B.A. Philosophy, University of Maryland. Graduate Diamonds graduate, Gemological Institute of America President and Co-Founder of the UMD Philosophy Club. My main research interests in Philosophy are Game Theory and Rationality.
This essay explores the relationship between reality and how we describe reality. On an individua... more This essay explores the relationship between reality and how we describe reality. On an individual basis, we hold certain facts about what exists to actually be the case in reality; these are our ontological commitments, and we express these commitments each and every time we speak. One may be more or less explicit about what he is ontologically committed to — for instance, one may say “apples exist” to express his commitment to the existence of apples or, at another time, he might say “some apples are red.” Though the latter sentence does not explicitly state the existence of apples, I will, for the purposes of this essay, take both sentences to be ontologically committing. The problem with many of the ontological statements we make is that when we write them out in their logical form, their symbolizations do not always translate to exactly that which we intend for them to state. For instance, suppose I’m rummaging through my refrigerator when my roommate calls out to me from the o...
The problem with ontological commitment is that when we symbolize the statements that we make abo... more The problem with ontological commitment is that when we symbolize the statements that we make about what 'exists' or what is 'real', they do not always translate to exactly that which we intend to express. In this essay, I explore the relation between 'Reality' and how we describe reality. I evaluate the accounts of three prominent philosophers on the topic, address their shortcomings, and introduce my own account; which I call "The Natural Definition of Reality".
This paper treats objects and their mirror images as two distinct objects (or stages of one and t... more This paper treats objects and their mirror images as two distinct objects (or stages of one and the same object) that are identical in every respect, except one is the mirror-reversed twin of the other. It asks, "Can an object differ aesthetically from its mirror-reversed self?" The greatest perceptible difference between such objects is the ostensive opposite orientation that they embody in relation to one another. This paper focuses its attention to orientation and explores whether a change in an object's orientation under mirror-reversal can cause an aesthetic divergence between the original object and its mirror-reversed self.
Willard Van Orman Quine's quantificational theory of ontological claims explains that we should e... more Willard Van Orman Quine's quantificational theory of ontological claims explains that we should express our ontological statements using an existential quantifier. Kit Fine objects to the quantificational view, arguing that it "distorts the basic logic of ontological commitment". In this essay, I argue that Fine's argument is invalid because it takes on the logical fallacy of equivocation; then I present a possible solution for this problem.
In this essay, I distinguish three areas of ontological inquiry. They pertain, respectively, to:... more In this essay, I distinguish three areas of ontological inquiry. They pertain, respectively, to: (1) questions concerning 'what there is?', (2) questions concerning 'what a theory of ontological commitment says there is?', and (3) questions concerning 'what a theory of ontological commitment should say there is, given what there is?'. I use the example of Kit Fine's objection to the quantificational view of ontological claims in order to show how philosophers who write in the areas of ontology and metaontology can easily, and unknowingly, misguide their solutions to ontological problems under the wrong area of ontological inquiry to which they allegedly pertain.
Suppose that you are faced with the following choice: You will receive a very large sum of money ... more Suppose that you are faced with the following choice: You will receive a very large sum of money if you were to go into a teleporter. The teleporter consists of rooms 1 and 2. When you enter room 1 all of the information about your body gets copied. Your body is then destroyed. At the exact time of your body being destroyed, a new body is assembled (by 3D printing) in room 2--exactly like the one destroyed, complete with your mental traits. Would you do it?
This essay explores the relationship between reality and how we describe reality. On an individua... more This essay explores the relationship between reality and how we describe reality. On an individual basis, we hold certain facts about what exists to actually be the case in reality; these are our ontological commitments, and we express these commitments each and every time we speak. One may be more or less explicit about what he is ontologically committed to — for instance, one may say “apples exist” to express his commitment to the existence of apples or, at another time, he might say “some apples are red.” Though the latter sentence does not explicitly state the existence of apples, I will, for the purposes of this essay, take both sentences to be ontologically committing. The problem with many of the ontological statements we make is that when we write them out in their logical form, their symbolizations do not always translate to exactly that which we intend for them to state. For instance, suppose I’m rummaging through my refrigerator when my roommate calls out to me from the o...
The problem with ontological commitment is that when we symbolize the statements that we make abo... more The problem with ontological commitment is that when we symbolize the statements that we make about what 'exists' or what is 'real', they do not always translate to exactly that which we intend to express. In this essay, I explore the relation between 'Reality' and how we describe reality. I evaluate the accounts of three prominent philosophers on the topic, address their shortcomings, and introduce my own account; which I call "The Natural Definition of Reality".
This paper treats objects and their mirror images as two distinct objects (or stages of one and t... more This paper treats objects and their mirror images as two distinct objects (or stages of one and the same object) that are identical in every respect, except one is the mirror-reversed twin of the other. It asks, "Can an object differ aesthetically from its mirror-reversed self?" The greatest perceptible difference between such objects is the ostensive opposite orientation that they embody in relation to one another. This paper focuses its attention to orientation and explores whether a change in an object's orientation under mirror-reversal can cause an aesthetic divergence between the original object and its mirror-reversed self.
Willard Van Orman Quine's quantificational theory of ontological claims explains that we should e... more Willard Van Orman Quine's quantificational theory of ontological claims explains that we should express our ontological statements using an existential quantifier. Kit Fine objects to the quantificational view, arguing that it "distorts the basic logic of ontological commitment". In this essay, I argue that Fine's argument is invalid because it takes on the logical fallacy of equivocation; then I present a possible solution for this problem.
In this essay, I distinguish three areas of ontological inquiry. They pertain, respectively, to:... more In this essay, I distinguish three areas of ontological inquiry. They pertain, respectively, to: (1) questions concerning 'what there is?', (2) questions concerning 'what a theory of ontological commitment says there is?', and (3) questions concerning 'what a theory of ontological commitment should say there is, given what there is?'. I use the example of Kit Fine's objection to the quantificational view of ontological claims in order to show how philosophers who write in the areas of ontology and metaontology can easily, and unknowingly, misguide their solutions to ontological problems under the wrong area of ontological inquiry to which they allegedly pertain.
Suppose that you are faced with the following choice: You will receive a very large sum of money ... more Suppose that you are faced with the following choice: You will receive a very large sum of money if you were to go into a teleporter. The teleporter consists of rooms 1 and 2. When you enter room 1 all of the information about your body gets copied. Your body is then destroyed. At the exact time of your body being destroyed, a new body is assembled (by 3D printing) in room 2--exactly like the one destroyed, complete with your mental traits. Would you do it?
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