Taiwan and Southeast Asia: Soft Power and Hard Truths Facing China's Ascendancy (Chee Leong Lee and Ying-kit Chan, eds.), 2023
This chapter explores the perceptions of the Thai elites towards Taiwan’s soft power from the Col... more This chapter explores the perceptions of the Thai elites towards Taiwan’s soft power from the Cold War years to the present. It shows that Taiwan until the early 1980s was viewed by the anti-communist Thai elites as an abode of peace and freedom. However, with China’s ascendancy and Taiwan’s democratization which gave rise to the emergence of separate political identity in the 1990s, they have kept their distance from Taiwan’s charm offensive since then. Given Thailand’s dependence on China’s diplomatic support after the 2014 coup and the intensification of cross-strait conflict since the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the Thai elites appear to be unreceptive to Tsai’s New Southbound Policy, in contrast with the young generation’s increase of interest in Taiwan.
The mid-1970s was the turbulent period of Thai politics. The collapse of the junta in 1973 gave rise to democracy under the 1974 Constitution, followed by the intensification of student protests and the switch of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China by the civilian government in 1975. These events eventually resulted in a rightist backlash which brought Thailand back to dictatorship after the October 6 coup in 1976. The article aims to analyze Thailand’s relations with Taiwan in this crucial period by utilizing available documents in three languages: Chinese, Thai, and English. It shows that the government of Taiwan endeavored to maintain relations with Thai elites and prominent figures of the right wing by emphasizing the threat of communism. Therefore, it can be argued that Taiwan in the mid-1970s gave tacit support to the Thai rightists.
he Study Paper portrays the overview of Taiwan’s policy towards Southeast Asia since 1949. Taiwan until the mid-1980s put an emphasis on promoting anti-Communism and developing relations with free-world countries like the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand. It also tried to cultivate relations with Indonesia in the hope that ASEAN under the latter’s leadership would be a major force against Communism after the American withdrawal from the Vietnam War in the mid-1970s. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Taiwan shifted its focus to strengthening economic relations with ASEAN countries in order to expand its diplomatic space, with the launches of “Go-South Policy” and “New Southbound Policy” in 1993 and 2016 respectively. However, the One-China principle has rendered ASEAN countries careful in engaging Taiwan, especially whenever the cross-strait relations become tense.
Asia in World Politics: Past, Present, and Future, 2021
The aim of this chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Cuba and China since the establ... more The aim of this chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Cuba and China since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1960 till the 80s when both two
countries strengthened cooperation. The paper shows reasons for conflict between
Cuba and China which started in the mid-60s emphasizing crucial moments like
“rice war” and termination of party relations. It also analyzes incentives which
led to the process of reconciliation and normalization of bilateral ties. The author
underlines the role of Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-American rapprochement as
a crucial factors which impacted relations between Beijing and Havana but also
argues that China has never seen Cuba as a security threat but rather target for
“moral attack” to deprecate Moscow.
This research aims to portray the troubled relationship between Thailand and China after the establishment of diplomatic ties by the Kukrit government in July 1975. Ultra-rightist currents in Thai politics in the mid-1970s resulted in the 6 October coup and the rise of Thanin’s anti-communist government in 1976, which in turn created negative impacts on Thailand’s relations with China. The article also shows Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin’s attempts to make friends with leading figures in the royal family and the army. Therefore, shortly after Thanin had been ousted by another coup in October 1977, tensions between the two countries de-escalated, followed by mutual visits of high-level leaders in the following year.
近代臺灣與東南亞 (Modern Taiwan and Southeast Asia). Taipei: National Taiwan Library, 2019
Thailand and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan were major allies of the United States against... more Thailand and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan were major allies of the United States against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the early decades of the Cold War. Relations between the two countries culminated in 1963 when King Bhumibol Adulyadej and Queen Sirikit made a state visit to Taipei and were warmly received by Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Soong Mei-ling. Notwithstanding the changes in world politics which resulted in the termination of Thailand-ROC diplomatic relations in 1975, the ties between the King and the ROC persisted. Since the early 1970s, the ROC government had given assistance in agricultural technology to “the Royal Project,” improving the livelihood of those living in the northern part of Thailand. These ties explained the reason why, during his “private trip” to Thailand in 1994, President Lee Teng-hui was given an audience with the King, implying a state visit.
The article sheds light on Thailand’s proactive diplomacy towards North Korea during the premierships of Chuan Leekpai and Thaksin Shinawatra from 2000 to 2006, as seen in its role in bringing North Korea into the ASEAN Regional Forum and its attempts to solve the nuclear crisis. After half a decade of efforts, however, Thailand was not only unable to change North Korea’s behavior, but also faced a dilemma between maintaining a good relationship with Pyongyang and dealing with humanitarian issues.
/ The research aims to study the Cold War relations between Thailand and the Kuomintang government since the latter’s relocation to Taiwan in 1949 by utilizing primary sources in Chinese, Thai, and English. It finds that, though recognizing the Kuomintang government as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations, Thailand in the early 1950s downgraded the relations to chargé d'affaires in order to block the Kuomintang’s dissemination of Chinese nationalism. Relations were upgraded and strengthened after Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat made a coup in 1957 and pursued active anti-communism. Notwithstanding changes in Thai domestic politics and international politics which resulted in the termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan and the recognition of the People’s Republic of China by the government of Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj in 1975, anti-communism was still a common cause between the two countries’ elites until the end of the 1970s. The legacy of friendship from the Cold War years, plus enhanced economic relations in the early 1990s, led to the Thai elites’ welcoming of the unofficial visit by President Lee Teng-hui in 1994.
Political Science and Public Administration Journal (Vol. 13 No. 2 ), 2022
This article aims to analyze the relations between Thailand and the Kuomintang government after i... more This article aims to analyze the relations between Thailand and the Kuomintang government after its relocation to Taiwan in 1949. It argues that while maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan and not recognizing the government of the People's Republic of China, the Phibun government downgraded its relations with the former to the level of chargé d'affaires in order to block the Kuomintang's influence over the Chinese community in Thailand. In other words, before the U.S.-backed coup by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in 1957, the determining factor for Thailand in dealing with both Taiwan and China was not the fight against communism so much as the suppression of Chinese nationalism in order to win political loyalties from the overseas Chinese community.
The Ming maritime voyages led by Muslim Chinese eunuch Zheng He in the early 15th century had tremendous impacts on Southeast Asia’s politics, economy, society, and culture. The article aims to explore relevant studies to indicate his legacies in the region, which are (1) the rise of Malacca as an entrepôt; (2) the so-called “Age of Commerce” and absolutism; (3) the spread of Islam; and (4) tales and sacred places related to Zheng He.
This article aims to portray the troubled relationship between Thailand and China after the establishment of diplomatic ties by Kukrit’s government in July 1975. Ultra-rightist currents in Thai politics in the mid-1970s resulted in the 6 October coup and the rise of Thanin’s anti-communist government in 1976, which in turn created negative impacts on Thailand’s relations with China. The article also shows the prominent role of Her Royal Highness the Princess Mother of the Ninth Reign in de-escalating Thailand-China tension and paving the way for Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin’s connection with leading figures in the Thai army. Therefore, shortly after Thanin had been ousted by another coup in October 1977, tensions between the two countries de-escalated, followed by mutual visits of high-level leaders in the following year.
Taiwan and Southeast Asia: Soft Power and Hard Truths Facing China's Ascendancy (Chee Leong Lee and Ying-kit Chan, eds.), 2023
This chapter explores the perceptions of the Thai elites towards Taiwan’s soft power from the Col... more This chapter explores the perceptions of the Thai elites towards Taiwan’s soft power from the Cold War years to the present. It shows that Taiwan until the early 1980s was viewed by the anti-communist Thai elites as an abode of peace and freedom. However, with China’s ascendancy and Taiwan’s democratization which gave rise to the emergence of separate political identity in the 1990s, they have kept their distance from Taiwan’s charm offensive since then. Given Thailand’s dependence on China’s diplomatic support after the 2014 coup and the intensification of cross-strait conflict since the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the Thai elites appear to be unreceptive to Tsai’s New Southbound Policy, in contrast with the young generation’s increase of interest in Taiwan.
The mid-1970s was the turbulent period of Thai politics. The collapse of the junta in 1973 gave rise to democracy under the 1974 Constitution, followed by the intensification of student protests and the switch of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China by the civilian government in 1975. These events eventually resulted in a rightist backlash which brought Thailand back to dictatorship after the October 6 coup in 1976. The article aims to analyze Thailand’s relations with Taiwan in this crucial period by utilizing available documents in three languages: Chinese, Thai, and English. It shows that the government of Taiwan endeavored to maintain relations with Thai elites and prominent figures of the right wing by emphasizing the threat of communism. Therefore, it can be argued that Taiwan in the mid-1970s gave tacit support to the Thai rightists.
he Study Paper portrays the overview of Taiwan’s policy towards Southeast Asia since 1949. Taiwan until the mid-1980s put an emphasis on promoting anti-Communism and developing relations with free-world countries like the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand. It also tried to cultivate relations with Indonesia in the hope that ASEAN under the latter’s leadership would be a major force against Communism after the American withdrawal from the Vietnam War in the mid-1970s. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Taiwan shifted its focus to strengthening economic relations with ASEAN countries in order to expand its diplomatic space, with the launches of “Go-South Policy” and “New Southbound Policy” in 1993 and 2016 respectively. However, the One-China principle has rendered ASEAN countries careful in engaging Taiwan, especially whenever the cross-strait relations become tense.
Asia in World Politics: Past, Present, and Future, 2021
The aim of this chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Cuba and China since the establ... more The aim of this chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Cuba and China since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1960 till the 80s when both two
countries strengthened cooperation. The paper shows reasons for conflict between
Cuba and China which started in the mid-60s emphasizing crucial moments like
“rice war” and termination of party relations. It also analyzes incentives which
led to the process of reconciliation and normalization of bilateral ties. The author
underlines the role of Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-American rapprochement as
a crucial factors which impacted relations between Beijing and Havana but also
argues that China has never seen Cuba as a security threat but rather target for
“moral attack” to deprecate Moscow.
This research aims to portray the troubled relationship between Thailand and China after the establishment of diplomatic ties by the Kukrit government in July 1975. Ultra-rightist currents in Thai politics in the mid-1970s resulted in the 6 October coup and the rise of Thanin’s anti-communist government in 1976, which in turn created negative impacts on Thailand’s relations with China. The article also shows Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin’s attempts to make friends with leading figures in the royal family and the army. Therefore, shortly after Thanin had been ousted by another coup in October 1977, tensions between the two countries de-escalated, followed by mutual visits of high-level leaders in the following year.
近代臺灣與東南亞 (Modern Taiwan and Southeast Asia). Taipei: National Taiwan Library, 2019
Thailand and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan were major allies of the United States against... more Thailand and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan were major allies of the United States against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the early decades of the Cold War. Relations between the two countries culminated in 1963 when King Bhumibol Adulyadej and Queen Sirikit made a state visit to Taipei and were warmly received by Chiang Kai-shek and his wife Soong Mei-ling. Notwithstanding the changes in world politics which resulted in the termination of Thailand-ROC diplomatic relations in 1975, the ties between the King and the ROC persisted. Since the early 1970s, the ROC government had given assistance in agricultural technology to “the Royal Project,” improving the livelihood of those living in the northern part of Thailand. These ties explained the reason why, during his “private trip” to Thailand in 1994, President Lee Teng-hui was given an audience with the King, implying a state visit.
The article sheds light on Thailand’s proactive diplomacy towards North Korea during the premierships of Chuan Leekpai and Thaksin Shinawatra from 2000 to 2006, as seen in its role in bringing North Korea into the ASEAN Regional Forum and its attempts to solve the nuclear crisis. After half a decade of efforts, however, Thailand was not only unable to change North Korea’s behavior, but also faced a dilemma between maintaining a good relationship with Pyongyang and dealing with humanitarian issues.
/ The research aims to study the Cold War relations between Thailand and the Kuomintang government since the latter’s relocation to Taiwan in 1949 by utilizing primary sources in Chinese, Thai, and English. It finds that, though recognizing the Kuomintang government as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations, Thailand in the early 1950s downgraded the relations to chargé d'affaires in order to block the Kuomintang’s dissemination of Chinese nationalism. Relations were upgraded and strengthened after Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat made a coup in 1957 and pursued active anti-communism. Notwithstanding changes in Thai domestic politics and international politics which resulted in the termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan and the recognition of the People’s Republic of China by the government of Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj in 1975, anti-communism was still a common cause between the two countries’ elites until the end of the 1970s. The legacy of friendship from the Cold War years, plus enhanced economic relations in the early 1990s, led to the Thai elites’ welcoming of the unofficial visit by President Lee Teng-hui in 1994.
Political Science and Public Administration Journal (Vol. 13 No. 2 ), 2022
This article aims to analyze the relations between Thailand and the Kuomintang government after i... more This article aims to analyze the relations between Thailand and the Kuomintang government after its relocation to Taiwan in 1949. It argues that while maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan and not recognizing the government of the People's Republic of China, the Phibun government downgraded its relations with the former to the level of chargé d'affaires in order to block the Kuomintang's influence over the Chinese community in Thailand. In other words, before the U.S.-backed coup by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat in 1957, the determining factor for Thailand in dealing with both Taiwan and China was not the fight against communism so much as the suppression of Chinese nationalism in order to win political loyalties from the overseas Chinese community.
The Ming maritime voyages led by Muslim Chinese eunuch Zheng He in the early 15th century had tremendous impacts on Southeast Asia’s politics, economy, society, and culture. The article aims to explore relevant studies to indicate his legacies in the region, which are (1) the rise of Malacca as an entrepôt; (2) the so-called “Age of Commerce” and absolutism; (3) the spread of Islam; and (4) tales and sacred places related to Zheng He.
This article aims to portray the troubled relationship between Thailand and China after the establishment of diplomatic ties by Kukrit’s government in July 1975. Ultra-rightist currents in Thai politics in the mid-1970s resulted in the 6 October coup and the rise of Thanin’s anti-communist government in 1976, which in turn created negative impacts on Thailand’s relations with China. The article also shows the prominent role of Her Royal Highness the Princess Mother of the Ninth Reign in de-escalating Thailand-China tension and paving the way for Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin’s connection with leading figures in the Thai army. Therefore, shortly after Thanin had been ousted by another coup in October 1977, tensions between the two countries de-escalated, followed by mutual visits of high-level leaders in the following year.
The article explores Norodom Sihanouk's ties with North Korea since his first meeting with Kim Il... more The article explores Norodom Sihanouk's ties with North Korea since his first meeting with Kim Il Sung in 1965 until his demise in 2012, by arguing that there were at least two factors for the solidification of relationship. The first factor was Sihanouk and Kim Il Sung, in their quest for national autonomy, shared a mentality of small state surrounded by dominant neighboring countries. The second was that, by the end of the 1970s, Cambodia had been devastated by years of wars and political turbulences, like North Korea after the Korean War (1950-1953). Sihanouk therefore saw North Korea's successes in postwar reconstruction as an example for the Cambodian people to rebuild their ravaged country.
วารสารสังคมศาสตร์ Journal of Social Sciences, 2019
This research article aims to study the factors leading to the establishment of Sino-Cuban diplom... more This research article aims to study the factors leading to the establishment of Sino-Cuban diplomatic relations in 1960 and the deterioration of bilateral ties within a few years, by using information from China's official publications and memoirs of Chinese diplomats. The research finds that, although Mao Zedong was ambivalent about whether Fidel Castro's revolution in 1959 would lead Cuba toward a socialist road, he was content with Castro's anti-U.S. stance and agreed to have official ties with the revolutionary government of Cuba in order that China would have its first diplomatic base in the Western Hemisphere, especially in Latin America which was regarded by the U.S. government as its own backyard. However, with the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the radicalization of Chinese politics, Castro by the mid-1960s decided to tilt toward the Soviet Union, which in turn resulted in China's cutting off party-to-party ties with Cuba in 1966.
The death of Lin Biao, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Defense Minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC), who was the rising star during the Cultural Revolution in 1971 is considered one of the great mysteries in the political history of modern China. The official version of PRC history portrays him as an ambitious leader who tried to stage a coup by assassinating Mao Zedong but failed. However, this article aims to shed new light on him by arguing that he was a humble leader whose death was a result of, first, his family's roles that led to the conflict with Jiang Qing's faction and, second, the difficulties he faced in maintaining a proper relationship with a highly-charismatic leader like Mao Zedong.
Prince of Songkla University Journal of International Studies , 2017
Although China and Yugoslavia had established diplomatic relations in 1955, the relations between... more Although China and Yugoslavia had established diplomatic relations in 1955, the relations between the two socialist states deteriorated soon afterward. By 1958, Yugoslavia was condemned by China as " revisionism. " The article aims to explore the Sino-Yugoslav conflict lasting from the late 1950s to the end of the 1960s through three contexts: the Sino-Soviet conflict; the Sino-Yugoslav competition for friendship among Afro-Asian nations; and Mao Zedong's strive for " continuous revolution " inside his country, which led to the radicalization of Chinese foreign policy.
The research aims at answering two questions. Firstly, what caused the Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement in the 1970s? Secondly, how did China justify its rapprochement with “revisionist” Yugoslavia under the framework of Marxism-Leninism? The author, using official publications and diplomatic memoirs, finds that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the main factor resulting in the adjustment of Beijing’s foreign policy toward Belgrade. China’s aim for rapprochement was to build a united front against the so-called “Soviet social-imperialism,” which was later justified by the Three-World Theory proposed by Mao Zedong in 1974. In addition, the rapprochement became an opportunity for China in the late 1970s to learn from the experience of Yugoslavia in instituting economic reforms.
International Journal of China Studies
Vol. 6, No. 2, August 2015, pp. 149-157
During recent dec... more International Journal of China Studies Vol. 6, No. 2, August 2015, pp. 149-157
During recent decades, public opinion has played an important role in the making of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese citizens, with the coming of commercialised media and information technology, have more latitude to express their own views on international affairs. As a result, it is difficult for the Chinese leadership to get the people to conform to official foreign policy orthodoxy, including the concept of “Peaceful Rise” propagated by the Chinese Communist Party and the government. Emotional outburst during the anti-Japanese protests in 2005 and 2012 reminds us that the peaceful image of China presented by the authorities has been challenged by the public’s violence and anger. However, the Chinese government has been quite successful in responding to public emotion while maintaining official foreign policy orthodoxy and regime stability. Therefore, although the role of public opinion is non-negligible, it does not completely dictate the course of Chinese foreign policy.
เป้าหมายของการดำเนินความสัมพันธ์ของจีนต่อเกาหลีเหนือในยุคหลังสงครามเย็นคือ การรักษาไว้ซึ่งสันติภาพและเสถียรภาพบนคาบสมุทรเกาหลีด้วยการชักจูงให้เกาหลีเหนือเข้าสู่เวทีเจรจาพหุภาคีเพื่อยุติโครงการพัฒนาอาวุธนิวเคลียร์ และการสนับสนุนระบอบการปกครองของเกาหลีเหนือไม่ให้ล่มสลายผ่านการให้ความช่วยเหลือทางเศรษฐกิจและการกระชับความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างผู้นำ อย่างไรก็ตาม วิกฤตการณ์นิวเคลียร์ที่ยืดเยื้อมาถึงสองทศวรรษแสดงให้เห็นถึงข้อจำกัดของจีนในการใช้อิทธิพลเพื่อกำหนดพฤติกรรมของเกาหลีเหนือ ซึ่งเท่ากับท้าทายแนวคิดของ Keohane and Nye ที่อธิบายว่าในการพึ่งพาซึ่งกันและกันแบบไม่สมดุลระหว่างสองประเทศนั้น ประเทศที่พึ่งพาน้อยกว่าจะเป็นฝ่ายที่มีอำนาจต่อรองมากกว่า
The research aims at answering the following three questions. First, how have Sino-North Korean relations changed since the end of the 1980s? Second, what is China’s purpose in the conduct of diplomacy towards North Korea in the post-Cold War Era? Third, does China, as Pyongyang’s major aid donor, have influence over North Korea’s behavior?
The research finds that Sino-North Korea relations had deteriorated in the mid-1990s, as a result of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992 and the deaths of revolutionary leaders of both countries like Kim Il Sung and Deng Xiaoping in 1994 and 1997 respectively. However, by the late 1990s, US military roles in world affairs became a crucial factor forming ideological solidarity between the two countries and led to the warming of relations since 1999.
China’s purpose in the conduct of diplomacy towards North Korea in the post-Cold War Era is, firstly, to maintain peace and order on the Korean Peninsula by persuading North Korea to join multilateral forum in solving the nuclear crisis and, secondly, to prevent the regime collapse by supplying aids to Pyongyang and strengthening ties with North Korean leaders. However, the two-decade perpetuation of North Korean nuclear crisis implies that China has limited influence over North Korea’s behavior, challenging Keohane and Nye’s concept of “asymmetrical interdependence” which argued that the less vulnerable state will gain more bargaining power over the more vulnerable one.
บทความนี้มุ่งพิจารณาการดำรงอยู่ของสนธิสัญญาพันธมิตรทางทหารระหว่างจีนกับเกาหลีเหนือในทศวรรษแรกของ... more บทความนี้มุ่งพิจารณาการดำรงอยู่ของสนธิสัญญาพันธมิตรทางทหารระหว่างจีนกับเกาหลีเหนือในทศวรรษแรกของยุคหลังสงครามเย็น โดยนำเอาแนวคิดของ Stephen M. Walt เรื่องปัจจัยของการคงอยู่และการล่มสลายพันธมิตรมาแสดงให้เห็นว่า พันธมิตรดังกล่าวดำรงอยู่ได้เนื่องจากความเป็นปึกแผ่นทางอุดมการณ์ (ideological solidarity) กล่าวคือ บทบาทด้านการทหารของสหรัฐอเมริกาในเอเชียตะวันออกและวิกฤตการณ์โคโซโวในปลายทศวรรษ 1990 ทำให้ทั้งสองฝ่ายเห็นคุณค่าของการกระชับความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างกันเพื่อต่อต้านลัทธิครองความเป็นใหญ่ (hegemonism) ของสหรัฐอเมริกา แต่การกระชับความสัมพันธ์ดังกล่าวก็เกิดขึ้นภายใต้การเปลี่ยนแปลงแนวคิดด้านความมั่นคงของจีนจากแบบสงครามเย็นมาเป็นแนวคิดความมั่นคงแบบใหม่ (New Security Concept) หรือกล่าวได้อีกอย่างหนึ่งว่าเหตุผลพื้นฐานดั้งเดิมของการเป็นพันธมิตรที่ก่อตัวขึ้นในยุคสงครามเย็นได้สิ้นสุดลงไปแล้ว
The article explores the enduring Sino-North Korean Alliance Treaty in the first decade of the post-Cold War era by using Stephen M. Walt’s ideas on factors leading to endurance and collapse of alliance. It argues that the enduring alliance between the two countries in the 1990s was the result of ideological solidarity, that is, the role of the American in East Asia and the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s led to the recovery of relations between the two countries against US hegemony. However, Sino-North Korean relations warmed amid China’s changing security outlook from the Cold War mentality to the so-called “New Security Concept.” In other words, the original rationale of the Sino-North Korean alliance during the Cold War has evaporated.
During the Cold War, Sino-North Korean relations were often described by Chinese leaders as “lips and teeth”, showing the sealed-in-blood friendship between the two countries which fought the American imperialists together in the Korean War (1950-1953). As a matter of fact, the so-called lips and teeth relations were mere rhetoric. This article shows that, in the 1960s, China used the 1961 alliance treaty with North Korea to contain the American and Soviet influences on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, China made a concession to North Korea in the case of border demarcation. However, the process of Sino-American normalization of relations against the Soviet Union in the 1970s made China less receptive to North Korean demands, including its refusal to support Kim Il Sung’s plan to launch the second Korean War in 1975. In addition, Deng Xiaoping’s institution of reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s led to the rise of economic ties between China and South Korea. By 1989, the Sino-Soviet normalization made North Korea less strategically important in Chinese eyes, which in turn resulted in the establishment of Sino-South Korean diplomatic relations in 1992 and the de facto demise of the Sino-North Korean alliance.
The so-called “two-line struggle” has been used as an analytical framework for the study of Chinese elite politics before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, depicting the conflict between Party Chairman Mao Zedong’s revolutionary romanticism and State President Liu Shaoqi’s pragmatism. However, given the fact that Liu repeatedly deferred to Mao on important issues and it was Mao who made final decisions, this article argues that Chinese elite politics in the first half of the 1960s should be viewed as “Mao’s dominance”. Therefore, Liu’s fall during the Cultural Revolution was not because of his defeat in the struggle against Mao, but a result of the “February Adverse Current’ incident in 1967 which forced Mao to reemphasize the legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution by using Liu as a main target.
Uploads
The mid-1970s was the turbulent period of Thai politics. The collapse of the junta in 1973 gave rise to democracy under the 1974 Constitution, followed by the intensification of student protests and the switch of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China by the civilian government in 1975. These events eventually resulted in a rightist backlash which brought Thailand back to dictatorship after the October 6 coup in 1976. The article aims to analyze Thailand’s relations with Taiwan in this crucial period by utilizing available documents in three languages: Chinese, Thai, and English. It shows that the government of Taiwan endeavored to maintain relations with Thai elites and prominent figures of the right wing by emphasizing the threat of communism. Therefore, it can be argued that Taiwan in the mid-1970s gave tacit support to the Thai rightists.
he Study Paper portrays the overview of Taiwan’s policy towards Southeast Asia since 1949. Taiwan until the mid-1980s put an emphasis on promoting anti-Communism and developing relations with free-world countries like the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand. It also tried
to cultivate relations with Indonesia in the hope that ASEAN under the latter’s leadership would be a major force against Communism after the American withdrawal from the Vietnam War in the mid-1970s. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Taiwan shifted its focus to strengthening economic relations with ASEAN countries in order to expand its diplomatic space, with the launches of “Go-South Policy” and “New Southbound Policy” in 1993 and 2016 respectively. However, the One-China principle has rendered ASEAN countries careful in engaging Taiwan, especially whenever the cross-strait relations become tense.
countries strengthened cooperation. The paper shows reasons for conflict between
Cuba and China which started in the mid-60s emphasizing crucial moments like
“rice war” and termination of party relations. It also analyzes incentives which
led to the process of reconciliation and normalization of bilateral ties. The author
underlines the role of Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-American rapprochement as
a crucial factors which impacted relations between Beijing and Havana but also
argues that China has never seen Cuba as a security threat but rather target for
“moral attack” to deprecate Moscow.
This research aims to portray the troubled relationship between Thailand and China after the establishment of diplomatic ties by the Kukrit government in July 1975. Ultra-rightist currents in Thai politics in the mid-1970s resulted in the 6 October coup and the rise of Thanin’s anti-communist government in 1976, which in turn created negative impacts on Thailand’s relations with China. The article also shows Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin’s attempts to make friends with leading figures in the royal family and the army. Therefore, shortly after Thanin had been ousted by another coup in October 1977, tensions between the two countries de-escalated, followed by mutual visits of high-level leaders in the following year.
มหาวิทยาลัยธรรมศาสตร์
เนื้อหาเริ่มจากชาวแมนจูเข้าบุกด่านของจีน สถาปนาราชวงศ์ชิงในต้นคริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 17
การสร้างความกลมกลืนระหว่างชาติพันธุ์ต่างๆ การขยายอำนาจออกไปจนเป็นจักรวรรดิที่ยิ่งใหญ่ที่สุด
ของเอเชียในกลางคริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 18
เมื่อเข้าสู่คริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 19 ปัญหาประชากร การกบฏ การเข้ามาของจักรวรรดินิยมตะวันตก และ
สาเหตุของความล้มเหลวในการปรับตัวของจีน
เมื่อเข้าสู่คริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 20 กล่าวถึงการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางการเมือง เศรษฐกิจ และสังคมของจีน
การสิ้นสุดของสถาบันจักรพรรดิและกำเนิดยุคขุนศึก การแสวงหาทางออกให้แก่ประเทศจีนโดยพรรค
กั๋วหมินตั่งและพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์จีน จนกระทั่งถึงการสถาปนาสาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนใน ค.ศ. 1949
และสุดท้ายว่าด้วยพัฒนาการของดินแดนขอบนอกของจีนในยุคสมัยใหม่ และนัยสำคัญต่อการสร้าง
เอกภาพของชาติ ซึ่งยังคงมีนัยต่อบูรณภาพทางดินแดนของจีน และเป็นประเด็นสำคัญด้านความมั่นคง
ของภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกมาจนปัจจุบัน
The article sheds light on Thailand’s proactive diplomacy towards North Korea during the premierships of Chuan Leekpai and Thaksin Shinawatra from 2000 to 2006, as seen in its role in bringing North Korea into the ASEAN Regional Forum and its attempts to solve the nuclear crisis. After half a decade of efforts, however, Thailand was not only unable to change North Korea’s behavior, but also faced a dilemma between maintaining a good relationship with Pyongyang and dealing with humanitarian issues.
/ The research aims to study the Cold War relations between Thailand and the Kuomintang government since the latter’s relocation to Taiwan in 1949 by utilizing primary sources in Chinese, Thai, and English. It finds that, though recognizing the Kuomintang government as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations, Thailand in the early 1950s downgraded the relations to chargé d'affaires in order to block the Kuomintang’s dissemination of Chinese nationalism. Relations were upgraded and strengthened after Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat made a coup in 1957 and pursued active anti-communism. Notwithstanding changes in Thai domestic politics and international politics which resulted in the termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan and the recognition of the People’s Republic of China by the government of Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj in 1975, anti-communism was still a common cause between the two countries’ elites until the end of the 1970s. The legacy of friendship from the Cold War years, plus enhanced economic relations in the early 1990s, led to the Thai elites’ welcoming of the unofficial visit by President Lee Teng-hui in 1994.
The Ming maritime voyages led by Muslim Chinese eunuch Zheng He in the early 15th century had tremendous impacts on Southeast Asia’s politics, economy, society, and culture. The article aims to explore relevant studies to indicate his legacies in the region, which are (1) the rise of Malacca as an entrepôt; (2) the so-called “Age of Commerce” and absolutism; (3) the spread of Islam; and (4) tales and sacred places related to Zheng He.
This article aims to portray the troubled relationship between Thailand and China after the establishment of diplomatic ties by Kukrit’s government in July 1975. Ultra-rightist currents in Thai politics in the mid-1970s resulted in the 6 October coup and the rise of Thanin’s anti-communist government in 1976, which in turn created negative impacts on Thailand’s relations with China. The article also shows the prominent role of Her Royal Highness the Princess Mother of the Ninth Reign in de-escalating Thailand-China tension and paving the way for Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin’s connection with leading figures in the Thai army. Therefore, shortly after Thanin had been ousted by another coup in October 1977, tensions between the two countries de-escalated, followed by mutual visits of high-level leaders in the following year.
The mid-1970s was the turbulent period of Thai politics. The collapse of the junta in 1973 gave rise to democracy under the 1974 Constitution, followed by the intensification of student protests and the switch of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China by the civilian government in 1975. These events eventually resulted in a rightist backlash which brought Thailand back to dictatorship after the October 6 coup in 1976. The article aims to analyze Thailand’s relations with Taiwan in this crucial period by utilizing available documents in three languages: Chinese, Thai, and English. It shows that the government of Taiwan endeavored to maintain relations with Thai elites and prominent figures of the right wing by emphasizing the threat of communism. Therefore, it can be argued that Taiwan in the mid-1970s gave tacit support to the Thai rightists.
he Study Paper portrays the overview of Taiwan’s policy towards Southeast Asia since 1949. Taiwan until the mid-1980s put an emphasis on promoting anti-Communism and developing relations with free-world countries like the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand. It also tried
to cultivate relations with Indonesia in the hope that ASEAN under the latter’s leadership would be a major force against Communism after the American withdrawal from the Vietnam War in the mid-1970s. With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Taiwan shifted its focus to strengthening economic relations with ASEAN countries in order to expand its diplomatic space, with the launches of “Go-South Policy” and “New Southbound Policy” in 1993 and 2016 respectively. However, the One-China principle has rendered ASEAN countries careful in engaging Taiwan, especially whenever the cross-strait relations become tense.
countries strengthened cooperation. The paper shows reasons for conflict between
Cuba and China which started in the mid-60s emphasizing crucial moments like
“rice war” and termination of party relations. It also analyzes incentives which
led to the process of reconciliation and normalization of bilateral ties. The author
underlines the role of Sino-Soviet relations and Sino-American rapprochement as
a crucial factors which impacted relations between Beijing and Havana but also
argues that China has never seen Cuba as a security threat but rather target for
“moral attack” to deprecate Moscow.
This research aims to portray the troubled relationship between Thailand and China after the establishment of diplomatic ties by the Kukrit government in July 1975. Ultra-rightist currents in Thai politics in the mid-1970s resulted in the 6 October coup and the rise of Thanin’s anti-communist government in 1976, which in turn created negative impacts on Thailand’s relations with China. The article also shows Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin’s attempts to make friends with leading figures in the royal family and the army. Therefore, shortly after Thanin had been ousted by another coup in October 1977, tensions between the two countries de-escalated, followed by mutual visits of high-level leaders in the following year.
มหาวิทยาลัยธรรมศาสตร์
เนื้อหาเริ่มจากชาวแมนจูเข้าบุกด่านของจีน สถาปนาราชวงศ์ชิงในต้นคริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 17
การสร้างความกลมกลืนระหว่างชาติพันธุ์ต่างๆ การขยายอำนาจออกไปจนเป็นจักรวรรดิที่ยิ่งใหญ่ที่สุด
ของเอเชียในกลางคริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 18
เมื่อเข้าสู่คริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 19 ปัญหาประชากร การกบฏ การเข้ามาของจักรวรรดินิยมตะวันตก และ
สาเหตุของความล้มเหลวในการปรับตัวของจีน
เมื่อเข้าสู่คริสต์ศตวรรษที่ 20 กล่าวถึงการเปลี่ยนแปลงทางการเมือง เศรษฐกิจ และสังคมของจีน
การสิ้นสุดของสถาบันจักรพรรดิและกำเนิดยุคขุนศึก การแสวงหาทางออกให้แก่ประเทศจีนโดยพรรค
กั๋วหมินตั่งและพรรคคอมมิวนิสต์จีน จนกระทั่งถึงการสถาปนาสาธารณรัฐประชาชนจีนใน ค.ศ. 1949
และสุดท้ายว่าด้วยพัฒนาการของดินแดนขอบนอกของจีนในยุคสมัยใหม่ และนัยสำคัญต่อการสร้าง
เอกภาพของชาติ ซึ่งยังคงมีนัยต่อบูรณภาพทางดินแดนของจีน และเป็นประเด็นสำคัญด้านความมั่นคง
ของภูมิภาคเอเชียตะวันออกมาจนปัจจุบัน
The article sheds light on Thailand’s proactive diplomacy towards North Korea during the premierships of Chuan Leekpai and Thaksin Shinawatra from 2000 to 2006, as seen in its role in bringing North Korea into the ASEAN Regional Forum and its attempts to solve the nuclear crisis. After half a decade of efforts, however, Thailand was not only unable to change North Korea’s behavior, but also faced a dilemma between maintaining a good relationship with Pyongyang and dealing with humanitarian issues.
/ The research aims to study the Cold War relations between Thailand and the Kuomintang government since the latter’s relocation to Taiwan in 1949 by utilizing primary sources in Chinese, Thai, and English. It finds that, though recognizing the Kuomintang government as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations, Thailand in the early 1950s downgraded the relations to chargé d'affaires in order to block the Kuomintang’s dissemination of Chinese nationalism. Relations were upgraded and strengthened after Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat made a coup in 1957 and pursued active anti-communism. Notwithstanding changes in Thai domestic politics and international politics which resulted in the termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan and the recognition of the People’s Republic of China by the government of Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj in 1975, anti-communism was still a common cause between the two countries’ elites until the end of the 1970s. The legacy of friendship from the Cold War years, plus enhanced economic relations in the early 1990s, led to the Thai elites’ welcoming of the unofficial visit by President Lee Teng-hui in 1994.
The Ming maritime voyages led by Muslim Chinese eunuch Zheng He in the early 15th century had tremendous impacts on Southeast Asia’s politics, economy, society, and culture. The article aims to explore relevant studies to indicate his legacies in the region, which are (1) the rise of Malacca as an entrepôt; (2) the so-called “Age of Commerce” and absolutism; (3) the spread of Islam; and (4) tales and sacred places related to Zheng He.
This article aims to portray the troubled relationship between Thailand and China after the establishment of diplomatic ties by Kukrit’s government in July 1975. Ultra-rightist currents in Thai politics in the mid-1970s resulted in the 6 October coup and the rise of Thanin’s anti-communist government in 1976, which in turn created negative impacts on Thailand’s relations with China. The article also shows the prominent role of Her Royal Highness the Princess Mother of the Ninth Reign in de-escalating Thailand-China tension and paving the way for Chinese Ambassador Chai Zemin’s connection with leading figures in the Thai army. Therefore, shortly after Thanin had been ousted by another coup in October 1977, tensions between the two countries de-escalated, followed by mutual visits of high-level leaders in the following year.
The death of Lin Biao, Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Defense Minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC), who was the rising star during the Cultural Revolution in 1971 is considered one of the great mysteries in the political history of modern China. The official version of PRC history portrays him as an ambitious leader who tried to stage a coup by assassinating Mao Zedong but failed. However, this article aims to shed new light on him by arguing that he was a humble leader whose death was a result of, first, his family's roles that led to the conflict with Jiang Qing's faction and, second, the difficulties he faced in maintaining a proper relationship with a highly-charismatic leader like Mao Zedong.
งานวิจัยนี้ต้องการตอบคำถามที่ว่า (1) อะไรคือปัจจัยสำคัญที่นำไปสู่การสมานไมตรีระหว่างจีนกับยูโกสลาเวียในทศวรรษ 1970 และ (2) ทางการจีนสร้างความสมเหตุสมผลให้กับการสมานไมตรีกับประเทศที่ตนตราหน้าว่า “ลัทธิแก้” อย่างยูโกสลาเวียอย่างไรภายใต้กรอบของลัทธิมากซ์-เลนิน ผู้วิจัยใช้แหล่งข้อมูลซึ่งประกอบไปด้วยสิ่งพิมพ์ของทางการจีนและบันทึกความทรงจำของนักการทูตจีน และพบคำตอบว่า การบุกเชโกสโลวะเกียของสหภาพโซเวียตใน ค.ศ. 1968 เป็นปัจจัยสำคัญที่ทำให้จีนปรับเปลี่ยนยุทธศาสตร์ด้านการต่างประเทศ ซึ่งรวมถึงการสมานไมตรีกับยูโกสลาเวียเพื่อสร้างแนวร่วมในการต่อต้าน “ลัทธิสังคมจักรวรรดินิยม” ของสหภาพโซเวียตภายใต้กรอบของ “ทฤษฎี 3 โลก” ที่เสนอโดยเหมาเจ๋อตงเมื่อ ค.ศ. 1974 และผลพลอยได้ที่เกิดขึ้นจากการสมานไมตรีดังกล่าวก็คือ จีนในปลายทศวรรษ 1970 ได้มีโอกาสเรียนรู้ประสบการณ์จากยูโกสลาเวียที่ดำเนินการปฏิรูปเศรษฐกิจมาก่อน
The research aims at answering two questions. Firstly, what caused the Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement in the 1970s? Secondly, how did China justify its rapprochement with “revisionist” Yugoslavia under the framework of Marxism-Leninism? The author, using official publications and diplomatic memoirs, finds that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was the main factor resulting in the adjustment of Beijing’s foreign policy toward Belgrade. China’s aim for rapprochement was to build a united front against the so-called “Soviet social-imperialism,” which was later justified by the Three-World Theory proposed by Mao Zedong in 1974. In addition, the rapprochement became an opportunity for China in the late 1970s to learn from the experience of Yugoslavia in instituting economic reforms.
Vol. 6, No. 2, August 2015, pp. 149-157
During recent decades, public opinion has played an important role in the
making of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese citizens, with the coming of
commercialised media and information technology, have more latitude to
express their own views on international affairs. As a result, it is difficult
for the Chinese leadership to get the people to conform to official foreign
policy orthodoxy, including the concept of “Peaceful Rise” propagated by the
Chinese Communist Party and the government. Emotional outburst during
the anti-Japanese protests in 2005 and 2012 reminds us that the peaceful
image of China presented by the authorities has been challenged by the
public’s violence and anger. However, the Chinese government has been
quite successful in responding to public emotion while maintaining official
foreign policy orthodoxy and regime stability. Therefore, although the role
of public opinion is non-negligible, it does not completely dictate the course
of Chinese foreign policy.
ผลการวิจัยพบว่า ความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างจีนกับเกาหลีเหนือตกต่ำลงในกลางทศวรรษ 1990 อันเป็นผลมาจากการที่จีนสถาปนาความสัมพันธ์ทางการทูตกับเกาหลีใต้เมื่อ ค.ศ. 1992 และการจากไปของผู้นำนักปฏิวัติของทั้งสองฝ่ายอย่างคิมอิลซุงและเติ้งเสี่ยวผิงเมื่อ ค.ศ. 1994 และ ค.ศ. 1997 ตามลำดับ อย่างไรก็ตาม เมื่อถึงปลายทศวรรษ 1990 บทบาททางการทหารของสหรัฐอเมริกาได้เป็นปัจจัยสำคัญที่ทำให้จีนและเกาหลีเหนือมีความเป็นปึกแผ่นทางอุดมการณ์และนำไปสู่กระชับความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างกันอีกครั้งหนึ่ง
เป้าหมายของการดำเนินความสัมพันธ์ของจีนต่อเกาหลีเหนือในยุคหลังสงครามเย็นคือ การรักษาไว้ซึ่งสันติภาพและเสถียรภาพบนคาบสมุทรเกาหลีด้วยการชักจูงให้เกาหลีเหนือเข้าสู่เวทีเจรจาพหุภาคีเพื่อยุติโครงการพัฒนาอาวุธนิวเคลียร์ และการสนับสนุนระบอบการปกครองของเกาหลีเหนือไม่ให้ล่มสลายผ่านการให้ความช่วยเหลือทางเศรษฐกิจและการกระชับความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างผู้นำ อย่างไรก็ตาม วิกฤตการณ์นิวเคลียร์ที่ยืดเยื้อมาถึงสองทศวรรษแสดงให้เห็นถึงข้อจำกัดของจีนในการใช้อิทธิพลเพื่อกำหนดพฤติกรรมของเกาหลีเหนือ ซึ่งเท่ากับท้าทายแนวคิดของ Keohane and Nye ที่อธิบายว่าในการพึ่งพาซึ่งกันและกันแบบไม่สมดุลระหว่างสองประเทศนั้น ประเทศที่พึ่งพาน้อยกว่าจะเป็นฝ่ายที่มีอำนาจต่อรองมากกว่า
The research aims at answering the following three questions. First, how have Sino-North Korean relations changed since the end of the 1980s? Second, what is China’s purpose in the conduct of diplomacy towards North Korea in the post-Cold War Era? Third, does China, as Pyongyang’s major aid donor, have influence over North Korea’s behavior?
The research finds that Sino-North Korea relations had deteriorated in the mid-1990s, as a result of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992 and the deaths of revolutionary leaders of both countries like Kim Il Sung and Deng Xiaoping in 1994 and 1997 respectively. However, by the late 1990s, US military roles in world affairs became a crucial factor forming ideological solidarity between the two countries and led to the warming of relations since 1999.
China’s purpose in the conduct of diplomacy towards North Korea in the post-Cold War Era is, firstly, to maintain peace and order on the Korean Peninsula by persuading North Korea to join multilateral forum in solving the nuclear crisis and, secondly, to prevent the regime collapse by supplying aids to Pyongyang and strengthening ties with North Korean leaders. However, the two-decade perpetuation of North Korean nuclear crisis implies that China has limited influence over North Korea’s behavior, challenging Keohane and Nye’s concept of “asymmetrical interdependence” which argued that the less vulnerable state will gain more bargaining power over the more vulnerable one.
You can download the full text from https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B6cJLMGN_b7pfld5MzRGX0xoU2tmTE5IRi0wektjUmlOOUV0WGo1ZmdrYkRMcGdLYUhaWDQ&usp=sharing
The article explores the enduring Sino-North Korean Alliance Treaty in the first decade of the post-Cold War era by using Stephen M. Walt’s ideas on factors leading to endurance and collapse of alliance. It argues that the enduring alliance between the two countries in the 1990s was the result of ideological solidarity, that is, the role of the American in East Asia and the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s led to the recovery of relations between the two countries against US hegemony. However, Sino-North Korean relations warmed amid China’s changing security outlook from the Cold War mentality to the so-called “New Security Concept.” In other words, the original rationale of the Sino-North Korean alliance during the Cold War has evaporated.
During the Cold War, Sino-North Korean relations were often described by Chinese leaders as “lips and teeth”, showing the sealed-in-blood friendship between the two countries which fought the American imperialists together in the Korean War (1950-1953). As a matter of fact, the so-called lips and teeth relations were mere rhetoric. This article shows that, in the 1960s, China used the 1961 alliance treaty with North Korea to contain the American and Soviet influences on the Korean Peninsula. As a result, China made a concession to North Korea in the case of border demarcation. However, the process of Sino-American normalization of relations against the Soviet Union in the 1970s made China less receptive to North Korean demands, including its refusal to support Kim Il Sung’s plan to launch the second Korean War in 1975. In addition, Deng Xiaoping’s institution of reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s led to the rise of economic ties between China and South Korea. By 1989, the Sino-Soviet normalization made North Korea less strategically important in Chinese eyes, which in turn resulted in the establishment of Sino-South Korean diplomatic relations in 1992 and the de facto demise of the Sino-North Korean alliance.
The so-called “two-line struggle” has been used as an analytical framework for the study of Chinese elite politics before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, depicting the conflict between Party Chairman Mao Zedong’s revolutionary romanticism and State President Liu Shaoqi’s pragmatism. However, given the fact that Liu repeatedly deferred to Mao on important issues and it was Mao who made final decisions, this article argues that Chinese elite politics in the first half of the 1960s should be viewed as “Mao’s dominance”. Therefore, Liu’s fall during the Cultural Revolution was not because of his defeat in the struggle against Mao, but a result of the “February Adverse Current’ incident in 1967 which forced Mao to reemphasize the legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution by using Liu as a main target.