This paper deals with the ideas underpinning the EU’s socio-economic governance by focusing on th... more This paper deals with the ideas underpinning the EU’s socio-economic governance by focusing on the notion of structural reforms in the framework of the European Semester. It asks which policy ideas are constitutive of the notion of structural reforms in the EU and whether said meaning has changed over time to tackle slow growth and rising inequalities. Our demonstration is mainly grounded on a content analysis of all European Semester documents since 2011 (including Annual Growth Surveys, Alert Mechanism Reports, Euro Area Recommendations, and Country-Specific Recommendations) and completed by a short series of interviews with European and national officials involved in the European Semester. We find that, despite floating meaning, the notion of structural reforms exhibits a persisting core consisting of typically neoliberal policy recipes such as the liberalisation of products and services markets, the deregulation of labour markets, and public administration reform. At the same time, structural reforms have covered eclectic—if not contradictory—policy ideas, thus accompanying a discursive turn towards more fiscal flexibility and (social) investment. Rather than a constructive dynamic towards a renewed agenda, such ambiguity, we argue, reflects a fundamental, asymmetric ongoing battle of ideas within the EU.
Since the onset of the crisis the EU has introduced new instruments of economic governance, at th... more Since the onset of the crisis the EU has introduced new instruments of economic governance, at the heart of which is the European semester. Scholars largely disagree on which institutional actor has come out as the winner from these reforms. This article attempts to contribute to this debate by examining how the European semester has been enforced by the Commission since 2011. The main argument is that although the decision-making process during the crisis has been broadly dominated by member states, the Commission enjoys considerable discretion over the enforcement of the European semester. This is explained by the incomplete nature of the contracts of delegation between member states and the Commission. As a case study, the article focusses on the Commission's discretion in enforcing the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and the reinforced Stability and Growth Pact, as well as in shaping the procedures of the semester itself. At the same time, it is shown that the Commission uses its discretion very carefully, alternating between flexibility and rigidity. Depuis le début de la crise, l'UE a développé des nouveaux instruments de gouvernance économique, au coeur desquels s'inscrit le semestre européen. Les avis académiques divergent quant à savoir quel acteur institutionnel est sorti renforcé de ces réformes. Cet article vise à contribuer à ce débat en examinant comment le semestre européen a été mis en application par la Commission depuis 2011. Il avance comme argument principal que malgré la domination des Etats-membres sur le processus décisionnel durant la crise, la Commission jouit d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire considérable sur la mise en application du semestre. Ceci s'explique par la nature incomplète des contrats de délégation 1 PhD candidate in Political and Social Sciences, Centre d'étude de la vie politique/Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Université Libre de Bruxelles. Comments welcome at pvheuver@ulb.ac.be
In the aftermath of the crisis, new instruments of economic governance have been adopted at the E... more In the aftermath of the crisis, new instruments of economic governance have been adopted at the EU level. Until recently, these have been strongly dominated by what I assume to be the ECFIN coalition. However, at least since 2011, this coalition’s supremacy has been challenged by the competing coalition’s (EPSCO) willingness to rebalance the economic governance so that social concerns are better taken into account. Hence, drawing on the agenda-setting literature in the EU context, this working paper aims at retracing the process that has led to put this issue of the social dimension of the EMU on to the EU political agenda. Three hypotheses are made concerning the rise of this issue, the strategies employed by agenda-setters, and the policy subsystem of the economic governance. First, this study shows that the interest in this issue has been gradually fostered ‘from below’, at the level of the European Parliament and the European Commission. Second, due to its ‘high politics’ nature, this issue could only be initiated ‘from above’ (European Council) and then expanded to lower levels of decision-making (Commission). Specifically, DG EMPL has managed to attract attention to this issue and to build its credibility in dealing with it by strategically framing the issue and directing it towards the EPSCO venue. Finally, I analyze the outcome of this agenda-setting process by assessing to what extent the two new social scoreboards which form part of this social dimension have been taken into account during the 2014 European semester. The result of this analysis is that the new economic governance has not been genuinely rebalanced insofar as its dominant policy core remains that of the ECFIN coalition.
During the fast-burning Eurozone crisis (Tsingou, 2014), decision-makers sought to harden the pre... more During the fast-burning Eurozone crisis (Tsingou, 2014), decision-makers sought to harden the pre-crisis tools of coordination with a view to prevent the errors allegedly committed in the past. These developments have given rise to an increasingly important literature in EU studies focusing on policies, policy processes, and inter-institutional politics. The first part of this note takes stock of this research, starting with the policies underpinning the EU macroeconomic governance, then looking at the policy processes on which they rely, and finally addressing the shifting roles of institutional actors in tackling slow-burning crises.
The aim of this paper is to assess to what extent the European Semester, which is the EU framewor... more The aim of this paper is to assess to what extent the European Semester, which is the EU framework for the coordination of national economic, fiscal and social policies, accounts for a change in the ideas promoted throughout the crisis. For doing this, we seek to tease out the meaning and substantial policy content entailed by the notion of ‘structural reforms’, a notion which has become ubiquitous yet barely explained or defined. Besides a brief reference to the genealogy of the notion of structural reforms and interviews, the bulk of our analysis relies on the content analysis of the key documents produced in the framework of the European Semester, including the Country Specific Recommendations made to the Member States. Our data supports three sets of findings. 1/ the notion of structural reforms has been vague and malleable enough to accommodate a certain degree of ideational change with a clear shift from fiscal consolidation to investment in 2014-2015. 2/ At the same time, there is obvious continuity at the level of more specific policy recopies and instruments. While the notion of structural reforms has fuzzy contours, it also has hard core inherited from its neoliberal origins. This hard core focuses on labour market reforms, the liberalization and deregulation of product and services markets, and the reform of public administration. 3/ With regard to social policy in particular, we detect an ongoing conflict between social retrenchment and social investment with the latter gaining ground in the discourse of the EU institutions. All in all, we conclude that the EU is trapped in a destructive – rather than constructive – ambiguity. Conflicting socioeconomic strategies crystalize on which type of structural reforms should be implemented and when or, in other words, whether austerity and investment can be pursued at the same time.
The financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis that hit the European Union (EU) in 2008 has le... more The financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis that hit the European Union (EU) in 2008 has led to a broad revamping of its architecture of economic governance. Scholars largely disagree on which institutional actor has come out as the winner from this. This paper attempts to contribute to this debate by examining a somewhat overlooked aspect of the post-crisis economic governance, namely its implementation by the Commission since the first cycle of the European Semester (ES) in 2011. The main argument is that although the decisions to respond to the crisis have to a large extent been initiated and taken by the Member States, the incomplete character of what are defined as two different " contracts " of delegation from the Member States to the supranational level has left the Commission with important discretionary power over the ES. This is demonstrated through an analysis of the Commission's discretion in the enforcement of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact as well as in the very organization of the ES. At the same time, the paper also shows that the Commission seems to use its discretionary power very carefully by mixing an understanding and inflexible attitude vis-à-vis Member States, thus employing the " good cop, bad cop " strategy.
This paper deals with the ideas underpinning the EU’s socio-economic governance by focusing on th... more This paper deals with the ideas underpinning the EU’s socio-economic governance by focusing on the notion of structural reforms in the framework of the European Semester. It asks which policy ideas are constitutive of the notion of structural reforms in the EU and whether said meaning has changed over time to tackle slow growth and rising inequalities. Our demonstration is mainly grounded on a content analysis of all European Semester documents since 2011 (including Annual Growth Surveys, Alert Mechanism Reports, Euro Area Recommendations, and Country-Specific Recommendations) and completed by a short series of interviews with European and national officials involved in the European Semester. We find that, despite floating meaning, the notion of structural reforms exhibits a persisting core consisting of typically neoliberal policy recipes such as the liberalisation of products and services markets, the deregulation of labour markets, and public administration reform. At the same time, structural reforms have covered eclectic—if not contradictory—policy ideas, thus accompanying a discursive turn towards more fiscal flexibility and (social) investment. Rather than a constructive dynamic towards a renewed agenda, such ambiguity, we argue, reflects a fundamental, asymmetric ongoing battle of ideas within the EU.
Since the onset of the crisis the EU has introduced new instruments of economic governance, at th... more Since the onset of the crisis the EU has introduced new instruments of economic governance, at the heart of which is the European semester. Scholars largely disagree on which institutional actor has come out as the winner from these reforms. This article attempts to contribute to this debate by examining how the European semester has been enforced by the Commission since 2011. The main argument is that although the decision-making process during the crisis has been broadly dominated by member states, the Commission enjoys considerable discretion over the enforcement of the European semester. This is explained by the incomplete nature of the contracts of delegation between member states and the Commission. As a case study, the article focusses on the Commission's discretion in enforcing the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and the reinforced Stability and Growth Pact, as well as in shaping the procedures of the semester itself. At the same time, it is shown that the Commission uses its discretion very carefully, alternating between flexibility and rigidity. Depuis le début de la crise, l'UE a développé des nouveaux instruments de gouvernance économique, au coeur desquels s'inscrit le semestre européen. Les avis académiques divergent quant à savoir quel acteur institutionnel est sorti renforcé de ces réformes. Cet article vise à contribuer à ce débat en examinant comment le semestre européen a été mis en application par la Commission depuis 2011. Il avance comme argument principal que malgré la domination des Etats-membres sur le processus décisionnel durant la crise, la Commission jouit d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire considérable sur la mise en application du semestre. Ceci s'explique par la nature incomplète des contrats de délégation 1 PhD candidate in Political and Social Sciences, Centre d'étude de la vie politique/Institut d'Etudes Européennes, Université Libre de Bruxelles. Comments welcome at pvheuver@ulb.ac.be
In the aftermath of the crisis, new instruments of economic governance have been adopted at the E... more In the aftermath of the crisis, new instruments of economic governance have been adopted at the EU level. Until recently, these have been strongly dominated by what I assume to be the ECFIN coalition. However, at least since 2011, this coalition’s supremacy has been challenged by the competing coalition’s (EPSCO) willingness to rebalance the economic governance so that social concerns are better taken into account. Hence, drawing on the agenda-setting literature in the EU context, this working paper aims at retracing the process that has led to put this issue of the social dimension of the EMU on to the EU political agenda. Three hypotheses are made concerning the rise of this issue, the strategies employed by agenda-setters, and the policy subsystem of the economic governance. First, this study shows that the interest in this issue has been gradually fostered ‘from below’, at the level of the European Parliament and the European Commission. Second, due to its ‘high politics’ nature, this issue could only be initiated ‘from above’ (European Council) and then expanded to lower levels of decision-making (Commission). Specifically, DG EMPL has managed to attract attention to this issue and to build its credibility in dealing with it by strategically framing the issue and directing it towards the EPSCO venue. Finally, I analyze the outcome of this agenda-setting process by assessing to what extent the two new social scoreboards which form part of this social dimension have been taken into account during the 2014 European semester. The result of this analysis is that the new economic governance has not been genuinely rebalanced insofar as its dominant policy core remains that of the ECFIN coalition.
During the fast-burning Eurozone crisis (Tsingou, 2014), decision-makers sought to harden the pre... more During the fast-burning Eurozone crisis (Tsingou, 2014), decision-makers sought to harden the pre-crisis tools of coordination with a view to prevent the errors allegedly committed in the past. These developments have given rise to an increasingly important literature in EU studies focusing on policies, policy processes, and inter-institutional politics. The first part of this note takes stock of this research, starting with the policies underpinning the EU macroeconomic governance, then looking at the policy processes on which they rely, and finally addressing the shifting roles of institutional actors in tackling slow-burning crises.
The aim of this paper is to assess to what extent the European Semester, which is the EU framewor... more The aim of this paper is to assess to what extent the European Semester, which is the EU framework for the coordination of national economic, fiscal and social policies, accounts for a change in the ideas promoted throughout the crisis. For doing this, we seek to tease out the meaning and substantial policy content entailed by the notion of ‘structural reforms’, a notion which has become ubiquitous yet barely explained or defined. Besides a brief reference to the genealogy of the notion of structural reforms and interviews, the bulk of our analysis relies on the content analysis of the key documents produced in the framework of the European Semester, including the Country Specific Recommendations made to the Member States. Our data supports three sets of findings. 1/ the notion of structural reforms has been vague and malleable enough to accommodate a certain degree of ideational change with a clear shift from fiscal consolidation to investment in 2014-2015. 2/ At the same time, there is obvious continuity at the level of more specific policy recopies and instruments. While the notion of structural reforms has fuzzy contours, it also has hard core inherited from its neoliberal origins. This hard core focuses on labour market reforms, the liberalization and deregulation of product and services markets, and the reform of public administration. 3/ With regard to social policy in particular, we detect an ongoing conflict between social retrenchment and social investment with the latter gaining ground in the discourse of the EU institutions. All in all, we conclude that the EU is trapped in a destructive – rather than constructive – ambiguity. Conflicting socioeconomic strategies crystalize on which type of structural reforms should be implemented and when or, in other words, whether austerity and investment can be pursued at the same time.
The financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis that hit the European Union (EU) in 2008 has le... more The financial, economic and sovereign debt crisis that hit the European Union (EU) in 2008 has led to a broad revamping of its architecture of economic governance. Scholars largely disagree on which institutional actor has come out as the winner from this. This paper attempts to contribute to this debate by examining a somewhat overlooked aspect of the post-crisis economic governance, namely its implementation by the Commission since the first cycle of the European Semester (ES) in 2011. The main argument is that although the decisions to respond to the crisis have to a large extent been initiated and taken by the Member States, the incomplete character of what are defined as two different " contracts " of delegation from the Member States to the supranational level has left the Commission with important discretionary power over the ES. This is demonstrated through an analysis of the Commission's discretion in the enforcement of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact as well as in the very organization of the ES. At the same time, the paper also shows that the Commission seems to use its discretionary power very carefully by mixing an understanding and inflexible attitude vis-à-vis Member States, thus employing the " good cop, bad cop " strategy.
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