Professor of Philosophy, author of The Virtues of Happiness (2014) and Moral Reality (2001), editor of Morality and Self-Interest (2008), and co-editor with David Copp of The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism (forthcoming), all OUP.
Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understand- ing it as... more Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understand- ing it as a continuity of empirical theories of the world as described through the scientific method. So, it might be surprising that one of the most important naturalistic moral realists, Philippa Foot, rejects standard evolutionary biology in her justly lauded Natural Goodness. One of her main reasons for this is the true claim that humans can flourish (eudaimonia) without reproducing, which she claims cannot be squared with evolutionary theory and biology more generally. The present argument concludes that Foot was wrong to reject evolutionary theory as the empirical foundation of natural- ized eudaimonist moral realism. This is based on contemporary discussion of biological function and evolutionary fitness, from which a definition of “eudaimonia” is constructed. This gives eudaimonist moral realism an empirically respectable foundation.
One of the few points of unquestioned agreement in virtue theory is that the virtues are supposed... more One of the few points of unquestioned agreement in virtue theory is that the virtues are supposed to be excellences. One way to understand this is to claim that the virtues always yield correct moral action and that we cannot be "too virtuous": the virtues cannot be had in excess or "to a fault". If we take this seriously, however, it yields the surprising conclusion that many traits which have been traditionally thought of as "virtues" fail to make the grade. The most prominent solution to the problem, reminiscent of Aristotle's view, is found to generate more problems than it solves.
CTX is a counterterrorism journal. This is a version of my Lober Lecture at the US Naval Postgrad... more CTX is a counterterrorism journal. This is a version of my Lober Lecture at the US Naval Postgraduate School, from Spring 2018.
The literature on humility, almost without exception, simply assumes that it is a virtue and goes... more The literature on humility, almost without exception, simply assumes that it is a virtue and goes on to analyze it from there. Here, two theses are defended, one negative and one positive. The negative thesis, that humility is not a virtue, is supported by a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that humility is a virtue. The positive thesis is that humility is rightly understood on the model of continence, which is not a virtue. Rather, continence and humility are "correctives", in that continence corrects for incontinence and humility corrects for arrogance. And as continence is a subordinate of temperance, humility is a subordinate of justice.
The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's und... more The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena (including confirmation bias, self-serving bias, etc.) are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance is distinguished from epistemic justice, as these have been conflated.
A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there ... more A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there would be no way to naturalistically represent or track them. Here, the basic structure for a tracking account of moral epistemology is given in empirically respectable terms, based on a eudaimonist conception of morality. The goal is to show how this form of moral realism can be seen as consistent with the details of evolutionary biology as well as being amenable to the most current understanding of representationalist or correspondence theories of truth.
A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite.... more A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite. The former is understood as resulting from the employment of a double standard in order to obtain a wrongful advantage, while a particular problem with the latter is that hypocrites do not give trustworthy testimony.
Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understand- ing it as... more Perhaps the most familiar understanding of “naturalism” derives from Quine, understand- ing it as a continuity of empirical theories of the world as described through the scientific method. So, it might be surprising that one of the most important naturalistic moral realists, Philippa Foot, rejects standard evolutionary biology in her justly lauded Natural Goodness. One of her main reasons for this is the true claim that humans can flourish (eudaimonia) without reproducing, which she claims cannot be squared with evolutionary theory and biology more generally. The present argument concludes that Foot was wrong to reject evolutionary theory as the empirical foundation of natural- ized eudaimonist moral realism. This is based on contemporary discussion of biological function and evolutionary fitness, from which a definition of “eudaimonia” is constructed. This gives eudaimonist moral realism an empirically respectable foundation.
One of the few points of unquestioned agreement in virtue theory is that the virtues are supposed... more One of the few points of unquestioned agreement in virtue theory is that the virtues are supposed to be excellences. One way to understand this is to claim that the virtues always yield correct moral action and that we cannot be "too virtuous": the virtues cannot be had in excess or "to a fault". If we take this seriously, however, it yields the surprising conclusion that many traits which have been traditionally thought of as "virtues" fail to make the grade. The most prominent solution to the problem, reminiscent of Aristotle's view, is found to generate more problems than it solves.
CTX is a counterterrorism journal. This is a version of my Lober Lecture at the US Naval Postgrad... more CTX is a counterterrorism journal. This is a version of my Lober Lecture at the US Naval Postgraduate School, from Spring 2018.
The literature on humility, almost without exception, simply assumes that it is a virtue and goes... more The literature on humility, almost without exception, simply assumes that it is a virtue and goes on to analyze it from there. Here, two theses are defended, one negative and one positive. The negative thesis, that humility is not a virtue, is supported by a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that humility is a virtue. The positive thesis is that humility is rightly understood on the model of continence, which is not a virtue. Rather, continence and humility are "correctives", in that continence corrects for incontinence and humility corrects for arrogance. And as continence is a subordinate of temperance, humility is a subordinate of justice.
The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's und... more The idea of epistemic temperance is introduced and explicated through a discussion of Plato's understanding of it. A variety of psychological and epistemic phenomena (including confirmation bias, self-serving bias, etc.) are presented which arise due to epistemic intemperance, or the inappropriate influence of conations on cognition. Two cases familiar to philosophers, self-deception and racial prejudice, are discussed as the result of epistemic intemperance though they are not typically seen as having a common cause. Finally, epistemic temperance is distinguished from epistemic justice, as these have been conflated.
A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there ... more A basic challenge to naturalistic moral realism is that, even if moral properties existed, there would be no way to naturalistically represent or track them. Here, the basic structure for a tracking account of moral epistemology is given in empirically respectable terms, based on a eudaimonist conception of morality. The goal is to show how this form of moral realism can be seen as consistent with the details of evolutionary biology as well as being amenable to the most current understanding of representationalist or correspondence theories of truth.
A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite.... more A distinction is made between acting hypocritically and the character trait of being a hypocrite. The former is understood as resulting from the employment of a double standard in order to obtain a wrongful advantage, while a particular problem with the latter is that hypocrites do not give trustworthy testimony.
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