Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture , 2023
To evaluate the exceptionality of logic, we need to specify (i) a conception of knowledge in gene... more To evaluate the exceptionality of logic, we need to specify (i) a conception of knowledge in general, (ii) a conception of logic in particular, and (iii) parameters with respect to which we evaluate logic's exceptionality. After specifying these things, I evaluate the exceptionality of logic in two senses: (a) whether logic is not continuous with the empirical sciences, (b) whether logic differs from other fields with respect to generality, formality, foundationality, apriority, analyticity, and necessity. My conclusion is that logic is exceptional in some ways, unexceptional in others. Logic is similar to other fields of knowledge, including the empirical sciences, in being grounded in the world, committed to truth, engaged in discovery, open to revision, and not being analytic, purely apriori, or foundational in the traditional foundationalist sense. But it differs from most fields, including the empirical sciences, in being formal, highly necessary, general, quasi-apriori, and foundational, though in a holistic, non-foundationalist, sense.
EPISTEMIC FRICTION: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic
Gila Sher
Brief Description:
The essa... more EPISTEMIC FRICTION: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic Gila Sher Brief Description: The essay approaches knowledge from the perspective of the “basic human epistemic situation” - the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. Viewed from this perspective, two fundamental principles of all knowledge are “epistemic friction” and “epistemic freedom”: knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower (freedom) knowledge is impossible. It follows that all knowledge, empirical and abstract, requires a grounding in both world and mind. With the fall of foundationalism, however, many philosophers have become skeptical about a substantive philosophical grounding of knowledge. The essay challenges this skepticism by charting a new foundational methodology, “foundational holism”, which is designed to provide all knowledge with a dual grounding in world and mind using holistic principles. Employing this methodology, the essay develops an integrated theory of knowledge, truth, and logic. This theory includes (i) a dynamic model of knowledge inspired by Quine yet opposed to his narrow empiricism, (ii) a substantivist theory of truth that advocates universal correspondence yet rejects the rigid and overly simplistic conception of traditional correspondence, and (iii) a new foundation for logic, demystifying its grounding in the world. This foundation brings logic in line with other fields of knowledge while affirming its strong necessity, generality, and normativity, which are explained by its “semantic formality”. The essay engages with multiple philosophers and philosophical views, setting the ground for further discussions of both freedom and friction.
The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint, 1991
The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on... more The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on critical analysis of the principles underlying modern Tarskian logic and inspired by mathematical and linguistic development. Extracting central philosophical ideas from Tarski’s early work in semantics, Sher questions whether these are fully realized by the standard first-order system. The answer lays the foundation for a new, broader conception of logic. By generally characterizing logical terms, Sher establishes a fundamental result in semantics. Her development of the notion of logicality for quantifiers and her work on branching are of great importance for linguistics. Sher outlines the boundaries of the new logic and points out some of the philosophical ramifications of the new view of logic for such issues as the logicist thesis, ontological commitment, the role of mathematics in logic, and the metaphysical underpinning of logic. She proposes a constructive definition of logical terms, reexamines and extends the notion of branching quantification, and discusses various linguistic issues and applications.
Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper ... more Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, Tarski's solution is justified by a sound philosophical principle that concerns the inner structure of truth. This principle provides a common philosophical basis to a number of solutions to the Liar paradox, including Tarski's and Kripke's. Tarski himself may not have been aware of this principle, but by providing a philosophical basis to his hierarchical solution to the paradox, it undermines the ad-hocness objection to this solution. Indeed, it contributes to the defense of Tarski's theory against other objections as well.
Two central themes of Douglas Edwards's The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and su... more Two central themes of Douglas Edwards's The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism. In Part I of this paper I discuss Edwards's grounds for rejecting deflationism and suggest a few additional grounds. In Part II I discuss Edward's truth-pluralism and respond to his criticism of my correspondence-pluralism. While these pluralisms share significant features, their differences also raise several important questions. I. Anti-Deflationism Deflationists, according to Edwards, "aim to remove truth as a notion of significance for philosophical study, and indeed as something that can play a key role in metaphysical theories" (Edward 2018: 2). Deflationary theories of truth come in two forms: radical deflationism, such as the redundancy theory, which rejects the view that truth is a property, and moderate deflationism, such as Horwich's (1990/8) minimalism, which rejects the view that truth is a substantive property. Moderate deflationis...
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Linguistics and Philosophy.
This paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Maddy's (2007, 2014a) – henceforth &... more This paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Maddy's (2007, 2014a) – henceforth "Theory 1" – and Sher's (1991, 2016) – "Theory 2". The two theories share a significant element: they both diverge from the commonly held view that logic is grounded only in the mind (language, concepts, conventions, etc.). Instead, they argue that logic is crucially grounded in the world. But the two theories differ in significant ways as well. Most distinctly, one is an anti-holist, "austere naturalist" theory while the other is a non-naturalist "foundationalholistic" theory. This methodological difference affects their questions, goals, orientations, the scope of their investigations, their logical realism (the way they ground logic in the world), their explanation of the modal force of logic, and their approach to the relation between logic and mathematics. The paper is not polemic. Its goal is not to compare the two theories with respect to...
Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of proper... more Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. In this paper I will show how the degrees of invariance of different types of properties are associated with, and explain, the modal force of the laws governing them. This explains differences in the modal force of laws/principles of different disciplines, starting with logic and mathematics and proceeding to physics and biology.
eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California ... more eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California and delivers a dynamic research platform to scholars worldwide.
Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture , 2023
To evaluate the exceptionality of logic, we need to specify (i) a conception of knowledge in gene... more To evaluate the exceptionality of logic, we need to specify (i) a conception of knowledge in general, (ii) a conception of logic in particular, and (iii) parameters with respect to which we evaluate logic's exceptionality. After specifying these things, I evaluate the exceptionality of logic in two senses: (a) whether logic is not continuous with the empirical sciences, (b) whether logic differs from other fields with respect to generality, formality, foundationality, apriority, analyticity, and necessity. My conclusion is that logic is exceptional in some ways, unexceptional in others. Logic is similar to other fields of knowledge, including the empirical sciences, in being grounded in the world, committed to truth, engaged in discovery, open to revision, and not being analytic, purely apriori, or foundational in the traditional foundationalist sense. But it differs from most fields, including the empirical sciences, in being formal, highly necessary, general, quasi-apriori, and foundational, though in a holistic, non-foundationalist, sense.
EPISTEMIC FRICTION: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic
Gila Sher
Brief Description:
The essa... more EPISTEMIC FRICTION: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic Gila Sher Brief Description: The essay approaches knowledge from the perspective of the “basic human epistemic situation” - the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. Viewed from this perspective, two fundamental principles of all knowledge are “epistemic friction” and “epistemic freedom”: knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower (freedom) knowledge is impossible. It follows that all knowledge, empirical and abstract, requires a grounding in both world and mind. With the fall of foundationalism, however, many philosophers have become skeptical about a substantive philosophical grounding of knowledge. The essay challenges this skepticism by charting a new foundational methodology, “foundational holism”, which is designed to provide all knowledge with a dual grounding in world and mind using holistic principles. Employing this methodology, the essay develops an integrated theory of knowledge, truth, and logic. This theory includes (i) a dynamic model of knowledge inspired by Quine yet opposed to his narrow empiricism, (ii) a substantivist theory of truth that advocates universal correspondence yet rejects the rigid and overly simplistic conception of traditional correspondence, and (iii) a new foundation for logic, demystifying its grounding in the world. This foundation brings logic in line with other fields of knowledge while affirming its strong necessity, generality, and normativity, which are explained by its “semantic formality”. The essay engages with multiple philosophers and philosophical views, setting the ground for further discussions of both freedom and friction.
The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint, 1991
The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on... more The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on critical analysis of the principles underlying modern Tarskian logic and inspired by mathematical and linguistic development. Extracting central philosophical ideas from Tarski’s early work in semantics, Sher questions whether these are fully realized by the standard first-order system. The answer lays the foundation for a new, broader conception of logic. By generally characterizing logical terms, Sher establishes a fundamental result in semantics. Her development of the notion of logicality for quantifiers and her work on branching are of great importance for linguistics. Sher outlines the boundaries of the new logic and points out some of the philosophical ramifications of the new view of logic for such issues as the logicist thesis, ontological commitment, the role of mathematics in logic, and the metaphysical underpinning of logic. She proposes a constructive definition of logical terms, reexamines and extends the notion of branching quantification, and discusses various linguistic issues and applications.
Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper ... more Tarski's hierarchical solution to the Liar paradox is widely viewed as ad hoc. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, Tarski's solution is justified by a sound philosophical principle that concerns the inner structure of truth. This principle provides a common philosophical basis to a number of solutions to the Liar paradox, including Tarski's and Kripke's. Tarski himself may not have been aware of this principle, but by providing a philosophical basis to his hierarchical solution to the paradox, it undermines the ad-hocness objection to this solution. Indeed, it contributes to the defense of Tarski's theory against other objections as well.
Two central themes of Douglas Edwards's The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and su... more Two central themes of Douglas Edwards's The Metaphysics of Truth are anti-deflationism and substantial pluralism. In Part I of this paper I discuss Edwards's grounds for rejecting deflationism and suggest a few additional grounds. In Part II I discuss Edward's truth-pluralism and respond to his criticism of my correspondence-pluralism. While these pluralisms share significant features, their differences also raise several important questions. I. Anti-Deflationism Deflationists, according to Edwards, "aim to remove truth as a notion of significance for philosophical study, and indeed as something that can play a key role in metaphysical theories" (Edward 2018: 2). Deflationary theories of truth come in two forms: radical deflationism, such as the redundancy theory, which rejects the view that truth is a property, and moderate deflationism, such as Horwich's (1990/8) minimalism, which rejects the view that truth is a substantive property. Moderate deflationis...
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, a... more JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Linguistics and Philosophy.
This paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Maddy's (2007, 2014a) – henceforth &... more This paper compares two theories of the nature of logic: Maddy's (2007, 2014a) – henceforth "Theory 1" – and Sher's (1991, 2016) – "Theory 2". The two theories share a significant element: they both diverge from the commonly held view that logic is grounded only in the mind (language, concepts, conventions, etc.). Instead, they argue that logic is crucially grounded in the world. But the two theories differ in significant ways as well. Most distinctly, one is an anti-holist, "austere naturalist" theory while the other is a non-naturalist "foundationalholistic" theory. This methodological difference affects their questions, goals, orientations, the scope of their investigations, their logical realism (the way they ground logic in the world), their explanation of the modal force of logic, and their approach to the relation between logic and mathematics. The paper is not polemic. Its goal is not to compare the two theories with respect to...
Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of proper... more Properties and relations in general have a certain degree of invariance, and some types of properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. In this paper I will show how the degrees of invariance of different types of properties are associated with, and explain, the modal force of the laws governing them. This explains differences in the modal force of laws/principles of different disciplines, starting with logic and mathematics and proceeding to physics and biology.
eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California ... more eScholarship provides open access, scholarly publishing services to the University of California and delivers a dynamic research platform to scholars worldwide.
How does Quine fare in the first decades of the twenty-first century? This chapter examines a clu... more How does Quine fare in the first decades of the twenty-first century? This chapter examines a cluster of Quinean theses that are especially fruitful in meeting some of the current challenges of epistemology and ontology. These theses offer an alternative to the traditional bifurcations of truth and knowledge into factual and conceptual-pragmatic-conventional, the traditional conception of a foundation for knowledge, and traditional realism. To make the most of Quine’s ideas, however, we have to take an active stance: accept some of his ideas and reject others, sort different versions of the relevant ideas, sharpen or revise some of the ideas, connect them with new, non-Quinean ideas, and so on. As a result the chapter pits Quine against Quine, in an attempt to identify those Quinean ideas that have a lasting value and sketch potential developments.
Although the invariance criterion of logicality first emerged as a criterion of a largely mathema... more Although the invariance criterion of logicality first emerged as a criterion of a largely mathematical interest (Mostowski 1957, Lindström 1966, Tarski 1966), it has developed into a criterion of considerable philosophical significance. As a philosophical criterion, invariance has been studied and developed from several perspectives. Two of these are the natural-language perspective and the theoretical-foundational perspective, centered on logic’s role in knowledge. My own work (Sher 1991 to 2016) has focused on the second perspective. I have argued that the invariance criterion of logicality makes important contributions to the development of a theoretical foundation for logic focused on its contribution to knowledge – a dual, normativedescriptive foundation centered on (i) the veridicality of logic and (ii) its strong modal force. Those who focus on the natural-language perspective concentrate on the descriptive adequacy of this criterion for the study of natural language. Here we...
CHEN Bo (hereafter, ‘C’ for short): Truly speaking, when I read your substantive theory of truth ... more CHEN Bo (hereafter, ‘C’ for short): Truly speaking, when I read your substantive theory of truth and foundational account for logic, I’m quite excited: these are what I like and what I want. I strongly agree with you about truth: the concept of truth is very substantial, utterly non-trivial. When we say a sentence is true, we do a significant thing: comparing what the sentence says with the situation in the world; in so doing, we need evidence, justification, clarification, and many other intellectual endeavors. Moreover, the concept of truth is essentially loaded with a metaphysical and epistemological burden which cannot be deflated. Could you sum up what you have done in developing a substantive theory of truth? What are the main claims of your theory of truth? What open questions are there still waiting to be answered? What further work is still waiting to be done?
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Books by Gila Sher
Gila Sher
Brief Description:
The essay approaches knowledge from the perspective of the “basic human epistemic situation” -
the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it
in its full complexity. Viewed from this perspective, two fundamental principles of all
knowledge are “epistemic friction” and “epistemic freedom”: knowledge must be substantially
constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower (freedom)
knowledge is impossible. It follows that all knowledge, empirical and abstract, requires a
grounding in both world and mind. With the fall of foundationalism, however, many
philosophers have become skeptical about a substantive philosophical grounding of knowledge.
The essay challenges this skepticism by charting a new foundational methodology, “foundational
holism”, which is designed to provide all knowledge with a dual grounding in world and mind
using holistic principles. Employing this methodology, the essay develops an integrated theory of
knowledge, truth, and logic. This theory includes (i) a dynamic model of knowledge inspired by
Quine yet opposed to his narrow empiricism, (ii) a substantivist theory of truth that advocates
universal correspondence yet rejects the rigid and overly simplistic conception of traditional
correspondence, and (iii) a new foundation for logic, demystifying its grounding in the world.
This foundation brings logic in line with other fields of knowledge while affirming its strong
necessity, generality, and normativity, which are explained by its “semantic formality”. The essay
engages with multiple philosophers and philosophical views, setting the ground for further
discussions of both freedom and friction.
Papers by Gila Sher
Gila Sher
Brief Description:
The essay approaches knowledge from the perspective of the “basic human epistemic situation” -
the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it
in its full complexity. Viewed from this perspective, two fundamental principles of all
knowledge are “epistemic friction” and “epistemic freedom”: knowledge must be substantially
constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower (freedom)
knowledge is impossible. It follows that all knowledge, empirical and abstract, requires a
grounding in both world and mind. With the fall of foundationalism, however, many
philosophers have become skeptical about a substantive philosophical grounding of knowledge.
The essay challenges this skepticism by charting a new foundational methodology, “foundational
holism”, which is designed to provide all knowledge with a dual grounding in world and mind
using holistic principles. Employing this methodology, the essay develops an integrated theory of
knowledge, truth, and logic. This theory includes (i) a dynamic model of knowledge inspired by
Quine yet opposed to his narrow empiricism, (ii) a substantivist theory of truth that advocates
universal correspondence yet rejects the rigid and overly simplistic conception of traditional
correspondence, and (iii) a new foundation for logic, demystifying its grounding in the world.
This foundation brings logic in line with other fields of knowledge while affirming its strong
necessity, generality, and normativity, which are explained by its “semantic formality”. The essay
engages with multiple philosophers and philosophical views, setting the ground for further
discussions of both freedom and friction.