Yuval Harari believes that humans make myths, and that these can be powerful engines for social c... more Yuval Harari believes that humans make myths, and that these can be powerful engines for social change. One of these myths, claims Harari, is the existence of 'liberal rights'. This article challenges that claim and defends the idea of grounding rights in human nature.
Understanding religious music is challenging. Indeed, the whole idea can seem perplexing and prob... more Understanding religious music is challenging. Indeed, the whole idea can seem perplexing and problematic. In this paper, a number of ways of understanding religious music are sketched. Seven main models are distinguished: the side-effect model, the ringtone model, the honey model, the addition model, the fitting beauty model, the organic unity model, and the similarity model. Some issues concerning Bach’s Sacred Cantatas are then considered in order to see how these approaches apply in one particularly controversial and puzzling example.
I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions th... more I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.
I construe the expressivist task with respect to the Frege-Geach problem as a simulation game, wh... more I construe the expressivist task with respect to the Frege-Geach problem as a simulation game, whereby the inferential roles characteristic of logical constant thought is explained in expressivist terms. I suggest that basis on which the relevant roles may be explained are rational consistencies and inconsistences among sentiments, and I show how this may also deliver moral propositions.
I argue against inferentialism about logic. First, I argue against an analogy between logic and c... more I argue against inferentialism about logic. First, I argue against an analogy between logic and chess, before considering a more basic objection to stipulating inference rules as a way of establishing the meaning of logical constants. The objection-the Mushroom Omelette Objection-is that stipulative acts are partly constituted by logical notions, and therefore cannot be used to explain logical thought. I then argue that the same problem also attaches to following existing conventional rules, since either those rules have logical contents, or following those conventional rules is done for logical reasons. Lastly, I compare this argument with other arguments found in Quine's early work, and consider two attempts to reply to Quine.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2021
I argue that eating meat is morally good and our duty when it is part of a practice that has bene... more I argue that eating meat is morally good and our duty when it is part of a practice that has benefited animals. The existence of domesticated animals depends on the practice of eating them, and the meat-eating practice benefits animals of that kind if they have good lives. The argument is not consequentialist but historical, and it does not apply to nondomesticated animals. I refine the argument and consider objections.
In this paper epistemic pluralism concerning knowledge is taken to be the claim that very differe... more In this paper epistemic pluralism concerning knowledge is taken to be the claim that very different facts may constitute knowledge. The paper argues for pluralism by arguing that very different facts can constitute the knowledge-making links between beliefs and facts. If pluralism is right, we need not anxiously seek a unified account of the links between beliefs and facts that partly constitute knowledge in different cases of knowledge. The paper argues that no good reasons have been put forward in favour of believing in a unified maker of knowledge. It then appeals to the role of knowledge in order to argue that we have positive reason to embrace pluralism.
I foreground the principle of epistemic dependence. I isolate that relation and distinguish it fr... more I foreground the principle of epistemic dependence. I isolate that relation and distinguish it from other relations and note what it does and does not entail. In particular, I distinguish between dependence and necessitation. This has many interesting consequences. On the negative side, many standard arguments in episte-mology are subverted. More positively, once we are liberated from the necessary and sufficient conditions project, many fruitful paths for future epistemological investigation open up. I argue that that not being defeated does not make for knowledge. And I argue for the multiple realization of epistemic properties in non-epistemic properties. If we know something then there is something in virtue of which we know it; and if we are justified in believing something then there is something in virtue of which we are justified in believing it. That much is relatively uncontroversial. Only slightly more controversial is the claim that our having an epistemic achievement, such as knowing something or being justified in believing something, depends on how we are in non-epistemic respects. That is, instantiating epistemic properties depends on our instantiating non-epistemic properties. In this paper, I argue that epistemic/non-epistemic dependence should be given a central place in epistemology, and that doing so has significant consequences. In the first part of this paper, the dependence approach is contrasted with what I shall call " the necessary and sufficient conditions project " the project of attempting to give necessary and sufficient conditions for someone knowing something or being justified in believing something. Although statements of the goal of uncovering necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge or justification are common in the first few pages of epistemology textbooks and articles, I have yet to find an articulation or defense of the project to take as an explicit target. It is usually briefly stated, in passing, as if it were obvious, before moving on. So I will proceed by
I argue that non‐naturalist moral realism does not have a problem with supervenience. The necessi... more I argue that non‐naturalist moral realism does not have a problem with supervenience. The necessities may be explained as flowing from the essence of moral properties. It is still true that non‐naturalism embraces necessary connections between distinct things, thus offending against ‘Hume's Principle’ according to which there are no such connections. Therefore, the apparent appeal of Hume's principle needs addressing. Hume's Principle faces a tsunami of counterexamples, of both abstract and non‐abstract kinds of things. Furthermore, Hume's Principle lacks any motivation and is highly revisionary of ordinary modal thought. Not only are supervenience objections to non‐naturalism that draw on Hume's principle ineffective, but also the modal presuppositions of the supervenience argument are far stranger than anything in non‐naturalism.
I raise the issue over why human beings should be concerned with God even if He created the world... more I raise the issue over why human beings should be concerned with God even if He created the world and even if He is responsible for Morality. I describe God's apparent irrelevance to human beings. In response, I consider and reject a Neo-Aristotelian solution. Instead I propose a Neoplatonist approach, which is cautiously endorsed. The nature of participation is briefly discussed. As an illustration, I consider free will from a Neoplatonist point of view. Jewish and Christian approaches to perfection are then contrasted. I conclude with the advantages of Neoplatonism over Neo-Aristotelianism.
Hanslick in Context, (eds) Alexander Wilfing, Christoph Landerer and Meike Wilfing-Albrecht, Hollitzer Press: Vienna., 2020
Hanslick has a subtle and compelling account of non-absolute music. I articulate and defend that ... more Hanslick has a subtle and compelling account of non-absolute music. I articulate and defend that account so that it throws light on his conception of absolute music. Hanslick thinks that aiming at musical-beauty is the essence of (most) music. Nevertheless, Hanslick recognizes the variety of things that music does apart from aiming at musical-beauty, even though he does think that musical-beauty is in some sense the central function or purpose of (most) music. Music with only the musical-beauty function can be called ‘absolute music’; but much music does more than that. I describe the way that Hanslick puts musical-beauty at the centre of his understanding of music, whether absolute or non-absolute. Making musical-beauty central and essential to all music, as Hanslick does, allows that things with musical-beauty functions can also have other functions--in particular, they can be the setting for words to express feelings. But Hanslick denies the equality of music and text when the two are combined: music, he thinks, has priority. Spelling out this priority means probing what I call the ‘back door’ to Hanslick’s general view of music, which is his claim that the nature of instrumental music gives the nature of all music; so non-absolute music is music in virtue of its musical-beauty function. Why believe that? Hanslick has arguments. What I call the ‘key to the back door’ of Hanslick’s view of music is: first, his argument that small variations in the music can spoil the beauty of the whole, while small variations in the text do not; and second, his argument that the musical-beauty of a music-text combination does not consist in expressing the text well. These arguments are persuasive, and they show that musical-beauty, where music is combined with text, does not consist primarily in the poetic theme, but it does consist primarily in the instrumental aspects of the music. If so, there is no equality between music and text. This is why good music (like good architecture) is adaptable to a variety of different texts and purposes.
Disinterested Pleasure and Beauty. Perspectives from Kantian and Contemporary Aesthetics. Berger, Larissa (Ed.). Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, pp. 59–85., 2023
Kant makes modest and ambitious claims with his idea of disinterested
pleasure. The modest claim ... more Kant makes modest and ambitious claims with his idea of disinterested pleasure. The modest claim is that all aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. The ambitious claim is that all and only aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. I defend only the modest claim. I initially give a basic explication of what Kant had in mind by the doctrine. I then argue that if aesthetic pleasure were not basically disinterested, judgements of taste could not make the normative (or “universal”) claims they do. Normativity is essential to judgements of taste; they would not be what they are without it. And basic disinterest is essential for normativity. Therefore, we cannot reject basic disinterestedness without rejecting judgements of taste altogether. I then distinguish various other notions of disinterest and argue that none of them allow Kant to make his ambitions claim.
I analyze and defend Kant's claim in the Critique of the Power of Judgement that pleasure in the ... more I analyze and defend Kant's claim in the Critique of the Power of Judgement that pleasure in the good is interested.
I look closely at one passage of the Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche discusses Kant’s doctrin... more I look closely at one passage of the Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche discusses Kant’s doctrine that the judgement of taste is disinterestedness. I separate Kant's view that the judgement of taste claims universal validity from Kant’s view that the judgement of taste should be impersonal and impartial. I then argue that Nietzsche has an interesting critique of the impersonal and impartial aspect of Kant’s disinterestedness doctrine, as opposed to claim to the universal validity of the judgement of taste. For Kant, the judgement of taste rests on something universal in human nature. So correct judgements of taste, like moral virtue, are available to all. Nietzsche disputes this democratic view. I highlight the distance between Nietzsche's critique and the much less interesting and less plausible views of various relativists, Marxists and feminists who have thought that Kant’s view that the judgement of taste claims universal validity is faulty. But for Nietzsche, this is unproblematic. I then address Nietzsche remarks about erotic beauty, which he contrasts with the pure pleasure in beauty. I show how Nietzsche’s is not criticizing Kant’s account of the pure judgment of taste. He thinks that Kant is right that such pleasures are actual and possible. (Nietzsche is no proto-Freudian.) Nietzsche’s point, however, is to question the Kantian value judgment, which ranks the pure disinterested pleasures above impure interested erotic pleasures. I connect the two themes since, I conjecture, the latter pleasure are the ecstatic pleasures of passionate noble souls who have access to higher beauty. On both these point, Nietzsche poses a profound challenge to Kant.
This commentary discusses various shortcomings in Chapman & Huffman's (2018) denial of difference... more This commentary discusses various shortcomings in Chapman & Huffman's (2018) denial of differences between human beings and animals and the ethical consequences they think turn on this. Rationality is proposed as a candidate for such a difference, one that also has acceptable ethical consequences.
Yuval Harari believes that humans make myths, and that these can be powerful engines for social c... more Yuval Harari believes that humans make myths, and that these can be powerful engines for social change. One of these myths, claims Harari, is the existence of 'liberal rights'. This article challenges that claim and defends the idea of grounding rights in human nature.
Understanding religious music is challenging. Indeed, the whole idea can seem perplexing and prob... more Understanding religious music is challenging. Indeed, the whole idea can seem perplexing and problematic. In this paper, a number of ways of understanding religious music are sketched. Seven main models are distinguished: the side-effect model, the ringtone model, the honey model, the addition model, the fitting beauty model, the organic unity model, and the similarity model. Some issues concerning Bach’s Sacred Cantatas are then considered in order to see how these approaches apply in one particularly controversial and puzzling example.
I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions th... more I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.
I construe the expressivist task with respect to the Frege-Geach problem as a simulation game, wh... more I construe the expressivist task with respect to the Frege-Geach problem as a simulation game, whereby the inferential roles characteristic of logical constant thought is explained in expressivist terms. I suggest that basis on which the relevant roles may be explained are rational consistencies and inconsistences among sentiments, and I show how this may also deliver moral propositions.
I argue against inferentialism about logic. First, I argue against an analogy between logic and c... more I argue against inferentialism about logic. First, I argue against an analogy between logic and chess, before considering a more basic objection to stipulating inference rules as a way of establishing the meaning of logical constants. The objection-the Mushroom Omelette Objection-is that stipulative acts are partly constituted by logical notions, and therefore cannot be used to explain logical thought. I then argue that the same problem also attaches to following existing conventional rules, since either those rules have logical contents, or following those conventional rules is done for logical reasons. Lastly, I compare this argument with other arguments found in Quine's early work, and consider two attempts to reply to Quine.
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2021
I argue that eating meat is morally good and our duty when it is part of a practice that has bene... more I argue that eating meat is morally good and our duty when it is part of a practice that has benefited animals. The existence of domesticated animals depends on the practice of eating them, and the meat-eating practice benefits animals of that kind if they have good lives. The argument is not consequentialist but historical, and it does not apply to nondomesticated animals. I refine the argument and consider objections.
In this paper epistemic pluralism concerning knowledge is taken to be the claim that very differe... more In this paper epistemic pluralism concerning knowledge is taken to be the claim that very different facts may constitute knowledge. The paper argues for pluralism by arguing that very different facts can constitute the knowledge-making links between beliefs and facts. If pluralism is right, we need not anxiously seek a unified account of the links between beliefs and facts that partly constitute knowledge in different cases of knowledge. The paper argues that no good reasons have been put forward in favour of believing in a unified maker of knowledge. It then appeals to the role of knowledge in order to argue that we have positive reason to embrace pluralism.
I foreground the principle of epistemic dependence. I isolate that relation and distinguish it fr... more I foreground the principle of epistemic dependence. I isolate that relation and distinguish it from other relations and note what it does and does not entail. In particular, I distinguish between dependence and necessitation. This has many interesting consequences. On the negative side, many standard arguments in episte-mology are subverted. More positively, once we are liberated from the necessary and sufficient conditions project, many fruitful paths for future epistemological investigation open up. I argue that that not being defeated does not make for knowledge. And I argue for the multiple realization of epistemic properties in non-epistemic properties. If we know something then there is something in virtue of which we know it; and if we are justified in believing something then there is something in virtue of which we are justified in believing it. That much is relatively uncontroversial. Only slightly more controversial is the claim that our having an epistemic achievement, such as knowing something or being justified in believing something, depends on how we are in non-epistemic respects. That is, instantiating epistemic properties depends on our instantiating non-epistemic properties. In this paper, I argue that epistemic/non-epistemic dependence should be given a central place in epistemology, and that doing so has significant consequences. In the first part of this paper, the dependence approach is contrasted with what I shall call " the necessary and sufficient conditions project " the project of attempting to give necessary and sufficient conditions for someone knowing something or being justified in believing something. Although statements of the goal of uncovering necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge or justification are common in the first few pages of epistemology textbooks and articles, I have yet to find an articulation or defense of the project to take as an explicit target. It is usually briefly stated, in passing, as if it were obvious, before moving on. So I will proceed by
I argue that non‐naturalist moral realism does not have a problem with supervenience. The necessi... more I argue that non‐naturalist moral realism does not have a problem with supervenience. The necessities may be explained as flowing from the essence of moral properties. It is still true that non‐naturalism embraces necessary connections between distinct things, thus offending against ‘Hume's Principle’ according to which there are no such connections. Therefore, the apparent appeal of Hume's principle needs addressing. Hume's Principle faces a tsunami of counterexamples, of both abstract and non‐abstract kinds of things. Furthermore, Hume's Principle lacks any motivation and is highly revisionary of ordinary modal thought. Not only are supervenience objections to non‐naturalism that draw on Hume's principle ineffective, but also the modal presuppositions of the supervenience argument are far stranger than anything in non‐naturalism.
I raise the issue over why human beings should be concerned with God even if He created the world... more I raise the issue over why human beings should be concerned with God even if He created the world and even if He is responsible for Morality. I describe God's apparent irrelevance to human beings. In response, I consider and reject a Neo-Aristotelian solution. Instead I propose a Neoplatonist approach, which is cautiously endorsed. The nature of participation is briefly discussed. As an illustration, I consider free will from a Neoplatonist point of view. Jewish and Christian approaches to perfection are then contrasted. I conclude with the advantages of Neoplatonism over Neo-Aristotelianism.
Hanslick in Context, (eds) Alexander Wilfing, Christoph Landerer and Meike Wilfing-Albrecht, Hollitzer Press: Vienna., 2020
Hanslick has a subtle and compelling account of non-absolute music. I articulate and defend that ... more Hanslick has a subtle and compelling account of non-absolute music. I articulate and defend that account so that it throws light on his conception of absolute music. Hanslick thinks that aiming at musical-beauty is the essence of (most) music. Nevertheless, Hanslick recognizes the variety of things that music does apart from aiming at musical-beauty, even though he does think that musical-beauty is in some sense the central function or purpose of (most) music. Music with only the musical-beauty function can be called ‘absolute music’; but much music does more than that. I describe the way that Hanslick puts musical-beauty at the centre of his understanding of music, whether absolute or non-absolute. Making musical-beauty central and essential to all music, as Hanslick does, allows that things with musical-beauty functions can also have other functions--in particular, they can be the setting for words to express feelings. But Hanslick denies the equality of music and text when the two are combined: music, he thinks, has priority. Spelling out this priority means probing what I call the ‘back door’ to Hanslick’s general view of music, which is his claim that the nature of instrumental music gives the nature of all music; so non-absolute music is music in virtue of its musical-beauty function. Why believe that? Hanslick has arguments. What I call the ‘key to the back door’ of Hanslick’s view of music is: first, his argument that small variations in the music can spoil the beauty of the whole, while small variations in the text do not; and second, his argument that the musical-beauty of a music-text combination does not consist in expressing the text well. These arguments are persuasive, and they show that musical-beauty, where music is combined with text, does not consist primarily in the poetic theme, but it does consist primarily in the instrumental aspects of the music. If so, there is no equality between music and text. This is why good music (like good architecture) is adaptable to a variety of different texts and purposes.
Disinterested Pleasure and Beauty. Perspectives from Kantian and Contemporary Aesthetics. Berger, Larissa (Ed.). Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, pp. 59–85., 2023
Kant makes modest and ambitious claims with his idea of disinterested
pleasure. The modest claim ... more Kant makes modest and ambitious claims with his idea of disinterested pleasure. The modest claim is that all aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. The ambitious claim is that all and only aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. I defend only the modest claim. I initially give a basic explication of what Kant had in mind by the doctrine. I then argue that if aesthetic pleasure were not basically disinterested, judgements of taste could not make the normative (or “universal”) claims they do. Normativity is essential to judgements of taste; they would not be what they are without it. And basic disinterest is essential for normativity. Therefore, we cannot reject basic disinterestedness without rejecting judgements of taste altogether. I then distinguish various other notions of disinterest and argue that none of them allow Kant to make his ambitions claim.
I analyze and defend Kant's claim in the Critique of the Power of Judgement that pleasure in the ... more I analyze and defend Kant's claim in the Critique of the Power of Judgement that pleasure in the good is interested.
I look closely at one passage of the Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche discusses Kant’s doctrin... more I look closely at one passage of the Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche discusses Kant’s doctrine that the judgement of taste is disinterestedness. I separate Kant's view that the judgement of taste claims universal validity from Kant’s view that the judgement of taste should be impersonal and impartial. I then argue that Nietzsche has an interesting critique of the impersonal and impartial aspect of Kant’s disinterestedness doctrine, as opposed to claim to the universal validity of the judgement of taste. For Kant, the judgement of taste rests on something universal in human nature. So correct judgements of taste, like moral virtue, are available to all. Nietzsche disputes this democratic view. I highlight the distance between Nietzsche's critique and the much less interesting and less plausible views of various relativists, Marxists and feminists who have thought that Kant’s view that the judgement of taste claims universal validity is faulty. But for Nietzsche, this is unproblematic. I then address Nietzsche remarks about erotic beauty, which he contrasts with the pure pleasure in beauty. I show how Nietzsche’s is not criticizing Kant’s account of the pure judgment of taste. He thinks that Kant is right that such pleasures are actual and possible. (Nietzsche is no proto-Freudian.) Nietzsche’s point, however, is to question the Kantian value judgment, which ranks the pure disinterested pleasures above impure interested erotic pleasures. I connect the two themes since, I conjecture, the latter pleasure are the ecstatic pleasures of passionate noble souls who have access to higher beauty. On both these point, Nietzsche poses a profound challenge to Kant.
This commentary discusses various shortcomings in Chapman & Huffman's (2018) denial of difference... more This commentary discusses various shortcomings in Chapman & Huffman's (2018) denial of differences between human beings and animals and the ethical consequences they think turn on this. Rationality is proposed as a candidate for such a difference, one that also has acceptable ethical consequences.
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Papers by nick zangwill
pleasure. The modest claim is that all aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. The ambitious claim is that all and only aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. I defend only the modest claim. I initially give a basic explication of what Kant had in mind by the doctrine. I then argue that if aesthetic pleasure were not basically disinterested, judgements of taste could not make the normative (or “universal”) claims they do. Normativity is essential to judgements of taste; they would not be what they are without it. And basic disinterest is essential for normativity. Therefore, we cannot reject basic disinterestedness without rejecting judgements of taste altogether. I then distinguish various other notions of disinterest and argue that none of them allow Kant to make his ambitions claim.
pleasure. The modest claim is that all aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. The ambitious claim is that all and only aesthetic pleasure is disinterested. I defend only the modest claim. I initially give a basic explication of what Kant had in mind by the doctrine. I then argue that if aesthetic pleasure were not basically disinterested, judgements of taste could not make the normative (or “universal”) claims they do. Normativity is essential to judgements of taste; they would not be what they are without it. And basic disinterest is essential for normativity. Therefore, we cannot reject basic disinterestedness without rejecting judgements of taste altogether. I then distinguish various other notions of disinterest and argue that none of them allow Kant to make his ambitions claim.