Papers by Charlotte Baumann
Oxford Handbook of Adorno
While a Marxist himself, Adorno argues that the analysis of the capitalist system cannot carry it... more While a Marxist himself, Adorno argues that the analysis of the capitalist system cannot carry its analytic and critical clout unless it is accompanied by a keen interest in system-induced suffering. His insight into the conceptual system of capitalism thus takes Adorno in the opposite direction to his students, Backhaus and Reichelt, who founded the New Reading of Marx. His students analyzed capitalist concepts and their systematic connections in a logical and deductive manner. Adorno, by contrast, reflects on the oppressive nature of systems and the difference that still exists between concepts and the human beings they refer to. In doing so, Adorno develops an unusual critique of capitalism and, indeed of more traditional Marxism, that both draws on Marx and bears similarities to anti-oppressive reasoning.
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Philosophische Rundschau, 2022
This article discusses anglophone readings of G. W. F. Hegel against the backdrop of German-langu... more This article discusses anglophone readings of G. W. F. Hegel against the backdrop of German-language scholarship. The article starts by differentiating types of metaphysics (I). Following a taxonomy introduced by Paul Redding, I then discuss Charles Taylor’s Christian-mystical (II), the so-called »non-metaphysical« (III) and the »revised metaphysical« reading (IV). Terry Pinkard’s work serves as an example of (III) and Stephen Houlgate’s as an example of (IV). I highlight problematic aspects of each reading that concern: the meaning of »reason in the world« (II), the anti-relativist clout of Hegel’s philosophy (III) and the difference between the development of logical concepts and the empirical origin of the world and human thinking (IV). The text ends (V) by pointing to the social implications of each type of reading.
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Hegel and the Frankfurt School, 2020
While Hegel's metaphysics was long reviled, it has garnered more interest in recent years, with e... more While Hegel's metaphysics was long reviled, it has garnered more interest in recent years, with even the so-called non-metaphysical Hegelians starting to explicitly discuss Hegel’s metaphysical commitments. This latest development revives the old question: what are the social-philosophical implications of Hegel’s metaphysics? While others have posed this question, my approach in this chapter is unique insofar as I contrast the former non-metaphysical reading (as developed by Robert Pippin) with a traditional way of interpreting Hegel’s metaphysics and social philosophy, whose lineage includes not Wittgenstein, Sellars, or Brandom, but rather Schelling, Marx, and Adorno. After discussing the two varieties of metaphysics (Sections 1–3), I will argue that my alternative metaphysical Hegel is more realist when it comes to assessing the power of social structures (Section 4), focused on structural freedom rather than agency (Sections 5 and 6), and more empowering for and lenient towards individuals who can make their interests count and are free to be irrational and egoist (Section 7).
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Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2019
The neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen is famously anti-empiricist in that he denies that sensations can m... more The neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen is famously anti-empiricist in that he denies that sensations can make a definable contribution to knowledge. However, in the second edition of Kant's Theory of Experience (1885), Cohen considers a proposition that contrasts with both his other work and that of his followers: a Kantian who studies scientific claims to truth-and the grounds on which they are made-cannot limit himself to studying mathematics and logical principles, but needs also to investigate underlying presuppositions about the empirical element of science. Due to his subjectivist approach, Cohen argues, Kant not only failed to explain how scientific observation and experiments are possible, but also misconceived the role of the ideas, particularly the idea of a system of nature.
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Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2020
With Hegel’s metaphysics attracting renewed attention, it is time to address a long-standing crit... more With Hegel’s metaphysics attracting renewed attention, it is time to address a long-standing criticism: Scholars from Marx to Popper and Habermas have worried that Hegel’s metaphysics has anti-individualist and authoritarian implications, which are particularly pronounced in his Philosophy of History, since Hegel identifies historical progress with reason imposing itself on individuals. Rather than proposing an alternative non-metaphysical conception of reason, as Pippin or Brandom have done, this article argues that critics are broadly right in their metaphysical reading of Hegel’s central concepts. However, they are mistaken about what Hegel’s approach entails, when one examines the specific types of states discussed (and rejected) by the philosopher in his Philosophy of History. Even on a traditional metaphysical reading, Hegel is not only non-authoritarian; he also makes a powerful argument concerning freedom, whereupon the freest society involves collective oversight and the shaping of social structures so as to ensure that they benefit everybody.
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British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2018
Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded f... more Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of 'mutual recognition' as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel's system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel's rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel's references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being.
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Philosophy & Social Criticism 37.1, 2011
The core argument of this article is that Adorno adopts the distinction between an abstract and a... more The core argument of this article is that Adorno adopts the distinction between an abstract and a concrete universal from Hegel and criticizes Hegel, on that basis, as abstract. The first two parts of the article outline that both thinkers take the abstract universal to be the form of a false type of knowledge and society, and the concrete universal to be a positive aim. However, as the third part argues, Adorno rejects how the concrete universal is understood in Hegel’s philosophy and formulates a different conception of it. The fourth part questions if Adorno manages to
overcome the problems he identifies in Hegel or whether they are inherent to the program of dialectics both endorse.
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European Journal of Philosophy, 2017
This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, whi... more This article discusses an interpretation of Kant's conception of transcendental subjectivity, which manages to avoid many of the concerns that have been raised by analytic interpreters over this doctrine. It is an interpretation put forward by selected C19 and early C20 neo-Kantian writers. The article starts out by offering a neo-Kantian interpretation of the object as something that is constituted by the categories and that serves as a standard of truth within a theory of judgment (I). The second part explicates transcendental subjectivity as the system of categories, which is self-referential and constitutes objects (II), in order to then evaluate this conception by means of a comparison with Hegel's absolute subject (III). Rather than delineating the differences between neo-Kantian writers, the article systematically expounds a shared project, which consists in providing the ultimate foundation for judgments by means of an anti-psychologist and non-metaphysical interpretation of transcendental subjectivity.
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Hegel Bulletin, 2018
Picking up on Marx's and Hegel's analyses of human beings as social and individual, the article s... more Picking up on Marx's and Hegel's analyses of human beings as social and individual, the article shows that what is at stake is not merely the possibility of individuality, but also the correct conception of the universal good. Both Marx and Hegel suppose that individuals must be social or political as individuals, which means, at least in Hegel's case, that particular interests must form part of the universal good. The good and the rational is not something that requires sacrificing one's interests for the community or denying one's particular character so as to become an equal rational agent. Very much to the contrary, the rational or the common good is nothing but the harmonious structuring of particular interests. While Section I introduces Marx's and Hegel's conceptions of individual and social beings, Sections II and III discuss their respective views of individuality, and Sections IV and V discuss the notion of a universal good containing individual interests.
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Zeitschrift für Politik. Sonderband 1, 2006
In this article, published under my former last name 'Charlotte Daub', I discuss the work of the ... more In this article, published under my former last name 'Charlotte Daub', I discuss the work of the UN High-Level Task Force on the Right to Development.
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Book Reviews by Charlotte Baumann
Hegel Studien, 2021
This is a book review of Nahum Brown's Hegel on Possibility: Dialectics, Contradiction and Modality.
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British Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2019
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I take the opportunity of discussing Shuster's Autonomy After Auschwitz to indicate how reason is... more I take the opportunity of discussing Shuster's Autonomy After Auschwitz to indicate how reason is understood in German Idealism, on a continental reading, and to show how some of Adorno's claims are almost unrecognizably different when understood in analytic terms of reasons plural. I begin my discussion with the Kantian notion of (transcendental) subjectivity, which Adorno uses to explain not only the rule of market laws in capitalism, but also the repression of (one's own) nature. I then discuss the value Adorno attributes to irrationality and, finally, reason in Hegel's metaphysics, as well as Adorno's concerns over and appreciation of this concept.
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Papers by Charlotte Baumann
overcome the problems he identifies in Hegel or whether they are inherent to the program of dialectics both endorse.
Book Reviews by Charlotte Baumann
overcome the problems he identifies in Hegel or whether they are inherent to the program of dialectics both endorse.