Papers by Gareth B R E N D A N Boswell
President Barack Obama, in his address to the American public on 4 December 2013 described econom... more President Barack Obama, in his address to the American public on 4 December 2013 described economic inequality as the “defining challenge of our time”.
At the time of writing (June 2016), the general public is increasingly being reminded (through the media) of the symptoms of growing inequality. These include rising relative poverty and excessive bonus payments to top executives that, since in many cases the payments are not commensurate with company performance, are not justifiable.
Changes to legislation in the United Kingdom have empowered investors to take action on executive pay, which in April 2016 led to executive pay being challenged by the investors of Weir group (72% of shareholders rejected a proposed pay scheme) and BP (59% of shareholders voted against a pay rise for the CEO).
This paper describes a system which would fall into the class of “predistribution” (coined by Jacob Hacker), as it relates to economic inequality, and should assist governments worldwide to produce a more equal distribution of employment income and fulfil the public’s expectations in terms of reducing inequality. It would further empower investors by allowing them to manage their risk by voting in favour of a standardized and more equal pay regime at an early stage, rather than them having to monitor and periodically approve the pay of top executives.
The system is based on a remuneration ratio that reflects the shape of an income curve that can be used to evaluate whether income distribution of individual businesses meets a government-defined benchmark. This paper demonstrates how the system would operate, which starts with modelling of employment income distribution for small, medium and large businesses in the United Kingdom. A case study of the system’s implementation is included, covering small, medium and large business in the UK.
The potential impact of all UK businesses conforming to a ratio value as appropriate for the size of the business is reviewed in terms of changes to income inequality and UK government net tax receipts.
The probability of a business conforming to a specified ratio value assumes that the owners and shareholders of businesses would voluntarily opt in if tax incentives offered for conforming are attractive. A tax incentive plan to propel voluntary conformity in the UK is proposed and the effect on business productivity and investment financial ratios is confirmed, in theory, to be positive.
Conference Presentations by Gareth B R E N D A N Boswell
N/A
See paper titled: The WME System: A predistribution solution to growing economic inequality
N/A
See paper titled: The WME System: A predistribution solution to growing economic inequality
Drafts by Gareth B R E N D A N Boswell
The positive correlation of educational attainment and IQ has led to Lynn and Meisenberg (2010) t... more The positive correlation of educational attainment and IQ has led to Lynn and Meisenberg (2010) to suggest that both are interchangeable measures of human capital. Human capital is richly rewarded in capitalist labour markets where the causal chain of economic growth (GDP) is believed to be: education increases intelligence, which increases work quality, which increases organisational efficiency and thereupon, wealth (Rindermann, 2008). This paper investigates the relative effect of Intelligence Quotient (IQ) on income inequality at household level before taxes and transfers, after taxes and transfers, and on the household disposable income percentile ratio 90/10. Other relevant factors are considered along with IQ, through the regression of median IQ at the first, fifth and tenth deciles and multiple variables on household income inequality. Bias is removed from parameter coefficients by means of a Principal Component Analysis, and the regression is repeated on the original household income inequality dependent variables using each independent variable's factor score. Rising IQ in the first and fifth deciles is found to decrease inequality and in the tenth decile rising IQ lowers inequality. IQ is found to be less important than labour share of GDP, welfare generosity and gross national income per capita for relative effect on household income inequality.
Uploads
Papers by Gareth B R E N D A N Boswell
At the time of writing (June 2016), the general public is increasingly being reminded (through the media) of the symptoms of growing inequality. These include rising relative poverty and excessive bonus payments to top executives that, since in many cases the payments are not commensurate with company performance, are not justifiable.
Changes to legislation in the United Kingdom have empowered investors to take action on executive pay, which in April 2016 led to executive pay being challenged by the investors of Weir group (72% of shareholders rejected a proposed pay scheme) and BP (59% of shareholders voted against a pay rise for the CEO).
This paper describes a system which would fall into the class of “predistribution” (coined by Jacob Hacker), as it relates to economic inequality, and should assist governments worldwide to produce a more equal distribution of employment income and fulfil the public’s expectations in terms of reducing inequality. It would further empower investors by allowing them to manage their risk by voting in favour of a standardized and more equal pay regime at an early stage, rather than them having to monitor and periodically approve the pay of top executives.
The system is based on a remuneration ratio that reflects the shape of an income curve that can be used to evaluate whether income distribution of individual businesses meets a government-defined benchmark. This paper demonstrates how the system would operate, which starts with modelling of employment income distribution for small, medium and large businesses in the United Kingdom. A case study of the system’s implementation is included, covering small, medium and large business in the UK.
The potential impact of all UK businesses conforming to a ratio value as appropriate for the size of the business is reviewed in terms of changes to income inequality and UK government net tax receipts.
The probability of a business conforming to a specified ratio value assumes that the owners and shareholders of businesses would voluntarily opt in if tax incentives offered for conforming are attractive. A tax incentive plan to propel voluntary conformity in the UK is proposed and the effect on business productivity and investment financial ratios is confirmed, in theory, to be positive.
Conference Presentations by Gareth B R E N D A N Boswell
Drafts by Gareth B R E N D A N Boswell
At the time of writing (June 2016), the general public is increasingly being reminded (through the media) of the symptoms of growing inequality. These include rising relative poverty and excessive bonus payments to top executives that, since in many cases the payments are not commensurate with company performance, are not justifiable.
Changes to legislation in the United Kingdom have empowered investors to take action on executive pay, which in April 2016 led to executive pay being challenged by the investors of Weir group (72% of shareholders rejected a proposed pay scheme) and BP (59% of shareholders voted against a pay rise for the CEO).
This paper describes a system which would fall into the class of “predistribution” (coined by Jacob Hacker), as it relates to economic inequality, and should assist governments worldwide to produce a more equal distribution of employment income and fulfil the public’s expectations in terms of reducing inequality. It would further empower investors by allowing them to manage their risk by voting in favour of a standardized and more equal pay regime at an early stage, rather than them having to monitor and periodically approve the pay of top executives.
The system is based on a remuneration ratio that reflects the shape of an income curve that can be used to evaluate whether income distribution of individual businesses meets a government-defined benchmark. This paper demonstrates how the system would operate, which starts with modelling of employment income distribution for small, medium and large businesses in the United Kingdom. A case study of the system’s implementation is included, covering small, medium and large business in the UK.
The potential impact of all UK businesses conforming to a ratio value as appropriate for the size of the business is reviewed in terms of changes to income inequality and UK government net tax receipts.
The probability of a business conforming to a specified ratio value assumes that the owners and shareholders of businesses would voluntarily opt in if tax incentives offered for conforming are attractive. A tax incentive plan to propel voluntary conformity in the UK is proposed and the effect on business productivity and investment financial ratios is confirmed, in theory, to be positive.