Camilla Cannon lives and writes in Charlotte, North Carolina. Their research interests includes critical trans studies, popular culture studies, neoliberal subjectivities, and philosophy of U.S. American slavery and Reconstruction.
In The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. DuBois posits racial reconciliation in the South as a necessar... more In The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. DuBois posits racial reconciliation in the South as a necessary precondition for the integration of black Americans into the civic and cultural life of the country, stating that “only by a union of intelligence and sympathy across the color-line in this critical period of the Republic shall justice and right triumph.”1 DuBois characterizes Reconstruction as a particularly poignant missed opportunity for this reconciliation, personifying the postbellum white race as a “gray-haired gentleman” and the postbellum black race as “a form hovering dark and mother-like,” lamenting the fact that “no man clasped the hands of these two passing figures of the present-past.”2 Postbellum racial reconciliation takes on a special importance in light of DuBois's messianic race ideal, in which the realization of the Negro race ideal of “human brotherhood”3 and subsequent integration of black Americans into civic and cultural life is necessary for America to attain its democratic ideal. My focus in this paper is DuBois's endowment of the figure of the Mammy with unique salvific potential vis-a-vis the project of postbellum racial reconciliation in the South. My argument is two-fold. First, DuBois's depiction of the figure of the Mammy corresponds to prevailing historico-cultural mythologies of domestic slave women as hyper-abundantly maternal, inordinately strong, and bound to the white slave-owning family by blood relations, social familiarity, and affection. Second, DuBois's endowment of the forced maternal, material, and reproductive labor of domestic slave women with salvific potential prevents a nuanced investigation of the lived experience of the female domestic slave, instead reducing her to an instrument for the realization of America’s democratic ideal.
In November 2017, “Girls” writer Murray Miller was accused of rape. The co-creators of “Girls,” L... more In November 2017, “Girls” writer Murray Miller was accused of rape. The co-creators of “Girls,” Lena Dunham and Jenni Konner, quickly issued a statement defending Miller, asserting that, “having worked closely with him for more than half a decade,” they reached the conclusion that the accusations against Mr. Miller were an example of the 3% of rape cases misreported annually.1 Dunham and Konner’s joint statement was met with surprise and condemnation online, as both had frequently and enthusiastically endorsed the idea that women should always be believed in cases of sexual assault accusations in the past. A number of commentators also drew attention to the fact that Miller is a white man while his accuser is a woman of color.
Dunham and Konner’s statement is emblematic of a discursive trend in third-party defenses of men accused of sexual assault in that it ascribes the moral incapacity to rape to the accused individual. As defined by Bernard Williams in Making Sense of Humanity, “moral incapacity” refers to those incapacities to commit a particular act which are “expressive of, or grounded in, the agent’s character and personal dispositions.”2 When an individual learns that a friend, colleague, or celebrity that they admire has been accused of sexual misconduct and responds with phrases such as “he could never do that;” “that’s now what he’s like;” etc, they are operating on the assumption that their personal history with the individual has given them unique insight into the character and personal dispositions--and therefore the capacity or incapacity to rape--of the accused individual.
In this paper, I am interested in what criteria go into the judgement of whether or not another individual is morally capable or incapable of rape, and how those criteria are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. In order to address this question, I will begin with an overview of Williams’ concept of moral incapacity and demonstrate the deployment of this concept in third-party defenses of celebrities accused of sexual misconduct. I will then contrast hegemonic constructions of the sexual characteristics of black and white masculinity. Next, I will use Linda Alcoff’s Visible Identities and Charles Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity to argue that individual “horizons of racial meaning” are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. Finally, I utilize Judith Butler’s discussion of grievable and ungrievable lives from Frames of War to examine the intersection between racialized reactions to allegations of sexual assault and the homogenization and de-individualization of marginalized identities. My ultimate argument is that third-party ascriptions of the moral capacity or incapacity to rape are best understood as deeply situated within both hegemonic understandings of black and white masculinity and how these understandings have come to inform individual “horizons of racial meaning.”
In The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. DuBois posits racial reconciliation in the South as a necessar... more In The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. DuBois posits racial reconciliation in the South as a necessary precondition for the integration of black Americans into the civic and cultural life of the country, stating that “only by a union of intelligence and sympathy across the color-line in this critical period of the Republic shall justice and right triumph.”1 DuBois characterizes Reconstruction as a particularly poignant missed opportunity for this reconciliation, personifying the postbellum white race as a “gray-haired gentleman” and the postbellum black race as “a form hovering dark and mother-like,” lamenting the fact that “no man clasped the hands of these two passing figures of the present-past.”2 Postbellum racial reconciliation takes on a special importance in light of DuBois's messianic race ideal, in which the realization of the Negro race ideal of “human brotherhood”3 and subsequent integration of black Americans into civic and cultural life is necessary for America to attain its democratic ideal. My focus in this paper is DuBois's endowment of the figure of the Mammy with unique salvific potential vis-a-vis the project of postbellum racial reconciliation in the South. My argument is two-fold. First, DuBois's depiction of the figure of the Mammy corresponds to prevailing historico-cultural mythologies of domestic slave women as hyper-abundantly maternal, inordinately strong, and bound to the white slave-owning family by blood relations, social familiarity, and affection. Second, DuBois's endowment of the forced maternal, material, and reproductive labor of domestic slave women with salvific potential prevents a nuanced investigation of the lived experience of the female domestic slave, instead reducing her to an instrument for the realization of America’s democratic ideal.
In November 2017, “Girls” writer Murray Miller was accused of rape. The co-creators of “Girls,” L... more In November 2017, “Girls” writer Murray Miller was accused of rape. The co-creators of “Girls,” Lena Dunham and Jenni Konner, quickly issued a statement defending Miller, asserting that, “having worked closely with him for more than half a decade,” they reached the conclusion that the accusations against Mr. Miller were an example of the 3% of rape cases misreported annually.1 Dunham and Konner’s joint statement was met with surprise and condemnation online, as both had frequently and enthusiastically endorsed the idea that women should always be believed in cases of sexual assault accusations in the past. A number of commentators also drew attention to the fact that Miller is a white man while his accuser is a woman of color.
Dunham and Konner’s statement is emblematic of a discursive trend in third-party defenses of men accused of sexual assault in that it ascribes the moral incapacity to rape to the accused individual. As defined by Bernard Williams in Making Sense of Humanity, “moral incapacity” refers to those incapacities to commit a particular act which are “expressive of, or grounded in, the agent’s character and personal dispositions.”2 When an individual learns that a friend, colleague, or celebrity that they admire has been accused of sexual misconduct and responds with phrases such as “he could never do that;” “that’s now what he’s like;” etc, they are operating on the assumption that their personal history with the individual has given them unique insight into the character and personal dispositions--and therefore the capacity or incapacity to rape--of the accused individual.
In this paper, I am interested in what criteria go into the judgement of whether or not another individual is morally capable or incapable of rape, and how those criteria are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. In order to address this question, I will begin with an overview of Williams’ concept of moral incapacity and demonstrate the deployment of this concept in third-party defenses of celebrities accused of sexual misconduct. I will then contrast hegemonic constructions of the sexual characteristics of black and white masculinity. Next, I will use Linda Alcoff’s Visible Identities and Charles Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity to argue that individual “horizons of racial meaning” are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. Finally, I utilize Judith Butler’s discussion of grievable and ungrievable lives from Frames of War to examine the intersection between racialized reactions to allegations of sexual assault and the homogenization and de-individualization of marginalized identities. My ultimate argument is that third-party ascriptions of the moral capacity or incapacity to rape are best understood as deeply situated within both hegemonic understandings of black and white masculinity and how these understandings have come to inform individual “horizons of racial meaning.”
Uploads
Dunham and Konner’s statement is emblematic of a discursive trend in third-party defenses of men accused of sexual assault in that it ascribes the moral incapacity to rape to the accused individual. As defined by Bernard Williams in Making Sense of Humanity, “moral incapacity” refers to those incapacities to commit a particular act which are “expressive of, or grounded in, the agent’s character and personal dispositions.”2 When an individual learns that a friend, colleague, or celebrity that they admire has been accused of sexual misconduct and responds with phrases such as “he could never do that;” “that’s now what he’s like;” etc, they are operating on the assumption that their personal history with the individual has given them unique insight into the character and personal dispositions--and therefore the capacity or incapacity to rape--of the accused individual.
In this paper, I am interested in what criteria go into the judgement of whether or not another individual is morally capable or incapable of rape, and how those criteria are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. In order to address this question, I will begin with an overview of Williams’ concept of moral incapacity and demonstrate the deployment of this concept in third-party defenses of celebrities accused of sexual misconduct. I will then contrast hegemonic constructions of the sexual characteristics of black and white masculinity. Next, I will use Linda Alcoff’s Visible Identities and Charles Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity to argue that individual “horizons of racial meaning” are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. Finally, I utilize Judith Butler’s discussion of grievable and ungrievable lives from Frames of War to examine the intersection between racialized reactions to allegations of sexual assault and the homogenization and de-individualization of marginalized identities. My ultimate argument is that third-party ascriptions of the moral capacity or incapacity to rape are best understood as deeply situated within both hegemonic understandings of black and white masculinity and how these understandings have come to inform individual “horizons of racial meaning.”
Dunham and Konner’s statement is emblematic of a discursive trend in third-party defenses of men accused of sexual assault in that it ascribes the moral incapacity to rape to the accused individual. As defined by Bernard Williams in Making Sense of Humanity, “moral incapacity” refers to those incapacities to commit a particular act which are “expressive of, or grounded in, the agent’s character and personal dispositions.”2 When an individual learns that a friend, colleague, or celebrity that they admire has been accused of sexual misconduct and responds with phrases such as “he could never do that;” “that’s now what he’s like;” etc, they are operating on the assumption that their personal history with the individual has given them unique insight into the character and personal dispositions--and therefore the capacity or incapacity to rape--of the accused individual.
In this paper, I am interested in what criteria go into the judgement of whether or not another individual is morally capable or incapable of rape, and how those criteria are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. In order to address this question, I will begin with an overview of Williams’ concept of moral incapacity and demonstrate the deployment of this concept in third-party defenses of celebrities accused of sexual misconduct. I will then contrast hegemonic constructions of the sexual characteristics of black and white masculinity. Next, I will use Linda Alcoff’s Visible Identities and Charles Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity to argue that individual “horizons of racial meaning” are informed by hegemonic understandings of race. Finally, I utilize Judith Butler’s discussion of grievable and ungrievable lives from Frames of War to examine the intersection between racialized reactions to allegations of sexual assault and the homogenization and de-individualization of marginalized identities. My ultimate argument is that third-party ascriptions of the moral capacity or incapacity to rape are best understood as deeply situated within both hegemonic understandings of black and white masculinity and how these understandings have come to inform individual “horizons of racial meaning.”