I am Philosophy Professor at the University of Brasilia. My research interests are philosophy of Language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of sciences and metaphysics.
In the broadest sense of the word, “intentionality” expresses the relational
property of being a... more In the broadest sense of the word, “intentionality” expresses the relational property of being about something. In a more common and strict sense of the word, “intentionality” denotes the power of the mind to represent something. Franz Brentano (1874) argues that intentionality is the “mark of the mental”. Edmund Husserl develops the notion of intentionality as the central idea of his Phenomenology. Late in the fifties R. M. Chisholm (1957) introduces intentionality in analytic philosophy, seeking, unsuccessfully, a logico-linguistic criterion of the mental. Soon after intentionality becomes a central notion in philosophy of mind. After a brief historical survey of the main philosophical contributions to the notion of intentionality, we present the structure of intentionality, and the complex relationship between intentionality and consciousness. Some fundamental questions are briefly tackled: How could we resolve the problem of non-existent intentional objects? Is intentionality really the mark of the mental? Is it possible to naturalise intentionality? Keywords Intentionality, Consciousness, Phenomenology, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind.
Resumo A primeira parte do texto expõe os princípios da semântica filosófica clássica e explica p... more Resumo A primeira parte do texto expõe os princípios da semântica filosófica clássica e explica por que eles são inapropriados para as línguas naturais. A segunda parte expõe princípios que parecem mais adequados para representar nossas habilidades de falantes-ouvintes. Palavras Chave: Semântica Clássica; O que é dito; Contextualismo; Línguas Naturais; Pragmática. Abstract: The first part of this paper exposes the main principles of classical philosophical semantics and explains why they are not appropriate to natural languages. The second part exposes principles of contextualist semantics for natural languages, more appropriate to represent our abilities as speaker-hearers.
Externalism in the philosophy of mind is a family of theories about the
individuation of mental ... more Externalism in the philosophy of mind is a family of theories about the individuation of mental states. Mental states are individuated by their content; and the content, in turn, is individuated by relations between the cognitive agent and external affairs, at least in many cases. Here we present some of these theories, which include ideas about direct reference, de re attitudes, and a conception of semantic and intentional properties. We present the thought experiments conceived of by Putnam, Burge and Davidson, and a discussion of two problems raised by the externalist doctrine: one about self-knowledge and the other about a priori knowledge of the external world. Keywords Externalism, Mental Content, Direct Reference, De re Attitude, Selfknowledge
In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actual... more In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke's works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept " fictional entities " in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore's paradox: it is paradoxical to say: " I made (created) it, but I do not believe it exists ". Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of " exist " that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history. Abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives (internal and external) in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people.
In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actual... more In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke's works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept " fictional entities " in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore's paradox: it is paradoxical to say: " I made (created) it, but I do not believe it exists. " Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of " exist " that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history. Abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives (internal and external) in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people.
I make some considerations on Frege's motivations to pose his puzzle: on identity, on objects, et... more I make some considerations on Frege's motivations to pose his puzzle: on identity, on objects, etc. I discuss Frege's solution and I conclude it works only for complex expressions expressing articulated modes of presentation. I also consider a recent paper by Glezakos on Frege's puzzle.
In the broadest sense of the word, “intentionality” expresses the relational
property of being a... more In the broadest sense of the word, “intentionality” expresses the relational property of being about something. In a more common and strict sense of the word, “intentionality” denotes the power of the mind to represent something. Franz Brentano (1874) argues that intentionality is the “mark of the mental”. Edmund Husserl develops the notion of intentionality as the central idea of his Phenomenology. Late in the fifties R. M. Chisholm (1957) introduces intentionality in analytic philosophy, seeking, unsuccessfully, a logico-linguistic criterion of the mental. Soon after intentionality becomes a central notion in philosophy of mind. After a brief historical survey of the main philosophical contributions to the notion of intentionality, we present the structure of intentionality, and the complex relationship between intentionality and consciousness. Some fundamental questions are briefly tackled: How could we resolve the problem of non-existent intentional objects? Is intentionality really the mark of the mental? Is it possible to naturalise intentionality? Keywords Intentionality, Consciousness, Phenomenology, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind.
Resumo A primeira parte do texto expõe os princípios da semântica filosófica clássica e explica p... more Resumo A primeira parte do texto expõe os princípios da semântica filosófica clássica e explica por que eles são inapropriados para as línguas naturais. A segunda parte expõe princípios que parecem mais adequados para representar nossas habilidades de falantes-ouvintes. Palavras Chave: Semântica Clássica; O que é dito; Contextualismo; Línguas Naturais; Pragmática. Abstract: The first part of this paper exposes the main principles of classical philosophical semantics and explains why they are not appropriate to natural languages. The second part exposes principles of contextualist semantics for natural languages, more appropriate to represent our abilities as speaker-hearers.
Externalism in the philosophy of mind is a family of theories about the
individuation of mental ... more Externalism in the philosophy of mind is a family of theories about the individuation of mental states. Mental states are individuated by their content; and the content, in turn, is individuated by relations between the cognitive agent and external affairs, at least in many cases. Here we present some of these theories, which include ideas about direct reference, de re attitudes, and a conception of semantic and intentional properties. We present the thought experiments conceived of by Putnam, Burge and Davidson, and a discussion of two problems raised by the externalist doctrine: one about self-knowledge and the other about a priori knowledge of the external world. Keywords Externalism, Mental Content, Direct Reference, De re Attitude, Selfknowledge
In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actual... more In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke's works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept " fictional entities " in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore's paradox: it is paradoxical to say: " I made (created) it, but I do not believe it exists ". Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of " exist " that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history. Abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives (internal and external) in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people.
In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actual... more In what follows, I present only part of a program that consists in developing a version of actualism as an adequate framework for the metaphysics of intentionality. I will try to accommodate in that framework suggestions found in Kripke's works and some positions developed by Amie Thomasson. What should we change if we accept " fictional entities " in the domain of the actual world? Actualism is the thesis that everything that exists belongs to the domain of the actual world and that there are no possibilia. I shall defend that there are abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, and institutions. My argument could be seen as a version of Moore's paradox: it is paradoxical to say: " I made (created) it, but I do not believe it exists. " Moreover, there are true sentences about them. I will examine what it means to include abstract artefacts in the domain of the actual world. I favour a use of " exist " that includes beings with no concrete occupation of tri-dimensional space; to exist, it is enough to have been introduced at some moment in history. Abstract artefacts, like fictional characters, exist in that sense. I argue that it is important to distinguish two perspectives (internal and external) in order to clarify the kind of knowledge we have of fictional characters. However, their existence presupposes a relation of dependence to a material basis and the mental activities of many people.
I make some considerations on Frege's motivations to pose his puzzle: on identity, on objects, et... more I make some considerations on Frege's motivations to pose his puzzle: on identity, on objects, etc. I discuss Frege's solution and I conclude it works only for complex expressions expressing articulated modes of presentation. I also consider a recent paper by Glezakos on Frege's puzzle.
Uploads
Papers by Andre Leclerc
property of being about something. In a more common and strict
sense of the word, “intentionality” denotes the power of the mind to
represent something. Franz Brentano (1874) argues that intentionality
is the “mark of the mental”. Edmund Husserl develops the notion of
intentionality as the central idea of his Phenomenology. Late in the
fifties R. M. Chisholm (1957) introduces intentionality in analytic
philosophy, seeking, unsuccessfully, a logico-linguistic criterion of the
mental. Soon after intentionality becomes a central notion in philosophy
of mind. After a brief historical survey of the main philosophical
contributions to the notion of intentionality, we present the structure
of intentionality, and the complex relationship between intentionality
and consciousness. Some fundamental questions are briefly tackled:
How could we resolve the problem of non-existent intentional objects?
Is intentionality really the mark of the mental? Is it possible to naturalise
intentionality?
Keywords
Intentionality, Consciousness, Phenomenology, Analytic Philosophy,
Philosophy of Mind.
individuation of mental states. Mental states are individuated by their
content; and the content, in turn, is individuated by relations between
the cognitive agent and external affairs, at least in many cases. Here
we present some of these theories, which include ideas about direct
reference, de re attitudes, and a conception of semantic and intentional
properties. We present the thought experiments conceived of by
Putnam, Burge and Davidson, and a discussion of two problems raised
by the externalist doctrine: one about self-knowledge and the other
about a priori knowledge of the external world.
Keywords
Externalism, Mental Content, Direct Reference, De re Attitude, Selfknowledge
property of being about something. In a more common and strict
sense of the word, “intentionality” denotes the power of the mind to
represent something. Franz Brentano (1874) argues that intentionality
is the “mark of the mental”. Edmund Husserl develops the notion of
intentionality as the central idea of his Phenomenology. Late in the
fifties R. M. Chisholm (1957) introduces intentionality in analytic
philosophy, seeking, unsuccessfully, a logico-linguistic criterion of the
mental. Soon after intentionality becomes a central notion in philosophy
of mind. After a brief historical survey of the main philosophical
contributions to the notion of intentionality, we present the structure
of intentionality, and the complex relationship between intentionality
and consciousness. Some fundamental questions are briefly tackled:
How could we resolve the problem of non-existent intentional objects?
Is intentionality really the mark of the mental? Is it possible to naturalise
intentionality?
Keywords
Intentionality, Consciousness, Phenomenology, Analytic Philosophy,
Philosophy of Mind.
individuation of mental states. Mental states are individuated by their
content; and the content, in turn, is individuated by relations between
the cognitive agent and external affairs, at least in many cases. Here
we present some of these theories, which include ideas about direct
reference, de re attitudes, and a conception of semantic and intentional
properties. We present the thought experiments conceived of by
Putnam, Burge and Davidson, and a discussion of two problems raised
by the externalist doctrine: one about self-knowledge and the other
about a priori knowledge of the external world.
Keywords
Externalism, Mental Content, Direct Reference, De re Attitude, Selfknowledge