Jeffrey Addicott
Lt. Colonel (U.S. Army, ret.) Jeffrey F. Addicott is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Center for Terrorism Law at St. Mary’s University School of Law. An active duty Army officer in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps for twenty years, Addicott spent a quarter of his career as the senior legal advisor to the United States Army’s Special Forces. As an internationally recognized authority on national security law, Addicott not only lectures and participates in professional and academic organizations both in the United States and abroad--giving more than 700 speeches--but also has testified before Congress on a variety of legal issues. He is a regular contributor to national and international news media outlets and has given more than 4,000 media interviews. Addicott is a prolific author, publishing over 60 books, articles, and monographs on a variety of legal topics.
Among his many contributions to the field, Addicott pioneered the teaching of law of war and human rights courses to the militaries of numerous nascent democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America. For these efforts he was awarded the Legion of Merit, named the “Army Judge Advocate of the Year,” and honored as a co-recipient of the American Bar Association’s Hodson Award. Addicott has served in senior legal positions in Germany, Korea, Panama, and throughout the United States. Addicott holds a Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.) and Master of Laws (LL.M.) from the University of Virginia School of Law. He also received a Master of Laws (LL.M.) from the Army Judge Advocate General’s School, where he was the Deputy Director of the International and Operational Law Division, and a Juris Doctor (J.D.) from the University of Alabama School of Law. Apart from teaching a variety of courses at the law school, Addicott served as the Associate Dean for Administration at St. Mary’s University School of Law (2006-2007).
Among his many contributions to the field, Addicott pioneered the teaching of law of war and human rights courses to the militaries of numerous nascent democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America. For these efforts he was awarded the Legion of Merit, named the “Army Judge Advocate of the Year,” and honored as a co-recipient of the American Bar Association’s Hodson Award. Addicott has served in senior legal positions in Germany, Korea, Panama, and throughout the United States. Addicott holds a Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.) and Master of Laws (LL.M.) from the University of Virginia School of Law. He also received a Master of Laws (LL.M.) from the Army Judge Advocate General’s School, where he was the Deputy Director of the International and Operational Law Division, and a Juris Doctor (J.D.) from the University of Alabama School of Law. Apart from teaching a variety of courses at the law school, Addicott served as the Associate Dean for Administration at St. Mary’s University School of Law (2006-2007).
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The ongoing civil action of Sokolow v. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) perfectly illustrates this dilemma—on the one hand the offending regime disavows acts of terror while on the other hand it secretly supports and orchestrates terror. However, Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestinian National Assembly (PNA), Chairman of the PLO, and senior leader of the Fatah political party, ultimately bears direct responsibility for the terror attacks against the American civilians involved in Sokolow.
In order for the plaintiffs in Sokolow to succeed in the subject civil action, it must be demonstrated that the PLO and the Fatah party, both under the effective control of Yasser Arafat, were responsible for the terror attacks during the Second Intifada. Because the defendants acted to avoid accountability, as is the pattern for all regimes that sponsor or support terrorism, this task is difficult. It is demonstrable, however, that, given the length of the Second Intifada and the number of terror attacks, the fingerprints are massive, and the case can stand as an ideal illustration of the use of civil suits to bring terrorists to account. The Sokolow case has the potential to do much good in the quest for justice and deterrence.
As the failures of the New World Order mount, the phrase loses its power. No peace movement has ever been premised on maintaining a strong and viable military, and no proponent of the New World Order can ever hope to be immune from the wishful thinking of those who demand the dismantling of the very forces that sustain and protect the freedom of the nation―the military establishment.
On the other hand, the concept Rule of Law does not necessarily carry with it the connotation that man is ever capable of achieving such a panacea. For the Rule of Law, it is enough if aggressive wars can be controlled through deterrence. Although the United States military most certainly deterred the aggressiveness of the Soviet Empire from 1945 to 1991, it was the beacon of American freedom that ultimately dispelled the darkness of communism. To the world, the United States offers a pattern of prosperity and freedom under the Rule of Law. This is the message the United States must continue to send to the world―not the ambiguous signals associated with a New World Order.
The current state of international armed conflict between the U.S. and the al-Qa’eda network constitutes the fundamental legal foundation for understanding the applicability of the appropriate rule of law. The level of disorder and violence characterizing the War on Terror can only be met by applying the laws established for armed conflict. The central flaw of the report is that it refuses to recognize that a state of armed conflict exists between the U.S. and radical Islamic terror groups. Because of this, the report alleges vast human rights abuses and advocates the immediate release of detainees.
The purpose of detention is not to punish, but to protect the host nation from future attacks and provide an opportunity to gather intelligence. Because detainees are not entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions, they may be interrogated so long as it is conducted free of torture or ill-treatment. Contrary to the report’s allegations, there is no evidence that the U.S. engages in an official command directed policy of torture or ill-treatment of detainees. The U.S. is not holding itself above the law by its rejection of the report. It has adhered to both the spirit and letter of the law in the handling of detainees set out in the law of war.
While American troops were involved in several cases of unlawful killings of unarmed civilians during the Indo-China War, by far the most violent, and hence the most infamous, of these incidents was the massacre at My Lai. Here, under the direct supervision of several company grade officers, American troops murdered well over 200 unarmed South Vietnamese civilians. The murdered consisted primarily of women, children, and old men.
While the massacre at My Lai cannot be undone, in developing a methodology for preventing future atrocities, the images and horror of My Lai illustrate perfectly the need for abiding by the law of war. From its engagements in Grenada in 1983, to Panama in 1989, to Kuwait in 1991, the United States military can take full credit for its commendable record in adhering to the law of war largely because of its commitment to institutionalizing the lessons learned from My Lai. Accordingly, every American soldier must understand the significance of the My Lai massacre and steadfastly keep it in the forefront of his or her awareness.
Although a United Nations-styled tribunal may be preferred to try Saddam, the deficiencies of the so-called United Nations model are seldom addressed. Even a cursory review shows why an Iraqi model is preferred. It was set up fully cognizant of the need to strike a balance between allowing the Iraqi people the right to prosecute Saddam and the concerns that the trails be fair. In short, as the process to try Saddam Hussein and his lieutenants goes through the preliminary stages, the basic framework for the Iraqi tribunal is in accordance with international norms and standards of due process. One can expect that the precise rules of evidence, soon to be released, will follow suit and fully address the due process concerns.
Recent case law associated with civil complaints brought in American courts against contracting companies operating in battlefield environments has given rise to a “political question” doctrine. This doctrine excludes from judicial review all controversies involving policy choices and other value determinations that the Constitution reserves to the Congress and the Executive for resolution.
Due to the complexities involved with the application of the political question doctrine, including determination of the nature and integration of a civilian contractor’s relationship to the military, a thorough overview of this doctrine is necessary. Because political question doctrine represents a formidable jurisdictional shield and will no doubt continue to be a source of jurisprudence and debate in the future, the value of a full understanding of its operation and application can not be overstated.
Five years after passing the use-of-force resolution in Iraq, Congress stopped passively sitting on the sidelines and became energized. The reality of this newly enacted Military Commission Act is that military commissions cannot exist in the absence of a true war. The United States is fighting a “virtual state” known as al Qaeda. However, al Qaeda acts more like a nation-state in terms of power and goals. Its members are highly dedicated to the mission of killing Americans, and will die for that cause. Recent terrorist attacks and attempts to cause terror prove that the United States’ war on terror is not a metaphor.
The United States’ policies are the correct policies. Congress has finally stepped up to the plate and acknowledged that our enemies do not wear uniforms. As a result, our President and military need firm and solid legal advice from the legal community to set the course and be the watchdogs for justice in the War on Terror.
The term targeted killing is most often associated with the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS), also known as drones. These attack platforms have been in use in the War on Terror for more than a decade. Despite harsh criticisms of nearly every aspect of the War on Terror waged by his predecessor, President Obama has killed hundreds of suspected enemy combatants through the use of drones. The primary legal theory that the United States relies on is the belief that it is at war and that unlawful enemy combatants, including American citizens, are part of a hostile force. In addition to the standard targeting considerations of proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and military necessity, it is well established that noncombatants may be killed if incidental to a lawful attack, a concept known as collateral damage.
The legal basis for targeted killing has often been clouded due to the government’s failure to set out the authority with clarity. Due to the President’s inability to clearly state a legal justification divorced from political overtures, people in the U.S. have found it easy to accuse the country of wrongdoing when targeting American citizens.
While service members charged with crimes have numerous due process rights, their rights in administrative actions are far more limited. This injustice provides a chilling effect on other service members who may now choose inaction when faced with a difficult decision on when to use force. n autonomous ROE Review Board that functions outside of the chain of command may prove useful in revealing ROE that should be repealed.
In tracing the evolution/creation debate, Professor Addicott clearly establishes all the interested segments in the controversy to include the Fundamentalist creationists and “Darwinian activists.” Interestingly, in evaluating how the Court will view intelligent design, Professor Addicott explores what he terms the “Darwinian paradigm”―arguing that Darwinian activists may have already violated the Establishment Clause by making Darwinian evolution its own religion.
All malum in se acts that abuse this diplomatic shield are objectionable. As such, it is necessary to examine the current legal status of the diplomatic bag and recent international efforts to re-examine that status. Conflicts between the sending state’s confidentiality interests and the receiving and transit states’ security interests must be closely examined, and a the United States should formalize its position on the status of the diplomatic bag.
The United States must remember that laws are made for general application and not for exceptions. Sporadic abuses of the diplomatic bag must not cause abandonment of this longstanding and necessary tool, used in performing diplomatic relations and in carrying out of legitimate national interests.
Major General Kenneth Bowra, United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC(A)), has made the promotion of human rights in the militaries of the emerging democracies a top priority for the Army Special Forces. With regard to America’s desire to inculcate human rights values in friendly foreign militaries, Special Forces soldiers have proven themselves to be premier ambassadors. By word and deed, Special Forces promote the message that commitment to preserving human rights is the hallmark of a professional military serving the interests of a democratic nation.
A window of opportunity now exists for Special Forces to make substantial contributions toward building and strengthening human rights concerns in the militaries of emerging democracies. Just ten years ago, hundreds of countries functioned under some form of nondemocratic rule. Today, the vast majority of these nations operate under properly elected civilian governments, but great nations are neither created nor sustained by accident. United States’ assistance is often required to help solidify and, in many cases, create a true commitment to promoting and preserving human rights, and the Special Forces are uniquely positioned and equipped for such a task.
The confusion associated with comprehending fundamental legal concepts associated with how America conducts the "War on Terror" centers around the unwillingness of the U.S. government to properly distinguish al-Qaeda unlawful enemy combatants from domestic jihadi terrorists. Instead, the terms "domestic terrorist," "domestic jihadist," or just "terrorist," are frequently employed to describe all categories of actors--unlawful enemy combatants as well as common criminals--leaving both domestic and international audiences puzzled as to what rule of law should to apply to a given act of terror. If the American government cannot properly differentiate between an enemy combatant and a domestic criminal, it is little wonder that attendant legal positions associated with investigation techniques, targeted killing, arrest, detention, rendition, trial, and interrogation are subject to never-ending debate.
Without a significant about face in leadership that is willing to discern the basic difference between an unlawful enemy combatant and a domestic criminal, America's reputation will remain under a cloud of suspicion and confusion regarding the legality of its actions associated with two significant areas of critique: rendition and targeted killing vis-á-vis unlawful enemy combatants in the War on Terror. The Obama Administration must drastically improve its dismal performance in articulating and communicating that distinction to the public.
The development of a new block of instruction that demonstrates to students how human rights can be institutionalized in a military clearly signals a new and dynamic approach to human rights training. Coupled with the addition of a full-time judge advocate to the SOA staff, this initiative signals a clear commitment to place human rights training in the forefront of the curriculum provided by the School of the Americas.
The attacks of 9/11 may have happened over a decade ago, but terrorism fueled by radical Islam is a growing phenomena, and Texas is not exempt. Indeed, the most infamous jihadi terrorist in the United States is Major Nidal Hasan, who murdered thirteen people in 2009 at Fort Hood, Texas. At his trial, Hasan proudly proclaimed that this large-scale terror attack was motivated by radical Islamic extremism, not work-place violence. Hasan is not the only jihadi terrorist that has ties to Texas.
To protect the public from the scourge of terrorism, the Obama administration has adopted the common-sense first line of defense that was employed by the Bush administration: “see something, say something.” In short, the public is the first line of defense. In fact, the vast majority of the radical Islamic terror plots in the United States were not foiled by any innovative security system or government agency, but by members of the public providing information of suspicious activity to law enforcement. Ultimately, the balance between security and civil liberties is something that all Americans must understand. The threat continues, but so must the debate on civil liberties.
Civil litigation against States that sponsor or support terrorism is a potential legal tool which could be used with great effect not only to deter terrorism, but to eliminate many of today’s most visible terror groups. Many democracies are economic superpowers and providing a legal avenue for victims to receive compensation via civil litigation would serve as an effective means to deny resources to terrorist organizations while punishing the State-sponsor. It would act as a powerful deterrent against nations who sponsor terrorism by making it unprofitable to engage in support of terrorist activities.
A major stumbling block to the success of this approach is the refusal of many democratic nations to honor monetary judgments awarding punitive damages. If real progress is to be made toward creating a global legal framework which effectively suppresses terrorism, the concept of punitive damages must be framed within the parameters of compensatory damages. Developing a framework under compensatory concepts would still produce meaningful and effective remedies. Of paramount importance is the ability to provide solid legal mechanisms for terror victims to file private causes of action against both those who commit acts of terror and those States who contribute to or stand behind those attacks.
FISA codifies in federal law the procedures associated with how electronic surveillance and searches of acquisition of foreign intelligence is conducted. In order to conduct electronic surveillance, a court order must be issued by a FISA judge. The judge must determine: (1) whether there is probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance or search is a foreign power, or its agent; and (2) that the primary purpose is to collect foreign intelligence.
The purpose of the Protect America Act was to provide an update to FISA in order to give the intelligence community the necessary tools to gather information about potential foreign enemies. One of the most relevant provisions is the requirement of the FISA court’s involvement in determining that reasonable procedures are used in ascertaining whether a target is outside the United States. These attempts to improve the U.S.’s national security policy have not been deprived of criticisms. The Act has been criticized for allowing massive, untargeted collection of international communications without court order or meaningful oversight. Despite this, the Protect America Act provides a framework for electronic intelligence gathering that keeps pace with heightened threats to national security due to advances in telecommunications technology.
Executive Order 12,333 is deficient and should be replaced by a new executive order which clearly defines the circumstances under which individuals may be lawfully targeted for death by military forces--either in peacetime or war. Alternatively, if the President does not replace Executive Order 12,333 with a new and more precise executive order, two interlocking principles militate against overturning Executive Order 12,333. The first of these reasons regards properly interpreting the most common definition of assassination; the second considers the proper use of armed force under the rule of law. Those who advocate that the ban on assassination should be lifted without modification are essentially advocating that the United States should be able to engage in unlawful killing or murder.
While other non-traditional military activities directed at drug reduction, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and nation building reduce human suffering and misery at the individual level, assisting in the institutionalization of basic internationally recognized human rights in foreign militaries, such as Cuba’s, has the potential to directly reduce the threat of aggressive warfare. United States military attorneys must prepare now to be ready to work together with the new Cuban armed forces.
The ongoing civil action of Sokolow v. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) perfectly illustrates this dilemma—on the one hand the offending regime disavows acts of terror while on the other hand it secretly supports and orchestrates terror. However, Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestinian National Assembly (PNA), Chairman of the PLO, and senior leader of the Fatah political party, ultimately bears direct responsibility for the terror attacks against the American civilians involved in Sokolow.
In order for the plaintiffs in Sokolow to succeed in the subject civil action, it must be demonstrated that the PLO and the Fatah party, both under the effective control of Yasser Arafat, were responsible for the terror attacks during the Second Intifada. Because the defendants acted to avoid accountability, as is the pattern for all regimes that sponsor or support terrorism, this task is difficult. It is demonstrable, however, that, given the length of the Second Intifada and the number of terror attacks, the fingerprints are massive, and the case can stand as an ideal illustration of the use of civil suits to bring terrorists to account. The Sokolow case has the potential to do much good in the quest for justice and deterrence.
As the failures of the New World Order mount, the phrase loses its power. No peace movement has ever been premised on maintaining a strong and viable military, and no proponent of the New World Order can ever hope to be immune from the wishful thinking of those who demand the dismantling of the very forces that sustain and protect the freedom of the nation―the military establishment.
On the other hand, the concept Rule of Law does not necessarily carry with it the connotation that man is ever capable of achieving such a panacea. For the Rule of Law, it is enough if aggressive wars can be controlled through deterrence. Although the United States military most certainly deterred the aggressiveness of the Soviet Empire from 1945 to 1991, it was the beacon of American freedom that ultimately dispelled the darkness of communism. To the world, the United States offers a pattern of prosperity and freedom under the Rule of Law. This is the message the United States must continue to send to the world―not the ambiguous signals associated with a New World Order.
The current state of international armed conflict between the U.S. and the al-Qa’eda network constitutes the fundamental legal foundation for understanding the applicability of the appropriate rule of law. The level of disorder and violence characterizing the War on Terror can only be met by applying the laws established for armed conflict. The central flaw of the report is that it refuses to recognize that a state of armed conflict exists between the U.S. and radical Islamic terror groups. Because of this, the report alleges vast human rights abuses and advocates the immediate release of detainees.
The purpose of detention is not to punish, but to protect the host nation from future attacks and provide an opportunity to gather intelligence. Because detainees are not entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva Conventions, they may be interrogated so long as it is conducted free of torture or ill-treatment. Contrary to the report’s allegations, there is no evidence that the U.S. engages in an official command directed policy of torture or ill-treatment of detainees. The U.S. is not holding itself above the law by its rejection of the report. It has adhered to both the spirit and letter of the law in the handling of detainees set out in the law of war.
While American troops were involved in several cases of unlawful killings of unarmed civilians during the Indo-China War, by far the most violent, and hence the most infamous, of these incidents was the massacre at My Lai. Here, under the direct supervision of several company grade officers, American troops murdered well over 200 unarmed South Vietnamese civilians. The murdered consisted primarily of women, children, and old men.
While the massacre at My Lai cannot be undone, in developing a methodology for preventing future atrocities, the images and horror of My Lai illustrate perfectly the need for abiding by the law of war. From its engagements in Grenada in 1983, to Panama in 1989, to Kuwait in 1991, the United States military can take full credit for its commendable record in adhering to the law of war largely because of its commitment to institutionalizing the lessons learned from My Lai. Accordingly, every American soldier must understand the significance of the My Lai massacre and steadfastly keep it in the forefront of his or her awareness.
Although a United Nations-styled tribunal may be preferred to try Saddam, the deficiencies of the so-called United Nations model are seldom addressed. Even a cursory review shows why an Iraqi model is preferred. It was set up fully cognizant of the need to strike a balance between allowing the Iraqi people the right to prosecute Saddam and the concerns that the trails be fair. In short, as the process to try Saddam Hussein and his lieutenants goes through the preliminary stages, the basic framework for the Iraqi tribunal is in accordance with international norms and standards of due process. One can expect that the precise rules of evidence, soon to be released, will follow suit and fully address the due process concerns.
Recent case law associated with civil complaints brought in American courts against contracting companies operating in battlefield environments has given rise to a “political question” doctrine. This doctrine excludes from judicial review all controversies involving policy choices and other value determinations that the Constitution reserves to the Congress and the Executive for resolution.
Due to the complexities involved with the application of the political question doctrine, including determination of the nature and integration of a civilian contractor’s relationship to the military, a thorough overview of this doctrine is necessary. Because political question doctrine represents a formidable jurisdictional shield and will no doubt continue to be a source of jurisprudence and debate in the future, the value of a full understanding of its operation and application can not be overstated.
Five years after passing the use-of-force resolution in Iraq, Congress stopped passively sitting on the sidelines and became energized. The reality of this newly enacted Military Commission Act is that military commissions cannot exist in the absence of a true war. The United States is fighting a “virtual state” known as al Qaeda. However, al Qaeda acts more like a nation-state in terms of power and goals. Its members are highly dedicated to the mission of killing Americans, and will die for that cause. Recent terrorist attacks and attempts to cause terror prove that the United States’ war on terror is not a metaphor.
The United States’ policies are the correct policies. Congress has finally stepped up to the plate and acknowledged that our enemies do not wear uniforms. As a result, our President and military need firm and solid legal advice from the legal community to set the course and be the watchdogs for justice in the War on Terror.
The term targeted killing is most often associated with the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVS), also known as drones. These attack platforms have been in use in the War on Terror for more than a decade. Despite harsh criticisms of nearly every aspect of the War on Terror waged by his predecessor, President Obama has killed hundreds of suspected enemy combatants through the use of drones. The primary legal theory that the United States relies on is the belief that it is at war and that unlawful enemy combatants, including American citizens, are part of a hostile force. In addition to the standard targeting considerations of proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and military necessity, it is well established that noncombatants may be killed if incidental to a lawful attack, a concept known as collateral damage.
The legal basis for targeted killing has often been clouded due to the government’s failure to set out the authority with clarity. Due to the President’s inability to clearly state a legal justification divorced from political overtures, people in the U.S. have found it easy to accuse the country of wrongdoing when targeting American citizens.
While service members charged with crimes have numerous due process rights, their rights in administrative actions are far more limited. This injustice provides a chilling effect on other service members who may now choose inaction when faced with a difficult decision on when to use force. n autonomous ROE Review Board that functions outside of the chain of command may prove useful in revealing ROE that should be repealed.
In tracing the evolution/creation debate, Professor Addicott clearly establishes all the interested segments in the controversy to include the Fundamentalist creationists and “Darwinian activists.” Interestingly, in evaluating how the Court will view intelligent design, Professor Addicott explores what he terms the “Darwinian paradigm”―arguing that Darwinian activists may have already violated the Establishment Clause by making Darwinian evolution its own religion.
All malum in se acts that abuse this diplomatic shield are objectionable. As such, it is necessary to examine the current legal status of the diplomatic bag and recent international efforts to re-examine that status. Conflicts between the sending state’s confidentiality interests and the receiving and transit states’ security interests must be closely examined, and a the United States should formalize its position on the status of the diplomatic bag.
The United States must remember that laws are made for general application and not for exceptions. Sporadic abuses of the diplomatic bag must not cause abandonment of this longstanding and necessary tool, used in performing diplomatic relations and in carrying out of legitimate national interests.
Major General Kenneth Bowra, United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC(A)), has made the promotion of human rights in the militaries of the emerging democracies a top priority for the Army Special Forces. With regard to America’s desire to inculcate human rights values in friendly foreign militaries, Special Forces soldiers have proven themselves to be premier ambassadors. By word and deed, Special Forces promote the message that commitment to preserving human rights is the hallmark of a professional military serving the interests of a democratic nation.
A window of opportunity now exists for Special Forces to make substantial contributions toward building and strengthening human rights concerns in the militaries of emerging democracies. Just ten years ago, hundreds of countries functioned under some form of nondemocratic rule. Today, the vast majority of these nations operate under properly elected civilian governments, but great nations are neither created nor sustained by accident. United States’ assistance is often required to help solidify and, in many cases, create a true commitment to promoting and preserving human rights, and the Special Forces are uniquely positioned and equipped for such a task.
The confusion associated with comprehending fundamental legal concepts associated with how America conducts the "War on Terror" centers around the unwillingness of the U.S. government to properly distinguish al-Qaeda unlawful enemy combatants from domestic jihadi terrorists. Instead, the terms "domestic terrorist," "domestic jihadist," or just "terrorist," are frequently employed to describe all categories of actors--unlawful enemy combatants as well as common criminals--leaving both domestic and international audiences puzzled as to what rule of law should to apply to a given act of terror. If the American government cannot properly differentiate between an enemy combatant and a domestic criminal, it is little wonder that attendant legal positions associated with investigation techniques, targeted killing, arrest, detention, rendition, trial, and interrogation are subject to never-ending debate.
Without a significant about face in leadership that is willing to discern the basic difference between an unlawful enemy combatant and a domestic criminal, America's reputation will remain under a cloud of suspicion and confusion regarding the legality of its actions associated with two significant areas of critique: rendition and targeted killing vis-á-vis unlawful enemy combatants in the War on Terror. The Obama Administration must drastically improve its dismal performance in articulating and communicating that distinction to the public.
The development of a new block of instruction that demonstrates to students how human rights can be institutionalized in a military clearly signals a new and dynamic approach to human rights training. Coupled with the addition of a full-time judge advocate to the SOA staff, this initiative signals a clear commitment to place human rights training in the forefront of the curriculum provided by the School of the Americas.
The attacks of 9/11 may have happened over a decade ago, but terrorism fueled by radical Islam is a growing phenomena, and Texas is not exempt. Indeed, the most infamous jihadi terrorist in the United States is Major Nidal Hasan, who murdered thirteen people in 2009 at Fort Hood, Texas. At his trial, Hasan proudly proclaimed that this large-scale terror attack was motivated by radical Islamic extremism, not work-place violence. Hasan is not the only jihadi terrorist that has ties to Texas.
To protect the public from the scourge of terrorism, the Obama administration has adopted the common-sense first line of defense that was employed by the Bush administration: “see something, say something.” In short, the public is the first line of defense. In fact, the vast majority of the radical Islamic terror plots in the United States were not foiled by any innovative security system or government agency, but by members of the public providing information of suspicious activity to law enforcement. Ultimately, the balance between security and civil liberties is something that all Americans must understand. The threat continues, but so must the debate on civil liberties.
Civil litigation against States that sponsor or support terrorism is a potential legal tool which could be used with great effect not only to deter terrorism, but to eliminate many of today’s most visible terror groups. Many democracies are economic superpowers and providing a legal avenue for victims to receive compensation via civil litigation would serve as an effective means to deny resources to terrorist organizations while punishing the State-sponsor. It would act as a powerful deterrent against nations who sponsor terrorism by making it unprofitable to engage in support of terrorist activities.
A major stumbling block to the success of this approach is the refusal of many democratic nations to honor monetary judgments awarding punitive damages. If real progress is to be made toward creating a global legal framework which effectively suppresses terrorism, the concept of punitive damages must be framed within the parameters of compensatory damages. Developing a framework under compensatory concepts would still produce meaningful and effective remedies. Of paramount importance is the ability to provide solid legal mechanisms for terror victims to file private causes of action against both those who commit acts of terror and those States who contribute to or stand behind those attacks.
FISA codifies in federal law the procedures associated with how electronic surveillance and searches of acquisition of foreign intelligence is conducted. In order to conduct electronic surveillance, a court order must be issued by a FISA judge. The judge must determine: (1) whether there is probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance or search is a foreign power, or its agent; and (2) that the primary purpose is to collect foreign intelligence.
The purpose of the Protect America Act was to provide an update to FISA in order to give the intelligence community the necessary tools to gather information about potential foreign enemies. One of the most relevant provisions is the requirement of the FISA court’s involvement in determining that reasonable procedures are used in ascertaining whether a target is outside the United States. These attempts to improve the U.S.’s national security policy have not been deprived of criticisms. The Act has been criticized for allowing massive, untargeted collection of international communications without court order or meaningful oversight. Despite this, the Protect America Act provides a framework for electronic intelligence gathering that keeps pace with heightened threats to national security due to advances in telecommunications technology.
Executive Order 12,333 is deficient and should be replaced by a new executive order which clearly defines the circumstances under which individuals may be lawfully targeted for death by military forces--either in peacetime or war. Alternatively, if the President does not replace Executive Order 12,333 with a new and more precise executive order, two interlocking principles militate against overturning Executive Order 12,333. The first of these reasons regards properly interpreting the most common definition of assassination; the second considers the proper use of armed force under the rule of law. Those who advocate that the ban on assassination should be lifted without modification are essentially advocating that the United States should be able to engage in unlawful killing or murder.
While other non-traditional military activities directed at drug reduction, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and nation building reduce human suffering and misery at the individual level, assisting in the institutionalization of basic internationally recognized human rights in foreign militaries, such as Cuba’s, has the potential to directly reduce the threat of aggressive warfare. United States military attorneys must prepare now to be ready to work together with the new Cuban armed forces.
The book begins with a brief examination of the history of law and bioterrorism, from ancient biological warfare to modern times. Drawing upon the lessons of this history, Sutton discusses historical events such as the use of anthrax in World War I, and further examines the rapidly growing concern over the use of biological weapons which led to the 1925 Geneva Convention.
Further, Sutton’s work is a great resource for counter-terrorism efforts, as most of her work centers on the necessity of dealing with legal issues that arise as a result of a bioterrorist attack. Law and Bioterrorism is without question a must-have textbook for anyone teaching or studying in this critical area of the law.
Whether in terms of the history of bioterrorism or laws and policy matters associated with bioterrorism, Sutton performs admirably. She has successfully created a valuable tool to aid the international dialogue in assessing the threat of a bioterrorist attack, and, as such, Law and Bioterrorism should be compulsory reading for any academic course in this area.
The symposium covered number of topics including operational law (OPLAW), legal considerations regarding psychological operations (PSYOP), Operation Just Cause, military changes taking place in Europe, the DOD Counternarcotics Mission, and the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. The first director of the Center, Colonel David E. Graham, closed the Symposium by noting that the Symposium had served as an excellent forum for extensively discussing the ways in which the various services deal with OPLAW matters.
Radical Islam Why? presents a concise but comprehensive exposition of the history of Islam, the distinction between Islam and radical Islam, clarification of the language used to discuss terrorism, and how violence and terrorism are manifested through and justified by the tenets of radical Islam. This work explains how and why the strict constructionist reading of the Koran by radical Islamists leads to jihadism, or violent aggressive struggle against all People of the Book (Jews and Christians), apostates (Muslims who have left Islam), and idolaters (polytheists).
Additionally, despite the popularity of the idea that radical Islam is somehow a perversion of an otherwise peaceful Islam, the author makes clear that this idea is quite false. Radical Islam is not an unfounded, baseless ideology, but rather a religious school of thought entirely consistent with the Koran and Sharia Law.
According to the author, this makes radical Islam vastly different from all previous hate movements with which civilized nations have coped. The Western values of democracy, freedom, and human rights stand as an intolerable affront to the precepts of radical Islam and Sharia Law. For that reason, radical Islam is dedicated to the destruction of the West and all those who adopt western ideas. The religious-based fanaticism runs so deeply that scores of adherents are eagerly willing to kill themselves in furtherance of their cause. For this reason, Islamist suicide bombers need no “exit” strategy for their acts of terrorism, making it almost impossible for law enforcement to stop them when they act alone or in small groups.
Further complicating the difficulties of dealing with radical Islamic jihadism are the myriad state-sponsored, state-supported, and sub-state terrorist organizations. These organizations recruit radicalized Muslims to commit calculated terror attacks for the purpose of eliminating anyone or anything that stands counter to Islam or Sharia law and the expansion of the caliphate— the transnational purely Islamic State. Radical Islam Why? explicates the differences between various discrete radical Islamic groups, paying special attention to al-Qa’eda and ISIS, and the special challenges the West faces in confronting them.
Because each organization operates at a different level of transparency, and with varying degrees of state sponsorship or support, it will be necessary for the West to devise strategies specifically designed to deal with each particular terrorist organization if the campaign against radical Islam is to be successful. For this, the author offers both short and long-term solutions for dealing with radical Islamism. First, the West must begin with a full understanding of the nature of its adversaries, an understanding for which Radical Islam Why? sets a solid foundation. Further, the American military force, the promotion of democratic principles and Christianity will all have integral roles in the effort to secure the West and western values against the destructive forces of radical Islam.
Radical Islam is, and will continue to be, the number one terror threat to the United States for many years hence, and must be fought with all available resources. To do this, it is imperative that the underlying theology be laid out on the table and fully understood. The thorough and unapologetic analysis of the religion of radical Islam and the author’s incisive appraisal of the threat radical Islam poses to the West and Western ideas merits serious and open consideration. It is time for transparency of thinking and firmness of action. America must know the truth about its enemy.