Extreme Philosophy: Bold Ideas and a Spirit of Progress, 2024
Monism is the claim that only one object exists. While few contemporary philosophers endorse moni... more Monism is the claim that only one object exists. While few contemporary philosophers endorse monism, it has an illustrious history – stretching back to Bradley, Spinoza and Parmenides. In this paper, I show that plausible assumptions about the higher-order logic of property identity entail that monism is true. Given the higher-order framework I operate in, this argument generalizes: it is also possible to establish that there is a single property, proposition, relation, etc. I then show why this form of monism is inconsistent; because all propositions are identical, p is identical to ~p – and so they have the same truth-value. At least one of the assumptions that generate higher-order monism must be rejected.
It is the aim of this paper to develop and defend an interpretation of level of scientific discip... more It is the aim of this paper to develop and defend an interpretation of level of scientific discipline within the truth-maker framework. In particular, I exploit the mereological relation of proper parthood, which is integral to truth-maker semantics, in order to provide an account of scientific level.
I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account what grounds facts of ... more I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account what grounds facts of the form a=b. In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that a=b partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity.
I provide an analysis of sentences of the form ‘To be F is to be G’ in terms of exact truth-maker... more I provide an analysis of sentences of the form ‘To be F is to be G’ in terms of exact truth-maker semantics—an approach that identifies the meanings of sentences with the states of the world directly responsible for their truth-values. Roughly, I argue that these sentences hold just in case that which makes something F also makes it G. This approach is hyperintensional and possesses desirable logical and modal features. In particular, these sentences are reflexive, transitive, and symmetric, and if they are true, then they are necessarily true, and it is necessary that all and only Fs are Gs. I motivate my account over Correia and Skiles’ [11] prominent alternative and close by defining an irreflexive and asymmetric notion of analysis in terms of the symmetric and reflexive notion.
This paper presents a puzzle about the logic of real definition. In particular, I demonstrate tha... more This paper presents a puzzle about the logic of real definition. In particular, I demonstrate that five principles concerning definition (that it is coextensional and irreflexive, that it applies to its cases, that it permits expansion and that it is itself defined) are incompatible. I then explore the advantages and disadvantages of each principle-one of which must be rejected to restore consistency.
I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowl... more I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true, then S knows that all analytic parts of p are true as well. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox. I close by arguing that contextualists who maintain that knowledge attributions are closed within—but not between—linguistic contexts are tacitly committed to this principle’s truth
I provide an analysis of sentences of the form 'To be F is to be G' in terms of exact truth-maker... more I provide an analysis of sentences of the form 'To be F is to be G' in terms of exact truth-maker semantics—an approach which identifies the meanings of sentences with the states of the world directly responsible for their truth-values. Roughly, I argue that these sentences hold just in case that which makes something F also makes it G. This approach is hyperintensional, and possesses desirable logical and modal features. In particular, these sentences are reflexive, transitive and symmetric, and, if they are true, then they are necessarily true, and it is necessary that all and only F s are Gs.
This paper is concerned with counterfactual logic and its implications for the modal
status of ma... more This paper is concerned with counterfactual logic and its implications for the modal status of mathematical claims. It is most directly a response to an ambitious program by Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2018), who seek to establish that mathematics is committed to its own necessity. I demonstrate that their assumptions collapse the counterfactual conditional into the material conditional. This collapse entails the success of counterfactual strengthening (the inference from ‘If A were true then C would be true’ to ‘If A and B were true then C would be true’), which is controversial within counterfactual logic, and which has counterexamples within pure and applied mathematics. I close by discussing the dispensability of counterfactual conditionals within the language of mathematics.
It is often said that there are two varieties of identity theory. Type-identity theorists interpr... more It is often said that there are two varieties of identity theory. Type-identity theorists interpret physicalism as the claim that every property is identical to a physical property, while token-identity theorists interpret it as the claim that every particular is identical to a physical particular. The aim of this paper is to undermine the distinction between the two. Drawing on recent work connecting generalized identity to truth-maker semantics , I demonstrate that these interpretations are logically equivalent. I then argue that each has the resources to resolve problems facing the other.
Two families of positions dominate debates over a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge.... more Two families of positions dominate debates over a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge. Traditionalism holds that knowledge has a complete, uniquely identifying analysis, while knowledge-first epistemology contends that knowledge is primitive— admitting of no reductive analysis whatsoever. Drawing on recent work in metaphysics, I argue that these alternatives fail to exhaust the available possibilities. Knowledge may have a merely partial analysis: a real definition that distinguishes it from some, but not all other things. I demonstrate that this position is attractive; it evades concerns that its rivals face.
Among contemporary philosophers, there is widespread (but not universal) consensus that begging t... more Among contemporary philosophers, there is widespread (but not universal) consensus that begging the question is a grave argumentative flaw. However, there is presently no satisfactory analysis of what this flaw consists of. Here, I defend a notion of question-begging in terms of analyticity. In particular, I claim that an argument begs the question just in case its conclusion is an analytic part of the conjunction of its premises.
Published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Consequentialists maintain that an act is morall... more Published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Consequentialists maintain that an act is morally right just in case it produces the best consequences of any available alternative. Because agents are ignorant about some of their acts’ consequences, they cannot be certain about which alternative is best. Kagan (1998) contends that it is reasonable to assume that unforeseen good and bad consequences roughly balance out and can be largely disregarded. A statistical argument demonstrates that Kagan’s assumption is almost always false. An act’s foreseeable consequences are an extremely poor indicator of the goodness of its overall consequences. Acting based on foreseeable consequences is barely more reliably good than acting completely at random.
This paper investigates the metaphysics in higher-order counterfactual logic. I establish the nec... more This paper investigates the metaphysics in higher-order counterfactual logic. I establish the necessity of identity and distinctness and show that the logic is committed to vacuism, which entails that all counteridenticals are true. I prove the Barcan, Converse Barcan, Being Constraint and Necessitism. I then show how to derive the Identity of Indiscernibles in counterfactual logic. I study a form of maximalist ontology which has been claimed to be so expansive as to be inconsistent. I show that it is equivalent to the collapse of the counterfactual into the material conditional---which is itself equivalent to the modal logic TRIV. TRIV is consistent, from which it follows that maximalism is, surprisingly, consistent. I close by arguing that stating the limit assumption requires a higher-order logic
The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that objects cannot differ only numerically. It i... more The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that objects cannot differ only numerically. It is widely held that one interpretation of this principle is trivially true: the claim that objects bearing all of the same properties are identical. This triviality ostensibly arises from haecceities (properties like is identical to a). I argue that this is not the case; we do not express a triviality with haecceities, because it is impossible to express the haecceities of indiscernible objects. I then argue that this inexpressibility generalizes to all of their trivializing properties. If there is a trivial version of the Identity of Indiscernibles, it is a version that we cannot express.
I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in ... more I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in higher-order logic. The resulting account allows for extremely fine- grained distinctions (i.e., it can distinguish between any relata that differ in their syntactic structure, while avoiding the Russell-Myhill problem). It is the first account that can consistently embrace three desirable logical principles that initially appear to be incompatible: the Identification Hypothesis (if F is, by definition, G then F is the same as G), Irreflexivity (there are no reflexive definitions) and Leibniz’s Law. Additionally, it possesses the resources to resolve the paradox of analysis.
I provide counterexamples to Kit Fine's semantics for imperative and deontic modals. In particula... more I provide counterexamples to Kit Fine's semantics for imperative and deontic modals. In particular, I argue that the semantics fails to provide necessary conditions for conjunctive imperatives.
Extreme Philosophy: Bold Ideas and a Spirit of Progress, 2024
Monism is the claim that only one object exists. While few contemporary philosophers endorse moni... more Monism is the claim that only one object exists. While few contemporary philosophers endorse monism, it has an illustrious history – stretching back to Bradley, Spinoza and Parmenides. In this paper, I show that plausible assumptions about the higher-order logic of property identity entail that monism is true. Given the higher-order framework I operate in, this argument generalizes: it is also possible to establish that there is a single property, proposition, relation, etc. I then show why this form of monism is inconsistent; because all propositions are identical, p is identical to ~p – and so they have the same truth-value. At least one of the assumptions that generate higher-order monism must be rejected.
It is the aim of this paper to develop and defend an interpretation of level of scientific discip... more It is the aim of this paper to develop and defend an interpretation of level of scientific discipline within the truth-maker framework. In particular, I exploit the mereological relation of proper parthood, which is integral to truth-maker semantics, in order to provide an account of scientific level.
I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account what grounds facts of ... more I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account what grounds facts of the form a=b. In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that a=b partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity.
I provide an analysis of sentences of the form ‘To be F is to be G’ in terms of exact truth-maker... more I provide an analysis of sentences of the form ‘To be F is to be G’ in terms of exact truth-maker semantics—an approach that identifies the meanings of sentences with the states of the world directly responsible for their truth-values. Roughly, I argue that these sentences hold just in case that which makes something F also makes it G. This approach is hyperintensional and possesses desirable logical and modal features. In particular, these sentences are reflexive, transitive, and symmetric, and if they are true, then they are necessarily true, and it is necessary that all and only Fs are Gs. I motivate my account over Correia and Skiles’ [11] prominent alternative and close by defining an irreflexive and asymmetric notion of analysis in terms of the symmetric and reflexive notion.
This paper presents a puzzle about the logic of real definition. In particular, I demonstrate tha... more This paper presents a puzzle about the logic of real definition. In particular, I demonstrate that five principles concerning definition (that it is coextensional and irreflexive, that it applies to its cases, that it permits expansion and that it is itself defined) are incompatible. I then explore the advantages and disadvantages of each principle-one of which must be rejected to restore consistency.
I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowl... more I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true, then S knows that all analytic parts of p are true as well. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox. I close by arguing that contextualists who maintain that knowledge attributions are closed within—but not between—linguistic contexts are tacitly committed to this principle’s truth
I provide an analysis of sentences of the form 'To be F is to be G' in terms of exact truth-maker... more I provide an analysis of sentences of the form 'To be F is to be G' in terms of exact truth-maker semantics—an approach which identifies the meanings of sentences with the states of the world directly responsible for their truth-values. Roughly, I argue that these sentences hold just in case that which makes something F also makes it G. This approach is hyperintensional, and possesses desirable logical and modal features. In particular, these sentences are reflexive, transitive and symmetric, and, if they are true, then they are necessarily true, and it is necessary that all and only F s are Gs.
This paper is concerned with counterfactual logic and its implications for the modal
status of ma... more This paper is concerned with counterfactual logic and its implications for the modal status of mathematical claims. It is most directly a response to an ambitious program by Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2018), who seek to establish that mathematics is committed to its own necessity. I demonstrate that their assumptions collapse the counterfactual conditional into the material conditional. This collapse entails the success of counterfactual strengthening (the inference from ‘If A were true then C would be true’ to ‘If A and B were true then C would be true’), which is controversial within counterfactual logic, and which has counterexamples within pure and applied mathematics. I close by discussing the dispensability of counterfactual conditionals within the language of mathematics.
It is often said that there are two varieties of identity theory. Type-identity theorists interpr... more It is often said that there are two varieties of identity theory. Type-identity theorists interpret physicalism as the claim that every property is identical to a physical property, while token-identity theorists interpret it as the claim that every particular is identical to a physical particular. The aim of this paper is to undermine the distinction between the two. Drawing on recent work connecting generalized identity to truth-maker semantics , I demonstrate that these interpretations are logically equivalent. I then argue that each has the resources to resolve problems facing the other.
Two families of positions dominate debates over a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge.... more Two families of positions dominate debates over a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge. Traditionalism holds that knowledge has a complete, uniquely identifying analysis, while knowledge-first epistemology contends that knowledge is primitive— admitting of no reductive analysis whatsoever. Drawing on recent work in metaphysics, I argue that these alternatives fail to exhaust the available possibilities. Knowledge may have a merely partial analysis: a real definition that distinguishes it from some, but not all other things. I demonstrate that this position is attractive; it evades concerns that its rivals face.
Among contemporary philosophers, there is widespread (but not universal) consensus that begging t... more Among contemporary philosophers, there is widespread (but not universal) consensus that begging the question is a grave argumentative flaw. However, there is presently no satisfactory analysis of what this flaw consists of. Here, I defend a notion of question-begging in terms of analyticity. In particular, I claim that an argument begs the question just in case its conclusion is an analytic part of the conjunction of its premises.
Published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Consequentialists maintain that an act is morall... more Published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Consequentialists maintain that an act is morally right just in case it produces the best consequences of any available alternative. Because agents are ignorant about some of their acts’ consequences, they cannot be certain about which alternative is best. Kagan (1998) contends that it is reasonable to assume that unforeseen good and bad consequences roughly balance out and can be largely disregarded. A statistical argument demonstrates that Kagan’s assumption is almost always false. An act’s foreseeable consequences are an extremely poor indicator of the goodness of its overall consequences. Acting based on foreseeable consequences is barely more reliably good than acting completely at random.
This paper investigates the metaphysics in higher-order counterfactual logic. I establish the nec... more This paper investigates the metaphysics in higher-order counterfactual logic. I establish the necessity of identity and distinctness and show that the logic is committed to vacuism, which entails that all counteridenticals are true. I prove the Barcan, Converse Barcan, Being Constraint and Necessitism. I then show how to derive the Identity of Indiscernibles in counterfactual logic. I study a form of maximalist ontology which has been claimed to be so expansive as to be inconsistent. I show that it is equivalent to the collapse of the counterfactual into the material conditional---which is itself equivalent to the modal logic TRIV. TRIV is consistent, from which it follows that maximalism is, surprisingly, consistent. I close by arguing that stating the limit assumption requires a higher-order logic
The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that objects cannot differ only numerically. It i... more The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that objects cannot differ only numerically. It is widely held that one interpretation of this principle is trivially true: the claim that objects bearing all of the same properties are identical. This triviality ostensibly arises from haecceities (properties like is identical to a). I argue that this is not the case; we do not express a triviality with haecceities, because it is impossible to express the haecceities of indiscernible objects. I then argue that this inexpressibility generalizes to all of their trivializing properties. If there is a trivial version of the Identity of Indiscernibles, it is a version that we cannot express.
I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in ... more I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in higher-order logic. The resulting account allows for extremely fine- grained distinctions (i.e., it can distinguish between any relata that differ in their syntactic structure, while avoiding the Russell-Myhill problem). It is the first account that can consistently embrace three desirable logical principles that initially appear to be incompatible: the Identification Hypothesis (if F is, by definition, G then F is the same as G), Irreflexivity (there are no reflexive definitions) and Leibniz’s Law. Additionally, it possesses the resources to resolve the paradox of analysis.
I provide counterexamples to Kit Fine's semantics for imperative and deontic modals. In particula... more I provide counterexamples to Kit Fine's semantics for imperative and deontic modals. In particular, I argue that the semantics fails to provide necessary conditions for conjunctive imperatives.
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Papers by Sam Elgin
status of mathematical claims. It is most directly a response to an ambitious program
by Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2018), who seek to establish that mathematics is
committed to its own necessity. I demonstrate that their assumptions collapse the
counterfactual conditional into the material conditional. This collapse entails the
success of counterfactual strengthening (the inference from ‘If A were true then C
would be true’ to ‘If A and B were true then C would be true’), which is controversial
within counterfactual logic, and which has counterexamples within pure and applied
mathematics. I close by discussing the dispensability of counterfactual conditionals
within the language of mathematics.
Consequentialists maintain that an act is morally right just in case it produces the best consequences of any available alternative. Because agents are ignorant about some of their acts’ consequences, they cannot be certain about which alternative is best. Kagan (1998) contends that it is reasonable to assume that unforeseen good and bad consequences roughly balance out and can be largely disregarded. A statistical argument demonstrates that Kagan’s assumption is almost always false. An act’s foreseeable consequences are an extremely poor indicator of the goodness of its overall consequences. Acting based on foreseeable consequences is barely more reliably good than acting completely at random.
Drafts by Sam Elgin
status of mathematical claims. It is most directly a response to an ambitious program
by Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2018), who seek to establish that mathematics is
committed to its own necessity. I demonstrate that their assumptions collapse the
counterfactual conditional into the material conditional. This collapse entails the
success of counterfactual strengthening (the inference from ‘If A were true then C
would be true’ to ‘If A and B were true then C would be true’), which is controversial
within counterfactual logic, and which has counterexamples within pure and applied
mathematics. I close by discussing the dispensability of counterfactual conditionals
within the language of mathematics.
Consequentialists maintain that an act is morally right just in case it produces the best consequences of any available alternative. Because agents are ignorant about some of their acts’ consequences, they cannot be certain about which alternative is best. Kagan (1998) contends that it is reasonable to assume that unforeseen good and bad consequences roughly balance out and can be largely disregarded. A statistical argument demonstrates that Kagan’s assumption is almost always false. An act’s foreseeable consequences are an extremely poor indicator of the goodness of its overall consequences. Acting based on foreseeable consequences is barely more reliably good than acting completely at random.