Alumno Programa de Doctorado en Derecho, U. Austral de Chile (Valdivia). Abogado. Licenciado en Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales por la U. Austral de Chile. Magíster en Derecho (mención Derecho Público) por la U. Austral de Chile. Magíster en Derecho Civil Patrimonial por la U. Diego Portales. Secretario de la Corte de Apelaciones de Valdivia, Chile.
El presente artículo trata acerca de la reacción que una comunidad jurídica tiene ante el “sublev... more El presente artículo trata acerca de la reacción que una comunidad jurídica tiene ante el “sublevado”, esto es, aquel miembro de la comunidad que se autocomprende como un “otro” y que usa la violencia en contra de aquella con un fin subversivo. En particular, cómo es posible la aplicación judicial del derecho del “nosotros” al “otro”.Para ello, se examina la obra "Facticidad y Validez" de Habermas. Se sostendrá que en la teoría discursiva de Habermas, las exigencias de legitimidad del Proceso surgen del status de miembro de la comunidad jurídica, siendo la ausencia de dicho status lo que distingue al justiciable cuando es un "otro político". De modo tal que dicha teoría es ciega ante la situación de aquél, evidenciando la dificultad del derecho para hacerse cargo del fenómeno del sublevado.
This paper is about the reaction that a legal community has against those who rebel (revolted), this is, against that member of the community that it is self understood as an "other" and the one who uses violence against that community with a subversive purpose. In particular, how it can be possible the judicial adjudication of the law of "we/us" to the "other". For this purpose the book "Between Facts and Norms" of Habermas is examined. It argues that in Habermas's discourse theory, the requirements of legitimacy of the process arise from the membership status of the legal community, being the absence of said status what distinguishes the defendant when it is a "political other". So that thistheory is blind to the situation of that one, making evident the jurisprudence difficulty to take over of the phenomenon of the rebel (revolt/insurrection).
Revista de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad de Valparaíso. Chile., Dec 2012
"El presente artículo trata acerca de la reacción que una comunidad jurídica tiene ante el “suble... more "El presente artículo trata acerca de la reacción que una comunidad jurídica tiene ante el “sublevado”, esto es, aquel miembro de la comunidad que se autocomprende como un “otro” y que usa la violencia en contra de aquella con un fin subversivo. En particular, cómo es posible la aplicación judicial del derecho del “nosotros” al “otro”.Para ello, se examina la obra "Facticidad y Validez" de Habermas. Se sostendrá que en la teoría discursiva de Habermas, las exigencias de legitimidad del Proceso surgen del status de miembro de la comunidad jurídica, siendo la ausencia de dicho status lo que distingue al justiciable cuando es un "otro político". De modo tal que dicha teoría es ciega ante la situación de aquél, evidenciando la dificultad del derecho para hacerse cargo del fenómeno del sublevado.
This paper is about the reaction that a legal community has against those who rebel (revolted), this is, against that member of the community that it is self understood as an "other" and the one who uses violence against that community with a subversive purpose. In particular, how it can be possible the judicial adjudication of the law of "we/us" to the "other". For this purpose the book "Between Facts and Norms" of Habermas is examined. It argues that in Habermas's discourse theory, the requirements of legitimacy of the process arise from the membership status of the legal community, being the absence of said status what distinguishes the defendant when it is a "political other". So that this theory is blind to the situation of that one, making evident the jurisprudence difficulty to take over of the phenomenon of the rebel (revolt/insurrection).
"
Capítulo de libro: Núñez; Arriagada & Hunter (Coords.), 2021: Teoría y Práctica del Precedente. V... more Capítulo de libro: Núñez; Arriagada & Hunter (Coords.), 2021: Teoría y Práctica del Precedente. Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, pp. 279-302.
El presente artículo trata acerca de la reacción que una comunidad jurídica tiene ante el “sublev... more El presente artículo trata acerca de la reacción que una comunidad jurídica tiene ante el “sublevado”, esto es, aquel miembro de la comunidad que se autocomprende como un “otro” y que usa la violencia en contra de aquella con un fin subversivo. En particular, cómo es posible la aplicación judicial del derecho del “nosotros” al “otro”.Para ello, se examina la obra "Facticidad y Validez" de Habermas. Se sostendrá que en la teoría discursiva de Habermas, las exigencias de legitimidad del Proceso surgen del status de miembro de la comunidad jurídica, siendo la ausencia de dicho status lo que distingue al justiciable cuando es un "otro político". De modo tal que dicha teoría es ciega ante la situación de aquél, evidenciando la dificultad del derecho para hacerse cargo del fenómeno del sublevado.
This paper is about the reaction that a legal community has against those who rebel (revolted), this is, against that member of the community that it is self understood as an "other" and the one who uses violence against that community with a subversive purpose. In particular, how it can be possible the judicial adjudication of the law of "we/us" to the "other". For this purpose the book "Between Facts and Norms" of Habermas is examined. It argues that in Habermas's discourse theory, the requirements of legitimacy of the process arise from the membership status of the legal community, being the absence of said status what distinguishes the defendant when it is a "political other". So that thistheory is blind to the situation of that one, making evident the jurisprudence difficulty to take over of the phenomenon of the rebel (revolt/insurrection).
Revista de Ciencias Sociales. Universidad de Valparaíso. Chile., Dec 2012
"El presente artículo trata acerca de la reacción que una comunidad jurídica tiene ante el “suble... more "El presente artículo trata acerca de la reacción que una comunidad jurídica tiene ante el “sublevado”, esto es, aquel miembro de la comunidad que se autocomprende como un “otro” y que usa la violencia en contra de aquella con un fin subversivo. En particular, cómo es posible la aplicación judicial del derecho del “nosotros” al “otro”.Para ello, se examina la obra "Facticidad y Validez" de Habermas. Se sostendrá que en la teoría discursiva de Habermas, las exigencias de legitimidad del Proceso surgen del status de miembro de la comunidad jurídica, siendo la ausencia de dicho status lo que distingue al justiciable cuando es un "otro político". De modo tal que dicha teoría es ciega ante la situación de aquél, evidenciando la dificultad del derecho para hacerse cargo del fenómeno del sublevado.
This paper is about the reaction that a legal community has against those who rebel (revolted), this is, against that member of the community that it is self understood as an "other" and the one who uses violence against that community with a subversive purpose. In particular, how it can be possible the judicial adjudication of the law of "we/us" to the "other". For this purpose the book "Between Facts and Norms" of Habermas is examined. It argues that in Habermas's discourse theory, the requirements of legitimacy of the process arise from the membership status of the legal community, being the absence of said status what distinguishes the defendant when it is a "political other". So that this theory is blind to the situation of that one, making evident the jurisprudence difficulty to take over of the phenomenon of the rebel (revolt/insurrection).
"
Capítulo de libro: Núñez; Arriagada & Hunter (Coords.), 2021: Teoría y Práctica del Precedente. V... more Capítulo de libro: Núñez; Arriagada & Hunter (Coords.), 2021: Teoría y Práctica del Precedente. Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, pp. 279-302.
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This paper is about the reaction that a legal community has against those who rebel (revolted), this is, against that member of the community that it is self understood as an "other" and the one who uses violence against that community with a subversive purpose. In particular, how it can be possible the judicial adjudication of the law of "we/us" to the "other". For this purpose the book "Between Facts and Norms" of Habermas is examined. It argues that in Habermas's discourse theory, the requirements of legitimacy of the process arise from the membership status of the legal community, being the absence of said status what distinguishes the defendant when it is a "political other". So that thistheory is blind to the situation of that one, making evident the jurisprudence difficulty to take over of the phenomenon of the rebel (revolt/insurrection).
This paper is about the reaction that a legal community has against those who rebel (revolted), this is, against that member of the community that it is self understood as an "other" and the one who uses violence against that community with a subversive purpose. In particular, how it can be possible the judicial adjudication of the law of "we/us" to the "other". For this purpose the book "Between Facts and Norms" of Habermas is examined. It argues that in Habermas's discourse theory, the requirements of legitimacy of the process arise from the membership status of the legal community, being the absence of said status what distinguishes the defendant when it is a "political other". So that this theory is blind to the situation of that one, making evident the jurisprudence difficulty to take over of the phenomenon of the rebel (revolt/insurrection).
"
This paper is about the reaction that a legal community has against those who rebel (revolted), this is, against that member of the community that it is self understood as an "other" and the one who uses violence against that community with a subversive purpose. In particular, how it can be possible the judicial adjudication of the law of "we/us" to the "other". For this purpose the book "Between Facts and Norms" of Habermas is examined. It argues that in Habermas's discourse theory, the requirements of legitimacy of the process arise from the membership status of the legal community, being the absence of said status what distinguishes the defendant when it is a "political other". So that thistheory is blind to the situation of that one, making evident the jurisprudence difficulty to take over of the phenomenon of the rebel (revolt/insurrection).
This paper is about the reaction that a legal community has against those who rebel (revolted), this is, against that member of the community that it is self understood as an "other" and the one who uses violence against that community with a subversive purpose. In particular, how it can be possible the judicial adjudication of the law of "we/us" to the "other". For this purpose the book "Between Facts and Norms" of Habermas is examined. It argues that in Habermas's discourse theory, the requirements of legitimacy of the process arise from the membership status of the legal community, being the absence of said status what distinguishes the defendant when it is a "political other". So that this theory is blind to the situation of that one, making evident the jurisprudence difficulty to take over of the phenomenon of the rebel (revolt/insurrection).
"