of Shi’ite intelligentsia, Qom and Najaf, is one of the outstanding scholars of our time trying to reconcile human rights norms with modern Islamic thoughts and practices. It is these above-mentioned philosophical and epistemological differences and their distinct way of defining the essence of human beings, according to Kadivar, that are underlying the current incompatibility between internationally recognised human rights and traditional Sunni and Shi’ite Islamic law. In this essay, we will firstly examine how Kadivar demonstrates why traditional fiqh is incapable of overcoming the fundamental conflict between the notion of human rights and Shari’ah precepts in traditional islam. We will go on by outlining his proposed way of elevating the authority of collective reason in imposing time limits for Shari’ah ordinances concerning interpersonal social transactions and of rethinking and reassessing their eternality, fixedness and continuity. We will then discuss critically his premises such as the possibility of such a collective reason, the rationality of Shari’ah ordinances and the utilisation of the concept of abrogation.
Undoubtedly, the international human rights movements is one of numerous human advancements and a... more Undoubtedly, the international human rights movements is one of numerous human advancements and achievements of the modern period that have challenged Muslims and the Islamic world. Almost too much has been said and written as to whether the classical tools of traditional islamic jurisprudence has sufficient potential to come to terms with contemporary human rights norms. When discussing the traditional islamic legal discourse on human rights and its relationship with modern legal philosophy, a perennial problem re- enters the field of discussion, that I characterise as non-complementary paradigms. Similar to the non-complementarity between Newtonian Physics and Quantum Mechanics (both using a different language to depict the world and working at a certain level), modern judicial interpretation and legal philosophy on the one side and traditional Islam on the other make use of different languages based on different underlying presumptions, propositions,underpinnings,principles,theoretical bases and ontological and epistemological frameworks. While taking this fact into consideration, I still believe a harmonisation between the two is possible. The paradox between strict universalism and cultural relativism - the former running the danger of imposing a western-centred notion of human rights that is often perceived by former colonies as a new form of cultural colonialism and the latter being susceptible for being abused and rationalised for obvious human rights violations and repressive policies - needs to be overcome by acknowledging cultural diversity and embracing an inclusive multicultural interpretation of human rights principles and a distribution of normative and interpretative authority among different cultures and civilisations. Islam, as one of the major civilisations of the modern world, can therefore as a matter of fact not be excluded from - even needs to be welcomed into - this process of interpretation, as is the case for all other cultures and civilisations world-wide. Contrary to the reformist approaches of thinkers such as Kadivar or Khaled Abou el Fadl, I advocate an approach that is more grounded in traditional jurisprudence. While I genuinely appreciate reformist works and sincerely believe that they inspire and offer new frameworks for heated theoretical discussion, I believe that any attempt to reconcile or harmonise Islamic Law with modern human rights norms will be in need of an Islamic jurisprudential legitimacy and textual support in order to be to be heard and acknowledged by traditional mainstream circles, and to be a stimulator for change and transformation instead of limiting its impact to the bookshelf. All tools available in fiqh that have the potential to overcome possible clashes should be utilised and exhausted. Utilising the the traditional doctrines and tools of maqasid and maslahah (the commonweal of the community or society) effectively on the side of Islamic Law and the tool of ‘margin of appreciation’ on the side of human rights will therefore help to establish a more harmonist approach towards the issue. I will try to demonstrate through a critical evaluation of different theoretical perspectives why I adopt this position. For this, I have selected two provisions of the ICCPR: Article 7 (Prohibition of torture or cruel, in- human or degrading treatment or punishment) and Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion). Due to the breathtaking amount of literature on these two particular rights, I will only highlight those contributions that to my assessment need to be contemplated on more intensely, instead of merely repeating what has already been said.
Nach der Veröffentlichung der Arbeiten von Frank Ramsey (1927) zur Steuertheorie und Marcel Boit... more Nach der Veröffentlichung der Arbeiten von Frank Ramsey (1927) zur Steuertheorie und Marcel Boiteux (1956) haben sich viele Wissenschaftler mit der Frage beschäftigt, welche Preisstruktur effizient ist, wenn ein Unternehmen unterschiedliche Güter bzw. Dienste anbietet, bei deren Herstellung Produktionskosten anfallen, und das Unternehmen verlustfrei operieren soll. Im etwas allgemeinerem Fall geht es um ein öffentliches Unternehmen, bzw. eine Regierung, welche(s) eine bestimmte Menge an Steuereinnahmen erzielen soll. Dabei soll die soziale Wohlfahrt bzw. der Unternehmensgewinn unter der Bedingung eben dieser Steuereinnahmen maximiert werden. Wie sollen nun diese Steuern auf verschiedene Güter verteilt werden, sodass eine second-best Lösung erzielt wird kann? Die bereits längst bekannte Antwort auf diese Frage lautet, dass der Preis für das Produkt bzw. die Dienstleistung umso höher über die Grenzkosten gesetzt werden sollte, je weniger empfindlich die Nachfrager des jeweiligen Gutes auf ihre Preisänderungen reagieren. In anderen Worten sollte der Preis für das Produkt invers proportional zur Elastizität ihrer Nachfrage sein. Nach dieser Theorie ist es effizient, die Fix- bzw. Gemeinkosten primär durch die Produkte zu finanzieren, deren Nachfrager schwächer auf Preisänderungen reagieren. Preise, die nach einer solchen Struktur gebildet werden, bezeichnet man als Ramsey-Boiteux-Preise. Mit diesem Thema beschäftigt sich diese Arbeit.
In this essay, we will examine the tension between faith and reason in the writings of Qutb. We w... more In this essay, we will examine the tension between faith and reason in the writings of Qutb. We will begin by providing the general conceptual framework of hakimiyyah upon which Qutb’s ideas on the status of the human intellect is built. We will then ponder his attitude towards the human intellect and the aims of science in accordance to Islamic conception of being. Finally we will explore his understanding of religious knowledge as a dynamic experiential revelatory process interwoven with action and struggle.
I have tried to outline the theory of post-secularism by first examining the historical and philo... more I have tried to outline the theory of post-secularism by first examining the historical and philosophical framework in which secularism initially emerged and asserted its claims. We have seen that the philosophical, political and societal constituents of the secularism thesis were perceived as intrinsically interrelated components of a single universal epistemological process of human development. This holistic imagination has been subject to a serious review and reconsideration in the last few decades. However, the idea of post-secular neither implies a rejection of the secular, nor a teleological failure of secularism per se. It rather tries to include religious voices, terminologies into the hitherto secular public sphere, and it reconceptualises, modifies both the secular and the religious, re-evaluates and abstracts its own presumptions and finally recognises its own limitations, while still sticking insistently to its inevitable secular epistemic framework, by recognising ‘the religious’ and encouraging and facilitating its way to gaining a secular episteme. Post-secularism is the process from a polemical, thoroughly ideological distaste for religion, to a more including, embracing, self-critical and respectful attitude towards religion.
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Papers by Fatih Cicek
In this essay, we will firstly examine how Kadivar demonstrates why traditional fiqh is incapable of overcoming the fundamental conflict between the notion of human rights and Shari’ah precepts in traditional islam. We will go on by outlining his proposed way of elevating the authority of collective reason in imposing time limits for Shari’ah ordinances concerning interpersonal social transactions and of rethinking and reassessing their eternality, fixedness and continuity. We will then discuss critically his premises such as the possibility of such a collective reason, the rationality of Shari’ah ordinances and the utilisation of the concept of abrogation.
The paradox between strict universalism and cultural relativism - the former running the danger of imposing a western-centred notion of human rights that is often perceived by former colonies as a new form of cultural colonialism and the latter being susceptible for being abused and rationalised for obvious human rights violations and repressive policies - needs to be overcome by acknowledging cultural diversity and embracing an inclusive multicultural interpretation of human rights principles and a distribution of normative and interpretative authority among different cultures and civilisations. Islam, as one of the major civilisations of the modern world, can therefore as a matter of fact not be excluded from - even needs to be welcomed into - this process of interpretation, as is the case for all other cultures and civilisations world-wide.
Contrary to the reformist approaches of thinkers such as Kadivar or Khaled Abou el Fadl, I advocate an approach that is more grounded in traditional jurisprudence. While I genuinely appreciate reformist works and sincerely believe that they inspire and offer new frameworks for heated theoretical discussion, I believe that any attempt to reconcile or harmonise Islamic Law with modern human rights norms will be in need of an Islamic jurisprudential legitimacy and textual support in order to be to be heard and acknowledged by traditional mainstream circles, and to be a stimulator for change and transformation instead of limiting its impact to the bookshelf. All tools available in fiqh that have the potential to overcome possible clashes should be utilised and exhausted. Utilising the the traditional doctrines and tools of maqasid and maslahah (the commonweal of the community or society) effectively on the side of Islamic Law and the tool of ‘margin of appreciation’ on the side of human rights will therefore help to establish a more harmonist approach towards the issue.
I will try to demonstrate through a critical evaluation of different theoretical perspectives why I adopt this position. For this, I have selected two provisions of the ICCPR: Article 7 (Prohibition of torture or cruel, in- human or degrading treatment or punishment) and Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion). Due to the breathtaking amount of literature on these two particular rights, I will only highlight those contributions that to my assessment need to be contemplated on more intensely, instead of merely repeating what has already been said.
In this essay, we will firstly examine how Kadivar demonstrates why traditional fiqh is incapable of overcoming the fundamental conflict between the notion of human rights and Shari’ah precepts in traditional islam. We will go on by outlining his proposed way of elevating the authority of collective reason in imposing time limits for Shari’ah ordinances concerning interpersonal social transactions and of rethinking and reassessing their eternality, fixedness and continuity. We will then discuss critically his premises such as the possibility of such a collective reason, the rationality of Shari’ah ordinances and the utilisation of the concept of abrogation.
The paradox between strict universalism and cultural relativism - the former running the danger of imposing a western-centred notion of human rights that is often perceived by former colonies as a new form of cultural colonialism and the latter being susceptible for being abused and rationalised for obvious human rights violations and repressive policies - needs to be overcome by acknowledging cultural diversity and embracing an inclusive multicultural interpretation of human rights principles and a distribution of normative and interpretative authority among different cultures and civilisations. Islam, as one of the major civilisations of the modern world, can therefore as a matter of fact not be excluded from - even needs to be welcomed into - this process of interpretation, as is the case for all other cultures and civilisations world-wide.
Contrary to the reformist approaches of thinkers such as Kadivar or Khaled Abou el Fadl, I advocate an approach that is more grounded in traditional jurisprudence. While I genuinely appreciate reformist works and sincerely believe that they inspire and offer new frameworks for heated theoretical discussion, I believe that any attempt to reconcile or harmonise Islamic Law with modern human rights norms will be in need of an Islamic jurisprudential legitimacy and textual support in order to be to be heard and acknowledged by traditional mainstream circles, and to be a stimulator for change and transformation instead of limiting its impact to the bookshelf. All tools available in fiqh that have the potential to overcome possible clashes should be utilised and exhausted. Utilising the the traditional doctrines and tools of maqasid and maslahah (the commonweal of the community or society) effectively on the side of Islamic Law and the tool of ‘margin of appreciation’ on the side of human rights will therefore help to establish a more harmonist approach towards the issue.
I will try to demonstrate through a critical evaluation of different theoretical perspectives why I adopt this position. For this, I have selected two provisions of the ICCPR: Article 7 (Prohibition of torture or cruel, in- human or degrading treatment or punishment) and Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion). Due to the breathtaking amount of literature on these two particular rights, I will only highlight those contributions that to my assessment need to be contemplated on more intensely, instead of merely repeating what has already been said.