In this essay, I evaluate Marcuse's analysis of Hegel's Philosophy of Right in light of his revol... more In this essay, I evaluate Marcuse's analysis of Hegel's Philosophy of Right in light of his revolutionary goals for Critical Theory.
Does the event causal view of agency provide a satisfactory view of human agency? I will outline ... more Does the event causal view of agency provide a satisfactory view of human agency? I will outline what I will call the 'standard story' of action. It is often said to begin with Donald Davidson.4 His account of action is also a theory of agency. Here we define actions as bodily movements, under a description which is intentional.5 The agent is revealed as one who's states relate intelligibly to events, such that they are said to rationally explain, and be the cause of, an action.6 Davidson's claim can be summed up as such, Actions are events-bodily movements-which are brought about, that is caused and rationalised, by the combination of a belief and a desire.7 Davidson aims to capture two key aspects of action. On the one hand, he wants to appeal to the sense that we act for reasons, and that there is a rational explanation to be had of our actions. Let us suppose you asked Brutus why he killed Ceasar, and he replied that he believed the old man was no longer fit to rule, and that among other things he desired to rid Rome of him. That you are given this answer is meant, on Brutus part, to explain to you his action. We also get something else, however: the cause. So, the other quite sensible feature Davidson aims to capture, is that we come to know of actions as being caused by the right sorts of things-which for him are mental states. What we thus end up with is a very intuitive claim that the rational explanation of action is also a causal one, and this has earned Davidson's account the slogan 'reasons are causes'. To take the first aspect then, we can say that when a person acts for a reason, their reason is both their belief that acting in such and such a manner will bring about a desired end, and the desire itself.8 A reason just is a belief and a desire, therefore. Davidson wants to appeal to the sense that intentional actions are those done for reasons, which are composed of mental states such as desiring and believing. When we say desire, included are all pro-attitudes, from desires to normative sources like moral and aesthetic principles, which are directed towards certain actions.9 To return again to the second aspect of action, that reason explanation is also causal explanation, we also need to explain which reason is the cause of action. The cause cannot only be reasons that the
In this essay I describe how it is possible for mythological consciousness to believe itself to h... more In this essay I describe how it is possible for mythological consciousness to believe itself to have absolute power over reality, and yet at, at the same time, feel its destiny to be wholly fated. I take Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms as my primary text.
In this paper I criticise a modern account of why meaning in life will be possible in a virtual r... more In this paper I criticise a modern account of why meaning in life will be possible in a virtual reality. I present various rebuttals against a paper by John Danaher.
In this essay, I give an account of why Hegel is still relevant today. I specifically look at the... more In this essay, I give an account of why Hegel is still relevant today. I specifically look at the ideas of negative and positive freedom, and how they related to our modern notion of freedom. I then discuss problems with modernity and how Hegel may be a crucial ally to have in responding to these modern dilemmas.
In this essay, I attempt to understand Meditation Practice, specifically mindfulness, through the... more In this essay, I attempt to understand Meditation Practice, specifically mindfulness, through the lens of a Predictive Processing framework in cognitive science. I make some suggestions as to how the current literature could be improved.
I address the puzzle of temporary intrinsics in metaphysics, namely, how an object may be said t... more I address the puzzle of temporary intrinsics in metaphysics, namely, how an object may be said to undergo change over time and yet remain identical. I put forward an account of temporal parts as a solution.
'Given determinism, free will is an illusion; for free will requires the possibility to do otherw... more 'Given determinism, free will is an illusion; for free will requires the possibility to do otherwise than what we in fact do.' Is this argument sound? I Introduction If determinism is true, then free will, I will argue, is an illusion. This is because the notion of free will does depend on our ability to have done otherwise, and that what we mean when we say we could have done otherwise further depends on the view we have our 'selves'. Though as will emerge, there seems to be conflicting attitudes to this very question. This means that the salience of my argument really depends on our attitude toward free will. But I will explore whether we have good reason to think these attitudes are warranted, and what, in the end, should matter to us in this respect. I will provide a general account of determinism and then move towards an understanding of the problem as it relates to free will. I will then look at reasons to reject the soundness of the argument and argue for the inadequacy of these accounts. II The Problem and Its Consequence As I see it, the question is this: whether we think free will is an illusion, is really a question about our attitudes towards what matters. The argument is foremost determined by this concern then-since determinism poses a problem for free will only if we think free will is something that is at odds with determinism. This seems like an inescapable starting point. The question is also difficult to strip away from ethics, and that is simply the recognition that free will is a question, primarily, from within our perspective-it relates deeply to human affairs. But I will consider the question as separate from that of moral responsibility. Free will bears strongly on our conception of what it is to be a 'self',1 which must, I argue, be part of our understanding of free will. It is easy to lose track of this in talking of metaphysics.
This paper largely centres around what might be contributing to the idea that there is a metaphys... more This paper largely centres around what might be contributing to the idea that there is a metaphysical dichotomy to facts and values. It explores this question in relation to ethical naturalism and how we need to re-address what we mean by natural in order to see that the dichotomy is a false one (metaphysically speaking). After rejecting the metaphysical picture of reality that validates the supposed dichotomy, I suggest a way that ethics can be just as objective as science - given a new construal of the distinction between subjective and objective.
The Duhem-Quine thesis, or more broadly the problem of underdetermination, actually spells out a ... more The Duhem-Quine thesis, or more broadly the problem of underdetermination, actually spells out a much simpler problem for all of us than it might suggest. The problem of evidence looks as though it faces anybody who uses it to justify beliefs, hypothesis, theories or any inference from observation. How we can derive a unique explanation from observables, when no unique answer is guaranteed, seems ubiquitous in human endeavours. The problem has thus been termed underdetermination, since no unique solution is given. We might think then, that the problem is one of skepticism; we aren't aware of what we aren't aware of, and what we aren't aware of could always conspire to undermine our conclusions-derived from what we are aware of. For Pierre Duhem the problem arises, for the most part, in scientific investigation, whereas for Quine the problem runs much deeper, and in fact permeates epistemology more generally. However, there seems to be a stark difference between what we can believe and what is rational to believe-which will raise questions of scientific methodology and its validity. In this essay, I will argue that we are indeed right to care about this pervasive dilemma, because what we believe has consequences. My answer to the question of its truth though, is less hospitable, but only towards specific conclusions. I will therefore give Quine's thesis the majority of attention since I see it implicating much of what Duhem states and also proving the biggest threat.
Is the concept of 'Evil' helpful to a modern understanding of the world? In this paper I argue th... more Is the concept of 'Evil' helpful to a modern understanding of the world? In this paper I argue that it is not, and go on to use the idea of moral luck to challenge our intuitions about good and evil.
48 hour timed paper on Kant. Included are the antinomies of pure reason and Kant's analysis of co... more 48 hour timed paper on Kant. Included are the antinomies of pure reason and Kant's analysis of cognition.
A brief analysis of the problems encountered during criminal justice and it's role in classifying... more A brief analysis of the problems encountered during criminal justice and it's role in classifying criminals. This essay challenges long held assumptions that have permeated society and led to the over correction of oppresive sterotypes, both publicly and within the justice system. Moreover, it argues for a new approach to criminal justice by suggesting the bio-social model as a causal explanation to criminal behaviour.
Why is astrology not a science? In this short essay I attempt to answer the problem of a demarcat... more Why is astrology not a science? In this short essay I attempt to answer the problem of a demarcation criterion that will answer this question.
I look at arguments for a religious worldview based on shares features of religious experience an... more I look at arguments for a religious worldview based on shares features of religious experience and argue the incoherency of this view. I use William James and John Hick as proponents of religious pluralism. Finally I argue that shared experience may point to features of cognition and not a deeper religious reality.
In short, an analysis of the relationship between Machiavelli's view of human nature, and how thi... more In short, an analysis of the relationship between Machiavelli's view of human nature, and how this impression informs his political theory.
A short piece on the validity of Husserl's description of what happens when we privilege the obje... more A short piece on the validity of Husserl's description of what happens when we privilege the objective lens of the sciences at the expense of our own personal, subjective experience.
A look at current policy regarding faith schools in the UK, and religious segregation as a moral ... more A look at current policy regarding faith schools in the UK, and religious segregation as a moral problem. Furthermore, it looks at the ethics of religious faith in relation to education, and argues for a seperation of religion from state funded education.
In this essay, I evaluate Marcuse's analysis of Hegel's Philosophy of Right in light of his revol... more In this essay, I evaluate Marcuse's analysis of Hegel's Philosophy of Right in light of his revolutionary goals for Critical Theory.
Does the event causal view of agency provide a satisfactory view of human agency? I will outline ... more Does the event causal view of agency provide a satisfactory view of human agency? I will outline what I will call the 'standard story' of action. It is often said to begin with Donald Davidson.4 His account of action is also a theory of agency. Here we define actions as bodily movements, under a description which is intentional.5 The agent is revealed as one who's states relate intelligibly to events, such that they are said to rationally explain, and be the cause of, an action.6 Davidson's claim can be summed up as such, Actions are events-bodily movements-which are brought about, that is caused and rationalised, by the combination of a belief and a desire.7 Davidson aims to capture two key aspects of action. On the one hand, he wants to appeal to the sense that we act for reasons, and that there is a rational explanation to be had of our actions. Let us suppose you asked Brutus why he killed Ceasar, and he replied that he believed the old man was no longer fit to rule, and that among other things he desired to rid Rome of him. That you are given this answer is meant, on Brutus part, to explain to you his action. We also get something else, however: the cause. So, the other quite sensible feature Davidson aims to capture, is that we come to know of actions as being caused by the right sorts of things-which for him are mental states. What we thus end up with is a very intuitive claim that the rational explanation of action is also a causal one, and this has earned Davidson's account the slogan 'reasons are causes'. To take the first aspect then, we can say that when a person acts for a reason, their reason is both their belief that acting in such and such a manner will bring about a desired end, and the desire itself.8 A reason just is a belief and a desire, therefore. Davidson wants to appeal to the sense that intentional actions are those done for reasons, which are composed of mental states such as desiring and believing. When we say desire, included are all pro-attitudes, from desires to normative sources like moral and aesthetic principles, which are directed towards certain actions.9 To return again to the second aspect of action, that reason explanation is also causal explanation, we also need to explain which reason is the cause of action. The cause cannot only be reasons that the
In this essay I describe how it is possible for mythological consciousness to believe itself to h... more In this essay I describe how it is possible for mythological consciousness to believe itself to have absolute power over reality, and yet at, at the same time, feel its destiny to be wholly fated. I take Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms as my primary text.
In this paper I criticise a modern account of why meaning in life will be possible in a virtual r... more In this paper I criticise a modern account of why meaning in life will be possible in a virtual reality. I present various rebuttals against a paper by John Danaher.
In this essay, I give an account of why Hegel is still relevant today. I specifically look at the... more In this essay, I give an account of why Hegel is still relevant today. I specifically look at the ideas of negative and positive freedom, and how they related to our modern notion of freedom. I then discuss problems with modernity and how Hegel may be a crucial ally to have in responding to these modern dilemmas.
In this essay, I attempt to understand Meditation Practice, specifically mindfulness, through the... more In this essay, I attempt to understand Meditation Practice, specifically mindfulness, through the lens of a Predictive Processing framework in cognitive science. I make some suggestions as to how the current literature could be improved.
I address the puzzle of temporary intrinsics in metaphysics, namely, how an object may be said t... more I address the puzzle of temporary intrinsics in metaphysics, namely, how an object may be said to undergo change over time and yet remain identical. I put forward an account of temporal parts as a solution.
'Given determinism, free will is an illusion; for free will requires the possibility to do otherw... more 'Given determinism, free will is an illusion; for free will requires the possibility to do otherwise than what we in fact do.' Is this argument sound? I Introduction If determinism is true, then free will, I will argue, is an illusion. This is because the notion of free will does depend on our ability to have done otherwise, and that what we mean when we say we could have done otherwise further depends on the view we have our 'selves'. Though as will emerge, there seems to be conflicting attitudes to this very question. This means that the salience of my argument really depends on our attitude toward free will. But I will explore whether we have good reason to think these attitudes are warranted, and what, in the end, should matter to us in this respect. I will provide a general account of determinism and then move towards an understanding of the problem as it relates to free will. I will then look at reasons to reject the soundness of the argument and argue for the inadequacy of these accounts. II The Problem and Its Consequence As I see it, the question is this: whether we think free will is an illusion, is really a question about our attitudes towards what matters. The argument is foremost determined by this concern then-since determinism poses a problem for free will only if we think free will is something that is at odds with determinism. This seems like an inescapable starting point. The question is also difficult to strip away from ethics, and that is simply the recognition that free will is a question, primarily, from within our perspective-it relates deeply to human affairs. But I will consider the question as separate from that of moral responsibility. Free will bears strongly on our conception of what it is to be a 'self',1 which must, I argue, be part of our understanding of free will. It is easy to lose track of this in talking of metaphysics.
This paper largely centres around what might be contributing to the idea that there is a metaphys... more This paper largely centres around what might be contributing to the idea that there is a metaphysical dichotomy to facts and values. It explores this question in relation to ethical naturalism and how we need to re-address what we mean by natural in order to see that the dichotomy is a false one (metaphysically speaking). After rejecting the metaphysical picture of reality that validates the supposed dichotomy, I suggest a way that ethics can be just as objective as science - given a new construal of the distinction between subjective and objective.
The Duhem-Quine thesis, or more broadly the problem of underdetermination, actually spells out a ... more The Duhem-Quine thesis, or more broadly the problem of underdetermination, actually spells out a much simpler problem for all of us than it might suggest. The problem of evidence looks as though it faces anybody who uses it to justify beliefs, hypothesis, theories or any inference from observation. How we can derive a unique explanation from observables, when no unique answer is guaranteed, seems ubiquitous in human endeavours. The problem has thus been termed underdetermination, since no unique solution is given. We might think then, that the problem is one of skepticism; we aren't aware of what we aren't aware of, and what we aren't aware of could always conspire to undermine our conclusions-derived from what we are aware of. For Pierre Duhem the problem arises, for the most part, in scientific investigation, whereas for Quine the problem runs much deeper, and in fact permeates epistemology more generally. However, there seems to be a stark difference between what we can believe and what is rational to believe-which will raise questions of scientific methodology and its validity. In this essay, I will argue that we are indeed right to care about this pervasive dilemma, because what we believe has consequences. My answer to the question of its truth though, is less hospitable, but only towards specific conclusions. I will therefore give Quine's thesis the majority of attention since I see it implicating much of what Duhem states and also proving the biggest threat.
Is the concept of 'Evil' helpful to a modern understanding of the world? In this paper I argue th... more Is the concept of 'Evil' helpful to a modern understanding of the world? In this paper I argue that it is not, and go on to use the idea of moral luck to challenge our intuitions about good and evil.
48 hour timed paper on Kant. Included are the antinomies of pure reason and Kant's analysis of co... more 48 hour timed paper on Kant. Included are the antinomies of pure reason and Kant's analysis of cognition.
A brief analysis of the problems encountered during criminal justice and it's role in classifying... more A brief analysis of the problems encountered during criminal justice and it's role in classifying criminals. This essay challenges long held assumptions that have permeated society and led to the over correction of oppresive sterotypes, both publicly and within the justice system. Moreover, it argues for a new approach to criminal justice by suggesting the bio-social model as a causal explanation to criminal behaviour.
Why is astrology not a science? In this short essay I attempt to answer the problem of a demarcat... more Why is astrology not a science? In this short essay I attempt to answer the problem of a demarcation criterion that will answer this question.
I look at arguments for a religious worldview based on shares features of religious experience an... more I look at arguments for a religious worldview based on shares features of religious experience and argue the incoherency of this view. I use William James and John Hick as proponents of religious pluralism. Finally I argue that shared experience may point to features of cognition and not a deeper religious reality.
In short, an analysis of the relationship between Machiavelli's view of human nature, and how thi... more In short, an analysis of the relationship between Machiavelli's view of human nature, and how this impression informs his political theory.
A short piece on the validity of Husserl's description of what happens when we privilege the obje... more A short piece on the validity of Husserl's description of what happens when we privilege the objective lens of the sciences at the expense of our own personal, subjective experience.
A look at current policy regarding faith schools in the UK, and religious segregation as a moral ... more A look at current policy regarding faith schools in the UK, and religious segregation as a moral problem. Furthermore, it looks at the ethics of religious faith in relation to education, and argues for a seperation of religion from state funded education.
Does the event causal view of agency provide a satisfactory view of human agency? I will outline ... more Does the event causal view of agency provide a satisfactory view of human agency? I will outline what I will call the 'standard story' of action. It is often said to begin with Donald Davidson.4 His account of action is also a theory of agency. Here we define actions as bodily movements, under a description which is intentional.5 The agent is revealed as one who's states relate intelligibly to events, such that they are said to rationally explain, and be the cause of, an action.6 Davidson's claim can be summed up as such, Actions are events-bodily movements-which are brought about, that is caused and rationalised, by the combination of a belief and a desire.7 Davidson aims to capture two key aspects of action. On the one hand, he wants to appeal to the sense that we act for reasons, and that there is a rational explanation to be had of our actions. Let us suppose you asked Brutus why he killed Ceasar, and he replied that he believed the old man was no longer fit to rule, and that among other things he desired to rid Rome of him. That you are given this answer is meant, on Brutus part, to explain to you his action. We also get something else, however: the cause. So, the other quite sensible feature Davidson aims to capture, is that we come to know of actions as being caused by the right sorts of things-which for him are mental states. What we thus end up with is a very intuitive claim that the rational explanation of action is also a causal one, and this has earned Davidson's account the slogan 'reasons are causes'. To take the first aspect then, we can say that when a person acts for a reason, their reason is both their belief that acting in such and such a manner will bring about a desired end, and the desire itself.8 A reason just is a belief and a desire, therefore. Davidson wants to appeal to the sense that intentional actions are those done for reasons, which are composed of mental states such as desiring and believing. When we say desire, included are all pro-attitudes, from desires to normative sources like moral and aesthetic principles, which are directed towards certain actions.9 To return again to the second aspect of action, that reason explanation is also causal explanation, we also need to explain which reason is the cause of action. The cause cannot only be reasons that the
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