I received my PhD in Philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania in 1998 and am now an Associate Professor at the University of Houston. I am the author of Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms (Cambridge University Press, 2009, pbk 2012), and numerous articles on various topics including: Descartes’ metaphysics and philosophy of science; Hobbes’ scientific method, early modern atomist, mechanical and naturalist philosophies; and late Scholastic Aristotelian theories of matter, form, causation and scientific demonstration. My latest work examines the reconceptualization of substantial and formal unity, and its implications for universals from late Scholastics to Spinoza. Supervisors: Professor Lisa Downing
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2005
Concluding his account of the purely material properties of the universe in Part IV of the Princi... more Concluding his account of the purely material properties of the universe in Part IV of the Principia Philosophiae René Descartes writes, ‘Indeed up to this point I have described this earth and, what is more, the whole observable universe, like [instar] a machine, considering nothing except the shapes and motions in it’. 1 Descartes justifies this approach, claiming that it is much better to take what we perceive to happen in large bodies as a model for what occurs in imperceptible small bodies, than to invent ‘extraordinary things which I am unable to know, having no resemblance to those which are sensed’. 2 Thus for Descartes, understanding and explaining natural phenomena requires transposing our knowledge of what constitutes and drives visible machines to the impenetrable realm of nature’s ultimate constituents. What could be more different than Aristotle’s organic
Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of t... more Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages which, on standard readings, are in conflict, are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, passages that appear to commit Descartes to a Platonist view of mathematical objects and the truths that follow from them are no longer in tension with the Conceptualist view of universals implied by his treatment of the eternal truths in the Principles of Philosophy. This interpretation also fits the historical evidence and explains why Descartes ends up with seemingly inconsistent commitments to divine simplicity and God’s efficient creation of truths that are not merely conceptually distinct from the divine essence.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2005
Concluding his account of the purely material properties of the universe in Part IV of the Princi... more Concluding his account of the purely material properties of the universe in Part IV of the Principia Philosophiae René Descartes writes, ‘Indeed up to this point I have described this earth and, what is more, the whole observable universe, like [instar] a machine, considering nothing except the shapes and motions in it’. 1 Descartes justifies this approach, claiming that it is much better to take what we perceive to happen in large bodies as a model for what occurs in imperceptible small bodies, than to invent ‘extraordinary things which I am unable to know, having no resemblance to those which are sensed’. 2 Thus for Descartes, understanding and explaining natural phenomena requires transposing our knowledge of what constitutes and drives visible machines to the impenetrable realm of nature’s ultimate constituents. What could be more different than Aristotle’s organic
Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of t... more Descartes is neither a Conceptualist nor a Platonist when it comes to the ontological status of the eternal truths and essences of mathematics but articulates a view derived from Proclus. There are several advantages to interpreting Descartes’ texts in light of Proclus’ view of universals and philosophy of mathematics. Key passages which, on standard readings, are in conflict, are reconciled if we read Descartes as appropriating Proclus’ threefold distinction among universals. Specifically, passages that appear to commit Descartes to a Platonist view of mathematical objects and the truths that follow from them are no longer in tension with the Conceptualist view of universals implied by his treatment of the eternal truths in the Principles of Philosophy. This interpretation also fits the historical evidence and explains why Descartes ends up with seemingly inconsistent commitments to divine simplicity and God’s efficient creation of truths that are not merely conceptually distinct from the divine essence.
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Papers by Helen Hattab