Dr. Jeanine Weekes Schroer’s research areas include social philosophy, feminist theory, critical race theory, cognitive science, and epistemologies of ignorance. She has also published on microaggressions and stereotype threat. She’s currently working on two book projects: one on agency in the context of cognitive decline and a second on black feminist ethics. Her recent publications include “For the Love of the Feminist Killjoy: Solving Philosophy’s Woman White Male Problem" (co-authored with Melissa Kozma) in Surviving Sexism in Academic: Strategies for Feminist Leadership, edited by Kirsti Cole, and Holly Hassel, Routledge 2017, p. 80-88 Phone: (218) 726 - 7714 Address: Department of Philosophy
University of Minnesota Duluth
1121 University Drive
305 A.B. Anderson Hall
Duluth, MN 55812-3087
Within the humanities, no discipline is more white and more male than Philosophy. Data shows that... more Within the humanities, no discipline is more white and more male than Philosophy. Data shows that women philosophers are far less likely to be published, and their publications are far less frequently cited. A growing body of research tracks Philosophy’s indifference to women and people of color at all stages in the discipline, as well as to research investigating the marginalization and oppression of women and people of color. Although the discipline has been aware of these disproportions for more than twenty years, recent data suggests that Philosophy’s “woman problem” is getting worse, not better. When mainstream Philosophy engages with these issues, the results are frequently a symphony of stereotype threats, microaggressions, and just-so stories that favor the status quo. For example, it is argued that women’s disproportionate representation in conferences, journals, citations, tenure track, associate, and full professorships is a not particularly surprising mathematical result of the original disproportion — women’s underrepresentation in the discipline as a whole. This makes it statistically improbable that any woman would be available to be in any of these categories, or that if she did miraculously appear, she would be better than the men she would be competing against. While these observations aren’t inaccurate, reciting them isn’t so much a response to the gender disproportions as it is a tacit resignation to them. Many of Philosophy’s responses to these issues ignore the culture and practice of Philosophy and also tend to “blame the victims” of these practices. When confronted with internally focused criticisms — e.g., Philosophy cultivates and sustains a subtly and overtly sexist culture — or when presented with appropriately aimed solutions — like organizing the professional life so as to protect the marginalized and undermine predation and exclusion — Philosophy doubles down on the sexism by invoking the potential injury to a model philosopher (who is ultimately male) and condemns a feminist killjoy who is destroying the profession. After unpacking Philosophy’s white male problem and the discourse that sustains it, we articulate why the common mainstream solutions tend to fail or falter: a masculinist line of thinking not only controls the narratives around sexism in Philosophy, it also determines the criterion by which we judge what kinds of narratives, strategies, and understandings are legitimate. We then discuss the strategies that have been successful in combating the “woman problem” in Philosophy, and the fact that they are widely criticized by mainstream philosophers. Various kinds of public campaigns that embrace and indulge the role of the feminist killjoy; what has been decried as “finger-pointing”, “gossip”, “social justice bullying”, “partiality”, and “coddling” — these strategies have worked. We argue that these campaigns of feminist joy killing are key to solving Philosophy’s white male problem. We must reject the typical narratives and embrace the thorny, antagonistic relationship between feminist critique and Philosophy. To quote feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger, “We are the winning side now. We will not relent; so it is only a matter of time.”
Our analysis is inspired by the fracas that arose around the second episode of the fourth Season ... more Our analysis is inspired by the fracas that arose around the second episode of the fourth Season of Netflix’s series Queer Eye, titled "Disabled But Not Really." This case will help us to articulate two important elements of microaggressions and to map the epistemic territory that polices the identity of disabled folks. Using this example, we will argue three things: First, central to conceptualizing microaggressions is understanding their mixed legibility. By this, we mean to suggest that crucial to the way that microaggressions function is that they are poised to deliver different messages to different audiences or multi-tiered messages to general audiences. Second, this mixed legibility is what allows microaggressions to be leveraged as part of a complex epistemology of domination that takes advantage of various mechanisms/element of epistemic oppression that are articulated in a growing literature (see literature review in the introduction to this volume). Finally, exploring the terrain of ableist microaggressions most clearly reveals how they can serve as a tool for maintaining the oppressive epistemologies that police the identities of disabled folk, but this role is not unique to them. In the first section, our argument will articulate how we understand “microaggression” and offer a clarifying augmentation of that account. In section two, we briefly locate ourselves within the literature attempting to define disability, then talk through how our analysis connects with the very few discussions of microaggressions within the context of disability. In section three, we introduce the case of “Disabled But Not Really.” In the fourth section, we leverage our previous analysis to show how microaggressions’ mixed legibility is crucial to their role in maintaining an epistemology that polices disability in general and disabled people in particular. We will close by discussing the ramifications this has for future analysis of both microaggressions and disability.
Our analysis is inspired by the fracas that arose around the second episode of the fourth Season ... more Our analysis is inspired by the fracas that arose around the second episode of the fourth Season of Netflix’s series Queer Eye, titled "Disabled But Not Really." This case will help us to articulate two important elements of microaggressions and to map the epistemic territory that polices the identity of disabled folks. Using this example, we will argue three things: First, central to conceptualizing microaggressions is understanding their mixed legibility. By this, we mean to suggest that crucial to the way that microaggressions function is that they are poised to deliver different messages to different audiences or multi-tiered messages to general audiences. Second, this mixed legibility is what allows microaggressions to be leveraged as part of a complex epistemology of domination that takes advantage of various mechanisms/element of epistemic oppression that are articulated in a growing literature (see literature review in the introduction to this volume). Finally, exploring the terrain of ableist microaggressions most clearly reveals how they can serve as a tool for maintaining the oppressive epistemologies that police the identities of disabled folk, but this role is not unique to them. In the first section, our argument will articulate how we understand “microaggression” and offer a clarifying augmentation of that account. In section two, we briefly locate ourselves within the literature attempting to define disability, then talk through how our analysis connects with the very few discussions of microaggressions within the context of disability. In section three, we introduce the case of “Disabled But Not Really.” In the fourth section, we leverage our previous analysis to show how microaggressions’ mixed legibility is crucial to their role in maintaining an epistemology that polices disability in general and disabled people in particular. We will close by discussing the ramifications this has for future analysis of both microaggressions and disability.
Within the humanities, no discipline is more white and more male than Philosophy. Data shows that... more Within the humanities, no discipline is more white and more male than Philosophy. Data shows that women philosophers are far less likely to be published, and their publications are far less frequently cited. A growing body of research tracks Philosophy’s indifference to women and people of color at all stages in the discipline, as well as to research investigating the marginalization and oppression of women and people of color. Although the discipline has been aware of these disproportions for more than twenty years, recent data suggests that Philosophy’s “woman problem” is getting worse, not better. When mainstream Philosophy engages with these issues, the results are frequently a symphony of stereotype threats, microaggressions, and just-so stories that favor the status quo. For example, it is argued that women’s disproportionate representation in conferences, journals, citations, tenure track, associate, and full professorships is a not particularly surprising mathematical result of the original disproportion — women’s underrepresentation in the discipline as a whole. This makes it statistically improbable that any woman would be available to be in any of these categories, or that if she did miraculously appear, she would be better than the men she would be competing against. While these observations aren’t inaccurate, reciting them isn’t so much a response to the gender disproportions as it is a tacit resignation to them. Many of Philosophy’s responses to these issues ignore the culture and practice of Philosophy and also tend to “blame the victims” of these practices. When confronted with internally focused criticisms — e.g., Philosophy cultivates and sustains a subtly and overtly sexist culture — or when presented with appropriately aimed solutions — like organizing the professional life so as to protect the marginalized and undermine predation and exclusion — Philosophy doubles down on the sexism by invoking the potential injury to a model philosopher (who is ultimately male) and condemns a feminist killjoy who is destroying the profession. After unpacking Philosophy’s white male problem and the discourse that sustains it, we articulate why the common mainstream solutions tend to fail or falter: a masculinist line of thinking not only controls the narratives around sexism in Philosophy, it also determines the criterion by which we judge what kinds of narratives, strategies, and understandings are legitimate. We then discuss the strategies that have been successful in combating the “woman problem” in Philosophy, and the fact that they are widely criticized by mainstream philosophers. Various kinds of public campaigns that embrace and indulge the role of the feminist killjoy; what has been decried as “finger-pointing”, “gossip”, “social justice bullying”, “partiality”, and “coddling” — these strategies have worked. We argue that these campaigns of feminist joy killing are key to solving Philosophy’s white male problem. We must reject the typical narratives and embrace the thorny, antagonistic relationship between feminist critique and Philosophy. To quote feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger, “We are the winning side now. We will not relent; so it is only a matter of time.”
Within the humanities, no discipline is more white and more male than Philosophy. Data shows that... more Within the humanities, no discipline is more white and more male than Philosophy. Data shows that women philosophers are far less likely to be published, and their publications are far less frequently cited. A growing body of research tracks Philosophy’s indifference to women and people of color at all stages in the discipline, as well as to research investigating the marginalization and oppression of women and people of color. Although the discipline has been aware of these disproportions for more than twenty years, recent data suggests that Philosophy’s “woman problem” is getting worse, not better. When mainstream Philosophy engages with these issues, the results are frequently a symphony of stereotype threats, microaggressions, and just-so stories that favor the status quo. For example, it is argued that women’s disproportionate representation in conferences, journals, citations, tenure track, associate, and full professorships is a not particularly surprising mathematical result of the original disproportion — women’s underrepresentation in the discipline as a whole. This makes it statistically improbable that any woman would be available to be in any of these categories, or that if she did miraculously appear, she would be better than the men she would be competing against. While these observations aren’t inaccurate, reciting them isn’t so much a response to the gender disproportions as it is a tacit resignation to them. Many of Philosophy’s responses to these issues ignore the culture and practice of Philosophy and also tend to “blame the victims” of these practices. When confronted with internally focused criticisms — e.g., Philosophy cultivates and sustains a subtly and overtly sexist culture — or when presented with appropriately aimed solutions — like organizing the professional life so as to protect the marginalized and undermine predation and exclusion — Philosophy doubles down on the sexism by invoking the potential injury to a model philosopher (who is ultimately male) and condemns a feminist killjoy who is destroying the profession. After unpacking Philosophy’s white male problem and the discourse that sustains it, we articulate why the common mainstream solutions tend to fail or falter: a masculinist line of thinking not only controls the narratives around sexism in Philosophy, it also determines the criterion by which we judge what kinds of narratives, strategies, and understandings are legitimate. We then discuss the strategies that have been successful in combating the “woman problem” in Philosophy, and the fact that they are widely criticized by mainstream philosophers. Various kinds of public campaigns that embrace and indulge the role of the feminist killjoy; what has been decried as “finger-pointing”, “gossip”, “social justice bullying”, “partiality”, and “coddling” — these strategies have worked. We argue that these campaigns of feminist joy killing are key to solving Philosophy’s white male problem. We must reject the typical narratives and embrace the thorny, antagonistic relationship between feminist critique and Philosophy. To quote feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger, “We are the winning side now. We will not relent; so it is only a matter of time.”
Our analysis is inspired by the fracas that arose around the second episode of the fourth Season ... more Our analysis is inspired by the fracas that arose around the second episode of the fourth Season of Netflix’s series Queer Eye, titled "Disabled But Not Really." This case will help us to articulate two important elements of microaggressions and to map the epistemic territory that polices the identity of disabled folks. Using this example, we will argue three things: First, central to conceptualizing microaggressions is understanding their mixed legibility. By this, we mean to suggest that crucial to the way that microaggressions function is that they are poised to deliver different messages to different audiences or multi-tiered messages to general audiences. Second, this mixed legibility is what allows microaggressions to be leveraged as part of a complex epistemology of domination that takes advantage of various mechanisms/element of epistemic oppression that are articulated in a growing literature (see literature review in the introduction to this volume). Finally, exploring the terrain of ableist microaggressions most clearly reveals how they can serve as a tool for maintaining the oppressive epistemologies that police the identities of disabled folk, but this role is not unique to them. In the first section, our argument will articulate how we understand “microaggression” and offer a clarifying augmentation of that account. In section two, we briefly locate ourselves within the literature attempting to define disability, then talk through how our analysis connects with the very few discussions of microaggressions within the context of disability. In section three, we introduce the case of “Disabled But Not Really.” In the fourth section, we leverage our previous analysis to show how microaggressions’ mixed legibility is crucial to their role in maintaining an epistemology that polices disability in general and disabled people in particular. We will close by discussing the ramifications this has for future analysis of both microaggressions and disability.
Our analysis is inspired by the fracas that arose around the second episode of the fourth Season ... more Our analysis is inspired by the fracas that arose around the second episode of the fourth Season of Netflix’s series Queer Eye, titled "Disabled But Not Really." This case will help us to articulate two important elements of microaggressions and to map the epistemic territory that polices the identity of disabled folks. Using this example, we will argue three things: First, central to conceptualizing microaggressions is understanding their mixed legibility. By this, we mean to suggest that crucial to the way that microaggressions function is that they are poised to deliver different messages to different audiences or multi-tiered messages to general audiences. Second, this mixed legibility is what allows microaggressions to be leveraged as part of a complex epistemology of domination that takes advantage of various mechanisms/element of epistemic oppression that are articulated in a growing literature (see literature review in the introduction to this volume). Finally, exploring the terrain of ableist microaggressions most clearly reveals how they can serve as a tool for maintaining the oppressive epistemologies that police the identities of disabled folk, but this role is not unique to them. In the first section, our argument will articulate how we understand “microaggression” and offer a clarifying augmentation of that account. In section two, we briefly locate ourselves within the literature attempting to define disability, then talk through how our analysis connects with the very few discussions of microaggressions within the context of disability. In section three, we introduce the case of “Disabled But Not Really.” In the fourth section, we leverage our previous analysis to show how microaggressions’ mixed legibility is crucial to their role in maintaining an epistemology that polices disability in general and disabled people in particular. We will close by discussing the ramifications this has for future analysis of both microaggressions and disability.
Within the humanities, no discipline is more white and more male than Philosophy. Data shows that... more Within the humanities, no discipline is more white and more male than Philosophy. Data shows that women philosophers are far less likely to be published, and their publications are far less frequently cited. A growing body of research tracks Philosophy’s indifference to women and people of color at all stages in the discipline, as well as to research investigating the marginalization and oppression of women and people of color. Although the discipline has been aware of these disproportions for more than twenty years, recent data suggests that Philosophy’s “woman problem” is getting worse, not better. When mainstream Philosophy engages with these issues, the results are frequently a symphony of stereotype threats, microaggressions, and just-so stories that favor the status quo. For example, it is argued that women’s disproportionate representation in conferences, journals, citations, tenure track, associate, and full professorships is a not particularly surprising mathematical result of the original disproportion — women’s underrepresentation in the discipline as a whole. This makes it statistically improbable that any woman would be available to be in any of these categories, or that if she did miraculously appear, she would be better than the men she would be competing against. While these observations aren’t inaccurate, reciting them isn’t so much a response to the gender disproportions as it is a tacit resignation to them. Many of Philosophy’s responses to these issues ignore the culture and practice of Philosophy and also tend to “blame the victims” of these practices. When confronted with internally focused criticisms — e.g., Philosophy cultivates and sustains a subtly and overtly sexist culture — or when presented with appropriately aimed solutions — like organizing the professional life so as to protect the marginalized and undermine predation and exclusion — Philosophy doubles down on the sexism by invoking the potential injury to a model philosopher (who is ultimately male) and condemns a feminist killjoy who is destroying the profession. After unpacking Philosophy’s white male problem and the discourse that sustains it, we articulate why the common mainstream solutions tend to fail or falter: a masculinist line of thinking not only controls the narratives around sexism in Philosophy, it also determines the criterion by which we judge what kinds of narratives, strategies, and understandings are legitimate. We then discuss the strategies that have been successful in combating the “woman problem” in Philosophy, and the fact that they are widely criticized by mainstream philosophers. Various kinds of public campaigns that embrace and indulge the role of the feminist killjoy; what has been decried as “finger-pointing”, “gossip”, “social justice bullying”, “partiality”, and “coddling” — these strategies have worked. We argue that these campaigns of feminist joy killing are key to solving Philosophy’s white male problem. We must reject the typical narratives and embrace the thorny, antagonistic relationship between feminist critique and Philosophy. To quote feminist philosopher Sally Haslanger, “We are the winning side now. We will not relent; so it is only a matter of time.”
There is an expansion of empirical research that at its core is an attempt to quantify the “feely... more There is an expansion of empirical research that at its core is an attempt to quantify the “feely” aspects of living in raced (and other stigmatized) bodies. This research is offered as part concession, part insistence on the reality of the “special” circumstances of living in raced bodies. While this move has the potential of making headway in debates about the character of racism and the unique nature of the harms of contemporary racism – through an analysis of stereotype threat research, microaggression research, and the reception of both discourses – I will argue that this scientization of the phenomenology of race and racism also stalls progress on the most significant challenges for the current conversation about race and racism: how to listen and how to be heard
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