Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Fundamental Theology at the Theologische Fakultät Fulda/Marburg (Germany) Address: https://www.disse-philosophie.com/
Psychic phenomena can be viewed either from a first-person perspective or from a third-person per... more Psychic phenomena can be viewed either from a first-person perspective or from a third-person perspective. Which of these perspectives can be considered an admissible source for a philosophical interpretation of mental phenomena and under which conditions? My proposed solution is a combined first-third person perspective guided by a methodological rule.
Psychische Phänomene können entweder aus der Erste-Person-Perspektive oder aus der Dritte-Person-Perspektive betrachtet werden. Welche dieser Perspektiven kann unter welchen Voraussetzungen als eine zulässige Quelle für eine philosophische Deutung psychischer Phänomene angesehen werden? Mein Lösungsvorschlag ist eine durch eine Methodenregel geleitete, kombinierte Erste-Dritte-Person-Perspektive.
Psychic phenomena can be viewed either from a first-person perspective or from a third-person per... more Psychic phenomena can be viewed either from a first-person perspective or from a third-person perspective. Which of these perspectives can be considered an admissible source for a philosophical interpretation of mental phenomena and under which conditions? My proposed solution is a combined first-third person perspective guided by a methodological rule.
What do human beings desire? Desire is diverse, multi-layered, often contradictory, directed to t... more What do human beings desire? Desire is diverse, multi-layered, often contradictory, directed to the most various goals: from the satisfaction of the simplest, biologically-related needs, such as hunger, thirst, or sexuality, to elaborate forms of desire for self-realization, social recognition or religious experience. But what is the ultimate goal of desire? Is there such a goal? The book examines desire as a phenomenon in the intersection area of anthropological and psychological philosophy. It deals with the anthropological principle, indicated in Plato and formulated by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, according to which all desire is ultimately directed to a Supreme Good or God. It critically reconsiders this principle by taking into account current phenomenology, empirical psychology and neuroscience.
The history of Western metaphysics is being unfold on the basis of nine outstanding philosophers.... more The history of Western metaphysics is being unfold on the basis of nine outstanding philosophers. For ancient philosophy: Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus; for medieval philosophy: Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham; for the modern period: Descartes, Kant and Hegel. The final chapter outlines some prominent opponents of metaphysics in the 19th/20th Century (Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger). Metaphysics being a fundamental philosophical discipline, this book can also be read as an introduction to philosophy as such.
In Western intellectual history faith is usually subordinated to knowledge. Ideally, mere faith i... more In Western intellectual history faith is usually subordinated to knowledge. Ideally, mere faith is to be overcome by knowledge. However is this view appropriate to the Christian self-understanding? Do we not need to assume that faith always includes some knowledge, that faith and knowledge are directly intertwined? But what kind of knowledge would that be? And what does it mean for the idea of an eschatological knowledge of God? The study examines this issue with reference to the Bible, Thomas Aquinas and Hans Urs von Balthasar.
The book deals with the structure of our concrete experience of freedom according to the existenc... more The book deals with the structure of our concrete experience of freedom according to the existence analysis of Kierkegaard in his pseudonymous works. Contrary to the (pre-)judgment of Modernity that freedom could only be adequately understood as full autonomy, Kierkegaard’s analysis shows that the highest form of freedom is realized not in full autonomy but in a relationship with God and therefore in a dialectic of autonomy and dependence. The starting point of the interpretation is the idea that Kierkegaard’s stages of existence are equivalent to stages of freedom.
L'article est consacre au depassement de la philosophie moderne inauguree par Descartes chez ... more L'article est consacre au depassement de la philosophie moderne inauguree par Descartes chez Theodor Adorno dans ses conceptions de la connaissance et chez Emmanuel Levinas dans ses vues sur l'intersubjectivite. L'A. etudie dans un premier temps la dialectique negative d'Adorno. Il etudie ensuite la meta-anthropologie exposee par Levinas dans Totalite et infini et le detachement de la metaphysique qui y sont operes.
In his late philosophy, Wittgenstein radically dissociates religion and metaphysics. In the first... more In his late philosophy, Wittgenstein radically dissociates religion and metaphysics. In the first and second parts of this paper, the implicit consequences of his critique of metaphysics for his philosophy of religion are analysed. On the one hand, it appears that Wittgenstein, in contrast to Aristotelian metaphysics, has no place for any metaphysical understanding of God, on the other hand, in contrast to Plato's metaphysical epistemology, it becomes evident that for him there is no possibility of any kind of metaphysical experience of God. The last part questions the a-metaphysical foundations of his positive understanding of religion.
Dieu et la fin dernière de l’individu. Une lecture critique de l’éthique de Levinas Jörg Disse Ré... more Dieu et la fin dernière de l’individu. Une lecture critique de l’éthique de Levinas Jörg Disse Résumé La philosophie de l’Autre de Levinas se veut l’explication d’un plan de la réalité humaine qui précède celui du sujet spontané, c’est-à-dire qui précède le plan de l’intentionnalité, du vouloir et de l’agir. Levinas appelle ce plan – entre autres – subjectivité. Or il évite l’idée d’une fin dernière de l’individu 1) en réduisant le plan de la subjectivité pré-spontanée à ce rapport (non-intentionnel et non- téléologique) à l’Autre et en concevant le rapport à Dieu comme passant nécessairement par l’Autre, 2) en identifiant la métaphysique à ce rapport, ce qui lui permet d’éviter de réintroduire la métaphysique traditionnelle sur le plan du sujet spontané, de devoir justifier une fin dernière de l’individu par recours au Dieu onto-théologique, comme le fait par exemple Kant. Au moyen d’une analyse du désir humain, je montre ensuite qu’il n’est pas possible de réduire la subjectivité pré-spontanée au rapport que Levinas décrit. Au niveau de la subjectivité, Dieu se manifeste aussi comme fin ultime du désir. Il y a en plus du rapport à Dieu passant par l’Autre un rapport à Dieu que la subjectivité découvre à l’intérieur d’elle-même, rapport qui dote cette subjectivité d’un caractère téléologique. La présence d’une telle téléologie rend légitime de poser la question de la finalité de l’individu sur le plan du sujet spontané aussi, question à laquelle cependant – Kant l’a bien vu – ne peut être répondu autrement que par la métaphysique au sens traditionnel du terme, la métaphy- sique comme onto-théologie.
cultura & psyché: Journal of Cultural Psychology, 2023
In intersubjectivity research circulates the idea of a second-person perspective as an independen... more In intersubjectivity research circulates the idea of a second-person perspective as an independent epistemic approach to psychological phenomena. In a discussion of the approaches of Michael Pauen and Thomas Fuchs, I would like to show that it does not make sense to introduce a second-person perspective alongside the established first- and third-person perspectives. Based on the assumption that perspectives differ meaningfully from one another solely through the means, through the different channels of experience and not through the relationship with different subject areas, it will be shown that both Pauen and Fuchs ultimately conceive the second-person perspective as the relationship to a specific subject area, and that at the same time there can be no meaningful talk of an independent channel of experience alongside the first- and third-person perspectives.
cultura & psyché: Journal of Cultural Psychology, 2022
ZusammenfassungDer Artikel befasst sich mit der Beziehung zwischen Kunst und Religion in der Phil... more ZusammenfassungDer Artikel befasst sich mit der Beziehung zwischen Kunst und Religion in der Philosophie des französischen Phänomenologen Michel Henry. Henry entwickelt eine Philosophie der Kunst, indem er Kandinskys Kunsttheorie auf der Grundlage seiner Phänomenologie des Lebens interpretiert. Kunst ist ein Ausdruck von Leben bzw. Subjektivität. Unter Leben oder Subjektivität versteht Henry die passive Selbstaffektion des Subjekts diesseits intentionaler Selbstreferenz. Selbstaffektion ist nach Henry nur möglich, wenn sich das Individuum, indem es sich auf sich selbst bezieht, gleichzeitig auf das absolute Leben bezieht. Unter Religion aber versteht Henry diese Bindung des Individuums an das absolute Leben. Indem Kunst Ausdruck des Lebens ist, ist sie somit zugleich ein Ausdruck von Religion.
Sebastian Hüsch, Isabelle Koch & Philipp Thomas (eds.): Negative Knowledge, 2020
La connaissance négative ne se cantonne pas à la connaissance de Dieu. Partant de l’idée d’une co... more La connaissance négative ne se cantonne pas à la connaissance de Dieu. Partant de l’idée d’une conscience préréflexive qu’à la suite de l’école de Heidelberg je considère comme indispensable à une compréhension adéquate de la conscience humaine et dont Jean-Paul Sartre marque la particularité en l’appelant conscience (de) soi, j’affirme, en me référant à Dieter Henrich, qu’il n’y a d’accès à une telle conscience que par une connaissance négative, comme celle développée par Thomas d’Aquin dans sa doctrine de Dieu. Les théories de la conscience de soi de Klaus Düsing et de Michel Henry, qui décrivent cette conscience préréflexive au moyen d’une connaissance positive, attestent l’échec d’une telle entreprise.
Marius Timmann Mjaaland (ed.), The Reformation of Philosophy , 2020
I consider the relationship between the notion of certainty and the notion of a form of life. The... more I consider the relationship between the notion of certainty and the notion of a form of life. There are circumstances under which a feeling of certainty may become the ground for adopting a certain form of life. The forms of life I have in mind are those with a formal orientation towards the realization of the (morally) good for its own sake. The article proceeds in three steps: First I consider Luther’s certainty of salvation as a kind of inaugural (theological) reflection on what will be called immediate certainty as the basis for a form of life aiming at the realization of the morally good for its own sake. With reference to Kierkegaard’s “Either-Or” I then try to show that such an immediate certainty can also be considered as the ground of an ethical form of life without religious implications. With the help of contemporary cognitive psychology I will finally propose an explanation of such a certainty as one that we experience because of our universal cognitive and conative constitution. The three steps amount to a universalization and naturalization of Luther’s certainty of salvation.
The article is a response to Michael Roth´s criticism of my contention that to do the good for it... more The article is a response to Michael Roth´s criticism of my contention that to do the good for its own sake absolutely speaking makes only sense within the limits of a commitment to theism.
Avec Thomas d'Aquin et Richard Swinburne à l'appui, cet article cherche à montrer en premier lieu... more Avec Thomas d'Aquin et Richard Swinburne à l'appui, cet article cherche à montrer en premier lieu que le théisme classique ne parvient pas à réconcilier l'idée de la perfection divine avec la notion moderne de personne. Il propose ensuite une solution consistant à appliquer à la doctrine de Dieu le modèle de complémentarité que Niels Bohr a utilisé pour la première fois en physique quantique pour expliquer (entre autres) la dualité onde-particule. J'applique ce modèle en juxtaposant les deux descriptions, celle d'un Dieu parfait, obtenue par la voie négative, et celle d'un Dieu personne obtenue par la voie positive, de manière à en faire des descriptions contradictoires mais également nécessaires.
Psychic phenomena can be viewed either from a first-person perspective or from a third-person per... more Psychic phenomena can be viewed either from a first-person perspective or from a third-person perspective. Which of these perspectives can be considered an admissible source for a philosophical interpretation of mental phenomena and under which conditions? My proposed solution is a combined first-third person perspective guided by a methodological rule.
Psychische Phänomene können entweder aus der Erste-Person-Perspektive oder aus der Dritte-Person-Perspektive betrachtet werden. Welche dieser Perspektiven kann unter welchen Voraussetzungen als eine zulässige Quelle für eine philosophische Deutung psychischer Phänomene angesehen werden? Mein Lösungsvorschlag ist eine durch eine Methodenregel geleitete, kombinierte Erste-Dritte-Person-Perspektive.
Psychic phenomena can be viewed either from a first-person perspective or from a third-person per... more Psychic phenomena can be viewed either from a first-person perspective or from a third-person perspective. Which of these perspectives can be considered an admissible source for a philosophical interpretation of mental phenomena and under which conditions? My proposed solution is a combined first-third person perspective guided by a methodological rule.
What do human beings desire? Desire is diverse, multi-layered, often contradictory, directed to t... more What do human beings desire? Desire is diverse, multi-layered, often contradictory, directed to the most various goals: from the satisfaction of the simplest, biologically-related needs, such as hunger, thirst, or sexuality, to elaborate forms of desire for self-realization, social recognition or religious experience. But what is the ultimate goal of desire? Is there such a goal? The book examines desire as a phenomenon in the intersection area of anthropological and psychological philosophy. It deals with the anthropological principle, indicated in Plato and formulated by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, according to which all desire is ultimately directed to a Supreme Good or God. It critically reconsiders this principle by taking into account current phenomenology, empirical psychology and neuroscience.
The history of Western metaphysics is being unfold on the basis of nine outstanding philosophers.... more The history of Western metaphysics is being unfold on the basis of nine outstanding philosophers. For ancient philosophy: Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus; for medieval philosophy: Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham; for the modern period: Descartes, Kant and Hegel. The final chapter outlines some prominent opponents of metaphysics in the 19th/20th Century (Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger). Metaphysics being a fundamental philosophical discipline, this book can also be read as an introduction to philosophy as such.
In Western intellectual history faith is usually subordinated to knowledge. Ideally, mere faith i... more In Western intellectual history faith is usually subordinated to knowledge. Ideally, mere faith is to be overcome by knowledge. However is this view appropriate to the Christian self-understanding? Do we not need to assume that faith always includes some knowledge, that faith and knowledge are directly intertwined? But what kind of knowledge would that be? And what does it mean for the idea of an eschatological knowledge of God? The study examines this issue with reference to the Bible, Thomas Aquinas and Hans Urs von Balthasar.
The book deals with the structure of our concrete experience of freedom according to the existenc... more The book deals with the structure of our concrete experience of freedom according to the existence analysis of Kierkegaard in his pseudonymous works. Contrary to the (pre-)judgment of Modernity that freedom could only be adequately understood as full autonomy, Kierkegaard’s analysis shows that the highest form of freedom is realized not in full autonomy but in a relationship with God and therefore in a dialectic of autonomy and dependence. The starting point of the interpretation is the idea that Kierkegaard’s stages of existence are equivalent to stages of freedom.
L'article est consacre au depassement de la philosophie moderne inauguree par Descartes chez ... more L'article est consacre au depassement de la philosophie moderne inauguree par Descartes chez Theodor Adorno dans ses conceptions de la connaissance et chez Emmanuel Levinas dans ses vues sur l'intersubjectivite. L'A. etudie dans un premier temps la dialectique negative d'Adorno. Il etudie ensuite la meta-anthropologie exposee par Levinas dans Totalite et infini et le detachement de la metaphysique qui y sont operes.
In his late philosophy, Wittgenstein radically dissociates religion and metaphysics. In the first... more In his late philosophy, Wittgenstein radically dissociates religion and metaphysics. In the first and second parts of this paper, the implicit consequences of his critique of metaphysics for his philosophy of religion are analysed. On the one hand, it appears that Wittgenstein, in contrast to Aristotelian metaphysics, has no place for any metaphysical understanding of God, on the other hand, in contrast to Plato's metaphysical epistemology, it becomes evident that for him there is no possibility of any kind of metaphysical experience of God. The last part questions the a-metaphysical foundations of his positive understanding of religion.
Dieu et la fin dernière de l’individu. Une lecture critique de l’éthique de Levinas Jörg Disse Ré... more Dieu et la fin dernière de l’individu. Une lecture critique de l’éthique de Levinas Jörg Disse Résumé La philosophie de l’Autre de Levinas se veut l’explication d’un plan de la réalité humaine qui précède celui du sujet spontané, c’est-à-dire qui précède le plan de l’intentionnalité, du vouloir et de l’agir. Levinas appelle ce plan – entre autres – subjectivité. Or il évite l’idée d’une fin dernière de l’individu 1) en réduisant le plan de la subjectivité pré-spontanée à ce rapport (non-intentionnel et non- téléologique) à l’Autre et en concevant le rapport à Dieu comme passant nécessairement par l’Autre, 2) en identifiant la métaphysique à ce rapport, ce qui lui permet d’éviter de réintroduire la métaphysique traditionnelle sur le plan du sujet spontané, de devoir justifier une fin dernière de l’individu par recours au Dieu onto-théologique, comme le fait par exemple Kant. Au moyen d’une analyse du désir humain, je montre ensuite qu’il n’est pas possible de réduire la subjectivité pré-spontanée au rapport que Levinas décrit. Au niveau de la subjectivité, Dieu se manifeste aussi comme fin ultime du désir. Il y a en plus du rapport à Dieu passant par l’Autre un rapport à Dieu que la subjectivité découvre à l’intérieur d’elle-même, rapport qui dote cette subjectivité d’un caractère téléologique. La présence d’une telle téléologie rend légitime de poser la question de la finalité de l’individu sur le plan du sujet spontané aussi, question à laquelle cependant – Kant l’a bien vu – ne peut être répondu autrement que par la métaphysique au sens traditionnel du terme, la métaphy- sique comme onto-théologie.
cultura & psyché: Journal of Cultural Psychology, 2023
In intersubjectivity research circulates the idea of a second-person perspective as an independen... more In intersubjectivity research circulates the idea of a second-person perspective as an independent epistemic approach to psychological phenomena. In a discussion of the approaches of Michael Pauen and Thomas Fuchs, I would like to show that it does not make sense to introduce a second-person perspective alongside the established first- and third-person perspectives. Based on the assumption that perspectives differ meaningfully from one another solely through the means, through the different channels of experience and not through the relationship with different subject areas, it will be shown that both Pauen and Fuchs ultimately conceive the second-person perspective as the relationship to a specific subject area, and that at the same time there can be no meaningful talk of an independent channel of experience alongside the first- and third-person perspectives.
cultura & psyché: Journal of Cultural Psychology, 2022
ZusammenfassungDer Artikel befasst sich mit der Beziehung zwischen Kunst und Religion in der Phil... more ZusammenfassungDer Artikel befasst sich mit der Beziehung zwischen Kunst und Religion in der Philosophie des französischen Phänomenologen Michel Henry. Henry entwickelt eine Philosophie der Kunst, indem er Kandinskys Kunsttheorie auf der Grundlage seiner Phänomenologie des Lebens interpretiert. Kunst ist ein Ausdruck von Leben bzw. Subjektivität. Unter Leben oder Subjektivität versteht Henry die passive Selbstaffektion des Subjekts diesseits intentionaler Selbstreferenz. Selbstaffektion ist nach Henry nur möglich, wenn sich das Individuum, indem es sich auf sich selbst bezieht, gleichzeitig auf das absolute Leben bezieht. Unter Religion aber versteht Henry diese Bindung des Individuums an das absolute Leben. Indem Kunst Ausdruck des Lebens ist, ist sie somit zugleich ein Ausdruck von Religion.
Sebastian Hüsch, Isabelle Koch & Philipp Thomas (eds.): Negative Knowledge, 2020
La connaissance négative ne se cantonne pas à la connaissance de Dieu. Partant de l’idée d’une co... more La connaissance négative ne se cantonne pas à la connaissance de Dieu. Partant de l’idée d’une conscience préréflexive qu’à la suite de l’école de Heidelberg je considère comme indispensable à une compréhension adéquate de la conscience humaine et dont Jean-Paul Sartre marque la particularité en l’appelant conscience (de) soi, j’affirme, en me référant à Dieter Henrich, qu’il n’y a d’accès à une telle conscience que par une connaissance négative, comme celle développée par Thomas d’Aquin dans sa doctrine de Dieu. Les théories de la conscience de soi de Klaus Düsing et de Michel Henry, qui décrivent cette conscience préréflexive au moyen d’une connaissance positive, attestent l’échec d’une telle entreprise.
Marius Timmann Mjaaland (ed.), The Reformation of Philosophy , 2020
I consider the relationship between the notion of certainty and the notion of a form of life. The... more I consider the relationship between the notion of certainty and the notion of a form of life. There are circumstances under which a feeling of certainty may become the ground for adopting a certain form of life. The forms of life I have in mind are those with a formal orientation towards the realization of the (morally) good for its own sake. The article proceeds in three steps: First I consider Luther’s certainty of salvation as a kind of inaugural (theological) reflection on what will be called immediate certainty as the basis for a form of life aiming at the realization of the morally good for its own sake. With reference to Kierkegaard’s “Either-Or” I then try to show that such an immediate certainty can also be considered as the ground of an ethical form of life without religious implications. With the help of contemporary cognitive psychology I will finally propose an explanation of such a certainty as one that we experience because of our universal cognitive and conative constitution. The three steps amount to a universalization and naturalization of Luther’s certainty of salvation.
The article is a response to Michael Roth´s criticism of my contention that to do the good for it... more The article is a response to Michael Roth´s criticism of my contention that to do the good for its own sake absolutely speaking makes only sense within the limits of a commitment to theism.
Avec Thomas d'Aquin et Richard Swinburne à l'appui, cet article cherche à montrer en premier lieu... more Avec Thomas d'Aquin et Richard Swinburne à l'appui, cet article cherche à montrer en premier lieu que le théisme classique ne parvient pas à réconcilier l'idée de la perfection divine avec la notion moderne de personne. Il propose ensuite une solution consistant à appliquer à la doctrine de Dieu le modèle de complémentarité que Niels Bohr a utilisé pour la première fois en physique quantique pour expliquer (entre autres) la dualité onde-particule. J'applique ce modèle en juxtaposant les deux descriptions, celle d'un Dieu parfait, obtenue par la voie négative, et celle d'un Dieu personne obtenue par la voie positive, de manière à en faire des descriptions contradictoires mais également nécessaires.
The article compares Kierkegaard’s and Marcel’s comprehension of existence and communication of e... more The article compares Kierkegaard’s and Marcel’s comprehension of existence and communication of existence. With reference to the notion of existence, both authors (independently from each other) develop the idea of a second reflection that includes a theory of communication. But whereas Kierkegaard conceives communication strictly within a first person perspective, Marcel establishes a kind of second person perspective. For this reason and despite a strong common basis in their views, different aspects of communication of existence are put forward by them.
Thesaurus in vasis fictilibus - 'Schatz in zerbrechlichen Gefäßen' (2 Kor 4,7). Festschrift für Bischof Heinz Josef Algermissen zum 75. Geburtstag., 2015
Whereas with regard to the beginning of the universe, there is much to be said for a convergence ... more Whereas with regard to the beginning of the universe, there is much to be said for a convergence between theology and the natural sciences, for the Christian understanding of creation can be linked quite effortlessly with the astrophysical standard model, things look far less favourable as far as the question of the end of the universe is concerned. Scientific and theological prognoses prove to be diametrically opposed. The essay contrasts the theological solutions of Teilhard de Chardin and John Polkinghorne that attempt to bring about a convergence between natural sciences and theology on this question.
Glück - Werte - Sinn. Metaethische, ethische und theologische Zugänge zur Frage nach dem guten Leben, 2013
Following the empirical cognitive psychology of K.E. Stanovich, but going at the same time beyond... more Following the empirical cognitive psychology of K.E. Stanovich, but going at the same time beyond it, human desire turns out to be essentially shaped by three overriding interests: an interest of genes in replicating themselves, an interest of individuals in their own happiness, and, an interest of reason directed towards the universal realisation of the good for its own sake. Depending on which interest a person is guided by in his or her life, it gives a fundamentally different direction to his or her understanding of the good life. Aditionally, what is a good life, depends on the form of life a person stands for. In the second part, two fundamentally opposed forms of life are examined: an atheistic and a theistic one. It is shown that the atheistic form of life is consistent with the interest of the individual, whereas for the theistic form of life is consistent with the interest of reason. The good life for the atheist consists in the pursuit of his own happiness; the good life for the theist consists in the universal realisation of the good for its own sake.
My aim is to relate Søren A. Kierkegaard's early theory of stages as described basically in "Eith... more My aim is to relate Søren A. Kierkegaard's early theory of stages as described basically in "Either-Or" to the theory of interest underlying the two process model of cognition of the Canadian psychologist Keith E. Stanovich with regard to the question of the highest formal goal we can pursue in our life. On the basis of Stanovich's distinction between type 1 and type 2 processing and Kierkegaard's distinction between an esthetical and an ethical stage of life, I argue for an extension of Stanovich's understanding of the goal structure of type 2 processing, for Kierkegaard's ethical stage of life being a natural expression of our cognitive faculties and for a critical approach to Kierkegaard's idea of a religious stage as hinted at in "Fear and Trembling".
Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 2010
The article deals with the question of whether human beings are religious by nature. The answer i... more The article deals with the question of whether human beings are religious by nature. The answer is based on the idea of relating religion to the structure of human desire understood as essentially a desire for absolute perfection. Religion is defined as a relation to a non-sensual reality superior to the human realm which enables human beings to find orientation in life. The relationship of religion to human desire consists in its being an expression of a natural desire for a perfection extending to the whole of reality. -/- Der Aufsatz befasst sich mit der Frage, ob der Mensch ein von Natur auf Religion angelegtes Wesen ist. Zu ihrer Beantwortung wird das Phänomen der Religion mit der Struktur menschlichen Verlangens als einem grundsätzlichen Verlangen nach Vollkommenheit schlechthin in Verbindung gebracht. Religion wird bestimmt als die Beziehung des Menschen zu einer sich den Sinnen entziehenden, ihm werthaft übergeordneten Wirklichkeit, die Lebensorientierung bietet. Was das Verhältnis zum menschlichen Verlangen betrifft, erweist die so bestimmte Religion sich als Ausdruck einer zur Natur des Menschen gehörigen Sehnsucht nach wirklichkeitsumfassender Vollkommenheit.
Compares Freud's conception of religion being negative for the health of our psyche to Kierkegaar... more Compares Freud's conception of religion being negative for the health of our psyche to Kierkegaard's theory of stages culminating in the necessity of a relationship to God for self-realization.
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Psychische Phänomene können entweder aus der Erste-Person-Perspektive oder aus der Dritte-Person-Perspektive betrachtet werden. Welche dieser Perspektiven kann unter welchen Voraussetzungen als eine zulässige Quelle für eine philosophische Deutung psychischer Phänomene angesehen werden? Mein Lösungsvorschlag ist eine durch eine Methodenregel geleitete, kombinierte Erste-Dritte-Person-Perspektive.
Books by Jörg Disse
Papers by Jörg Disse
Psychische Phänomene können entweder aus der Erste-Person-Perspektive oder aus der Dritte-Person-Perspektive betrachtet werden. Welche dieser Perspektiven kann unter welchen Voraussetzungen als eine zulässige Quelle für eine philosophische Deutung psychischer Phänomene angesehen werden? Mein Lösungsvorschlag ist eine durch eine Methodenregel geleitete, kombinierte Erste-Dritte-Person-Perspektive.