This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense ... more This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense of self.” Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls “for-meness” or “mineness.” Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent. Conscious experience may well be reflexive (insofar as it is relation to me) but this does not imply that I additionally have a sense of what it is like for me to have that experience. I do not just happen to disagree with Zahavi’s account of pre-reflective experience but, more importantly, I am concerned that he imposes it onto his interpretation of Edmund Husserl. Zahavi claims that when Husserl argues that consciousness is necessarily a form of self-consciousness, he must be...
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 1999
Dans le cadre du trentieme anniversaire de la Societe anglaise de phenomenologie celebre les 11-1... more Dans le cadre du trentieme anniversaire de la Societe anglaise de phenomenologie celebre les 11-13 avril 1997 a Oxford dans le cadre d'un colloque consacre au theme du renouveau de la phenomenologie, l'A. montre que la definition husserlienne de la presence renouvelle la conception traditionnelle du temps dans le sens d'une eternite qui se rend presente par son propre mode de temporalisation et se fait affirmation de la vie, au-dela de toute interpretation nostalgique de la phenomenologie de Husserl comprise comme aspiration a un commencement qui ne sera jamais present. Examinant la mise entre parentheses de ce qui n'est pas visible et de ce qui est absent par la reduction phenomenologique, l'A. s'oppose a la lecture de Husserl par Derrida et conclut a l'extension de la presence dans un prolongement infini qui est le moment sublime de la phenomenologie
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2009
... 10.1080/09672550902948944 Lilian Alweiss a pages 415-434. ... Husserl, E. 1964. The Paris Lec... more ... 10.1080/09672550902948944 Lilian Alweiss a pages 415-434. ... Husserl, E. 1964. The Paris Lectures , Edited by: Koestenbaum, Peter. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. View all references: p. 14, and Heidegger to Dasein's ecstatic structure (Heidegger, 196211. Heidegger, M. 1962. ...
When it comes to questions of ethics we reach the limits of philos-ophy. Philosophy can do little... more When it comes to questions of ethics we reach the limits of philos-ophy. Philosophy can do little to determine how we should conduct our lives. Guidelines, strategies or principles never seem to be sen-sitive to the specificity of our human predicament. Whereas philos-ophy seeks ...
... Heidegger's Being and Time Th± s O ne 4X8T-PX9-35TB ... Heidegger's Being and Time ... more ... Heidegger's Being and Time Th± s O ne 4X8T-PX9-35TB ... Heidegger's Being and Time Theodore Kisiel UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley Los Angeles London ...
This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense ... more This paper takes Zahavi’s view to task that every conscious experience involves a “minimal sense of self.” Zahavi bases his claim on the observation that experience, even on the pre-reflective level, is not only about the object, but also has a distinctive qualitative aspect which is indicative of the fact that it is for me. It has the quality of what he calls “for-meness” or “mineness.” Against this I argue that there are not two phenomena but only one. On the pre-reflective level, experience is transparent. Conscious experience may well be reflexive (insofar as it is relation to me) but this does not imply that I additionally have a sense of what it is like for me to have that experience. I do not just happen to disagree with Zahavi’s account of pre-reflective experience but, more importantly, I am concerned that he imposes it onto his interpretation of Edmund Husserl. Zahavi claims that when Husserl argues that consciousness is necessarily a form of self-consciousness, he must be...
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 1999
Dans le cadre du trentieme anniversaire de la Societe anglaise de phenomenologie celebre les 11-1... more Dans le cadre du trentieme anniversaire de la Societe anglaise de phenomenologie celebre les 11-13 avril 1997 a Oxford dans le cadre d'un colloque consacre au theme du renouveau de la phenomenologie, l'A. montre que la definition husserlienne de la presence renouvelle la conception traditionnelle du temps dans le sens d'une eternite qui se rend presente par son propre mode de temporalisation et se fait affirmation de la vie, au-dela de toute interpretation nostalgique de la phenomenologie de Husserl comprise comme aspiration a un commencement qui ne sera jamais present. Examinant la mise entre parentheses de ce qui n'est pas visible et de ce qui est absent par la reduction phenomenologique, l'A. s'oppose a la lecture de Husserl par Derrida et conclut a l'extension de la presence dans un prolongement infini qui est le moment sublime de la phenomenologie
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2009
... 10.1080/09672550902948944 Lilian Alweiss a pages 415-434. ... Husserl, E. 1964. The Paris Lec... more ... 10.1080/09672550902948944 Lilian Alweiss a pages 415-434. ... Husserl, E. 1964. The Paris Lectures , Edited by: Koestenbaum, Peter. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. View all references: p. 14, and Heidegger to Dasein's ecstatic structure (Heidegger, 196211. Heidegger, M. 1962. ...
When it comes to questions of ethics we reach the limits of philos-ophy. Philosophy can do little... more When it comes to questions of ethics we reach the limits of philos-ophy. Philosophy can do little to determine how we should conduct our lives. Guidelines, strategies or principles never seem to be sen-sitive to the specificity of our human predicament. Whereas philos-ophy seeks ...
... Heidegger's Being and Time Th± s O ne 4X8T-PX9-35TB ... Heidegger's Being and Time ... more ... Heidegger's Being and Time Th± s O ne 4X8T-PX9-35TB ... Heidegger's Being and Time Theodore Kisiel UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley Los Angeles London ...
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 2019
Exercise 1 Warm up 1. What are the best inclusions you know of NL and NPSPACE, into deterministic... more Exercise 1 Warm up 1. What are the best inclusions you know of NL and NPSPACE, into deterministic classes? Prove them briey. 2. A unidirectional verier is a Turing machine with an additional input tape, which head never moves to the left (stay or right only). The second input word is called the unidi-rectional certicate. Prove that any language in NP has a unidirectional verier running in polynomial time (regarding its rst entry). 3. Prove that a language A is in NL if and only if there exists a unidirectional verier V working in logarithmic space (on its work tapes), and a polynomial function p such that: Let coAccessibility be the language of all (G, s, t) where G = (V, E) is a graph in which t is not accessible from s. We want to show the following theorem: Theorem. Is s(n) ≥ log(n) is space constructible, then NSPACE(s(n)) = co-NSPACE(s(n)).
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