Multinational military operations [MNMO] occur in different emanations: They might involve the co... more Multinational military operations [MNMO] occur in different emanations: They might involve the concerted action of states – (ad hoc) ‘coalitions of the willing’– participating in a joint military operation in which every state retains command over its troops (‘national command model’) or a ‘multinational integrated command’ is established, or – in another variant – national contingents are subjected to the lead or domination of a specific state (‘framework nation’ or ‘lead nation’ model). Furthermore such coalitions may act with the authorization of an international organization [IO] or within its institutional setting under its lead or under the lead of one IO which might be in turn authorized by another IO. The plurality of actors involved and the intricate web of different spheres of authority and control characterizing MNMO pose considerable challenges in terms of ‘accountability’. This contribution is dedicated to illustrating these challenges and critically reflecting on the specific schemes international law offers to address the ‘pluriverse’ of ‘accountability problems’ arising when states and IOs act together militarily. After sketching the conceptual contours of ‘accountability’ [I] as well as the specific features of MNMO that make it difficult to hold relevant actors accountable [II], this contribution will, in its main part III, turn to rules on the ‘international legal responsibility’ of states and IOs – a genuinely legal scheme which realizes – ‘accountability’, before offering some final observations [IV]. It will be shown that the ‘pluriverse’ of MNMO gravitates in terms of ‘legal accountability’ around three basic sub-problems: the ‘attribution of conduct’, the ‘attribution of responsibility’ and the allocation of secondary obligations stemming from responsibility. With respect to these matters, the actors involved and the various overlapping spheres of control they exercise over MNMO pose a major challenge that international legal scholarship has yet to address in a satisfactory manner.
Multinational Military Operations and Questions of Attribution
Multinational military operations ... more Multinational Military Operations and Questions of Attribution Multinational military operations are usually embedded into multilevel institutional settings (UN, NATO, EU), hence posing considerable legal problems regarding the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. One of the most controversial aspects concerns the attribution of conduct. This contribution seeks to sketch, firstly, the doctrinal contours of the concept of “attribution” in international law. In a second step, UN peacekeeping missions will be analyzed and contrasted with military operations which are merely authorized by the UN Security Council based on its Chapter VII powers. In this context, the author addresses the question whether acts or omissions of individual soldiers on the ground are to be seen as conduct of the troop-contributing states or rather of the UN. The analysis will also examine the consequences for the normative operation of attribution stemming from a possible involvement of other international organizations such as NATO which might come to the fore as a third actor. As will be shown, international law determines attribution in these constellations based of the criterion of “effective control” over the specific conduct in question. Based on these findings, the author questions – in a third step – the persuasiveness of the widespread understanding of “effective control” as “exclusive control” advocating for the possibility of a “multiple attribution” of conduct and evidencing its legal status. “Multiple” or “dual attribution” could be a potent doctrinal instrument allowing a fair liability regime to be established between all actors involved in multinational military operations while at the same time strengthening the legal position of victims of wrongful acts. The contribution closes with several theses intended to inspire further academic debate. Multinationale militärische Einsätze sind oftmals in ein komplexes institutionelles Geflecht gebettet (UN, NATO, EU), was sich im Hinblick auf Fragen der völkerrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit als besondere Herausforderung darstellt. Eines der umstrittensten Probleme ist die “Zurechung”. Dieser Beitrag beleuchtet zunächst die völkerrechtlichen Determinanten der “Zurechung” als einer genuin normativen Operation. In einem zweiten Schritt werden unter diesem Gesichtspunkt UN Friedensmissionen analysiert und militärischen Einsätzen, die lediglich auf einer Autorisierung des UN Sicherheitsrates nach Kapitel VII der UN-Charta beruhen, gegenüber gestellt. In diesem Zusammenhang soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, ob Handlungen des einzelnen Soldaten im Rahmen derartiger Einsätze völkerrechtlich als solche der UN oder vielmehr der truppenstellenden Staaten zu betrachten sind. Untersucht wird auch, ob die Einbindung weiterer internationaler Organisationen - wie z. B. der NATO - in derartige Operationen an dem gefundenen Ergebnis unter normativen Gesichtspunkten etwas ändert. Wie gezeigt werden wird, ist die “effektive Kontrolle” über das in Frage stehende Handeln der entscheidende völkerrechtliche Maßstab zur Beantwortung der Zurechnungsfrage. Hiervon ausgehend wird der Beitrag in einem dritten Schritt den Rechtsbegriff der “effektiven Kontrolle” dekonstruieren und aufzeigen, dass dieser keineswegs als “exklusive Kontrolle” zu verstehen ist. Vielmehr erkennt das Völkerrecht die Möglichkeit einer “mehrfachen” bzw. “dualen Zurechnung” an. Letztere - so die Kernthese der Analyse - könnte sich potentiell als wirkungsvolles dogmatisches Instrument zur Implementierung eines fairen Haftungsregimes zwischen den beteiligten Akteuren erweisen und zugleich eine Stärkung der Rechtsposition von Opfern völkerrechtswidriger Handlungen im Rahmen multilateraler militärischer Operationen bedingen. Der Beitrag schließt mit Thesen, die eine weitergehende völkerrechtswissenschaftliche Debatte inspirieren sollen.
KEYWORDS: attribution, responsibility of international organizations, effective control, multiple attribution, dual attribution, Art. 7
This contribution analyses the normative implications of the US raid against the headquarters of ... more This contribution analyses the normative implications of the US raid against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in 1993 in reaction to a foiled assassination attempt against former President Bush. Its main focus is on an assessment of the legality of the operation, its precedential value and its evolutive potential with regard to the regime on the ‘ius contra bellum’ and here specifically the right to self-defence as enshrined in Art. 51 of the UN Charter. After analysing the multiple contentious dimensions of the US claim of justification, the article comes to the conclusion that the raid constituted an illegal ‘armed reprisal’. In light of observable state practice its precedent-setting nature should not be overstated. However, albeit qualified as an ‘one-off incident’ the US raid did not leave the prohibition on the use of force and the contemporary discourse surrounding it untouched. Hence, it appears essential to demystify its frequently asserted evolutive potential particularly with regard to the temporal limitations of Art. 51 UN Charter to which this article is dedicated.
On 6 October 2016 the Federal Court of Justice (henceforth " Court ") decided on an appeal agains... more On 6 October 2016 the Federal Court of Justice (henceforth " Court ") decided on an appeal against the Higher Regional Court of Cologne's dismissal of two actions for compensation brought against the Federal Republic of Germany (III ZR 140/15, only available in German): Abdul Hannan sought compensation for the death of two of his sons in the amount of 40.000 Euro, Qureisha Rauf, a mother of seven, sought alimentation for the death of her husband and father of her children in the amount of 50.000 Euro. The death of their relatives was the result of a fatal airstrike ordered by Colonel Klein who was in charge of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz in the northern part of Afghanistan. The PRT was institutionally embedded in the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Whilst Klein was operationally subordinated to the ISAF commander and in the end the NATO Commander-in-Chief he remained within the chain of command of the German Federal Army ultimately being subject to orders of the German Ministry of Defense. The ordered strike was directed against two fuel tanks previously stolen by Taliban from PRT's premises which were stuck in a sandbank close by. Fearing that these tanks would be used for an attack against the PRT camp Klein commanded their destruction after receiving the information of a military informant that no civilians were present at the relevant location which infrared pictures delivered by US-American fighter aircrafts seemed to support. In retrospect these assumption proved wrong: The attack led to the death of 100 to 150 people, mostly civilians who gathered around the fuel tanks out of curiosity, others were apparently forced by the Taliban to assist with the recovery of the tanks (with regard to the criminal investigation against Klein see here).
Das Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs zu der Frage, ob zivile Opfer von militärischen Einsätzen der B... more Das Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs zu der Frage, ob zivile Opfer von militärischen Einsätzen der Bundeswehr im Ausland Deutschland auf Schadensersatz verklagen können (III ZR 140/50), hat viel Aufsehen erregt (eine erste Kritik hierzu ist zu finden). Jetzt sind die einsehbar und erlauben eine detailliertere Auseinandersetzung, die vor dem Hintergrund der erheblichen Implikationen der betreffenden Entscheidung mehr denn geboten erscheint. Kritik an dem Urteil des BGH ist nicht nur aus völkerrechtlicher, sondern vor allem aus verfassungsrechtlicher Perspektive angebracht, und zwar viel mehr als bisweilen in der Auseinandersetzung zu Tage tritt: Weder trägt der BGH der Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit des Grundgesetzes hinreichend Rechnung, noch erkennt er, wie sehr militärische Handlungen deutscher Soldaten im Rahmen bewaffneter Konflikte mit Fragen des Grundrechtschutzes zusammenhängen ‒ beides Momente, die für die grundsätzliche Einschlägigkeit des Amtshaftungsregimes streiten, die der III. Senat in Abrede stellt. Sachverhalt Zu befinden hatte der BGH über einen Sachverhalt, der sich im nordafghanischen Kunduz in der Nacht vom 03. auf den 04.09.2009 ereignete. Im Kern des Geschehens stand ein folgenschwerer Befehl von Oberst Klein, der das Kommando über das Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) innehatte. Operativ unterstand Oberst Klein dem ISAF-Kommandeur und letztendlich dem NATO-Oberbefehlshaber, verblieb aber – wie dies im Rahmen von multinationalen, institutionell eingebetteten Einsätzen nicht zuletzt aufgrund verfassungsrechtlicher Vorgaben üblich ist – in die Befehlsstrukturen der Bundeswehr ein-und somit letztendlich der Befehlsgewalt des Bundesverteidigungsministers untergeordnet. Klein hatte erfahren, dass Taliban zwei Tanklaster entwendet hatten, die jedoch nunmehr im Flussbett in der Nähe des Feldlagers des PRT Kunduz feststeckten. Er befürchtete, die Taliban planten, die Laster für einen Angriff gegen das PRT-Lager zu verwenden. Zwei amerikanische Kampffluge, die Klein im ISAF-Hauptquartier angefordert hatte, übermittelten ihm Infrarot-Luftaufnahmen von dem Geschehen vor Ort. Zudem gab ein Informant des Militärs an, dass an dem Aufenthaltsort der Laster nur Aufständische und keine Zivilisten zugegen waren. Klein befahl daraufhin den Abwurf zweier Bomben durch zwei US-amerikanische Kampfflugzeuge auf die Tanklaster, die hierdurch zerstört wurden. Diese Maßnahme kostete etwa 100 Menschen ‒ entgegen den Angaben des Informanten überwiegend Zivilisten ‒ das Leben. Anders als sich das Geschehen für Oberst Klein darstellte, hatten sich um die betreffenden Tanklastwagen einige Unbeteiligte aus Neugierde versammelt, andere Zivilisten waren offenbar von den Taliban-Kämpfern dazu gezwungen worden, bei der Bergung der Tanklaster Hilfe zu leisten.
Focusing on the operations of the ‘Global Coalition against ISIL’ in Syria, this article examines... more Focusing on the operations of the ‘Global Coalition against ISIL’ in Syria, this article examines whether the mere silence of states in view of state actions that challenge the established reading of Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter might induce and consolidate a process of normative change, and if so, under what conditions. While a ‘legislative responsibility’ is incumbent on states in situations of ‘normative volatility’, which requires them to ‘speak up’, I submit that silent behaviour generates norm-evolutionary effects only under strict conditions. Such effects occur if other states and the international community can legitimately expect that a state makes its dissenting position known. The determination of such an expectation requires an overall assessment of numerous factors including: the determinacy of the legality claims made by the acting states, the capacity of silent states to act, the specific circumstances in which a claim was made, the determinacy of reactive claims of other actors, and questions of time, as well as the nature of the affected rules. I conclude by finding that mere passivity in light of the legality-claims currently made with regard to Coalition airstrikes against ISIL positions in Syria does not amount to ‘acquiescence’.
People take part in protests against the PiS government (Photo credit: Czarek Sokolowski / AP/Pre... more People take part in protests against the PiS government (Photo credit: Czarek Sokolowski / AP/Press Association Images) Poland is reeling under a serious constitutional crisis threatening its democracy. Beyond the short-term political posturing, the preclusion of similar sagas requires the adoption of broad-based constitutional reforms to depoliticize the judicial appointment process and to constrain the influence of any transient majorities – writes Dr Starski. The coming into power of the conservative PiS (Law and Justice Party), following its electoral victory (http://rgnn.org/2015/10/29/polish-elections-law-and-justice-pis-wins-overall-majority/) in October 2015, has precipitated a constitutional crisis involving the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. Beyond criticisms of PiS's move against the Tribunal, it is essential to focus prospectively on ways to resolve the ongoing crisis. Various proposals have been made to bring the constitutional drama to an end ‒ not in all cases necessarily to a happy one. The challenge is to find a way through the storm that is pragmatic but leaves core constitutional values intact. A resolution of the crisis within the limits of the law seems highly unlikely. The persisting " constitutional emergency " may call for steps entailing ‒ to the least ‒ unorthodox readings of constitutional principles. The crucial question seems to be how much " transitional unconstitutionality " is tolerable to ultimately restore the rule of law. In this context, it is important to distinguish between short-term schemes to the stalemate between the Tribunal and the PiS government, and long-term solutions to deal with fundamental questions concerning the composition and mandate of the Tribunal.
I submit that United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2249 (2015) is – at least de fact... more I submit that United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2249 (2015) is – at least de facto – another step towards a reconfiguration of the UN collective security system. The call upon UN members to take " all necessary measures " has to be seen in the context of the self-defense narrative employed by most states forming the " Global Coalition to Counter ISIL " to justify their operations. Irrespective of the resolution's ambiguity, it is hardly doubtful that it de facto yields a legitimizing effect for this narrative, inevitably endorsing it – even if the term " self-defense " is not mentioned once. Against this background, it seems that the UNSC actually assists in installing self-defense measures as a substitute for collective action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNC). This recalibration of the UNSC's role in the context of the use of force deserves a second thought. Self-defense is – irrespective of the legality of its invocation in specific cases de lege lata – hardly the right tool to deal with the global and permanent threat of terrorism. As has already been excellently illustrated by Dapo Akande and Marko Milanovic, the resolution's main characteristic is its ambiguity (see EJIL talk! Blog). Its vagueness is obviously the result of political necessities and compromise. In my view, however, interpreting the resolution from the perspective of an objective observer, it is clear that the UNSC did not authorize measures based on Art. 39 et seq. of the UNC. It is true that the term " necessary measures " is generally connoted with the authorization of force. It is likewise true that the preamble of the resolution which classifies " terrorism in all forms and manifestations " as " threats to international peace and security " alludes to the wording of Art. 39 UNC. But any " authorizing " tenor is neutralized by the clauses " calls upon " and " in compliance with international law, in particular with the United Nations Charter […]. " The UNSC neither authorizes nor decides. It is generally acknowledged that an authorization within Chapter VII of the UNC requires explicit wording – a requirement the resolution (deliberately) does not meet. The call upon the members to " eradicate " ISIL safe havens, however, implies the use of force. Since the UNC establishes a comprehensive ban on the use of force, only self-defense or consent remain as justifications for military operations against ISIL within Iraq and Syria outside of a UNSC authorization. So to put the resolution's message in a nutshell: States are called upon to use force against ISIL by exercising their right to self-defense if its prerequisites are given or to urge states hosting ISIL to give their consent to armed operations on their territory if self-defense cannot be invoked. To this extent it could be argued that the resolution says nothing, but merely refers to the law as it stands. Neither does it authorize the use of force nor does it give the self-defense narrative of the " Global Coalition " unequivocal blessing. But this is only true if the context of the resolution is not also taken into account. Although silent on self-defense, UNSC resolution 2249 still serves as a reinforcement of the main narrative of the " Global Coalition " : The UNSC has chosen wording that allows its resolution to be interpreted as an affirmation of ongoing self-defense operations. And states understand it that way: France stated after its adoption that the UN represented: " the primacy of law and collective security. It is therefore to the Security Council that the President of the Republic has naturally turned to organize and mobilize our international action. […] The resolution frames our action within the framework of international law and in respect for the Charter of the United Nations, which is our common good […]. In the view of France the resolution creates " conditions for international mobilisation " .
Inspite of all the EU-criticism to be heard – a sad highlight was Krystyna Pawłowicz, a Sejm repr... more Inspite of all the EU-criticism to be heard – a sad highlight was Krystyna Pawłowicz, a Sejm representative of PiS, who declared the flag of the European Union a " dirty rag " – the Polish people are sensitive to all signals coming from official and inoffical EU channels. It is clear even to PiS that Poland depends on the EU – not only in economic but even more in security issues (Russia). Still the Polish government seems to test how far it can go. It is exactly this attitude that makes a strong EU reaction essential. From that perspective a more than legitimate " saber-rattling " with Art. 7 TEU makes also sense in diplomatic terms.
Right before Christmas the governing right-wing party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS – which paradox... more Right before Christmas the governing right-wing party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS – which paradoxically translates " Law and Justice ") wrote another chapter in the tragic Polish saga on the disempowerment of the Constitutional Tribunal and the devaluation of the holy grail of modern democracies – the principle of separation of powers – by adopting another amendment statute to the rules governing the Tribunal (Dz.U. 2015 poz. 2217). The current developments are highly dangerous and alarming from the perspective of constitutional law. The Polish constitution faces an existential challenge. But this phase might also mark the beginning of a process of a true constitutional maturation of the Polish state…
On 9 th March ‒ just two days before the Venice Commission adopted its opinion on the same matter... more On 9 th March ‒ just two days before the Venice Commission adopted its opinion on the same matter ‒ the Polish Constitutional Tribunal announced its judgment on the statute of 22 nd December 2015 amending the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal. This legislative move resembled nothing less than a constitutional coup d'etat against the Polish judiciary and the constitutional state. Fortunately this assault encountered a forceful reaction of its designated target, the Tribunal itself. With the probably most important and in its substance most extraordinary ruling since its establishment thirty years ago the Court asserts itself as the guardian of the Polish constitution. The Court's reasoning – widely applauded by legal scholars and practitioners – evidences one central point: The Tribunal proved to be a strong opponent within the power play of Kaczyński and its arsenal of puppets holding key public offices. The Court has sent a clear message to the government whose agenda lies in transforming the Polish state into a " dictatorial democracy " (demokratura) ruled autocratically by the simple majority of PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość which translates " Law and Justice ") in the Sejm: You will not fool us and we will strike back with a very powerful tool, the rule of law. Now the resolution of the constitutional crisis depends on a rather technical requirement which nevertheless signifies the executive's commitment to the rule of law: the publication of the Tribunal's judgment in the law gazette. Recapitulation: What were the key points of the amendment statute of 22 nd December? The infamous amendment required the Tribunal to adjudicate in full bench as a general rule and introduced a " double 2/3 requirement " : It was only competent to render judgments with a 2/3 majority if 2/3 of its members were present. Dates of court hearings were to be set in the sequence of submitted applications irrespective of their constitutional urgency or significance and the earliest three/six months after the parties have been notified of the applications. The amended procedural rules should also apply to already pending cases (under certain circumstances) and the statute became effective on the day of its publication (no vacatio legis). The President and the Minister of Justice were granted the competence to file applications for disciplinary proceedings against Tribunal judges. Both of them (as well as the Sejm) were given a role in the procedure leading to the expiration of the term of the office of Tribunal judges (summary of the amendments to be found here). In a nutshell: The amendment statute is incompatible with the Polish constitution and a particularly drastic example of a legislative process falling short of democratic standards and good legislative practice. In detail the court addresses three major points being the rules guiding the ongoing judicial proceeding (1.), violations of the constitution by the legislative procedure leading to the amendment (2.) as well as the amendment's incompatibility with the constitution in substance (3.). Its key findings are: 1. The Court is competent to disregard binding law as an emanation of its judicial independence if weighty reasons are given. In the present case this very reason is rather self-evident: The object of review cannot be at the same time its very basis. Hence the Court does not obey the amended procedural rules in rendering its judgment thereby reinstating the supremacy of the constitution over ordinary legislative acts. Taking the factual circumstances into account the twelve judges who have signed the judgment constitute the Tribunal's
Multinational military operations [MNMO] occur in different emanations: They might involve the co... more Multinational military operations [MNMO] occur in different emanations: They might involve the concerted action of states – (ad hoc) ‘coalitions of the willing’– participating in a joint military operation in which every state retains command over its troops (‘national command model’) or a ‘multinational integrated command’ is established, or – in another variant – national contingents are subjected to the lead or domination of a specific state (‘framework nation’ or ‘lead nation’ model). Furthermore such coalitions may act with the authorization of an international organization [IO] or within its institutional setting under its lead or under the lead of one IO which might be in turn authorized by another IO. The plurality of actors involved and the intricate web of different spheres of authority and control characterizing MNMO pose considerable challenges in terms of ‘accountability’. This contribution is dedicated to illustrating these challenges and critically reflecting on the specific schemes international law offers to address the ‘pluriverse’ of ‘accountability problems’ arising when states and IOs act together militarily. After sketching the conceptual contours of ‘accountability’ [I] as well as the specific features of MNMO that make it difficult to hold relevant actors accountable [II], this contribution will, in its main part III, turn to rules on the ‘international legal responsibility’ of states and IOs – a genuinely legal scheme which realizes – ‘accountability’, before offering some final observations [IV]. It will be shown that the ‘pluriverse’ of MNMO gravitates in terms of ‘legal accountability’ around three basic sub-problems: the ‘attribution of conduct’, the ‘attribution of responsibility’ and the allocation of secondary obligations stemming from responsibility. With respect to these matters, the actors involved and the various overlapping spheres of control they exercise over MNMO pose a major challenge that international legal scholarship has yet to address in a satisfactory manner.
Multinational Military Operations and Questions of Attribution
Multinational military operations ... more Multinational Military Operations and Questions of Attribution Multinational military operations are usually embedded into multilevel institutional settings (UN, NATO, EU), hence posing considerable legal problems regarding the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. One of the most controversial aspects concerns the attribution of conduct. This contribution seeks to sketch, firstly, the doctrinal contours of the concept of “attribution” in international law. In a second step, UN peacekeeping missions will be analyzed and contrasted with military operations which are merely authorized by the UN Security Council based on its Chapter VII powers. In this context, the author addresses the question whether acts or omissions of individual soldiers on the ground are to be seen as conduct of the troop-contributing states or rather of the UN. The analysis will also examine the consequences for the normative operation of attribution stemming from a possible involvement of other international organizations such as NATO which might come to the fore as a third actor. As will be shown, international law determines attribution in these constellations based of the criterion of “effective control” over the specific conduct in question. Based on these findings, the author questions – in a third step – the persuasiveness of the widespread understanding of “effective control” as “exclusive control” advocating for the possibility of a “multiple attribution” of conduct and evidencing its legal status. “Multiple” or “dual attribution” could be a potent doctrinal instrument allowing a fair liability regime to be established between all actors involved in multinational military operations while at the same time strengthening the legal position of victims of wrongful acts. The contribution closes with several theses intended to inspire further academic debate. Multinationale militärische Einsätze sind oftmals in ein komplexes institutionelles Geflecht gebettet (UN, NATO, EU), was sich im Hinblick auf Fragen der völkerrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit als besondere Herausforderung darstellt. Eines der umstrittensten Probleme ist die “Zurechung”. Dieser Beitrag beleuchtet zunächst die völkerrechtlichen Determinanten der “Zurechung” als einer genuin normativen Operation. In einem zweiten Schritt werden unter diesem Gesichtspunkt UN Friedensmissionen analysiert und militärischen Einsätzen, die lediglich auf einer Autorisierung des UN Sicherheitsrates nach Kapitel VII der UN-Charta beruhen, gegenüber gestellt. In diesem Zusammenhang soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, ob Handlungen des einzelnen Soldaten im Rahmen derartiger Einsätze völkerrechtlich als solche der UN oder vielmehr der truppenstellenden Staaten zu betrachten sind. Untersucht wird auch, ob die Einbindung weiterer internationaler Organisationen - wie z. B. der NATO - in derartige Operationen an dem gefundenen Ergebnis unter normativen Gesichtspunkten etwas ändert. Wie gezeigt werden wird, ist die “effektive Kontrolle” über das in Frage stehende Handeln der entscheidende völkerrechtliche Maßstab zur Beantwortung der Zurechnungsfrage. Hiervon ausgehend wird der Beitrag in einem dritten Schritt den Rechtsbegriff der “effektiven Kontrolle” dekonstruieren und aufzeigen, dass dieser keineswegs als “exklusive Kontrolle” zu verstehen ist. Vielmehr erkennt das Völkerrecht die Möglichkeit einer “mehrfachen” bzw. “dualen Zurechnung” an. Letztere - so die Kernthese der Analyse - könnte sich potentiell als wirkungsvolles dogmatisches Instrument zur Implementierung eines fairen Haftungsregimes zwischen den beteiligten Akteuren erweisen und zugleich eine Stärkung der Rechtsposition von Opfern völkerrechtswidriger Handlungen im Rahmen multilateraler militärischer Operationen bedingen. Der Beitrag schließt mit Thesen, die eine weitergehende völkerrechtswissenschaftliche Debatte inspirieren sollen.
KEYWORDS: attribution, responsibility of international organizations, effective control, multiple attribution, dual attribution, Art. 7
This contribution analyses the normative implications of the US raid against the headquarters of ... more This contribution analyses the normative implications of the US raid against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in 1993 in reaction to a foiled assassination attempt against former President Bush. Its main focus is on an assessment of the legality of the operation, its precedential value and its evolutive potential with regard to the regime on the ‘ius contra bellum’ and here specifically the right to self-defence as enshrined in Art. 51 of the UN Charter. After analysing the multiple contentious dimensions of the US claim of justification, the article comes to the conclusion that the raid constituted an illegal ‘armed reprisal’. In light of observable state practice its precedent-setting nature should not be overstated. However, albeit qualified as an ‘one-off incident’ the US raid did not leave the prohibition on the use of force and the contemporary discourse surrounding it untouched. Hence, it appears essential to demystify its frequently asserted evolutive potential particularly with regard to the temporal limitations of Art. 51 UN Charter to which this article is dedicated.
On 6 October 2016 the Federal Court of Justice (henceforth " Court ") decided on an appeal agains... more On 6 October 2016 the Federal Court of Justice (henceforth " Court ") decided on an appeal against the Higher Regional Court of Cologne's dismissal of two actions for compensation brought against the Federal Republic of Germany (III ZR 140/15, only available in German): Abdul Hannan sought compensation for the death of two of his sons in the amount of 40.000 Euro, Qureisha Rauf, a mother of seven, sought alimentation for the death of her husband and father of her children in the amount of 50.000 Euro. The death of their relatives was the result of a fatal airstrike ordered by Colonel Klein who was in charge of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz in the northern part of Afghanistan. The PRT was institutionally embedded in the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Whilst Klein was operationally subordinated to the ISAF commander and in the end the NATO Commander-in-Chief he remained within the chain of command of the German Federal Army ultimately being subject to orders of the German Ministry of Defense. The ordered strike was directed against two fuel tanks previously stolen by Taliban from PRT's premises which were stuck in a sandbank close by. Fearing that these tanks would be used for an attack against the PRT camp Klein commanded their destruction after receiving the information of a military informant that no civilians were present at the relevant location which infrared pictures delivered by US-American fighter aircrafts seemed to support. In retrospect these assumption proved wrong: The attack led to the death of 100 to 150 people, mostly civilians who gathered around the fuel tanks out of curiosity, others were apparently forced by the Taliban to assist with the recovery of the tanks (with regard to the criminal investigation against Klein see here).
Das Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs zu der Frage, ob zivile Opfer von militärischen Einsätzen der B... more Das Urteil des Bundesgerichtshofs zu der Frage, ob zivile Opfer von militärischen Einsätzen der Bundeswehr im Ausland Deutschland auf Schadensersatz verklagen können (III ZR 140/50), hat viel Aufsehen erregt (eine erste Kritik hierzu ist zu finden). Jetzt sind die einsehbar und erlauben eine detailliertere Auseinandersetzung, die vor dem Hintergrund der erheblichen Implikationen der betreffenden Entscheidung mehr denn geboten erscheint. Kritik an dem Urteil des BGH ist nicht nur aus völkerrechtlicher, sondern vor allem aus verfassungsrechtlicher Perspektive angebracht, und zwar viel mehr als bisweilen in der Auseinandersetzung zu Tage tritt: Weder trägt der BGH der Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit des Grundgesetzes hinreichend Rechnung, noch erkennt er, wie sehr militärische Handlungen deutscher Soldaten im Rahmen bewaffneter Konflikte mit Fragen des Grundrechtschutzes zusammenhängen ‒ beides Momente, die für die grundsätzliche Einschlägigkeit des Amtshaftungsregimes streiten, die der III. Senat in Abrede stellt. Sachverhalt Zu befinden hatte der BGH über einen Sachverhalt, der sich im nordafghanischen Kunduz in der Nacht vom 03. auf den 04.09.2009 ereignete. Im Kern des Geschehens stand ein folgenschwerer Befehl von Oberst Klein, der das Kommando über das Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) innehatte. Operativ unterstand Oberst Klein dem ISAF-Kommandeur und letztendlich dem NATO-Oberbefehlshaber, verblieb aber – wie dies im Rahmen von multinationalen, institutionell eingebetteten Einsätzen nicht zuletzt aufgrund verfassungsrechtlicher Vorgaben üblich ist – in die Befehlsstrukturen der Bundeswehr ein-und somit letztendlich der Befehlsgewalt des Bundesverteidigungsministers untergeordnet. Klein hatte erfahren, dass Taliban zwei Tanklaster entwendet hatten, die jedoch nunmehr im Flussbett in der Nähe des Feldlagers des PRT Kunduz feststeckten. Er befürchtete, die Taliban planten, die Laster für einen Angriff gegen das PRT-Lager zu verwenden. Zwei amerikanische Kampffluge, die Klein im ISAF-Hauptquartier angefordert hatte, übermittelten ihm Infrarot-Luftaufnahmen von dem Geschehen vor Ort. Zudem gab ein Informant des Militärs an, dass an dem Aufenthaltsort der Laster nur Aufständische und keine Zivilisten zugegen waren. Klein befahl daraufhin den Abwurf zweier Bomben durch zwei US-amerikanische Kampfflugzeuge auf die Tanklaster, die hierdurch zerstört wurden. Diese Maßnahme kostete etwa 100 Menschen ‒ entgegen den Angaben des Informanten überwiegend Zivilisten ‒ das Leben. Anders als sich das Geschehen für Oberst Klein darstellte, hatten sich um die betreffenden Tanklastwagen einige Unbeteiligte aus Neugierde versammelt, andere Zivilisten waren offenbar von den Taliban-Kämpfern dazu gezwungen worden, bei der Bergung der Tanklaster Hilfe zu leisten.
Focusing on the operations of the ‘Global Coalition against ISIL’ in Syria, this article examines... more Focusing on the operations of the ‘Global Coalition against ISIL’ in Syria, this article examines whether the mere silence of states in view of state actions that challenge the established reading of Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter might induce and consolidate a process of normative change, and if so, under what conditions. While a ‘legislative responsibility’ is incumbent on states in situations of ‘normative volatility’, which requires them to ‘speak up’, I submit that silent behaviour generates norm-evolutionary effects only under strict conditions. Such effects occur if other states and the international community can legitimately expect that a state makes its dissenting position known. The determination of such an expectation requires an overall assessment of numerous factors including: the determinacy of the legality claims made by the acting states, the capacity of silent states to act, the specific circumstances in which a claim was made, the determinacy of reactive claims of other actors, and questions of time, as well as the nature of the affected rules. I conclude by finding that mere passivity in light of the legality-claims currently made with regard to Coalition airstrikes against ISIL positions in Syria does not amount to ‘acquiescence’.
People take part in protests against the PiS government (Photo credit: Czarek Sokolowski / AP/Pre... more People take part in protests against the PiS government (Photo credit: Czarek Sokolowski / AP/Press Association Images) Poland is reeling under a serious constitutional crisis threatening its democracy. Beyond the short-term political posturing, the preclusion of similar sagas requires the adoption of broad-based constitutional reforms to depoliticize the judicial appointment process and to constrain the influence of any transient majorities – writes Dr Starski. The coming into power of the conservative PiS (Law and Justice Party), following its electoral victory (http://rgnn.org/2015/10/29/polish-elections-law-and-justice-pis-wins-overall-majority/) in October 2015, has precipitated a constitutional crisis involving the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. Beyond criticisms of PiS's move against the Tribunal, it is essential to focus prospectively on ways to resolve the ongoing crisis. Various proposals have been made to bring the constitutional drama to an end ‒ not in all cases necessarily to a happy one. The challenge is to find a way through the storm that is pragmatic but leaves core constitutional values intact. A resolution of the crisis within the limits of the law seems highly unlikely. The persisting " constitutional emergency " may call for steps entailing ‒ to the least ‒ unorthodox readings of constitutional principles. The crucial question seems to be how much " transitional unconstitutionality " is tolerable to ultimately restore the rule of law. In this context, it is important to distinguish between short-term schemes to the stalemate between the Tribunal and the PiS government, and long-term solutions to deal with fundamental questions concerning the composition and mandate of the Tribunal.
I submit that United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2249 (2015) is – at least de fact... more I submit that United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 2249 (2015) is – at least de facto – another step towards a reconfiguration of the UN collective security system. The call upon UN members to take " all necessary measures " has to be seen in the context of the self-defense narrative employed by most states forming the " Global Coalition to Counter ISIL " to justify their operations. Irrespective of the resolution's ambiguity, it is hardly doubtful that it de facto yields a legitimizing effect for this narrative, inevitably endorsing it – even if the term " self-defense " is not mentioned once. Against this background, it seems that the UNSC actually assists in installing self-defense measures as a substitute for collective action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNC). This recalibration of the UNSC's role in the context of the use of force deserves a second thought. Self-defense is – irrespective of the legality of its invocation in specific cases de lege lata – hardly the right tool to deal with the global and permanent threat of terrorism. As has already been excellently illustrated by Dapo Akande and Marko Milanovic, the resolution's main characteristic is its ambiguity (see EJIL talk! Blog). Its vagueness is obviously the result of political necessities and compromise. In my view, however, interpreting the resolution from the perspective of an objective observer, it is clear that the UNSC did not authorize measures based on Art. 39 et seq. of the UNC. It is true that the term " necessary measures " is generally connoted with the authorization of force. It is likewise true that the preamble of the resolution which classifies " terrorism in all forms and manifestations " as " threats to international peace and security " alludes to the wording of Art. 39 UNC. But any " authorizing " tenor is neutralized by the clauses " calls upon " and " in compliance with international law, in particular with the United Nations Charter […]. " The UNSC neither authorizes nor decides. It is generally acknowledged that an authorization within Chapter VII of the UNC requires explicit wording – a requirement the resolution (deliberately) does not meet. The call upon the members to " eradicate " ISIL safe havens, however, implies the use of force. Since the UNC establishes a comprehensive ban on the use of force, only self-defense or consent remain as justifications for military operations against ISIL within Iraq and Syria outside of a UNSC authorization. So to put the resolution's message in a nutshell: States are called upon to use force against ISIL by exercising their right to self-defense if its prerequisites are given or to urge states hosting ISIL to give their consent to armed operations on their territory if self-defense cannot be invoked. To this extent it could be argued that the resolution says nothing, but merely refers to the law as it stands. Neither does it authorize the use of force nor does it give the self-defense narrative of the " Global Coalition " unequivocal blessing. But this is only true if the context of the resolution is not also taken into account. Although silent on self-defense, UNSC resolution 2249 still serves as a reinforcement of the main narrative of the " Global Coalition " : The UNSC has chosen wording that allows its resolution to be interpreted as an affirmation of ongoing self-defense operations. And states understand it that way: France stated after its adoption that the UN represented: " the primacy of law and collective security. It is therefore to the Security Council that the President of the Republic has naturally turned to organize and mobilize our international action. […] The resolution frames our action within the framework of international law and in respect for the Charter of the United Nations, which is our common good […]. In the view of France the resolution creates " conditions for international mobilisation " .
Inspite of all the EU-criticism to be heard – a sad highlight was Krystyna Pawłowicz, a Sejm repr... more Inspite of all the EU-criticism to be heard – a sad highlight was Krystyna Pawłowicz, a Sejm representative of PiS, who declared the flag of the European Union a " dirty rag " – the Polish people are sensitive to all signals coming from official and inoffical EU channels. It is clear even to PiS that Poland depends on the EU – not only in economic but even more in security issues (Russia). Still the Polish government seems to test how far it can go. It is exactly this attitude that makes a strong EU reaction essential. From that perspective a more than legitimate " saber-rattling " with Art. 7 TEU makes also sense in diplomatic terms.
Right before Christmas the governing right-wing party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS – which paradox... more Right before Christmas the governing right-wing party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS – which paradoxically translates " Law and Justice ") wrote another chapter in the tragic Polish saga on the disempowerment of the Constitutional Tribunal and the devaluation of the holy grail of modern democracies – the principle of separation of powers – by adopting another amendment statute to the rules governing the Tribunal (Dz.U. 2015 poz. 2217). The current developments are highly dangerous and alarming from the perspective of constitutional law. The Polish constitution faces an existential challenge. But this phase might also mark the beginning of a process of a true constitutional maturation of the Polish state…
On 9 th March ‒ just two days before the Venice Commission adopted its opinion on the same matter... more On 9 th March ‒ just two days before the Venice Commission adopted its opinion on the same matter ‒ the Polish Constitutional Tribunal announced its judgment on the statute of 22 nd December 2015 amending the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal. This legislative move resembled nothing less than a constitutional coup d'etat against the Polish judiciary and the constitutional state. Fortunately this assault encountered a forceful reaction of its designated target, the Tribunal itself. With the probably most important and in its substance most extraordinary ruling since its establishment thirty years ago the Court asserts itself as the guardian of the Polish constitution. The Court's reasoning – widely applauded by legal scholars and practitioners – evidences one central point: The Tribunal proved to be a strong opponent within the power play of Kaczyński and its arsenal of puppets holding key public offices. The Court has sent a clear message to the government whose agenda lies in transforming the Polish state into a " dictatorial democracy " (demokratura) ruled autocratically by the simple majority of PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość which translates " Law and Justice ") in the Sejm: You will not fool us and we will strike back with a very powerful tool, the rule of law. Now the resolution of the constitutional crisis depends on a rather technical requirement which nevertheless signifies the executive's commitment to the rule of law: the publication of the Tribunal's judgment in the law gazette. Recapitulation: What were the key points of the amendment statute of 22 nd December? The infamous amendment required the Tribunal to adjudicate in full bench as a general rule and introduced a " double 2/3 requirement " : It was only competent to render judgments with a 2/3 majority if 2/3 of its members were present. Dates of court hearings were to be set in the sequence of submitted applications irrespective of their constitutional urgency or significance and the earliest three/six months after the parties have been notified of the applications. The amended procedural rules should also apply to already pending cases (under certain circumstances) and the statute became effective on the day of its publication (no vacatio legis). The President and the Minister of Justice were granted the competence to file applications for disciplinary proceedings against Tribunal judges. Both of them (as well as the Sejm) were given a role in the procedure leading to the expiration of the term of the office of Tribunal judges (summary of the amendments to be found here). In a nutshell: The amendment statute is incompatible with the Polish constitution and a particularly drastic example of a legislative process falling short of democratic standards and good legislative practice. In detail the court addresses three major points being the rules guiding the ongoing judicial proceeding (1.), violations of the constitution by the legislative procedure leading to the amendment (2.) as well as the amendment's incompatibility with the constitution in substance (3.). Its key findings are: 1. The Court is competent to disregard binding law as an emanation of its judicial independence if weighty reasons are given. In the present case this very reason is rather self-evident: The object of review cannot be at the same time its very basis. Hence the Court does not obey the amended procedural rules in rendering its judgment thereby reinstating the supremacy of the constitution over ordinary legislative acts. Taking the factual circumstances into account the twelve judges who have signed the judgment constitute the Tribunal's
This contribution analyses the normative implications of the US raid against the headquarters of ... more This contribution analyses the normative implications of the US raid against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in 1993 in reaction to a foiled assassination attempt against former President Bush. Its main focus is on an assessment of the legality of the operation, its precedential value and its evolutive potential with regard to the regime on the ‘ius contra bellum’ and here specifically the right to self-defence as enshrined in Art. 51 of the UN Charter. After analysing the multiple contentious dimensions of the US claim of justification, the article comes to the conclusion that the raid constituted an illegal ‘armed reprisal’. In light of observable state practice its precedent-setting nature should not be overstated. However, albeit qualified as an ‘one-off incident’ the US raid did not leave the prohibition on the use of force and the contemporary discourse surrounding it untouched. Hence, it appears essential to demystify its frequently asserted evolutive potential particularly with regard to the temporal limitations of Art. 51 UN Charter to which this article is dedicated.
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states – (ad hoc) ‘coalitions of the willing’– participating in a joint military operation in which every state retains command
over its troops (‘national command model’) or a ‘multinational integrated command’ is established, or – in another variant
– national contingents are subjected to the lead or domination of a specific state (‘framework nation’ or ‘lead nation’
model). Furthermore such coalitions may act with the authorization of an international organization [IO] or within its institutional
setting under its lead or under the lead of one IO which might be in turn authorized by another IO. The plurality
of actors involved and the intricate web of different spheres of authority and control characterizing MNMO pose considerable
challenges in terms of ‘accountability’. This contribution is dedicated to illustrating these challenges and critically
reflecting on the specific schemes international law offers to address the ‘pluriverse’ of ‘accountability problems’ arising
when states and IOs act together militarily.
After sketching the conceptual contours of ‘accountability’ [I] as well as the specific features of MNMO that make it difficult
to hold relevant actors accountable [II], this contribution will, in its main part III, turn to rules on the ‘international
legal responsibility’ of states and IOs – a genuinely legal scheme which realizes – ‘accountability’, before offering some
final observations [IV].
It will be shown that the ‘pluriverse’ of MNMO gravitates in terms of ‘legal accountability’ around three basic sub-problems:
the ‘attribution of conduct’, the ‘attribution of responsibility’ and the allocation of secondary obligations stemming
from responsibility. With respect to these matters, the actors involved and the various overlapping spheres of control
they exercise over MNMO pose a major challenge that international legal scholarship has yet to address in a satisfactory
manner.
Multinational military operations are usually embedded into multilevel institutional settings (UN, NATO, EU), hence posing
considerable legal problems regarding the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. One of the most controversial
aspects concerns the attribution of conduct. This contribution seeks to sketch, firstly, the doctrinal contours of
the concept of “attribution” in international law. In a second step, UN peacekeeping missions will be analyzed and contrasted
with military operations which are merely authorized by the UN Security Council based on its Chapter VII powers.
In this context, the author addresses the question whether acts or omissions of individual soldiers on the ground are to
be seen as conduct of the troop-contributing states or rather of the UN. The analysis will also examine the consequences
for the normative operation of attribution stemming from a possible involvement of other international organizations such
as NATO which might come to the fore as a third actor. As will be shown, international law determines attribution in these
constellations based of the criterion of “effective control” over the specific conduct in question. Based on these findings,
the author questions – in a third step – the persuasiveness of the widespread understanding of “effective control”
as “exclusive control” advocating for the possibility of a “multiple attribution” of conduct and evidencing its legal status.
“Multiple” or “dual attribution” could be a potent doctrinal instrument allowing a fair liability regime to be established
between all actors involved in multinational military operations while at the same time strengthening the legal position of
victims of wrongful acts. The contribution closes with several theses intended to inspire further academic debate.
Multinationale militärische Einsätze sind oftmals in ein komplexes institutionelles Geflecht gebettet (UN, NATO, EU), was
sich im Hinblick auf Fragen der völkerrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit als besondere Herausforderung darstellt. Eines der
umstrittensten Probleme ist die “Zurechung”. Dieser Beitrag beleuchtet zunächst die völkerrechtlichen Determinanten
der “Zurechung” als einer genuin normativen Operation. In einem zweiten Schritt werden unter diesem Gesichtspunkt
UN Friedensmissionen analysiert und militärischen Einsätzen, die lediglich auf einer Autorisierung des UN Sicherheitsrates
nach Kapitel VII der UN-Charta beruhen, gegenüber gestellt. In diesem Zusammenhang soll der Frage nachgegangen
werden, ob Handlungen des einzelnen Soldaten im Rahmen derartiger Einsätze völkerrechtlich als solche der
UN oder vielmehr der truppenstellenden Staaten zu betrachten sind. Untersucht wird auch, ob die Einbindung weiterer
internationaler Organisationen - wie z. B. der NATO - in derartige Operationen an dem gefundenen Ergebnis unter
normativen Gesichtspunkten etwas ändert. Wie gezeigt werden wird, ist die “effektive Kontrolle” über das in Frage stehende
Handeln der entscheidende völkerrechtliche Maßstab zur Beantwortung der Zurechnungsfrage. Hiervon ausgehend
wird der Beitrag in einem dritten Schritt den Rechtsbegriff der “effektiven Kontrolle” dekonstruieren und aufzeigen,
dass dieser keineswegs als “exklusive Kontrolle” zu verstehen ist. Vielmehr erkennt das Völkerrecht die Möglichkeit
einer “mehrfachen” bzw. “dualen Zurechnung” an. Letztere - so die Kernthese der Analyse - könnte sich potentiell als
wirkungsvolles dogmatisches Instrument zur Implementierung eines fairen Haftungsregimes zwischen den beteiligten
Akteuren erweisen und zugleich eine Stärkung der Rechtsposition von Opfern völkerrechtswidriger Handlungen im Rahmen
multilateraler militärischer Operationen bedingen. Der Beitrag schließt mit Thesen, die eine weitergehende völkerrechtswissenschaftliche
Debatte inspirieren sollen.
KEYWORDS:
attribution, responsibility of international organizations, effective control, multiple attribution, dual attribution, Art. 7
DARIO, state responsibility
Zurechnung, völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit internationaler Organisationen, effektive Kontrolle, mehrfache Zurechnung,
duale Zurechnung, Art. 7 DARIO, Staatenverantwortlichkeit
whether the mere silence of states in view of state actions that challenge the established reading
of Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter might induce and consolidate a process of normative
change, and if so, under what conditions. While a ‘legislative responsibility’ is incumbent on
states in situations of ‘normative volatility’, which requires them to ‘speak up’, I submit that silent
behaviour generates norm-evolutionary effects only under strict conditions. Such effects occur if
other states and the international community can legitimately expect that a state makes its dissenting
position known. The determination of such an expectation requires an overall assessment
of numerous factors including: the determinacy of the legality claims made by the acting
states, the capacity of silent states to act, the specific circumstances in which a claim was made,
the determinacy of reactive claims of other actors, and questions of time, as well as the nature
of the affected rules. I conclude by finding that mere passivity in light of the legality-claims currently
made with regard to Coalition airstrikes against ISIL positions in Syria does not amount to
‘acquiescence’.
states – (ad hoc) ‘coalitions of the willing’– participating in a joint military operation in which every state retains command
over its troops (‘national command model’) or a ‘multinational integrated command’ is established, or – in another variant
– national contingents are subjected to the lead or domination of a specific state (‘framework nation’ or ‘lead nation’
model). Furthermore such coalitions may act with the authorization of an international organization [IO] or within its institutional
setting under its lead or under the lead of one IO which might be in turn authorized by another IO. The plurality
of actors involved and the intricate web of different spheres of authority and control characterizing MNMO pose considerable
challenges in terms of ‘accountability’. This contribution is dedicated to illustrating these challenges and critically
reflecting on the specific schemes international law offers to address the ‘pluriverse’ of ‘accountability problems’ arising
when states and IOs act together militarily.
After sketching the conceptual contours of ‘accountability’ [I] as well as the specific features of MNMO that make it difficult
to hold relevant actors accountable [II], this contribution will, in its main part III, turn to rules on the ‘international
legal responsibility’ of states and IOs – a genuinely legal scheme which realizes – ‘accountability’, before offering some
final observations [IV].
It will be shown that the ‘pluriverse’ of MNMO gravitates in terms of ‘legal accountability’ around three basic sub-problems:
the ‘attribution of conduct’, the ‘attribution of responsibility’ and the allocation of secondary obligations stemming
from responsibility. With respect to these matters, the actors involved and the various overlapping spheres of control
they exercise over MNMO pose a major challenge that international legal scholarship has yet to address in a satisfactory
manner.
Multinational military operations are usually embedded into multilevel institutional settings (UN, NATO, EU), hence posing
considerable legal problems regarding the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. One of the most controversial
aspects concerns the attribution of conduct. This contribution seeks to sketch, firstly, the doctrinal contours of
the concept of “attribution” in international law. In a second step, UN peacekeeping missions will be analyzed and contrasted
with military operations which are merely authorized by the UN Security Council based on its Chapter VII powers.
In this context, the author addresses the question whether acts or omissions of individual soldiers on the ground are to
be seen as conduct of the troop-contributing states or rather of the UN. The analysis will also examine the consequences
for the normative operation of attribution stemming from a possible involvement of other international organizations such
as NATO which might come to the fore as a third actor. As will be shown, international law determines attribution in these
constellations based of the criterion of “effective control” over the specific conduct in question. Based on these findings,
the author questions – in a third step – the persuasiveness of the widespread understanding of “effective control”
as “exclusive control” advocating for the possibility of a “multiple attribution” of conduct and evidencing its legal status.
“Multiple” or “dual attribution” could be a potent doctrinal instrument allowing a fair liability regime to be established
between all actors involved in multinational military operations while at the same time strengthening the legal position of
victims of wrongful acts. The contribution closes with several theses intended to inspire further academic debate.
Multinationale militärische Einsätze sind oftmals in ein komplexes institutionelles Geflecht gebettet (UN, NATO, EU), was
sich im Hinblick auf Fragen der völkerrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit als besondere Herausforderung darstellt. Eines der
umstrittensten Probleme ist die “Zurechung”. Dieser Beitrag beleuchtet zunächst die völkerrechtlichen Determinanten
der “Zurechung” als einer genuin normativen Operation. In einem zweiten Schritt werden unter diesem Gesichtspunkt
UN Friedensmissionen analysiert und militärischen Einsätzen, die lediglich auf einer Autorisierung des UN Sicherheitsrates
nach Kapitel VII der UN-Charta beruhen, gegenüber gestellt. In diesem Zusammenhang soll der Frage nachgegangen
werden, ob Handlungen des einzelnen Soldaten im Rahmen derartiger Einsätze völkerrechtlich als solche der
UN oder vielmehr der truppenstellenden Staaten zu betrachten sind. Untersucht wird auch, ob die Einbindung weiterer
internationaler Organisationen - wie z. B. der NATO - in derartige Operationen an dem gefundenen Ergebnis unter
normativen Gesichtspunkten etwas ändert. Wie gezeigt werden wird, ist die “effektive Kontrolle” über das in Frage stehende
Handeln der entscheidende völkerrechtliche Maßstab zur Beantwortung der Zurechnungsfrage. Hiervon ausgehend
wird der Beitrag in einem dritten Schritt den Rechtsbegriff der “effektiven Kontrolle” dekonstruieren und aufzeigen,
dass dieser keineswegs als “exklusive Kontrolle” zu verstehen ist. Vielmehr erkennt das Völkerrecht die Möglichkeit
einer “mehrfachen” bzw. “dualen Zurechnung” an. Letztere - so die Kernthese der Analyse - könnte sich potentiell als
wirkungsvolles dogmatisches Instrument zur Implementierung eines fairen Haftungsregimes zwischen den beteiligten
Akteuren erweisen und zugleich eine Stärkung der Rechtsposition von Opfern völkerrechtswidriger Handlungen im Rahmen
multilateraler militärischer Operationen bedingen. Der Beitrag schließt mit Thesen, die eine weitergehende völkerrechtswissenschaftliche
Debatte inspirieren sollen.
KEYWORDS:
attribution, responsibility of international organizations, effective control, multiple attribution, dual attribution, Art. 7
DARIO, state responsibility
Zurechnung, völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit internationaler Organisationen, effektive Kontrolle, mehrfache Zurechnung,
duale Zurechnung, Art. 7 DARIO, Staatenverantwortlichkeit
whether the mere silence of states in view of state actions that challenge the established reading
of Arts. 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter might induce and consolidate a process of normative
change, and if so, under what conditions. While a ‘legislative responsibility’ is incumbent on
states in situations of ‘normative volatility’, which requires them to ‘speak up’, I submit that silent
behaviour generates norm-evolutionary effects only under strict conditions. Such effects occur if
other states and the international community can legitimately expect that a state makes its dissenting
position known. The determination of such an expectation requires an overall assessment
of numerous factors including: the determinacy of the legality claims made by the acting
states, the capacity of silent states to act, the specific circumstances in which a claim was made,
the determinacy of reactive claims of other actors, and questions of time, as well as the nature
of the affected rules. I conclude by finding that mere passivity in light of the legality-claims currently
made with regard to Coalition airstrikes against ISIL positions in Syria does not amount to
‘acquiescence’.