Kartezjańska epistemologia społeczna? Współczesna epistemologia społeczna a wczesna filozofia now... more Kartezjańska epistemologia społeczna? Współczesna epistemologia społeczna a wczesna filozofia nowożytna Wielu współczesnych epistemologów społecznych uważa, że tocząc batalię z indywidualistycznym podejściem do wiedzy, walczy tym samym z podejściem do wiedzy opisanym przez Kartezjusza. Choć wypada się zgodzić, że Kartezjusz przedstawia indywidualistyczny obraz wiedzy naukowej, niemniej trzeba dodać, że wskazuje on na istotne praktyczne funkcje odnoszenia się do świadectw i przekonań innych osób. Jednakże zrozumienie racji Kartezjusza za zaangażowaniem się w indywidualizm pozwala nam na identyfikację kluczowych wyzwań, z jakimi spotka się epistemologia społeczna, m.in., że poleganie na świadectwach innych może propagować uprzedzenia oraz hamować autentyczne zrozumienie. Implikacje zawarte u Kartezjusza zostały opracowywane i rozwinięte przez niektórych z jego bezpośrednich spadkobierców. W prezentowanym tekście zostanie przedstawione, jak np. François Poulain de la Barre oraz w pewny...
... appears here as the central educational philosopher of the Enlighten-ment liberal movement, i... more ... appears here as the central educational philosopher of the Enlighten-ment liberal movement, in a section authored by Professor Nathan Tarcov, but ... doctrine in the universities, since most people derived their opinions from the clergy and the learned among the gentry, who in ...
Etude de la conception de la causation formelle developpee par Descartes contre la theorie scolas... more Etude de la conception de la causation formelle developpee par Descartes contre la theorie scolastique des especes. Definissant la cause comme premisse de l'explication, Descartes substitue a l'explication des formes substantielles et des especes intentionnelles l'explication de la formation des idees concernant la perception des sens
THAT DESCARTES WAS INTERESTED from the very start of his philosophic career in developing a metho... more THAT DESCARTES WAS INTERESTED from the very start of his philosophic career in developing a method for problem-solving that could be applied generally to the solution of "unknowns" is well known. Also well known is the further development of the method by the introduction of the technique of hyperbolic doubt in his mature, metaphysical works, especially in the Meditations. Perhaps less widely appreciated is the important role that accounts of systems of signs played in the development of his early accounts of a method; it is crucial to the method that the elements of problems be identified and signified by simple and convenient signs that can then be arranged to display the relations among the known elements and the unknown solution. Commentators such as Michel Foucault(1) have brought this interest in signification to our attention and shown the widespread importance of such projects in the seventeenth century. Few, however, have examined the relation between the early pr...
Kartezjańska epistemologia społeczna? Współczesna epistemologia społeczna a wczesna filozofia now... more Kartezjańska epistemologia społeczna? Współczesna epistemologia społeczna a wczesna filozofia nowożytna Wielu współczesnych epistemologów społecznych uważa, że tocząc batalię z indywidualistycznym podejściem do wiedzy, walczy tym samym z podejściem do wiedzy opisanym przez Kartezjusza. Choć wypada się zgodzić, że Kartezjusz przedstawia indywidualistyczny obraz wiedzy naukowej, niemniej trzeba dodać, że wskazuje on na istotne praktyczne funkcje odnoszenia się do świadectw i przekonań innych osób. Jednakże zrozumienie racji Kartezjusza za zaangażowaniem się w indywidualizm pozwala nam na identyfikację kluczowych wyzwań, z jakimi spotka się epistemologia społeczna, m.in., że poleganie na świadectwach innych może propagować uprzedzenia oraz hamować autentyczne zrozumienie. Implikacje zawarte u Kartezjusza zostały opracowywane i rozwinięte przez niektórych z jego bezpośrednich spadkobierców. W prezentowanym tekście zostanie przedstawione, jak np. François Poulain de la Barre oraz w pewny...
... appears here as the central educational philosopher of the Enlighten-ment liberal movement, i... more ... appears here as the central educational philosopher of the Enlighten-ment liberal movement, in a section authored by Professor Nathan Tarcov, but ... doctrine in the universities, since most people derived their opinions from the clergy and the learned among the gentry, who in ...
Etude de la conception de la causation formelle developpee par Descartes contre la theorie scolas... more Etude de la conception de la causation formelle developpee par Descartes contre la theorie scolastique des especes. Definissant la cause comme premisse de l'explication, Descartes substitue a l'explication des formes substantielles et des especes intentionnelles l'explication de la formation des idees concernant la perception des sens
THAT DESCARTES WAS INTERESTED from the very start of his philosophic career in developing a metho... more THAT DESCARTES WAS INTERESTED from the very start of his philosophic career in developing a method for problem-solving that could be applied generally to the solution of "unknowns" is well known. Also well known is the further development of the method by the introduction of the technique of hyperbolic doubt in his mature, metaphysical works, especially in the Meditations. Perhaps less widely appreciated is the important role that accounts of systems of signs played in the development of his early accounts of a method; it is crucial to the method that the elements of problems be identified and signified by simple and convenient signs that can then be arranged to display the relations among the known elements and the unknown solution. Commentators such as Michel Foucault(1) have brought this interest in signification to our attention and shown the widespread importance of such projects in the seventeenth century. Few, however, have examined the relation between the early pr...
Talk delivered at the Hume Conference, July 2018, Budapest, Hungary.
Previous, longer version ... more Talk delivered at the Hume Conference, July 2018, Budapest, Hungary.
Previous, longer version delivered at the Hume Society meeting, American Philosophical Association, February 2018, Chicago, Il USA;
Previous version also shared with members of my seminar, "Hume's Ethics & Aesthetics (Passions & Sentiments)," winter 2018.
Thanks to all the thoughtful and patient people in these venues!
Hume draws frequent and strong analogies between moral and aesthetic judgment. Both are grounded on sentimental responses; moral judgments are responses to beauties of character; and true taste is a virtue of character. I do not want to deny the importance of the comparison, but I do want to advise caution about assimilating aesthetic and moral normativity. I illustrate some points of difference by considering how Hume thinks we judge the characters of those who show good (or bad) aesthetic or moral judgment and what sorts of abilities go into the ability for each kind of judgment. I argue that good aesthetic judge shows a kind of special expertise that is not demanded for moral judgment and that there are good social reasons for the difference.
Plan for a seminar held 19 September 2015,
at the conference “Memory, Aesthetics, and Ethics,”
p... more Plan for a seminar held 19 September 2015, at the conference “Memory, Aesthetics, and Ethics,” part of the “Affect Project,” Fort Garry Hotel, Winnipeg, MB.
“What Do Women Want in a Feminist History of Philosophy?”
What might women want in a feminist ... more “What Do Women Want in a Feminist History of Philosophy?”
What might women want in a feminist history of philosophy? Many things, surely. But here I will try to make a case that we should want a nuanced history of reception – on the grounds that attention to reception is one important way to make our investigations of philosophical history serve (current) feminist ends. Part of this case will involve a bit of reflection on the aims and importance of the history of philosophy and part on considering some of the legacies of Descartes and Hume, two philosophers with very different evaluations from contemporary feminists.
Although taxonomy is often a dull and dusty business, it thrived among seventeenth-century writer... more Although taxonomy is often a dull and dusty business, it thrived among seventeenth-century writers on the passions. What motivated their almost obsessive interest? Most authors of the period identified and categorized the passions in ways derived from earlier taxonomies (particularly those found in Aristotle, the Stoics and Aquinas). Their deliberate choices proved efficient devices for marking intellectual affiliations and demonstrating allegiances to specific theories of mind. But not surprisingly, such genuinely innovative philosophers as Descartes and Hobbes produced genuinely innovative enumerations, which differed from what had gone before by identifying different lists and numbers of passions, positing novel principles of divisions, and redrawing “family” groupings. A particularly telling innovation is their identification of distinctive focal passions: within the economy of the alternative catalogues, such leading passions serve to delineate the accounts of the mind and its faculties, and even to encapsulate general approaches to philosophical explanation. I will analyze a few features of these novel classifications and how they arose to account for the “functions,” content and correction of the passions, particularly in the wake of widespread early modern suspicion about final causation. My hope is that attention to the aims and contexts of such classificatory-explanatory apparatuses can help us to appreciate some of the most alien, yet characteristic passions of the period, such as Descartes’s “admiration” and Hobbes's “glory.”
Although taxonomy is often a dull and dusty business, it thrived among seventeenth-century writer... more Although taxonomy is often a dull and dusty business, it thrived among seventeenth-century writers on the passions. What motivated their almost obsessive interest? Most authors of the period identified and categorized the passions in ways derived from earlier taxonomies (particularly those found in Aristotle, the Stoics and Aquinas). Their deliberate choices proved efficient devices for marking intellectual affiliations and demonstrating allegiances to specific theories of mind. But not surprisingly, such
genuinely innovative philosophers as Descartes and Hobbes produced genuinely innovative enumerations, which differed from what had gone before by identifying different lists and numbers of passions, positing novel principles of divisions, and redrawing “family” groupings. A particularly telling innovation is their identification of distinctive focal passions: within the economy of the alternative catalogues, such leading passions serve to delineate the accounts of the mind and its faculties, and even to
encapsulate general approaches to philosophical explanation. I will analyze a few features of these novel classifications and how they arose to account for the “functions,” content and correction of the passions, particularly in the wake of widespread early modern
suspicion about final causation. My hope is that attention to the aims and contexts of such classificatory-explanatory apparatuses can help us to appreciate some of the most alien, yet characteristic passions of the period, such as Descartes’s “admiration” and Hobbes's “glory.”
This is the slide show for a seminar, held at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia,... more This is the slide show for a seminar, held at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia, 20 April 2016, 6-9 p.m.
This is the slide show for a seminar, held at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia,... more This is the slide show for a seminar, held at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia, 19 April 2016, 6-9 p.m.
This is the slide show for a seminar, held at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia,... more This is the slide show for a seminar, held at Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia, 18 April 2016, 6-9 p.m.
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Previous, longer version delivered at the Hume Society meeting, American Philosophical Association, February 2018, Chicago, Il USA;
Previous version also shared with members of my seminar, "Hume's Ethics & Aesthetics (Passions & Sentiments)," winter 2018.
Thanks to all the thoughtful and patient people in these venues!
Hume draws frequent and strong analogies between moral and aesthetic judgment. Both are grounded on sentimental responses; moral judgments are responses to beauties of character; and true taste is a virtue of character. I do not want to deny the importance of the comparison, but I do want to advise caution about assimilating aesthetic and moral normativity. I illustrate some points of difference by considering how Hume thinks we judge the characters of those who show good (or bad) aesthetic or moral judgment and what sorts of abilities go into the ability for each kind of judgment. I argue that good aesthetic judge shows a kind of special expertise that is not demanded for moral judgment and that there are good social reasons for the difference.
at the conference “Memory, Aesthetics, and Ethics,”
part of the “Affect Project,” Fort Garry Hotel, Winnipeg, MB.
What might women want in a feminist history of philosophy? Many things, surely. But here I will try to make a case that we should want a nuanced history of reception – on the grounds that attention to reception is one important way to make our investigations of philosophical history serve (current) feminist ends. Part of this case will involve a bit of reflection on the aims and importance of the history of philosophy and part on considering some of the legacies of Descartes and Hume, two philosophers with very different evaluations from contemporary feminists.
genuinely innovative philosophers as Descartes and Hobbes produced genuinely innovative enumerations, which differed from what had gone before by identifying different lists and numbers of passions, positing novel principles of divisions, and redrawing “family” groupings. A particularly telling innovation is their identification of distinctive focal passions: within the economy of the alternative catalogues, such leading passions serve to delineate the accounts of the mind and its faculties, and even to
encapsulate general approaches to philosophical explanation. I will analyze a few features of these novel classifications and how they arose to account for the “functions,” content and correction of the passions, particularly in the wake of widespread early modern
suspicion about final causation. My hope is that attention to the aims and contexts of such classificatory-explanatory apparatuses can help us to appreciate some of the most alien, yet characteristic passions of the period, such as Descartes’s “admiration” and Hobbes's “glory.”