The main part of my research is focused on different themes in metaethics, but I have also authored papers in aesthetics, experimental philosophy, and normative ethics. In my dissertation, Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism (2004), I defend a naturalist, non-reductionist, version of moral realism. In recent years, I have become particularly interested in the connection between moral language and attitudes, and the connection between normative reasons for action and rationality. I am currently defending a view of normative reasons according to which some reasons depend on our desires while other reasons - in particular moral reasons - are desire independent. Address: University of Oslo Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas P.O. Box 1020 Blindern 0315 OSLO Norway
In this paper, I argue that a realist account of the modality of moral supervenience is superior ... more In this paper, I argue that a realist account of the modality of moral supervenience is superior to a non-cognitivist account. According to the recommended realist account, moral supervenience amounts to strong supervenience where the outer 'necessary' is conceptual and the inner metaphysical. It is argued that non-cognitivism faces a critical choice between weak and strong supervenience where both options are implausible on this view. However, non-cognitivism seems to have an important advantage: It can explain why the outer 'necessary' is conceptual by reference to the function of moral language to influence behaviour. In the main part of the paper, I argue that realism is able to explain why 'necessary' in moral supervenience needs to be understood in the recommended manner by reference to the connection between moral properties and moral reasons. Moreover, I argue that the realist account has other attractive features. In contrast to non-cognitivism, it can unify the normative sphere by being generalizable to other normative notions. In addition, it can be part of an explanation of why moral language can have the function to influence behaviour.
According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that the... more According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that an agent employs in such a process. I maintain that it is the latter which explains why it is rational for an agent to have a certain desire, not the former. As a result, there might be two types of principles. The second type of principle leaves room for objective moral reasons.
One of the most discussed views in metaethics is Moral Internalism, according to which there is a... more One of the most discussed views in metaethics is Moral Internalism, according to which there is a conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation to act. Moral Internalism is regarded to yield the prime argument against Moral Cognitivism and for Moral Non-Cognitivism. In this paper, I investigate the significance of the corresponding claim in metaaesthetics. I pursue two lines of argument. First, I argue that Aesthetic Internalism – the view that there is a conceptually necessary connection between aesthetic value judgments and motivation to act – is mistaken. It follows, I maintain, that the most important argument against Aesthetic Cognitivism, and for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, is flawed, and that the latter view presumably is incorrect. Second, I argue that considerations with regard to Aesthetic Internalism give rise to two normative puzzles with relevance for the normative domain in general. The most plausible solution to these puzzles entails, I maintain, that we need to revise the established view about normative judgments. Moreover, I propose a novel externalist account of aesthetic value judgments.
A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation
between moral blameworthiness and ... more A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation
between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As
there has been little of direct exchange between the debate
on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has
not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I consider
two notions about blameworthiness and reasons that are fundamental
in respective field. The two notions might seem
incontrovertible when considered individually, but I argue that
they together entail claims that are highly contentious. In particular,
I maintain that they entail unreasonable and contradictory
claims since the practices of moral blame and rational
criticism diverge with regard to three dimensions: justification,
response, and function. Thus, we need to give up one of the
principal notions. The solutions to this puzzle suggest that the
connection between reasons and rationality is weaker than
standardly presumed in metaethics.
A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the du... more A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desireindependent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.
According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it
is a challenge exclusi... more According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it
is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it
is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which
moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something,
irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies
to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to
cognitivist internalism according to which moral judgments consist in motivating
beliefs. Hence, in order for a metaethical view to evade the Frege-Geach problem, it
should avoid stating that moral judgments are motivating.
According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism a... more According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable to do so. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view about normative reasons which involves the same notion of rationality as internalism, at the same time as it is able to account for categorical moral reasons. Thus, it evades the dilemma.
One of the most discussed challenges to metaethical expressivism is the embedding problem. It is ... more One of the most discussed challenges to metaethical expressivism is the embedding problem. It is widely presumed that the reason why expressivism faces this difficulty is that it claims that moral sentences express non-cognitive states, or attitudes, which constitute their meaning. In this paper, it is argued that the reason why the embedding problem constitutes a challenge to expressivism is another than what it usually is thought to be. Further, when we have seen the real reason why expressivism is vulnerable to this difficulty, it is plausible to argue that it makes up a challenge to certain other metaethical views as well.
Abstract. Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers ... more Abstract. Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers have argued that moral properties are dispositions. According to one version of this view, most clearly represented by Jonathan Dancy, a moral property is the property ...
Following Temkin’s Inequality I take my point of departure in an individualistic
approach accord... more Following Temkin’s Inequality I take my point of departure in an individualistic
approach according to which a situation is bad in respect of inequality to the extent
individuals in it have egalitarian complaints. After having criticised some of Temkin’s
notions of inequality, I argue that there are two proper egalitarian conceptions, the Equal
Share Conception and the Place Conception. The first concerns how much welfare an
individual can claim to have in order to have what she should have in virtue of equality.
The second concerns an individual’s egalitarian complaint in so far as it depends on her
place in a situation’s distribution of welfare. I argue that the first conception can be
employed in a defence of Telic Egalitarianism against Derek Parfit’s Levelling Down
Objection and that the second one can explain why this objection may seem so convincing. I also argue that Telic Egalitarianism, understood according to the first conception, in one respect is preferable to Parfit’s Priority View.
In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On ... more In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a strong version of internalism is able to explain our notion of the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the possibility that people who suffer from certain mental conditions need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, a weaker form of internalism avoids this difficulty, but fails to explain our notion of the connection between moral judgments and motivation. Moreover, I argue that externalism in conjunction with a pragmatic claim that employs Grice’s concept of generalized conversational implicature is able to account for both these considerations and that it consequently avoids the dilemma. Thus, there is reason to think that this view is preferable to internalism.
In this paper, I argue that a realist account of the modality of moral supervenience is superior ... more In this paper, I argue that a realist account of the modality of moral supervenience is superior to a non-cognitivist account. According to the recommended realist account, moral supervenience amounts to strong supervenience where the outer 'necessary' is conceptual and the inner metaphysical. It is argued that non-cognitivism faces a critical choice between weak and strong supervenience where both options are implausible on this view. However, non-cognitivism seems to have an important advantage: It can explain why the outer 'necessary' is conceptual by reference to the function of moral language to influence behaviour. In the main part of the paper, I argue that realism is able to explain why 'necessary' in moral supervenience needs to be understood in the recommended manner by reference to the connection between moral properties and moral reasons. Moreover, I argue that the realist account has other attractive features. In contrast to non-cognitivism, it can unify the normative sphere by being generalizable to other normative notions. In addition, it can be part of an explanation of why moral language can have the function to influence behaviour.
According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that the... more According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that an agent employs in such a process. I maintain that it is the latter which explains why it is rational for an agent to have a certain desire, not the former. As a result, there might be two types of principles. The second type of principle leaves room for objective moral reasons.
One of the most discussed views in metaethics is Moral Internalism, according to which there is a... more One of the most discussed views in metaethics is Moral Internalism, according to which there is a conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation to act. Moral Internalism is regarded to yield the prime argument against Moral Cognitivism and for Moral Non-Cognitivism. In this paper, I investigate the significance of the corresponding claim in metaaesthetics. I pursue two lines of argument. First, I argue that Aesthetic Internalism – the view that there is a conceptually necessary connection between aesthetic value judgments and motivation to act – is mistaken. It follows, I maintain, that the most important argument against Aesthetic Cognitivism, and for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, is flawed, and that the latter view presumably is incorrect. Second, I argue that considerations with regard to Aesthetic Internalism give rise to two normative puzzles with relevance for the normative domain in general. The most plausible solution to these puzzles entails, I maintain, that we need to revise the established view about normative judgments. Moreover, I propose a novel externalist account of aesthetic value judgments.
A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation
between moral blameworthiness and ... more A central issue in practical philosophy concerns the relation
between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As
there has been little of direct exchange between the debate
on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has
not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I consider
two notions about blameworthiness and reasons that are fundamental
in respective field. The two notions might seem
incontrovertible when considered individually, but I argue that
they together entail claims that are highly contentious. In particular,
I maintain that they entail unreasonable and contradictory
claims since the practices of moral blame and rational
criticism diverge with regard to three dimensions: justification,
response, and function. Thus, we need to give up one of the
principal notions. The solutions to this puzzle suggest that the
connection between reasons and rationality is weaker than
standardly presumed in metaethics.
A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the du... more A theory of normative reasons for action faces the fundamental challenge of accounting for the dual nature of reasons. On the one hand, some reasons appear to depend on, and vary with, desires. On the other hand, some reasons appear categorical in the sense of being desireindependent. However, it has turned out to be difficult to provide a theory that accommodates both these aspects. Internalism is able to account for the former aspect, but has difficulties to account for the latter, whereas externalism is vulnerable to the reverse problem. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view that consists of two parts: First, I defend a distinction between requiring reasons and justifying reasons in terms of their different connections to rationality. Second, I put forward a subjectivist, procedural, view of rationality. The ecumenical alternative, I argue, is able to accommodate the mentioned duality within a unified theory. In outlining this view, I also suggest that it has a number of other significant advantages.
According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it
is a challenge exclusi... more According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it
is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it
is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which
moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something,
irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies
to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to
cognitivist internalism according to which moral judgments consist in motivating
beliefs. Hence, in order for a metaethical view to evade the Frege-Geach problem, it
should avoid stating that moral judgments are motivating.
According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism a... more According to an influential way of understanding the debate between internalism and externalism about normative reasons, these theories confront us with a dilemma. Internalism is taken to involve a view about rationality which is considered less philosophically problematic than its competitors, whereas externalism is taken to suggest a more contentious view concerning this notion. However, the assumption that externalism involves a more demanding notion of rationality implies that it is able to account for categorical moral reasons, whereas internalism is unable to do so. In this paper, I outline an ecumenical view about normative reasons which involves the same notion of rationality as internalism, at the same time as it is able to account for categorical moral reasons. Thus, it evades the dilemma.
One of the most discussed challenges to metaethical expressivism is the embedding problem. It is ... more One of the most discussed challenges to metaethical expressivism is the embedding problem. It is widely presumed that the reason why expressivism faces this difficulty is that it claims that moral sentences express non-cognitive states, or attitudes, which constitute their meaning. In this paper, it is argued that the reason why the embedding problem constitutes a challenge to expressivism is another than what it usually is thought to be. Further, when we have seen the real reason why expressivism is vulnerable to this difficulty, it is plausible to argue that it makes up a challenge to certain other metaethical views as well.
Abstract. Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers ... more Abstract. Inspired by an analogy between moral and secondary properties, some moral philosophers have argued that moral properties are dispositions. According to one version of this view, most clearly represented by Jonathan Dancy, a moral property is the property ...
Following Temkin’s Inequality I take my point of departure in an individualistic
approach accord... more Following Temkin’s Inequality I take my point of departure in an individualistic
approach according to which a situation is bad in respect of inequality to the extent
individuals in it have egalitarian complaints. After having criticised some of Temkin’s
notions of inequality, I argue that there are two proper egalitarian conceptions, the Equal
Share Conception and the Place Conception. The first concerns how much welfare an
individual can claim to have in order to have what she should have in virtue of equality.
The second concerns an individual’s egalitarian complaint in so far as it depends on her
place in a situation’s distribution of welfare. I argue that the first conception can be
employed in a defence of Telic Egalitarianism against Derek Parfit’s Levelling Down
Objection and that the second one can explain why this objection may seem so convincing. I also argue that Telic Egalitarianism, understood according to the first conception, in one respect is preferable to Parfit’s Priority View.
In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On ... more In this paper, I argue that internalism about moral judgments and motivation faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a strong version of internalism is able to explain our notion of the connection between moral language and motivation, but fails to account for the possibility that people who suffer from certain mental conditions need not be accordingly motivated. On the other hand, a weaker form of internalism avoids this difficulty, but fails to explain our notion of the connection between moral judgments and motivation. Moreover, I argue that externalism in conjunction with a pragmatic claim that employs Grice’s concept of generalized conversational implicature is able to account for both these considerations and that it consequently avoids the dilemma. Thus, there is reason to think that this view is preferable to internalism.
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Papers by Caj Strandberg
between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As
there has been little of direct exchange between the debate
on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has
not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I consider
two notions about blameworthiness and reasons that are fundamental
in respective field. The two notions might seem
incontrovertible when considered individually, but I argue that
they together entail claims that are highly contentious. In particular,
I maintain that they entail unreasonable and contradictory
claims since the practices of moral blame and rational
criticism diverge with regard to three dimensions: justification,
response, and function. Thus, we need to give up one of the
principal notions. The solutions to this puzzle suggest that the
connection between reasons and rationality is weaker than
standardly presumed in metaethics.
is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it
is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which
moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something,
irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies
to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to
cognitivist internalism according to which moral judgments consist in motivating
beliefs. Hence, in order for a metaethical view to evade the Frege-Geach problem, it
should avoid stating that moral judgments are motivating.
approach according to which a situation is bad in respect of inequality to the extent
individuals in it have egalitarian complaints. After having criticised some of Temkin’s
notions of inequality, I argue that there are two proper egalitarian conceptions, the Equal
Share Conception and the Place Conception. The first concerns how much welfare an
individual can claim to have in order to have what she should have in virtue of equality.
The second concerns an individual’s egalitarian complaint in so far as it depends on her
place in a situation’s distribution of welfare. I argue that the first conception can be
employed in a defence of Telic Egalitarianism against Derek Parfit’s Levelling Down
Objection and that the second one can explain why this objection may seem so convincing. I also argue that Telic Egalitarianism, understood according to the first conception, in one respect is preferable to Parfit’s Priority View.
between moral blameworthiness and normative reasons. As
there has been little of direct exchange between the debate
on reasons and the debate on blameworthiness, this topic has
not received the attention it deserves. In this paper, I consider
two notions about blameworthiness and reasons that are fundamental
in respective field. The two notions might seem
incontrovertible when considered individually, but I argue that
they together entail claims that are highly contentious. In particular,
I maintain that they entail unreasonable and contradictory
claims since the practices of moral blame and rational
criticism diverge with regard to three dimensions: justification,
response, and function. Thus, we need to give up one of the
principal notions. The solutions to this puzzle suggest that the
connection between reasons and rationality is weaker than
standardly presumed in metaethics.
is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it
is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which
moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something,
irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies
to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to
cognitivist internalism according to which moral judgments consist in motivating
beliefs. Hence, in order for a metaethical view to evade the Frege-Geach problem, it
should avoid stating that moral judgments are motivating.
approach according to which a situation is bad in respect of inequality to the extent
individuals in it have egalitarian complaints. After having criticised some of Temkin’s
notions of inequality, I argue that there are two proper egalitarian conceptions, the Equal
Share Conception and the Place Conception. The first concerns how much welfare an
individual can claim to have in order to have what she should have in virtue of equality.
The second concerns an individual’s egalitarian complaint in so far as it depends on her
place in a situation’s distribution of welfare. I argue that the first conception can be
employed in a defence of Telic Egalitarianism against Derek Parfit’s Levelling Down
Objection and that the second one can explain why this objection may seem so convincing. I also argue that Telic Egalitarianism, understood according to the first conception, in one respect is preferable to Parfit’s Priority View.