Professor of Philosophy, Tsinghua University, China.
PhD in Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh MA in History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh BS in Materials Physics, Fudan University
Research Interests: Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action Non-Research Interests: Modern Philosophy (from Descartes to Kant), Ethics _ Supervisors: John McDowell
We enjoy immediate knowledge of our own limbs and bodies. I argue that this knowledge, which is a... more We enjoy immediate knowledge of our own limbs and bodies. I argue that this knowledge, which is also called proprioception, is a special form of perception, special in that it is, unlike perception by the external senses, at the same time also a form of genuine self-knowledge. The argument has two parts. Negatively, I argue against the view, held by G. E. M. Anscombe and strengthened by John McDowell, that this knowledge, bodily self-knowledge, is non-perceptual. This involves, inter alia, rescuing from McDowell’s attack the very idea of receptive self-knowledge (of which perceptual self-knowledge is a species). On the positive side, I develop, by drawing on the work of Brian O’Shaughnessy, a detailed account of bodily self-knowledge as a special form of perception. This account spells out how this special form of perception is epistemologically mediated by sensations of a special class of primary qualities—vital-dynamic sensations as I call them—in one’s limbs.
现代西方哲学在心灵与身体之间的关系上往往陷于困境。摆脱困境的一个切入口是身体性自我知识，比如我们关于自己肢体姿势的知识。本文就此做一点初步探索。出发点是以下论断：这种知识不是观察知识（安斯康姆）... more 现代西方哲学在心灵与身体之间的关系上往往陷于困境。摆脱困境的一个切入口是身体性自我知识，比如我们关于自己肢体姿势的知识。本文就此做一点初步探索。出发点是以下论断：这种知识不是观察知识（安斯康姆）或感知性知识（麦克道尔）。然后阐释安斯康姆的另一个论断：这种知识的内容只能通过关涉身体本身的词汇来描述，无法独立描述。该论断凸显了身体性自我知识与五官感觉知识的不同特征，但是否足以断定它不是感知性知识，还有待进一步考量。
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jul 1, 2015
Since the rise of modern natural science there has been deep tension between the concep-tual and ... more Since the rise of modern natural science there has been deep tension between the concep-tual and the natural. Wittgenstein’s discussion of how we learn a sensation-language con-tains important resources that can help us relieve this tension. The key here, I propose, is to focus our attention on animal nature, conceived as partially re-enchanted (in the sense recommended by John McDowell). To see how nature, so conceived, helps us relieve the tension in question, it is crucial to gain a firm and detailed appreciation of how the primi-tive-instinctive, a central part of animal nature, actually serves the conceptual. I offer such an appreciation by closely examining §244 of the Philosophical Investigations and Peter Winch’s discussion of it. The general aim is to bring out a certain kind of Wittgensteinian “naturalism” (not as a theory but as a general reminder), a “naturalism” that is fully alive to the rootedness of conceptuality in nature. A concomitant aim is to illustrate the truth of Wittgenstein’s saying that in philosophy one often has to pay close attention to details.
A dualism characteristic of modern philosophy is the conception of the inner and the outer as two... more A dualism characteristic of modern philosophy is the conception of the inner and the outer as two independently intelligible domains. Wittgenstein’s attack on this dualism contains deep insights. The main insight (excavated from §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations) is this: our sensory consciousness is deeply shaped by language and this shaping plays a fundamental role in the etiology of the dualism. I locate this role in the learning of a sensation-language (as described in §244), by showing that this learning is, under another aspect, the incision of language, namely the infliction of cuts upon certain natural-primitive unities between the inner and the outer. These cuts, driven by powerful forces, eventually harden into an entrenched division between the inner and the outer, thereby providing a constant soil for the dualism. That this dualism is rooted in the very learning of a language is cause for ambivalence about language.
This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on ... more This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion.
这个访谈录包括八位提问者的问题和麦克道尔的回应。主要论题如下：（1）理性如何运作和理性动物如何脱胎于非理性动物这两类问题之间的关系，（2）麦克道尔的概念论、内在论、和析取论，（3）麦克道尔的认识... more 这个访谈录包括八位提问者的问题和麦克道尔的回应。主要论题如下：（1）理性如何运作和理性动物如何脱胎于非理性动物这两类问题之间的关系，（2）麦克道尔的概念论、内在论、和析取论，（3）麦克道尔的认识论、及其“第二自然”观念，（4）所谓“自由意志问题”，（5）哲学的治学之道，和（6）麦克道尔近期的一个比较大的观点变化，即不再认为经验内容是命题性的而转而认为它是直观性的。
We enjoy immediate knowledge of our own limbs and bodies. I argue that this knowledge, which is a... more We enjoy immediate knowledge of our own limbs and bodies. I argue that this knowledge, which is also called proprioception, is a special form of perception, special in that it is, unlike perception by the external senses, at the same time also a form of genuine self-knowledge. The argument has two parts. Negatively, I argue against the view, held by G. E. M. Anscombe and strengthened by John McDowell, that this knowledge, bodily self-knowledge, is non-perceptual. This involves, inter alia, rescuing from McDowell’s attack the very idea of receptive self-knowledge (of which perceptual self-knowledge is a species). On the positive side, I develop, by drawing on the work of Brian O’Shaughnessy, a detailed account of bodily self-knowledge as a special form of perception. This account spells out how this special form of perception is epistemologically mediated by sensations of a special class of primary qualities—vital-dynamic sensations as I call them—in one’s limbs.
现代西方哲学在心灵与身体之间的关系上往往陷于困境。摆脱困境的一个切入口是身体性自我知识，比如我们关于自己肢体姿势的知识。本文就此做一点初步探索。出发点是以下论断：这种知识不是观察知识（安斯康姆）... more 现代西方哲学在心灵与身体之间的关系上往往陷于困境。摆脱困境的一个切入口是身体性自我知识，比如我们关于自己肢体姿势的知识。本文就此做一点初步探索。出发点是以下论断：这种知识不是观察知识（安斯康姆）或感知性知识（麦克道尔）。然后阐释安斯康姆的另一个论断：这种知识的内容只能通过关涉身体本身的词汇来描述，无法独立描述。该论断凸显了身体性自我知识与五官感觉知识的不同特征，但是否足以断定它不是感知性知识，还有待进一步考量。
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Jul 1, 2015
Since the rise of modern natural science there has been deep tension between the concep-tual and ... more Since the rise of modern natural science there has been deep tension between the concep-tual and the natural. Wittgenstein’s discussion of how we learn a sensation-language con-tains important resources that can help us relieve this tension. The key here, I propose, is to focus our attention on animal nature, conceived as partially re-enchanted (in the sense recommended by John McDowell). To see how nature, so conceived, helps us relieve the tension in question, it is crucial to gain a firm and detailed appreciation of how the primi-tive-instinctive, a central part of animal nature, actually serves the conceptual. I offer such an appreciation by closely examining §244 of the Philosophical Investigations and Peter Winch’s discussion of it. The general aim is to bring out a certain kind of Wittgensteinian “naturalism” (not as a theory but as a general reminder), a “naturalism” that is fully alive to the rootedness of conceptuality in nature. A concomitant aim is to illustrate the truth of Wittgenstein’s saying that in philosophy one often has to pay close attention to details.
A dualism characteristic of modern philosophy is the conception of the inner and the outer as two... more A dualism characteristic of modern philosophy is the conception of the inner and the outer as two independently intelligible domains. Wittgenstein’s attack on this dualism contains deep insights. The main insight (excavated from §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations) is this: our sensory consciousness is deeply shaped by language and this shaping plays a fundamental role in the etiology of the dualism. I locate this role in the learning of a sensation-language (as described in §244), by showing that this learning is, under another aspect, the incision of language, namely the infliction of cuts upon certain natural-primitive unities between the inner and the outer. These cuts, driven by powerful forces, eventually harden into an entrenched division between the inner and the outer, thereby providing a constant soil for the dualism. That this dualism is rooted in the very learning of a language is cause for ambivalence about language.
This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on ... more This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion.
这个访谈录包括八位提问者的问题和麦克道尔的回应。主要论题如下：（1）理性如何运作和理性动物如何脱胎于非理性动物这两类问题之间的关系，（2）麦克道尔的概念论、内在论、和析取论，（3）麦克道尔的认识... more 这个访谈录包括八位提问者的问题和麦克道尔的回应。主要论题如下：（1）理性如何运作和理性动物如何脱胎于非理性动物这两类问题之间的关系，（2）麦克道尔的概念论、内在论、和析取论，（3）麦克道尔的认识论、及其“第二自然”观念，（4）所谓“自由意志问题”，（5）哲学的治学之道，和（6）麦克道尔近期的一个比较大的观点变化，即不再认为经验内容是命题性的而转而认为它是直观性的。
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